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ABSTRACT 
After conducting extensive research at the Public Record Office at Kew, London, 
which involved unearthing documents pertaining to Brunei-UK relationships between 
1966 and 1984, I decided to focus my work on Brunei's political development between 
those periods of time. While I focused my work on this field, it became obvious that 
Brunei's security and survival remained the main issues that posed challenges and 
difficulties to the Sultans of Brunei. 
Starting in 1966, it was indeed a crucial year because this was when Britain decided 
to end its protection over Brunei. As a result of this decision, Britain put more pressure 
on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in the Sultanate. 
Britain's insistence that the Sultan should implement the system was supported by 
Malaysia and Brunei's local party. This demand for democracy posed challenges and 
difficulties concerning Brunei's security and survival, as it could reduce the power of 
the Sultan and would bring Brunei within Malaysia. Britain's decision also troubled the 
Sultan, as it would leave Brunei inadequately protected from any internal and external 
threats or attacks. Consequently the Sultan was apprehensive over Malaysia, which still 
wanted to bring Brunei within the Federation of Malaysia, and Indonesia for its past 
support of the 1962 Bruneian ex-rebels and for harbouring the leader of the rebellion, 
Azahari, after the end of the rebellion. 
In this study I hope to give a clearer understanding of Brunei's history particularly 
between 1966 and 1984, as previous authors of Brunei's history have either not touched 
at all or only touched briefly on Britain's demands on the Sultan to implement a 
democratic system of government and Malaysia's persistent objective to bring Brunei 
within Malaysia. Furthermore, none of the authors of Brunei's history has studied in 
any detail the issues arising from Malaysia's intention to bring Brunei within Malaysia, 
i. e., the escape of Brunei's 1962 ex-rebels to Limbang (which made Brunei's call for 
the return of Limbang an urgent matter) and the- ex-rebels' political activities outside 
Brunei between 1973 and 1975, which had the support of the Malaysian government 
and other foreign countries and international organizations. 
iii 
This study benefits from the use of the documents pertaining to Brunei-UK 
relationships (from 1966 onwards) that are available at the Public Record Office but 
that previous authors of Brunei's history have not used. Although there is a 
shortcoming in this study that is the unavailability of records for the period 1976 until 
1984, I have used local and foreign newspapers and secondary materials which are 
available in various institutions both in Brunei and abroad. In addition, I have carried 
out interviews with key figures pertaining to the issues mentioned above in order to 
pursue the study. The method used in the study is chronological so that the events and 
issues highlighted in this thesis can be adequately discussed and followed. 
Nani Suryani Haji Abu Bakar 
University of Leeds 
United Kingdom 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This thesis aims to delineate Brunei's political development between 1966 and 1984 
by highlighting the problems and challenges faced by the Sultans (Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddien III [r. 1950 - 1967] and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah [r. 1967 - ]) with regard to 
the security and survival of the Sultan and the Sultanate. 
The study begins in the year 1966 when Britain decided to end its 1959 Agreement 
with Brunei and withdraw its Gurkha battalion from the Sultanate. Under the 1959 
Agreement, Britain was responsible for Brunei's external affairs and defence including 
internal security. 
Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei, and to withdraw its battalion 
from the Sultanate, posed a problem for Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III, as the British 
end of military protection and the pulling out of the Gurkha battalion would leave the 
Sultanate militarily weak to defend itself against any internal' and external threats. In 
particular, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien was concerned by Malaysia, which still wanted 
to bring Brunei within the federation despite the Sultan's reiteration that Brunei would 
not join Malaysia. 2 
The Sultan was also apprehensive over Indonesia which had not spelled out its 
policy towards Brunei since the end of the Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation in 1966. 
The Sultan distrusted Indonesia because of its support of the 1962 Rebellion in Brunei 
and for harbouring the leader of the rebellion, A. M. Azahari, (following the end of the 
rebellion in 1963). 3 The Sultan distrusted Azahari for having led the 1962 rebellion as 
well as for his ambitions to achieve early independence for Brunei and to form the 
Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU), which would consist of Brunei and its 
1 F. C. O. 24/205 Brief No. 3, Meeting with Sultan of Brunei on 26th June 1967: The Gurkha 
Police Field and Internal Security. 
2 F. C. O. 24/209 Report by the Secretary of State for Wales, 28 July to 4 August 1968. 
3 Ibid, 28 July to 4 August 1968. 
2 
former territories Sarawak and Sabah. While in Indonesia, Azahari continued to pursue 
his party's desire to form the NKKU with the Indonesian government's espousal. 
The 1962 Rebellion broke out in Brunei because the Parti Rakyat Brunei (PRB), the 
People's Party of Brunei led by Azahari, was against the Malaysian Plan proposed by 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaya, in 1961. The Malaysian Plan, 
backed by the British, proposed the formation of Malaysia which would consist of 
Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. Azahari, alternatively, wanted to form 
the NKKU, of which the Sultan of Brunei - Sultan Omar All Saifuddien III - would 
become the constitutional ruler. The Sultan, however, did not support the party's aim, 
as he did not want his power to be reduced to that of constitutional monarch and the 
Bruneians to be submerged by immigrants from Sarawak and North Borneo. When the 
PRB rebelled in December 1962 Britain, which was responsible for Brunei's defence 
and internal security under the 1959 Agreement, sent its Gurkha battalion to Brunei to 
crush the rebellion and thus saved the Sultan's throne. 
Since the end of the rebellion and the Sultan's rejection of Malaysia in 1963, the 
Sultan had been relying on British military protection to secure his country and his 
throne from any internal and external threats. Britain however, following Brunei's 
rejection of Malaysia, was planning to bring Brunei within the federation at least by 
1965 4 This plan, nevertheless, was unsuccessful as Brunei refused to take up Britain's 
suggestion of employing officers from Malaysia. Britain had hoped that doing so would 
bring Brunei closer to Malaysia and lead to its entering the federation. 5 
In 1966, the British Labour Government decided that its 1959 Agreement with 
Brunei would end in November 1970. As a result of Britain's decision to end its 
agreement with Brunei, the Sultan came under more pressure to implement a 
democratic system of government in Brunei. The Commonwealth Office's insistence 
that the Sultan should implement a democratic system of government was a challenge 
to the security and survival of the monarch because if he implemented the system he 
would lose his power as an absolute monarch. Moreover, he believed that the closer 
Brunei moved towards a democratic system of government, the more likely it would be 
4 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development and the Formation of Malaysia: 
1961 - 1967', Ph. D. thesis, University of Hull, 2002, p. 137. 5 Ibid., p. 137. 
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to enter Malaysia. This was because the Sultan was aware that some Bruneian 
politicians who were urging him to implement a democratic system of government 
were interested in Malaysia's political system. 7 
The Malaysian government also wanted to see the implementation of a democratic 
system of government in Brunei, as it believed that only an elected government would 
be susceptible to the attractions of the federation! Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime 
minister of Malaysia, therefore persuaded the Commonwealth Office to urge the Sultan 
to implement the system, as he believed that the British had the power to do so. 9 The 
Commonwealth Office on the other hand did not object to Malaysia's intention to bring 
Brunei within the federation as such a union would ensure the security of Brunei and 
Malaysia in the longer term. 10 
Since the Sultan did not want to lose his power as an absolute monarch and did not 
want Brunei to join Malaysia, he had consistently refused to implement a democratic 
system of government in Brunei. Nevertheless, the Sultan had been refusing to 
implement the system since the 1950s. During the 1962 Rebellion, the Sultan 
suspended the Executive and Legislative Councils and declared a State of Emergency. 
It was only in July 1963 that the Sultan reinstalled both councils and ended the State of 
Emergency. When the Executive and the Legislative Councils were re-established, 
none of the members of the councils were elected; the Sultan nominated them all. l t 
The Parti Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Brunei (the BAKER party), the People's 
Independent Front of Brunei, called for the implementation of the constitutional 
proposals contained in the White Paper 4/65 following the elections for the Legislative 
6 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development and the Formation of Malaysia: 
1961-1967', Ph. D. thesis, University of Hull, 2002, p. 206. 
'Ibid., p. 206. 
8 D0229/8, Brunei and Malaysia, 8 November 1967. 
9 D0229/8, British High Commissioner to Malaysia to J. O. Moreton, 8 November 1967. 
'°D0229/8, Brunei and Malaysia, 8 November 1967. 
11 B. A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The Making of Brunei 
Darussalam, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, p. 351. 
4 
Council on 25 March 1965.12 The paper contemplated the introduction of a ministerial 
system of government, but the Sultan did not implement it fully. 
When the British High Commissioner, F. D. Webber, was to be transferred to 
Australia in October 1967 by the Commonwealth Office, Sir Omar asked the 
Commonwealth Office to stop the transfer. This was because he was anxious that any 
change in High Commissioner would presuppose a much tougher line by the 
Commonwealth Office on the issue of constitutional development in Brunei. 13 When 
the Commonwealth Office did not heed his request, the Sultan abdicated. He did, 
however, remain an active power behind his son Hassanal Bolkiah, who became the 
twenty-ninth Sultan of Brunei in October 1967. 
Since the Sultan and Sir Omar (the former Sultan) refused to implement a 
democratic system of government, in 1968 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
which was formed in that year abandoned its efforts to persuade them to do so. 14 
Furthermore, the end of Britain's agreement with Brunei was approaching. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office also abandoned its hope of bringing Brunei within 
Malaysia, as the Sultan and most of the Bruneians were not interested in becoming a 
member of the federation. 15 
Although Sir Omar was satisfied with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 
decision to cease urging him and his son to implement a democratic system of 
government, he was not content with Britain's decision to end its military protection 
over the Sultanate. This was because the Sultan and Sir Omar were not confident that 
the Sultanate could defend itself against any internal or external threats or attacks. 
Consequently, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and Sir Omar proposed that Britain agree to 
joint responsibility for Brunei's defence. 16 However, Britain rejected the proposal, as it 
was not compatible with its plan to withdraw fully from the region by 1971.17 
Consequently, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and his father tried to hire Gurkha soldiers from 
12 Borneo Bulletin, 26 November 1966. 
13 W032/21069, Webber to Commonwealth Office, 7 October 1967. 
14 D0229/8, Walker to J. O. Moreton, 8 November 1967. 
15 D0229/8, Commonwealth Office to Webber, 24 October 1967. 
16 OD3989, Record of Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and His 
Highness the Sultan of Brunei at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 December 1969. 17 Ibid., 22 December 1969. 
5 
Nepal but were unsuccessful as the Nepalese King Mahendra did not want international 
communities to accuse him of supporting the archaic regime. 18 
The coming of the Conservative Party to power in Britain in June 1970, however, 
completely overturned the Labour government's plan to end its agreement with Brunei 
and withdraw its Gurkha battalion from the Sultanate. Under the 1971 Agreement, 
which was signed by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and Anthony Royle, Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Conservative government agreed to continue 
its responsibility for Brunei's external affairs and defence, where the defence of Brunei 
became the consultative responsibility of both Brunei and the British government. 19 
Moreover, under the agreement, the Conservative government relinquished its 
responsibility to advise the Sultan on the internal affairs of the state? ° The 
Conservative government agreed to the retention of the Gurkha battalion in Brunei, 
although some conditions were imposed? ' 
The Sultan and Sir Omar were pleased with the coming of the Conservative Party to 
power as it saved Brunei from achieving full independence. Furthermore, the new 
government did not insist that Sir Omar and his son implement a democratic system of 
government. However, not everyone was satisfied with the Conservative government's 
decision to continue to be responsible for Brunei's external affairs and to defend Brunei 
based on consultation between the two governments. When the BAKER party learned 
that Brunei would not become independent in November 1970, Abdul Latif, the 
Secretary-General of the BAKER party, sent a memorandum to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations (UN) seeking the UN's sponsorship for Brunei's independence. 22 
'a FCO15/288, Dale to Oxley, 26 April 1967. 
19 Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei Amending the Agreement of 29 
September 1959, Bandar Seri Begawan, 23 November 1971, Cmnd. 4932, London, HMSO, 1972. 
Also in FC058/6814, Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei, Amending the 
Agreement of 29 September 1959. 
20 Ibid. 
21 PREM15/384, UK responsibility for Brunei: Prime Minister's meeting with the Sultan of 
Brunei, 30 April 1971. 
22 Straits Times, 17 October 1970. 
6 
The party also called upon the Sultan to introduce a democratic system of government 
in Brunei. 23 
The BAKER party's demands posed a challenge for the Sultan and Sir Omar, as 
they could have affected the security and survival of the monarch and the monarchy. 
The demands of the PRB could have lead Britain to relinquish its remaining 
responsibilities towards Brunei and forced Brunei to accept full independence. The 
Sultan and Sir Omar, who did not want to see the end of British protection over Brunei, 
halted the activities of the BAKER party. They suspended the Legislative and District 
Council elections in 1970 and 1971 and extended the State of Emergency in Brunei 24 
By doing so they effectively ended the political activities of the BAKER party. 
Although the Sultan and Sir Omar had successfully ceased the activities of the 
party, they nevertheless continued to face challenges and problems over Brunei's 
internal and external security as a result of Malaysia's intention to bring Brunei within 
the federation. Between 1970 and 1975, the Malaysian government under its new prime 
minister Tun Abdul Razak continued Tunku Abdul Rahman's policy to bring Brunei 
within Malaysia. 25 
In 1973, the Malaysian authorities used Azahari, who was living in Indonesia, to 
push the British to grant Brunei independence and to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei. Azahari on the other hand demanded that the Malaysian 
authorities meet certain conditions, one of which was the release of Brunei's ex-rebels 
from the Berakas detention camp in Brunei. 26 Consequently, the Malaysian authorities 
inspired the 1962 Bruneian ex-rebels to escape from the camp to Malaysia by 
promising them that they would be granted political asylum if their escape was 
successful. 
As a result of the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to Limbang, Sir Omar's calls for the 
return of Limbang from Malaysia to Brunei became an urgent matter. He wanted 
Limbang to be returned to Brunei in order to ensure the security of the Sultanate. 
23 Ibid., 17 October 1970. 
24 Borneo Bulletin, 6 February 1971. 
25 In September 1970, Tun Razak succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia. 
26 Author's interview with Mahmud Murshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
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Indeed, Brunei had been reclaiming Limbang from Britain since 1890 and Malaysia 
since 1963. In September 1970, Sir Omar revived Brunei's claim to Limbang publicly 
as he argued that Limbang rightfully belonged to the Sultanate. 27 Limbang, which had 
once been part of Brunei's territory, was annexed by Charles Brooke in Sarawak in 
1890. This annexation split Brunei into two wings - the west and the east wings-with 
Limbang in the middle. In 1945, Limbang became a part of British colony and then part 
of Malaysia when Sarawak joined the former in 1963. 
Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam (r. 1885 - 1906), who ruled Brunei during Brooke's 
occupation of Limbang, maintained that Brunei had rights over Limbang, as he had 
never surrendered it to either Sarawak or Britain. 28 After his death, however, his 
successor Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam (r. 1906 - 1924) was not able to make any 
claim on Limbang as his rule was under the tight control of the British residents. 29 
When Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin (r. 1924 - 1950) ruled, he tried to claim Limbang from 
Britain, but his untimely death in 1950 virtually ended his claim over the territory. 30 
Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III, who revived Brunei's claim over Limbang in the early 
1960s, failed to open up a discussion with the British government, as the latter did not 
want the Sultan's claim over Limbang to hinder the formation of Malaysia. 31 
After the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the Sultan revived 
his claim over Limbang to the Federal Government by letter, as Limbang had then 
become part of the Malaysian State of Sarawak. 32 However, neither the Sultan nor the 
Brunei government received any reply from Malaysia. In 1965, Marsal Maun, Brunei's 
27 Pelita Brunei, 30 September 1970. 
2$ DO169/54/42219, Brunei Claim to Limbang District of Sarawak, `Annexation of the Limbang 
District'. 
29 See Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Alf Saifuddin III and Britain, pp. 18 - 19, D. S. Ranjit Singh, 
Brunei 1839-1983: Problems of Political Survival, Singapore, 1984, p. 112 & Muhammad Hadi 
Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 146. 
30 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', pp. 176 - 7. 31 Ibid., p. 153. 
32 CO 1030/1671, Record of a Meeting between the Secretary of State and His Highness the Sultan 
of Brunei, at Commonwealth Relations Office, 29 July 1963 (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 
`Brunei's Political Development', p. 172). 
8 
Chief Minister, wrote a letter to the Malaysian government reminding the latter of the 
Sultan's letter which the Malaysian government had not replied to. 3 
As mentioned earlier, in September 1970, Sir Omar revived his claim over Limbang 
publicly, 34 but Tun Abdul Razak refused to discuss this issue with the Brunei 
government, 35 claiming that Limbang rightfully belonged to Malaysia. The escape of 
Brunei's ex-rebels to Limbang in July 1973, however, made Brunei's claim on the 
territory an urgent matter as the escape could have caused instability in the Sultanate. 
Tun Abdul Razak, who did not want to discuss the issue of Limbang with Brunei, 
closed the Limbang issue in December 1973. 
In Limbang, the escaped Bruneian ex-rebels used the territory to spread their 
propaganda to the people of Brunei with the support of the Malaysian Chief Minister of 
Sarawak, Abdul Rahman Yakub, who focused his campaign directly on Brunei with the 
aim of pushing the British to grant Brunei independence and to destabilise Brunei. 
When the British warned the Malaysian government about the activities of the escaped 
ex-rebels in Limbang, the Malaysian government did not heed the warning and 
continued to support them. The ex-rebels did not get support from the Malaysian 
government alone, but also from other countries and international organizations. 
With their support, in November 1975 the PRB successfully presented their case at 
the UN. Following this presentation, the Brunei Resolution was adopted by the Fourth 
Committee of the 30`h Session of the General Assembly. 36 The Brunei Resolution called 
on Britain as the administering power to facilitate the holding of free general elections 
in Brunei, the lifting of the ban on all political parties and the return of all political 
exiles to Brunei so that they could participate fully in the elections. 37 The adoption of 
Brunei Resolution at the UN put pressure on the Sultan and Sir Omar over Brunei's 
situation in the international arena. 
33 FC024/734, Marsal bin Maun to the Minister of External Affairs, Federation of Malaysia, 17 
April 1965. 
m Pelita Brunei, 30 September 1970, Straits Times, 10 October 1970 & Daily Star, 1 October 
1970. 
35 FC024/1679, Tun Abdul Razak to Anthony Royle, 14 December 1973. 
36 Haji Zaini bin Haji Ahmad (ed. ), The People's Party of Brunei: Selected Documents, Petaling 
Jaya, Insan, p. 69. 
37 Ibid, p. 69. 
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The adoption of the Brunei Resolution at the UN happened at the same time that the 
British Labour government (which came to power in October 1974) reconvened its 
negotiations with Brunei. When the Labour government returned to power, it revived 
its 1966 decision to end its responsibilities towards Brunei's external affairs and 
defence. In November 1974, the Labour government gave one year's notice to Sultan 
Hassanal Bolkiah to review the terms of the agreement. 38 This took effect in November 
1975 and negotiations began in January 1976, thus putting further pressure on the 
Sultan and Sir Omar, who were not in favour of full independence as they were still not 
confident over Brunei's security. 
Malaysia's continuous hostilities towards Brunei reflected in its support of 
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in December 1975 and its comparison of Brunei's 
situation with East Timor worried the Sultan and Sir Omar. 39 In 1976, however, Lord 
Goronwy Roberts, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, assured 
the Sultan and Sir Omar that there was no possibility of military intervention in the 
Sultanate. 40 His assurance came at the time when Malaysia and Indonesia suddenly 
changed their policy towards Brunei. 
When Hussein Onn came to power as the prime minister of Malaysia (following the 
unexpected death of Tun Abdul Razak) in January 1976, he moved away from the 
adventurist policy of Tun Abdul Razak to a friendly policy towards the Sultanate. 
Indonesia which did not want any radical regime emerged in Brunei for fear that it 
would cause instability in the region, spelled out its goodwill policy towards Brunei. 
The Association of South-East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) concept of peace, stability, 
mutual tolerance and co-operation which was manifested in the Treaty of Amity and 
Co-operation in Southeast Asia in 1976 had also influenced Malaysia and Indonesia to 
change their policy towards the Sultanate. 41 Because of this change, the PRB lost the 
support of the Malaysian government and this became one of the factors which led to 
the demise of the PRB. 
39 Parliamentary Debated (Hansard), 21 January 1976. 
39 FC024/2998, G. A. Dugan to Muir, 26 November 1975. 
10 Borneo Bulletin, 17 January 1976. 
41 Donald E. Weatherbee, `Brunei: The ASEAN Connection', Asian Survey, 23(6), 1983, p. 730. 
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The transformation of policy of both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments 
towards the Sultanate as well as the weakened PRB reduced the Sultan and Sir Omar's 
feelings of tension over Brunei's security. It also produced a favourable atmosphere for 
Brunei and Britain to eventually conclude the 1979 Agreement whereby Brunei would 
gain full independence at the end of 1983.2 Under this agreement, the British 
government would at the request of the Brunei government assist the latter in the fields 
of external affairs and defence before it became independent 43 The five-year transition 
period was used by the Sultanate to strengthen its internal and external security by re- 
establishing and strengthening its relations with Malaysia and Indonesia and by 
venturing into ASEAN and the UN. It also reinforced, re-equipped and expanded its 
forces and retained the Gurkha battalion in order to protect the Sultanate from any 
internal and external threats. 
Thus in this thesis, a study of Brunei's political development between 1966 and 
1984 will highlight the problems and challenges faced by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien 
III and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (with regard to Brunei's security and survival). This 
study will argue that Britain's decision to end its 1959 Agreement with Brunei posed 
challenges and difficulties to Brunei's security and survival. When Britain decided to 
end its agreement with Brunei, the Sultan's position as an absolute monarch and the 
position of the Sultanate were endangered, as the British put increased pressure on the 
Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. The Sultan did not 
want to implement the system as it would reduce the power of the monarch. Moreover, 
the implementation of the system would only bring Brunei closer into the Federation of 
Malaysia. 
Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei also caused challenges and 
difficulties to the Sultanate regarding its security and survival as Brunei would not be 
able to defend itself against any internal and external threats or attacks (because of its 
small population and army). This study will also argue that the cause of Brunei's 
42 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Her Majesty the Queen of the Untied Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan and Yang 
Di Pertuan of Brunei with Exchange of Notes. CMND 7496. London: HMSO, 1979 (hereafter 
cited as Treaty of Friendship and Commerce). 
43 Ibid. 
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insecurity was Malaysia's hostile attitude towards Brunei. Malaysia's continuous 
attempts to bring Brunei within the federation (which was initially supported by 
Britain), its support of the local Bruneian parties and Brunei's ex-rebels caused the 
Sultan and Sir Omar to feel apprehensive over Brunei's security when it became 
independent. A further issue to be examined is Brunei's insecurity over Indonesia, as 
the latter had not spelled out its policy towards Brunei after the end of its confrontation 
with Malaysia in 1966. 
This study will also show that the change of policy of both the Malaysian and 
Indonesian governments from an aggressive to a friendly one and the demise of the 
PRB reduced the Sultan and Sir Omar's anxiety over Brunei's security and survival, 
creating a favourable atmosphere for the signing of the 1979 Agreement (whereby 
Brunei would attain its independence in 1984). 
1.2. Literature review 
Although there are a number of authors who have written about Brunei's political 
development from its early periods until its independence, they have either not 
mentioned or only mentioned in passing the problems and challenges faced by Sultan 
Omar All Saifuddien III and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah over Brunei's security and 
survival (for the period between 1966 and 1984). 
When Britain decided to end its agreement with Brunei, the British government 
began to put more pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of 
government. Britain's insistence that the Sultan should implement the system was a 
challenge to the security and survival of the monarchy, as it could reduce the power of 
the Sultan and would bring Brunei into the federation. 
The Sultan was apprehensive that the ending of Britain's agreement with Brunei 
would result in the Sultanate being unable to defend itself against any internal and 
external threats or attacks. He was particularly concerned over Malaysia, which still 
intended to bring Brunei within the federation. The Sultan was also apprehensive over 
Indonesia, which had not indicated its policy towards Brunei after the end of Indonesia- 
Malaysia Confrontation in 1966. 
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Although D. S. Ranjit Singh44 and K. U. Menon45 have written about Brunei's 
security and survival from its early times until independence, they have not discussed in 
detail the issues of Brunei's security and survival between 1966 and 1984. Ranjit Singh 
only discusses in detail Brunei's security and survival from 1839 until 1963. In his 
study, he identifies two factors which almost caused the extinction of the Sultanate. The 
first resulted from European territorial encroachments in the 1800s and second was due 
to various merger proposals in the 1950s and 1960s. 
As mentioned earlier, Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from Brunei in 1970 
presented a problem for Sultan Omar All Saifuddien as it would have left Brunei 
militarily weak to defend itself against any internal and external threats. Malaysia's 
intention to bring Brunei within the federation and Indonesia's unclear policy towards 
Brunei worried the Sultan. On this issue, neither Menon nor Ranjit Singh has pointed 
out Malaysia's intention to bring Brunei within Malaysia or Indonesia's attitude 
towards Brunei. 
Moreover, neither author has discussed Britain's insistence that Sultan Omar All 
Saifuddien and later Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei before the end of the British agreement with the Sultanate (in 
November 1970). The Commonwealth Office's insistence that Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddien and later Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah introduce the system posed a challenge to 
both of them as it would have reduced the power of the monarch. Moreover, Sultan 
Omar Ali Saifuddien believed that the faster Brunei moved towards a democratic 
system of government, the more likely it was to become part of Malaysia. 
The pressure to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei did not 
come only from the British, but also from the BAKER party and the Malaysian 
government. In the context of the BAKER party, Ranjit Singh only mentions the 
formation of the BAKER party without explaining in detail its political activities 
between 1966 and 1970 (which posed challenges and difficulties over Brunei's security 
44D. S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: Problems of Political Survival, Singapore, 1984. 
43 K. U. Menon, `Negara Brunei Darussalam from Protectorate to Statehood: The Ceaseless Quest 
for Security', Ph. D. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1988. 
46R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 35. 
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and survival). 7 Menon, like Ranjit Singh, has not discussed the BAKER party's 
political activities between 1966 and 1970. 
The Conservative government which came to power in Britain in June 1970, 
however, agreed to be consultatively responsible over Brunei's defence and control 
Brunei's external affairs fully. The Conservative government's decision disappointed 
the BAKER party and as a result, it called upon the UN to sponsor Brunei's full 
independence. 48 This posed a problem for the Sultan and Sir Omar, as they feared the 
BAKER party's call to the UN would put pressure on the British to release their 
remaining responsibilities towards the Sultanate. On this issue, once again none of the 
authors has pointed out the pressure posed by the BAKER party to either the Sultan or 
Sir Omar. The Sultan and Sir Omar's action in suspending the Legislative and District 
Council elections in 1970 and 1971 (which was aimed at halting the BAKER party's 
political activities and ending the plan for a democratic system of government in 
Brunei) has also not been mentioned in detail by any of the authors. 
Furthermore, they have not discussed fully the problems faced by the Sultanate 
concerning the Limbang issue. As noted previously, the Limbang issue had become a 
sticking point between Brunei and the Malaysian government since Limbang had 
become part of Malaysia in 1963. On this issue, Ranjit Singh only discusses briefly the 
Sultan's claim on Limbang, which created conflict between Brunei and Sarawak from 
1970 until 1974.9 Similarly, Menon also only briefly mentions the Sultan's claim on 
Limbang between 1970 and 1974. In 1973, Brunei's claim on Limbang became an 
urgent matter when Brunei's ex-rebels escaped to Limbang. 
The issue of the escape of Brunei's 1962 ex-rebels from Berakas Detention Camp in 
1973 to Limbang has also not been discussed in any detail by either author. Although 
Ranjit Singh and Menon have mentioned that the ex-rebels escaped with the 
connivance of the Malaysian government, they have not mentioned why the Malaysian 
" Ibid., p. 210. 
's Straits Times, 10 October, 1970. 
49 Ibid., pp. 203 - 204. 
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government was involved in the episode. Similarly, although Zariani Abdul Rahmanso 
has written about the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels, she has not mentioned the reason for 
the Malaysian government's involvement in the episode. With the Malaysian 
government's backing, the ex-rebels were able to solicit support from other countries 
and international organizations (before the Brunei Resolution was adopted by the 
Fourth Committee of the UN in November 1975). Although Ranjit Singh has 
mentioned this in his work, he has not discussed fully their activities and the problems 
and challenges they posed for the Sultan and Sir Omar over their country's security. 
Similarly, Menon also has not mentioned in any detail their activities and the threat 
they posed to the state's security, although he has mentioned the support the ex-rebels 
obtained from Malaysia and other countries. Neither Zariani nor Zaini Haji Ahmadsl 
has written in detail about the problems and challenges the ex-rebels posed as a result 
of their activities. 
The two other authors of Brunei's history, namely G. E. Saunders52 and B. A. 
Hamzah53" also have not mentioned Britain's decision in 1966 to end its agreement with 
Brunei in 1970. Saunders has not discussed the Malaysian government's continuous 
attempts to bring Brunei within Malaysia or the British, the BAKER party and the 
Malaysian government's insistence that the Sultan implement a democratic system of 
government between 1966 and 1970. Although Saunders mentions the Limbang issue, 
the escape of the 1962 Bruneian ex-rebels, the revival of the PRB in Kuala Lumpur and 
the passing of the Brunei Resolution at the UN in 1975 (which posed further problems 
over Brunei's security and survival), he only mentions these in passing without going 
into detail. 
Like Saunders, Hamzah has not mentioned Britain's decision to end its agreement 
with Brunei. Hamzah maintains that the British were reluctant to grant Brunei 
independence because of their oil interests in the Sultanate. According to Hamzah, 
50 rani Abdul Rahman, Escape from Berakas! 1962 Brunei Revolt, Kuala Lumpur, AI-Ahad 
Enterprise, 1992. 
51 Zaini Haji Ahmad, Haji (ed. ), Brunei Aferdeka: Sejarah dan Budaya Politik Bandar Seri 
Begawan, De'lmas Printing and Trading Company, 2003. 
52 G. E. Saunders (2od ed. ), A History of Brunei, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 
53 B . A. Hamzah, The Oil Sultanate: Political History of Oil in Brunei Darussalam, Kuala Lumpur, Mawaddah Enterprise, 1991. 
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`Great Britain could have granted Brunei independence in 1959,1962,1971 or 1979; 
instead on each occasion it renegotiated and renewed its political commitments to 
Brunei. '-'4 Indeed, in 1966, the British Labour Government was intending to end its 
agreement with Brunei and grant Brunei full independence in November 1970. The 
coming of the Conservative party to power in June 1970, however, reversed the Labour 
government's decision to grant Brunei full independence in that year. 
Since these authors have not mentioned Britain's decision to end its agreement with 
Brunei, there is a significant gap in the study and analysis of Brunei's history. As 
mentioned previously, Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei put the 
Sultan and the Sultanate's position in jeopardy, since Britain subsequently put more 
pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in the 
Sultanate. The introduction of such a system (although to Britain a way of ending its 
agreement with the Sultanate) was a challenge to the Sultan, as it could have affected 
the security and the survival of the monarch and the monarchy. It could have led to the 
reduction of the Sultan's power as well as to Brunei's entry into Malaysia. As 
mentioned before, the call for the implementation of a democratic system of 
government in Brunei did not come only from the British but also from the BAKER 
party and the Malaysian government. The Malaysian government was anxious for the 
system to be implemented as it believed that only an elected government in Brunei 
could possibly be persuaded to enter Malaysia. 
Indeed, Malaysia's intention to bring Brunei within Malaysia was an important part 
of Brunei's history: it created challenges and difficulties over its security and survival, 
as the Malaysian authorities backed Brunei's politicians and ex-rebels in their efforts to 
achieve this aim. As a result, the Sultanate became apprehensive over establishing full 
independence and thus did so relatively late. Moreover, since the introduction of a 
democratic system of government could have led to the reduction of the Sultan's power 
' Hamzah, The Oil Sultanate: Political History of Oil in Brunei Darussalam, p. 183. 
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and the admission of Brunei to Malaysia, the Sultan and Sir Omar ended the prospect of 
democracy in Brunei. 
This study also aims to continue what previous authors namely, Muhammad Hadi 
Abdullah5S and B. A. Hussainmiya56" have been examining. Muhammad Hadi Abdullah 
and Hussainmiya have studied in depth Brunei's political development from 1950 until 
1967, that is, from the time Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III ruled Brunei until his 
abdication in 1967 (when the Labour government first announced its decision to 
withdraw from east of Suez). This was a critical moment for the Sultan, as he 
maintained that Brunei would not be able to defend his country against its predatory 
neighbours if Britain withdrew its forces from Brunei. 7 
It was also during his reign that the Malaysian Plan was proposed by Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the 1962 Rebellion occurred, the Malaysian Plan was rejected and the conflict 
between Malaysia and Brunei started. Both authors have studied these events in depth. 
Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, however, goes further by examining the origins of the 
Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation, 58 which occurred as a result of the formation of 
Malaysia in 1963 and the Limbang issue between 1890 and 1963.59 The significance of 
this study is that it will continue from where the above left off, that is, from the time the 
British decided to end its agreement with Brunei in 1966 until Brunei achieved its 
independence in 1984. This study, however, will focus on the challenges and problems 
faced by the Sultanate concerning its security and survival. 
Since this thesis will also touch on the reign of the new Sultan - that is Sultan 
Hassanal Bolkiah - whose rule began in October 1967, it will contribute to the writing 
of Brunei's history as no detailed studies about him (between those periods of time) 
have been written before. Although in this regard Lord Alun Chalfont60 has written 
ss Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development and the Formation of Malaysia: 
1961-1967', Ph. D. thesis, University of Hull, 2002. 
56 B. A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The Making of Brunei 
Darussalam, Kuala Lumpur, 1995. 
s' OD39/89, Brunei Internal and Economic Situation, Call by Sultan of Brunei, 22 December 
1969. 
sa Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development', pp. 206-243. 
59 Ibid., pp. 165 - 205. 60 Lord Alan Chalfont, By God's Will: A Portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1989. 
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about the rule of the monarch from 1967 until 1984, he has not used the documents 
pertaining to Brunei-British relations from the Public Record Office in London 
(between 1966 and 1975); neither has he analysed the issues raised in this study, i. e., 
the challenges and difficulties faced by the Sultanate concerning its security and 
survival. However, it should be borne in mind that it was the Sultan's father who was 
the real power behind the throne, especially between 1967 and 1979. 
1.3. Sources: analysis 
In pursuing the study, various documents drawn primarily from the Colonial Office 
(CO), the Dominion Office (DO), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), the War Office (WO), the Foreign Office (FO), HM 
Treasury (T) and the Prime Minister's Office pertaining to Brunei that are available at 
the Public Record Office (PRO) in London will be used. These documents cover the 
period from 1966 until 1975. Documents of subsequent years, however, had not been 
released at the time this study was carried out. The previous mentioned authors have 
not used these documents, especially those between 1967 and 1975. The aim of this 
study is to make full use of the documents to uncover the political challenges and 
problems concerning Brunei's security and survival between 1966 and 1975, to fill the 
gap and to give further details on the challenges and difficulties faced by the Sultanate 
concerning Brunei's security between 1966 and 1975 which previous authors have not 
discussed or have not explained in detail. 
In addition, other primary and secondary resources such as Hansard, Parliamentary 
debates, newspapers, periodicals and books, which are available at the Brotherton 
Library and the Edward Boyle Library at the University of Leeds, Brynmor Jones 
Library at the University of Hull, the British Library in London, the University of 
Brunei Darussalam Library, Brunei National Archive and the Brunei Historical Centre 
were also used in the study for the years between 1966 and 1975 as well as between 
1976 and 1984. Aside from these resources, interviews with the 1962 ex-rebels and the 
ex-political detainees were used to clarify some issues in the study. Its approach is 
18 
chronological, so that the development of events between 1967 and 1984 can be 
analysed adequately. 
However, before Britain's decision to end its 1959 Agreement with Brunei in 1966 
is delineated, a brief background to Brunei's political development between 1950 and 
1966 will be given. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the challenges and problems 
that Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien was facing between those years. This study will show 
that the challenges and problems faced by the Sultanate with regard to its security and 
survival had existed prior to 1966. 
The study will initially describe the challenges faced by the Sultanate as a result of 
the British plan to associate Brunei closely with the two Northern Borneo territories. It 
will show that from the beginning of his rule, the Sultan was not attracted by the British 
scheme mainly because he was apprehensive that the plan would affect the security of 
the monarch and the monarchy; because of his lack of interest, the British plan 
collapsed. 
In 1960, the Malaysian Plan proposed by the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman once again posed a challenge to Brunei's security and survival. The Sultan, 
although cautious towards the plan, was prepared to study the pros and cons of joining 
Malaysia before a decision was finally made in July 1963. The PRB was against the 
plan from its inception; the rebellion they launched in Brunei in 1962 was however 
successfully crushed by the British forces. Although the 1962 Rebellion showed the 
vulnerability of the Sultanate without British protection, the Sultan did not accept the 
Malaysian plan right away. The Sultan however finally refused to join Malaysia as he 
wanted to safeguard the status of the monarch and the monarchy. 
Although the Sultan had reiterated that Brunei would not join Malaysia, the study 
will show that Britain continued its efforts to bring Brunei within the federation at least 
by 1965. Nevertheless, Britain's attempt was unsuccessful as the Sultan refused to 
employ Malaysians, a ploy which the British government had hoped would bring 
Brunei closer to Malaysia and eventually lead to its joining the latter. 
Chapter Three will concentrate on the difficulties faced by the Sultanate in relation 
to its security and survival as a result of Britain's decision to end its 1959 Agreement 
with Brunei in November 1970. To start with, this study will examine why the British 
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government wanted to end the agreement with Brunei and the challenges and problems 
this created over Brunei's security and survival. This study will show that as a result of 
Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei the position of the monarch and the 
monarchy was in danger. This was because by this decision, the British put increased 
pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. As 
explained before, the Sultan did not want to implement the system as it could reduce 
the power of the monarch and would bring Brunei closer to the Federation of Malaysia. 
This study will also show that the Sultan did not want Britain to end its agreement 
with Brunei as he thought that Brunei would not be able to defend itself against any 
internal and external threats or attacks. In this respect it will show that the Sultan did 
not want to establish independence mainly because of the hostile attitudes of Malaysia 
and Indonesia towards Brunei. The study will also argue that when the British proposed 
a new treaty for Brunei, the Sultan and Sir Omar rejected it as it did not include the 
British defence of Brunei. The study will show that the Sultan and Sir Omar made 
unrelenting efforts to maintain British military protection over the Sultanate. It will 
demonstrate that Sir Omar was not interested in associating Brunei with the Five-Power 
nations namely Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia (over the 
defence of the region) as he did not trust Malaysia. 
Chapter Four will concentrate on the challenges faced by the Sultanate following 
the reversal of policy of east Suez by the Conservative Party when it came to power in 
Britain in June 1970. Initially, it will examine why the Conservative government 
reversed the Labour government's policy to end the 1959 Agreement with Brunei in 
November 1970. Under the 1971 Agreement between Brunei and Britain, Brunei's 
external affairs came under full British control and Brunei's defence became the 
consultative responsibility of both Brunei and Britain. 
Although the Agreement satisfied the Sultan and Sir Omar, the BAKER party was 
not pleased with it. As a result, it called upon the UN to sponsor Brunei's full 
independence. As mentioned previously, the BAKER party's calls to the UN posed a 
problem for Sir Omar and the Sultan, as they feared that the BAKER party's call could 
put pressure on Britain to relinquish its remaining responsibilities towards the 
Sultanate. 
20 
This study will show that since the Sultan and Sir Omar were apprehensive about 
the BAKER party's political activities, they put an end to them by suspending the 
District and Legislative Council elections and extending the state of emergency in 
Brunei. The study will also show that the failure of the implementation of a democratic 
system of government in Brunei was a result of Britain's inability to persuade the 
Sultan to implement the system, the people's lack of interest in democracy and the lack 
of party leaders' credibility in organising their parties. 
Chapter Five will examine the problems faced by the Sultan and Sir Omar in 
connection with Sir Omar's claim over Limbang from Malaysia in 1970. To begin with, 
it will study the reasons for Sir Omar's public resurrection over the territory in 
September 1970. This study will show that one of the reasons for Sir Omar publicly 
renewing Brunei's claim over Limbang was the Chief Minister of Sarawak's 
pronouncement to the descendants of the Brunei's citizens in Limbang to be loyal to the 
Malaysian government. To Sir Omar, Abdul Rahman's speech was provocative. 
However, Tun Abdul Razak refused to consider Brunei's claim over Limbang for 
reasons that will be discussed in this chapter. 
Brunei's claim over Limbang however became an urgent matter when Brunei's 
1962 ex-rebels escaped from Berakas Detention Camp to Limbang in July 1973. This 
study will show that when Sir Omar insisted on the return of Limbang from Malaysia, 
the Malaysian government refused to return the territory to Brunei and closed the 
Limbang issue in December 1974. Sir Omar, however, maintained that Brunei would 
not give up its claim over Limbang because of security reasons. 
Chapter Six will focus on the problems and challenges faced by the Sultan and Sir 
Omar as a result of the activities of the escaped Bruneian ex-rebels in Malaysia and 
internationally. This study will argue that the Malaysian government was involved in 
the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels. As pointed out before, the Malaysian authorities were 
using Azahari to achieve their aims to push the British to grant Brunei independence 
and to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. Azahari on the other 
hand insisted that the Malaysian authorities release the Bruneian 1962 ex-rebels who 
were detained in the Berakas detention camp in Brunei. This study will also show that 
the Malaysian government's use of Azahari to achieve its aims gave Azahari the 
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opportunity to revive his struggle (which was inhibited by the Indonesian government 
when Suharto came to power in 1966). 
The study will look into the reactivation of the PRB in Kuala Lumpur and its 
political aims. It will show that since the Malaysian government did not control the 
activities of the ex-rebels in west Malaysia, the Brunei government had to call the 
Bruneian students who were studying in west Malaysia to return to Brunei for fear that 
they would incite the students to work against the Brunei government. Apart from 
that, this study will explore the PRB's political activities in Limbang where it will show 
that the PRB received support from the Chief Minister of Sarawak (who was scheming 
to push Britain to grant Brunei full independence and to destabilise Brunei). It will then 
look into Britain's efforts to end the Federal Government of Malaysia and Sarawak's 
support of the PRB members in Malaysia, which caused the Sultan and Sir Omar to 
refuse to accept independence. 
The study will show that the PRB gained support not only from the Malaysian 
government but also from other countries and organizations. It was their support which 
led to the presentation of Brunei's case at the UN in November 1975. Finally, it will 
also look into the protective measures carried out by the Sultan and Sir Omar to 
safeguard the security of the Sultanate following the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to 
Malaysia in 1973. 
Chapter Seven will focus on the problems faced by the Sultan and Sir Omar as a 
result of the Labour government's decision to revive its 1966 policy to end its 
agreement with Brunei and to withdraw its Gurkha battalion from the Sultanate. 
Initially, it will look into the revival of policy by the Labour government as well as the 
Sultan and Sir Omar's efforts to reverse the British government's decision to withdraw 
the Gurkha battalion from Brunei. 
The Sultan was apprehensive of achieving independence as the Federal Government 
of Malaysia and Sarawak were still actively supporting the ex-rebels. Although Tun 
Abdul Razak informed the British High Commissioner that he would restrict the 
political activities of the PRB, Malaysia continued to show hostilities towards Brunei. 
This study will show that the Malaysian government's support of Indonesia's 
intervention in East Timor in December 1975 and its comparison of Brunei's situation 
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with East Timor caused the Sultan and Sir Omar to be concerned over Brunei's security 
without British protection. 
However, in a dramatic turn of events in 1976, the Malaysian government changed 
its aggressive policy towards Brunei to a friendly one and the Indonesian government 
spelled out its own friendly policy towards the Sultanate. Tun Abdul Razak, the new 
prime minister who came to power in January 1976, clarified that Malaysia's hostile 
attitude towards Brunei would only postpone Brunei's independence. The Indonesian 
government did not want a radical regime to take the place of the present one, and this 
was one of the reasons for Indonesia spelling out its goodwill policy towards the 
Sultanate. This study will also show that the change of policy of both the Malaysian 
and Indonesian governments as well as the diminishing popularity of the PRB (as a 
result of loss of support from Malaysia) decreased Sir Omar and the Sultan's tension 
over Brunei's security and created a conducive atmosphere for the signing of the 1979 
Agreement between Brunei and the British government. 
Chapter Eight will examine the preparations made by the Sultanate, especially in 
relation to its internal and external security, before it became independent in 1984. In 
this study, it will be shown that Brunei made more contacts with Malaysia and 
Indonesia in order to re-establish and strengthen its relations with the two countries. 
Brunei also made efforts to enter ASEAN and the UN in order to safeguard its external 
security after it became independent in 1984. It will demonstrate that the Brunei 
government strived to expand its defence organisations namely the Royal Brunei 
Armed Forces, the Royal Brunei Police, the Gurkha Reserve Unit and the British 
Gurkha battalion in order to bolster its internal and external security. It will also show 
that Brunei established the Internal Security Enactment (ISE) and improved the social 
welfare of the people of Brunei in order to reinforce its security. 
Chapter Nine will draw together the main points raised in the preceding chapters 
which assess Brunei's political development between 1966 and 1984 (with regard to the 
challenges and difficulties over Brunei's security and survival). At this stage, it can be 
said that as a result of Britain's resolution to end its agreement with Brunei in 1970, 
challenges and difficulties arose over its security as the Sultans were not confident that 
Brunei would be able to defend itself against any internal and external threats. Britain's 
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resolution to urge the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government as a way 
of ending its agreement with Brunei also posed challenges and difficulties over its 
security and survival as the implementation of the system would diminish the power of 
the monarch and would bring Brunei within the Federation of Malaysia. Since Sir Omar 
and his son were unwilling to bring about independence and to implement a democratic 
system of government in Brunei, the latter gained independence rather late and the 
democratic system did not materialise in Brunei. Furthermore, this chapter will point 
out issues which have either not been covered at all or not been covered in detail by 
previous authors of Brunei's history, but have been covered and given in further detail 
in this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Brunei and the British Decolonisation Policy: 
1950-1966 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will briefly delineate Britain's long-term policy to decolonize 
Brunei between 1950 and 1966. The aim is to give background knowledge of the 
challenges and problems concerning Brunei's security and survival between those years 
before the author discusses the challenges and problems over its security and survival 
(as a result of Britain's decision to end its 1959 Agreement with Brunei in November 
1970). This study will show that the challenges and problems with regard to Brunei's 
security and survival had existed prior to 1966. 
To begin with, this study will briefly delineate Britain's plan to associate 
Brunei closely with the two Northern Borneo territories and the problems this posed for 
Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III. This study will argue that the Sultan (as well as the 
Malay aristocrats) was apprehensive of the British plan as it would affect Brunei's 
security and survival. This study will show that one of the reasons why the Sultan 
promulgated the constitution in 1959 was that he wanted to safeguard the position of 
the monarch and the monarchy. Since the Sultan was not interested in the British plan 
to associate Brunei with the two Northern Borneo territories, the plan met with failure. 
The study will also briefly delineate the Malayan plan which was introduced 
by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaya, and which was aimed at 
forming a federation of Malaysia that would consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, 
Sarawak and Brunei; it will discuss the problems this posed for the Sultan. This study 
will show that when the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, announced 
his plan to federate Malaya with Brunei, the two Northern Borneo territories and 
Singapore, the Sultan was cautious towards the plan. In spite of this, he was prepared to 
study the pros and cons of the Malaysian Plan before a decision was finally made in 
July 1963. The PRB, however, was against the plan from its inception. This opposition 
later culminated in the outbreak of the 1962 rebellion in Brunei. Although the 1962 
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rebellion showed the vulnerability of the Sultanate without British protection, the 
Sultan did not accept the Malaysian plan straightaway. The Sultan recommenced 
Brunei's negotiations with Malaya over the Malaysian terms, but eventually gave up 
the plan. The Sultan abandoned the plan mainly because he wanted to secure the 
position of the monarch and the monarchy. The Sultan, however, was hoping that 
Britain would continue its protection over the Sultanate, if possible indefinitely. This 
study will show that (after Brunei's rejection of Malaysia in 1963) Britain was 
continuing its effort to bring Brunei within the federation at least by 1965. 
2.2. British decolonisation policy 
Britain's plan to decolonise Brunei as well as Malaya, Singapore and their 
Northern Borneo territories Sarawak and Sabah emerged after the end of the Second 
World War. Although Britain had no intention of decolonizing Brunei (its protectorate), 
Malaya, Singapore and the two Northern Borneo territories immediately, Britain had a 
long-term policy towards these colonies and protectorate. Britain's policy was to unite 
Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah before they were merged with Malaya and then granted 
independence. ' The main reason why Britain planned to unite the three Northern 
Borneo territories with Malaya was that it wanted to protect them from their potentially 
acquisitive neighbour Indonesia and to help to level the social and economic 
inequalities in the three Northern Borneo territories. 
Malcolm MacDonald, who was appointed as Commissioner-General for the 
United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, executed the task to associate the Northern Borneo 
territories closely before they were merged with Malaya. In the case of Brunei, 
Anthony Abell, the Governor of Sarawak and High Commissioner for Brunei, was 
delegated to carry out the plan. In his announcement, Abell wished to see Brunei 
develop a closer co-operation with its neighbours - Sarawak and North Borneo. 
Initially, the co-operation among the three Borneo territories took the form of 
governors' conferences which were held every six months. The aim of the conferences 
'C0537/6113 (ITEM 1), Note by Mr J Higham, 1 February 1950. Cited in A. V. M. Horton, The 
British Residency in Brunei, 1906 - 1959, Hull, University of Hull, Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Occassional Paper No. 6,1984, p. 42. 
2 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin 111 and Britain, p. 224. 
3 Borneo Bulletin, 13 July 1957 (cited in Horton, The British Residency in Brunei, p. 43). 
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was to `plan for greater co-ordination in policy and administration of matters of 
common interest'. At the conference on 23 April 1953, an announcement was made 
that a decision had been taken to form a standing conference of the heads of 
government of the three Northern Borneo territories with the aim to `maintain the 
closest possible harmony of policy among them. '5 Following the conference, the Straits 
Times newspaper reported that the meeting was held as a step towards the formation of 
the federation of the three Northern Borneo territories. 6 In its editorial of 24 April 1953, 
the same newspaper commented that the conference was the seed of the federation, 7 but 
the Sultan promptly denied that it was a step towards the establishment of the 
federation. 8 According to the Brunei government's report, the Sultan had `never 
thought about the unification nor did they wish to unite or federate Brunei with other 
states'. 9 
Indeed from the outset, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien was apprehensive of 
Britain's plan to associate Brunei closely with Sarawak and North Borneo because he 
realised that it could affect the security and the survival of the Sultanate. In this regard, 
he was concerned that the plan would reduce his status from that of an absolute 
monarch to a constitutional monarch. 1° Besides, the Sultan and the aristocrats were 
worried that if Brunei were closely associated with Sarawak and North Borneo, 
Brunei's status would be reduced from a protectorate to a colony. 11 This was despite 
4Straits Times, 23 April 1953 (cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 128). s Ibid., p. 128. 
6 Ibid., p. 128. 
7 Straits Times, 24 April 1953 (cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 -1983, p. 128). 8 B. Simadjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945 - 1963, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p. 
122. Cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 128. 9 Berita Brunei, 16th March 1956, p. 1, (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political 
Development', p. 20). 
10 Zaini Haji Ahmad, Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme di Brunei 1939-1962,2R Publication, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1989, p. 60. 
'1R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, pp. 143 - 144. When Brunei was united administratively with 
Sarawak on 1 May 1948, it caused dissatisfaction to the Sultan and the aristocrats who were 
apprehensive that their status would eventually be reduced and that they would come under 
Sarawak's supremacy (whereas before this Sarawak was under the supremacy of Brunei) (R. 
Singh, Brunei 1839 -1983, p. 127). 
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Anthony Abell's assurance to the Bruneians that the arrangement would not affect 
Brunei's status as a protected state with a British High Commissioner. 12 
Furthermore, the Sultan and the aristocrats were apprehensive that if Brunei 
were closely associated with Sarawak and North Borneo, the Chinese in Sarawak and 
North Borneo would dominate the Malays in Brunei. 13 In addition, they were concerned 
that there would be an influx of immigrants from Sarawak and North Borneo to the 
Sultanate. Moreover, they were skeptical that the Muslims in Brunei and the Islamic 
religion would be adversely affected if Brunei were to be closely associated with 
Sarawak and North Borneo (who were mostly non-Muslims). 14 Besides, the Sultan and 
the aristocrats were alarmed that Brunei's wealth would be used by the central 
administration to subsidize the development of Sarawak and North Borneo. 15 This was 
despite the Governor of North Borneo's assurance to the Sultan that Brunei's wealth 
would not be shared with Sarawak and North Borneo. 16 The Sultan and the aristocrats 
were also concerned that the Bruneians would be administratively dominated by the 
people of Sarawak, as Brunei had insufficient skilled powers to run the administration 
of the country. '7 
Therefore it is obvious that the Sultan and the aristocrats were apprehensive of 
the British plan as they believed that it would affect Brunei's protectorate status, the 
status of the monarch, Brunei's economic wealth, its administration, the Malay race and 
the Islamic religion. 
Although the Sultan and the aristocrats doubted Britain's plan to associate 
their country closely with Sarawak and North Borneo, Malcolm MacDonald and 
Anthony Abell continued to pursue the plan. In 1954, MacDonald suggested that all 
British territories in Southeast Asia should be formed into a federation. 18 At this time, 
12 The Sarawak gazette, 1 June 1948, pp. 115 -17. Cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839-1983, p. 127. 13 Borneo Bulletin, 14 March 1959. Cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 -1983, p. 143. 14 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development, p. 21. 
'5 Straits Times, 20 October 1958. Cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 -1983, p. 140. 16 J. R. Angel, `The Proposed Federation of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei; the Development 
and Decline of the British Borneo Concept', unpublished M. A. dissertation, University of 
Sydney, Sydney, 1963, p. 139 (cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 127). " Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 18. 
'$ J. R. Angel, 'The Proposed Federation of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei', in R. Singh, 
Brunei 1839 -1983, p. 127. 
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not only the Bruneians doubted the British plan to unite the Borneo territories; the 
people of Sarawak and North Borneo were also having reservations about such a plan. 
19 
In order to put a stop to Britain's plan to associate Brunei with the two Northern 
Borneo territories, the Sultan ignored the Colonial Office's proposal and made his own 
way to promulgate the constitution which was aimed at safeguarding the positions of 
the monarch, the monarchy, the Malay race and the Islamic religion which the Sultan 
and the Bruneians were concerned would be affected if Brunei were to be closely 
associated with Sarawak and North Borneo. 20 
When Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien announced his desire to grant Brunei its 
first written constitution, Anthony Abell welcomed the Sultan's decision because he 
was hoping that he would be able to influence the Sultan to limit the power of the 
monarch. He was also hoping to retain the power of the Resident and to increase the 
authority of the High Commissioner by establishing reserve powers built into the 
Constitution. 21 Furthermore, he thought it was time that Brunei reassessed the functions 
of the State Council and possibly substituted it with new institutions. This was because 
to him the present State Council had become anachronistic and obsolete. 2 
The Sultan, however, did not want to give any real power to the Resident or 
the High Commissioner but wanted all administrative powers presently vested in the 
Resident to be transferred to a Mentri Besar, or Chief Minister, who would be a Brunei 
Malay and who would hold office at the Sultan's pleasure. 23 He would also appoint a 
Brunei Malay State Secretary, who would act as the government's official spokesman, 
19 Simanjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945 - 1963, p. 120. Cited in R. Singh., Brunei 1839 - 
1983, p. 127. 
20 The Sultan also promulgated the Constitution in order to adapt his own traditional system of 
administration to a modem system of government. This was because he realised that he could not 
maintain his own traditional system of administration without making changes to adjust to a 
modem system of government. Moreover, he wanted to put an end to the system of Resident that 
had existed since 1906 (which to him was already out of date). In addition, the Constitution was 
also the basis for self-government which would eventually enable Brunei to become an 
independent and sovereign state (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political 
Development', p. 17). 
2' Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saffuddin III and Britain, p. 148. 
22 B. A. Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside Story, Bandar Seri Begawan, 
Brunei Press Sendirian Berhad, 2000, p. 14. 
23 See the summary of the Constitution Advisory Committee's report in Hussainmiya, Sultan 
Omar Ali Saifuddin I11 and Britain, pp. 146-8. 
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and a number of other Malay officials. The British Resident would become the British 
Advisor who was to offer `nasihat' (good advice) to the Sultan and his administration, 
and his appointment was to be approved by the Sultan-in-Council. The powers of the 
High Commissioner would also be transferred to the Sultan-in-Council, where he 
would retain the right to advise the Sultan-in-Council 24 Anthony Abell however was 
not satisfied with the Sultan's arrangement regarding the issues of the Resident and the 
reserve powers of the High Commissioner. Consequently, these issues became an 
obstacle between the Sultan and the High Commissioner which subsequently delayed 
the promulgation of the Constitution. 
Anthony Abell's dissatisfaction over the Sultan's arrangement was also shared 
by the PRB. The PRB led by Azahari sought national leadership to pass through the 
rapid democratization of governmental institutions. The PRB, formed in 1956, wanted 
the implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei with the Sultan as 
a constitutional monarch. In its memorandum to the British government in 1957, the 
PRB requested the British to hold free and democratic elections in Brunei. It wanted at 
least 75 per cent of the members of the proposed legislature to be elected by adult 
suffrage and the party, which commanded the majority in the house, to form the 
government. 5 It also sought to form a `Union or Federation' of the three territories of 
Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah, with the Sultan of Brunei - Sultan Omar All Saifuddien III 
- becoming the constitutional head of the state. 
26 
Although the PRB shared the same plan as Britain to form the federation of 
Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo, the High Commissioner did not support the PRB. 
This was because the ultimate decision to form the federation should come from the 
Sultan, not the PRB. It was therefore the duty of Anthony Abell to persuade the Sultan 
to unite Brunei with Sarawak and North Borneo; he was, however, unable to do so as 
he could not convince the Sultan that his country's wealth would not be used to develop 
24 That was on any matters that he saw fit and believed were necessary for the safety and welfare 
of the state, except for matters relating to Islamic religion and the customs of the Brunei Malays 
(cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, pp. 146 - 148). 25 Zaini Haji Ahmad (ed. ), The People's Party of Brunei, p. 11. 
26 Ibid. p. 12. 
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Sarawak and North Borneo and that his country's status would not be altered from a 
protectorate to a colony. 
In 1957, in his bid to prevail upon the Sultan to accept the proposal for a 
closer association, Anthony Abell proposed that the Colonial Office return the Island of 
Labuan and Limbang to Brunei?? Anthony Abell also proposed that the Colonial Office 
cease Brunei's administrative link with Sarawak which had been in operation since 
194828 and make the Sultan the head of the Islamic faith in the three territories29 In 
addition, he suggested the establishment of the office of Governor-General who would 
represent the British government in North Borneo and Sarawak and act as High 
Commissioner in Brunei. 30 The Colonial Office, however, rejected these proposals 
aimed at winning over the Sultan just for the sake of getting his agreement to the closer 
association. 31 
With the independence of Malaya in 1957, however, Britain's plan to merge 
the Borneo territories with Malaya and Singapore into a unit before it was granted 
independence was shattered. When the Alliance of the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association and later the Malayan 
Indian Congress emerged victorious in the 1955 Malayan elections, they demanded the 
acceleration of Malaya's independence from the British government. Consequently, the 
British had to fulfil their demand32to grant Malaya independence in 1957. 
Sir Robert Scott (1955-60) who replaced Malcolm MacDonald as the 
Commissioner-General, however, had a new plan for the Borneo territories. He 
proposed to unite the Borneo territories urgently and to speed up the political progress 
among the territories should independent Malaya adopt the plan to absorb the Borneo 
21 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 229. Labuan was ceded to Britain 
by Brunei in 1847 whereas Limbang was forcibly annexed by Charles Brooke of Sarawak in 
1890. 
28 Ibid., p. 227. 
29 C01030/164, Secret, No. 1, UK Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia to CO, 4 February 
1955. Cited in ibid, p. 227. 
31 C01030/164, G. C. Whiteley's Minute to J. B. Johnston, 23 May 1956, in which Anthony 
Abell's ideas are summarized. Cited in ibid., p. 228. 
31 Ibid., p. 229. 
32 Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, & Tan Tai Yong (editors), The Transformation of Southeast Asia, 
p. 118. 
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territories into its fold. 3 The Sultan was however persistent in rejecting any proposal 
which aimed to unite Brunei with the two Northern Borneo territories. When the 
Secretary of State proposed immediate talks with Sarawak and North Borneo, the 
Sultan rejected the proposal. 34 
The Sultan's continuous rejection of Britain's plan to associate Brunei closely 
with the two Northern Borneo territories led Anthony Abell and Sir Roland Turnbull, 
the Governor of North Borneo, to instigate a plan to establish a loose federation where 
the three states would continue their existence, retaining autonomy over their own 
revenue and expenditure. 5 The Central government would control their defence, 
external relations, communications and internal security, 36 but the Sultan persistently 
rejected the proposal. According to the Borneo Bulletin's report of 15 February 1958, 
members of Brunei's State Council opposed Brunei's federation with other territories. 37 
In 1958, when the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia was quoted as 
saying (at the ninth Inter-Territorial Conference held in Brunei) that the conference 
pointed the way to a closer political association, 38 the Sultan unremittingly announced 
that the Conference did not mean that the three territories would become a federation. 39 
He also announced that Brunei was not a colony and that it was important to preserve 
the country's position with patience and determination 40 
With the promulgation of Brunei's constitution in September 1959, the Sultan 
was in a much more secure position as the latter successfully strengthened, enhanced 
and safeguarded the power of the monarch and the monarchy. Although initially 
Anthony Abell did not welcome the Sultan's constitutional proposal, he eventually 
accepted it almost unchanged. This was mainly because of the Sultan's intransigence to 
give in to Britain's wishes 4' 
33 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 231. 
34 Ibid., p. 231. 
3SAnge1, 'The Proposed Federation of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei' (Cited in R. Singh, 
Brunei 1839 -1983, p. 139). 36 Ibid., p. 139. 
37 Borneo Bulletin, 15 February 1958 (cited R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 140). 38 Borneo Bulletin, 5 April 1958 (cited in Ibid., p. 140). 
39 Borneo Bulletin, 26 April 1958 (cited in ibid., p. 140). 
40 Angel, 'The Proposed Federation', p. 258. Cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 140. 41 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 207. 
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With the promulgation of the Constitution, the 1905/1906 Agreement was 
revoked and replaced by the 1959 Agreement; the post of the Resident was abolished 
and the High Commissioner took the place of the Resident 42 The administrations of 
Brunei and Sarawak were divorced and Brunei achieved internal self-government. The 
British, however, retained complete control over Brunei's external affairs and defence43 
and this was stated in the Article 3 of the 1959 Agreement which says that: 
Her Majesty shall have complete control of the defence of the State and 
agrees at all times to protect the State and the Government thereof and to the 
utmost of Her power to take whatever measures may be necessary for the 
defence of the State; and His Highness agrees that for these purposes he will 
ensure that such legislative and executive action as in the opinion of Her 
Majesty's Government shall be necessary for the purposes of the defence of 
the State and the Government thereof (which expression in this Article 
includes defence against any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of the 
State) shall be taken within the State; and His Highness further agrees that 
for the aforesaid purpose Her Majesty's Forces and persons authorized on 
behalf of Her Majesty shall be at all times allowed to have free access to the 
State as 
Following the promulgation of Brunei's Constitution, the British began to toy 
with the idea of merging Sarawak and North Borneo without Brunei. Lord Selkirk 
announced that he favoured the federation of the two territories as a step towards their 
self-government 45 However, the plan was not pursued as the two territories were not 
economically able to stand on their own without Brunei. 6 Moreover, the association of 
North Borneo and Sarawak would be considered as unworkable to the British if Brunei 
were not part of the association. 7 As a result, Britain began to look to independent 
42 The High Commissioner was appointed by the Queen in consultation with the Sultan. 
43 With regard to external affairs, Brunei was not allowed to make any treaty, enter into any 
engagement, deal in or correspond on political matters with other states, or send envoys to any 
other states. 
44R. Singh, Brunei 1839-1983, Appendix H, p. 237. 
as Borneo Bulletin, 24 September 1960. Cited in R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 155. 46 Ibid., p. 155. 
47 Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, & Tan Tai Yong (editors), The Transformation of Southeast Asia, 
Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2003, p. 148. 
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Malaya in order to solve its problems over its Northern Borneo territories including 
Brunei. 
2.3. Brunei and the Malaysian Plan 
In 1958, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaya, voiced his plan 
to unite Malaya with the three Northern Borneo territories to the Colonial Office. The 
idea of the unification of Malaya and the Northern Borneo territories had been under 
discussion since 1956 48 It became significant to the Malayan leaders when they 
realized that it was necessary to unite Malaya with Singapore. In fact the idea emerged 
after several discussions with Singapore's leaders including Lee Kuan Yew. The latter 
and his party, the People's Action Party (PAP), became the main promoter of the 
merger with the federation 49 
In the early 1950s, the Malayan leaders refused to federate with Singapore as 
they were apprehensive that Singapore's predominantly Chinese population would 
overwhelm the predominantly Malay population of Malaya. In this case, the Chinese 
would be the largest single community, comprising 43 per cent of the total population 
compared with 41 per cent Malays. 50 Moreover, the Malayan leaders were anxious that 
Singapore's economic interests would conflict with those of Malaya and that Malayan 
politics would be radicalized through contact with Singapore's left-wing parties 51 
However, since the development of Communist activities in Singapore 
alarmed the Malayan leaders, they began to reconsider merging Singapore with Malaya. 
This was because they were concerned that an independent Singapore would come 
under the control of the Communists, which would affect the position of Malaya. The 
Malayan leaders therefore wanted to assist the non-Communist leader Lee Kuan Yew 
of PAP in order to achieve independence within a federation. 2 Nevertheless, the 
Malayan leaders judged that if Singapore was to be brought into the federation, they 
48 B. W. Andaya & L. Y. Andaya (2°d ed. ), A History of Malaysia, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 
283. 
49 Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, & Tan Tai Yong (editors), The Transformation of Southeast Asia, 
144. P. 
C. M. Turnbull (2°d ed), A History of Singapore, 1819 - 1988, Singapore, Oxford University 
Press, 1989, p. 272. 
51 Andaya & Andaya (2"d ed. ), A History of Malaysia, p. 283. 
52 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 32. 
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also needed to bring the Northern Borneo territories within Malaya to balance 
Singapore's predominantly Chinese population with the Malays of Malaya and the 
three Northern Borneo territories. 
In Brunei's case, apart from its crucial function of balancing the Malay 
population with the Chinese population in Singapore, Brunei's merger with Malaya, 
Singapore and the two Borneo territories could also enhance the security of the region 
against any Communist activities. 53 Tunku Abdul Rahman was also interested in 
bringing Brunei within the federation of Malaysia as it could provide bigger markets 
and create more job opportunities for the people of Brunei. 54 Furthermore, the Tunku 
was confident that if Brunei joined the federation, the latter could safeguard the 
survival of the Sultanate. In this case, Brunei's dynasty would be protected within the 
Federal Constitution which `would contain effective safeguards for the position of the 
Ruler' 55 Nevertheless, the Sultan would only be a constitutional monarch. 56 Moreover, 
if Brunei joined the Federation, Brunei could economically assist the development of 
Sarawak and North Borneo57 and Malaysia as a whole. 8 
The Malayan plan to federate Malaya with Singapore and the three Northern 
Borneo territories was accepted in principle by Britain, as the plan would help to solve 
Britain's problems with decolonizing the three Northern Borneo territories 59 To the 
Colonial Office, individual independence for these territories was not viable as these 
countries would be exposed to danger. 60 The Commonwealth Office was particularly 
53 In addition, the Malayan leaders were also interested to integrate Sarawak, North Borneo and 
Brunei into the federation as they wished to protect the position of the Malays of Northern 
Borneo. According to Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, `the Malays advocated the federation of 
Malaysia probably because they aimed at safeguarding the position of the Malays of northern 
Borneo'. (Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political 
Unification in the Malaysian Region, 1945 - 1965, Kuala Lumpur, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 
1974, p. 133, cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar All Saifuddien III and Britain, p. 238. 
54 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 39. 
u C. O. 1030/1012 `Greater Malaysia - Brunei Aspects, ' Mr. Reginald Maudling, Colonial Office 
to Sultan of Brunei, 9th March 1962 (cited in ibid., p. 39). 
56 Ibid., p. 39. 
"Muhammad Abu Bakar, `Politik Brunei Menjelang Penubuhan Malaysia', Malaysia darf Segi 
Sejarah, Kuala Lumpur, p. 122. 
 Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, & Tan Tai Yong (editors), The Transformation of Southeast Asia, 
158. P. 
Ibid., p. 144 
60Ibid., p. 148. 
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worried over the Communist threat in the Borneo territories. The Sarawak United 
People's Party (SUPP) in Sarawak had been heavily infiltrated by Communist elements 
and furthermore it had connections with the PRB 61 
Moreover, the Colonial Office was worried that Brunei would be a target for 
Indonesian conspiracy and internal sedition. In Britain's view, Brunei would not be able 
to defend itself against any internal and external threats, but if Brunei joined the 
federation, Brunei would benefit from the central government's forces as well as British 
forces. If the Federation of Malaysia was formed, the existing defence agreement that 
Malaya had with Britain (the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement [AMDA] of 1957) 
would be extended to the Northern Borneo territories. 62 Therefore, from Britain's 
perspective, the best solution for Brunei's future security was to join the Federation of 
Malaysia. The Colonial Office consequently supported the idea and even pressed the 
Sultan to join Malaysia as it would be dangerous for Brunei to stay alone. 63 Moreover, 
the decolonization of Brunei became an even more pressing matter for the Colonial 
Office as in December 1960 the United Nations General Assembly had passed a 
resolution - the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples - where the colonial powers were urged to take immediate measures to transfer 
all powers to the peoples of their colonies. 64 
61 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 36. 
62 Ibid., 35. 
63 D. O. 169/262, Malaysia: the Position of Brunei - the London Talks June/July 1963, `Note by 
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The Colonial Office nevertheless warned Tunku Abdul Rahman against any 
premature announcement of the federation as it would cause political chaos in the 
Northern Borneo territories. 5 Lord Selkirk warned the Malaysian Prime Minister not to 
rush the scheme too quickly, as unrest could occur throughout Northern Borneo. 66 In 
early 1960, however, Tunku Abdul Rahman took the initiative by visiting Sarawak and 
North Borneo and on 27 May 1961 he eventually made his idea for the Federation of 
Malaysia public (when he made an address to the Foreign Correspondents Association 
of South-East Asia in Singapore). 67 
The Tunku's speech had immediate and widespread consequences in Sarawak 
and North Borneo. Although it was widely welcomed in Sarawak, the latter suggested 
that it should be united first with North Borneo. However, the Sarawak and North 
Borneo territories' feelings toward the federation hardened as they were not in favour 
of a proposal for the absorption of Sarawak and North Borneo with the same status as 
the existing States. 8 In Brunei, the Sultan received the Tunku's speech with caution. 
Although Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien had had a favourable attitude towards Malaya 
prior to Tunku Abdul Rahman's announcement of the plan, the Sultan was nevertheless 
cautious over the Tunku's Proposal. 
In the 1950s, the Sultan showed a favourable attitude towards Malaya as he 
wanted to avoid the issue of the Northern Borneo federation. When Malaya became 
independent in 1957, Brunei's relation with Malaya improved as the Sultan wanted to 
demonstrate to Britain that he preferred Brunei to be associated with an independent 
state than with the British colonies, Sarawak and North Borneo. 69 After Brunei 
achieved internal self-government in 1959, the rapport between Brunei and Malaya 
became formidable as Brunei sought Malayan officials to fill the important posts in the 
63 In the 1940s, when Sarawak was transferred to the crown colony, it caused political anxiety to 
the locals which divided the Malay community and led to the murder of the British Governor. 
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administration of the state (which had previously been held by the British). 0 In 1958, 
the Brunei State Council approved a $100 million loan to Malaya following a personal 
approach by Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Sultan. ' An exchange of visits between the 
leaders of the two countries also took place. As a result of Brunei's close relationship 
with Malaya, the British plan to unite Brunei with Sarawak and North Borneo was 
undermined 72 
As mentioned before, when Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the plan for the 
formation of Malaysia in May 1961, the Sultan was cautious. When the Eighth 
Regional Conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) was held 
in Singapore in July 1961, Brunei did not send any observers. 73 At this conference, the 
principle of merger was approved and a formal agreement in principle was 
announced. 74 
Although the Sultan's attitude towards Tunku Abdul Rahman's announcement 
was guarded, he was aware of Brunei's weaknesses if Britain were to end its military 
protection over Brunei. Since 1906, Brunei had depended on British military protection 
for its security and survival. The 1906 Agreement that Brunei had with Britain brought 
Brunei under full British protection. Even though Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien was 
cautious towards the plan, he was prepared to examine the pros and cons of joining 
Malaysia. In addition, the Sultan planned to seek favourable terms from Malaya that 
would bring advantages and benefits to the people of Brunei and the country. If the 
terms were not favourable to Brunei, it would not enter Malaysia. 75 
Nevertheless, the PRB opposed the Malaysian Plan from its inception since it 
would jeopardise its aim to form the NKKU under the `Sri Mahkota Negara', as the 
Sultan of Brunei would be called. 76 According to Zaini Haji Ahmad, the party's 
70 Ibid., p. 239. 
71 Ibid., p. 234. 
72 There is however a suggestion that the Sultan became closer to Malaya as he felt `insecure over 
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organizer, it was the aim of the PRB to restore the sovereignty of the Sultan of Brunei 
over his former dominions Sarawak and Sabah. 7 Thus any move to unite the Northern 
Borneo territories with another country would fail in its attempt to integrate the three 
territories and to restore Brunei's sovereignty over Sarawak and Sabah. 78 
In order to upstage the Malaysian Plan, the PRB mobilised support from the 
political leaders of Sarawak and Sabah, where it successfully gained cooperation from 
the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) and the United Kadazan Organisation of 
North Borneo, which were also anti-Malaysia. On 9 July, the PRB, SUPP and the 
United Kadazan Organisation of North Borneo formally established the United Borneo 
Front. 79 
In addition, the PRB gained support from the Indonesian leaders, who gave 
moral backing to the PRB. 80 Aside from moral support, members of Tentera Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI), the Indonesian National Army, were also known to have trained 
TNKU members secretly as early as July 1962.81 The reason for Sukarno's espousal of 
the PRB's struggle was the powerful influence of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), 
the Indonesian Communist Party, within Sukarno's cabinet. 82 The PKI shored up 
Azahari's anti-Malaysia cause, which led to the 1962 Rebellion. The PKI supported 
Azahari not because it wanted to see the creation of the NKKU, but to destroy the 
Malaysian Federation and set up its own power base in the Borneo territories. 83 
Sukarno, who wanted the PKI's continuous support, backed the PKI's policy by 
supporting Azahari. 84 
Within Brunei and the adjacent areas (such as Limbang and Lawas), the PRB 
had won a large number of followers who had become increasingly anti-Malaysia. Even 
before the Malaysian Plan was proposed, there were already widespread anti-Malayan 
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78 Ibid., p. 22. 
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feelings among the people of Brunei. They resented the presence in Brunei of the 
Malayans, who were enlisted by the Brunei government to fill several key positions that 
had previously been held by British officers following Brunei's achievement of internal 
self-government in 1959.85 These ill feelings towards the Malayans deteriorated after 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaya, announced the Malaysian Plan in 
May 1961. 
The Sultan was well aware that the people of Brunei were anti-Malayan and 
that they supported the PRB because of its vociferous opposition to the Malaysian Plan. 
Consequently the Sultan was under pressure. According to B. A. Hussainmiya, `the 
Sultan faced the toughest decision of his career'. 86 On one side there were the British, 
who urged him to join Malaysia, and on the other side there was the PRB, which had 
successfully mobilised mass opinion against the Malaysian Plan87 and wanted Brunei to 
form a federation with Sarawak and Sabah, which the Sultan was totally against. 
On this issue, the Sultan had to play for time to enable him to consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of joining Malaysia. According to Muhammad Hadi 
Abdullah, the Malaysian proposal presented an option to the Sultan to balance pressure 
posed by the people and the British; by manipulating the issue, the Sultan could tackle 
and then crush the PRB. 88 
The Malaysian plan was, however, not a straightforward issue, since it had 
coincided with Brunei's first district council elections. According to the 1959 
Constitution, elections to the district councils were to be held two years after its 
commencement. In September 1960, the Brunei government announced that these 
elections would be held in August the following year. However, when the time of the 
elections was approaching, the Sultan postponed them indefinitely. 89 During this time, 
the Sultan encouraged the formation of political parties in an attempt to erode the 
political strength of the PRB90 and as a result of this, two political parties emerged - the 
85 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Alf Saifuddin III and Britain, pp. 255 - 258. 86 Ibid., p. 276. 
87 Ibid., p. 276. 
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40 
Brunei National Organisation (BNO) and the Brunei United Party (BUP). Both the 
BNO and BUP were pro-Malaysian Plan. Nonetheless, neither of these parties was able 
to attract large numbers of people to challenge the PRB, which had attracted the 
majority of the people of Brunei. 91 
Although the Sultan was losing the support of his people, he did not give in to 
the PRB's wishes, as the motives of the PRB were contradictory to his stance. 
Moreover, he still wanted to explore the benefits of Brunei joining Malaysia. On 5 
December 1961, the Sultan issued a statement that the idea of the Malaysian plan was 
`attractive' because of the social and cultural affirmatives between the two countries. 92 
In February 1962, Brunei delegates joined Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo in the 
signing of the `Memorandum on Malaysia', which unanimously approved the 
Malaysian plan. 93 Consequently, the PRB verbally attacked the Brunei delegation for 
signing the documents, saying that joining Malaysia was contrary to the wishes of the 
people. 4 
Indeed, during the hearing of the Brunei-Malaysia Commission of January 
1962, the majority of the people in Brunei opposed Malaysia and supported the 
formation of the NKKU. The Brunei government, however, did not publish the report 
on the Brunei-Malaysia Commission, and only gave the impression that the people of 
Brunei had accepted Malaysia in principle. 95 During a session of the Brunei Legislative 
Council held on 18 July 1962, the Sultan announced that the people had accepted the 
Malaysian concept `in principle'. 6 This was followed by a move made by the Acting 
Chief Minister, Dato Marsal Maun, to support the royal speech, and the motion was 
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adopted, which clarified the pro-Malaysian position of the Brunei government. 97 The 
Sultan obtained a mandate from the Legislative Council to negotiate with the British 
and Malaysian governments on the terms of Brunei's entry into Malaysia. 98 
This development disappointed the PRB. Nevertheless, the PRB pinned its 
hope on the coming of the District Council election to be held in August 1962. To the 
PRB the election was significant in order to achieve its aim of preventing Brunei from 
entering Malaysia. If they won the election, the district councillors elected to the 
Legislative Council could present a motion to block Brunei's entry into Malaysia. 
When the District Council election was held on 30 and 31 August 1962, the PRB 
adopted manifestos which among other issues included independence for Brunei by 
1963; the rejection of Malaysia and the formation of a Federation of North Borneo; and 
internal economic, administrative and educational reforms. 99 The election resulted in a 
landslide victory for the PRB, which won fifty-four out of a possible fifty-five seats, 
with the remaining seat going to an independent that later joined the PRB. The PRB 
victory proved the undisputed popularity of the party and also the endorsement of the 
people's opposition to the Malaysian plan. In September 1962, when the new 
Legislative Council was formed, the party sought to table a motion `blocking' the 
formation of Malaysia. As the Council feared suffering defeats in the debates, it 
postponed the Legislative Council meeting to 5 December 1962.100 
Before the Legislative Council meeting was held, the PRB submitted a motion 
to the Brunei government to be tabled at the forthcoming meeting. The motion 
demanded that the British government return Sarawak and North Borneo to the 
sovereignty of the Brunei Sultan; that the British government federate the three Borneo 
territories; that Brunei be kept out of Malaysia and that Brunei be granted independence 
by 1963.101 The Sultan, who was against the PRB motion, rejected the motion to be 
tabled at the forthcoming meeting by giving the excuse that the motion involved the 
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British government and had nothing to do with the government of Brunei. 102 This 
disappointed Azahari who commented, `when we received that, I knew we could not 
stop Malaysia by constitutional means, we had no alternative, we decided to strike'. 103 
On 8 December 1962, the rebellion broke out. 104 
The 1962 Rebellion was a major challenge to the Sultan as the rebels openly 
threatened his position and the country's security. When Azahari, who was in Manila 
(on his way to New York to seek the UN's recognition for the government of the 
NKKU), announced that the Sultan had declared the independence within the 
Commonwealth of a state that comprised the three Northern Borneo territories, 105 the 
Sultan denied this promptly in a broadcast. 106 Azahari and Zaini's mission to the UN 
however failed to materialise as their visa applications were rejected by the American 
Embassy in Manila. 107 
During the rebellion, the Sultan could not handle the situation efficiently and 
effectively. The TNKU, the militant wing of the PRB, was everywhere. The oilfields at 
Seria, much of Brunei Town and the rest of the state and parts of the Fourth and Fifth 
Divisions of Sarawak, including Limbang, were overrun by the rebels. The country's 
police force could not quell such a large-scale rebellion. Moreover, Brunei's army had 
just been created and was undergoing training in Malaya, and the British forces were 
not present in Brunei at that time. Under the 1959 Agreement, although the internal 
security and defence of the state were under British responsibility, the Sultan did not 
102 R. Singh, Brunei 1839-1983, p. 172. 
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allow any British security exercises on Brunei's soil. 108 Despite this, when the rebellion 
broke out, Britain immediately despatched its army to Brunei to crush the rebellion. 
Although the 1962 Rebellion and the indirect involvement of Indonesia in the 
Rebellion showed the vulnerability of the Sultanate, this did not persuade the Sultan to 
accept the Malaysian Plan straight away. Similarly, although the people of Brunei were 
against the Malaysian Plan, this did not make the Sultan directly abandon the plan. The 
1962 Rebellion did not stop the Sultan further considering the pros and cons of joining 
Malaysia, and soon after the end of the 1962 Rebellion, in January 1963, two Brunei 
officials were despatched to Kuala Lumpur to hold preliminary talks with the Malayan 
government. 
In the meetings, which were held between 5 February and 3 March 1963, 
issues such as Brunei's finances, the Sultan's position in the council of rulers, the 
special rights and privileges of the people of Brunei and the representation of Brunei in 
the federal government were discussed thoroughly by both governments. 109 However, 
none of the issues discussed in the meetings satisfied the Sultan. 
During the discussions, the Malayan side insisted that the control of Brunei's 
oil revenues should be passed to the federal government ten years after Brunei's entry 
into Malaysia, whereas the Sultan wanted to retain Brunei's control over any revenue 
and income relating to oil in perpetuity. The Malayan government also wanted the right 
to tax immediately any new oil and mineral finds discovered after the Sultanate joined 
Malaysia, whereas the Sultan maintained that Brunei should retain such revenue. The 
Malayan government additionally wanted the Sultan's contributions of $40 million 
annually to the federal government to be compulsory, while the Sultan wanted it to be 
voluntary. 
There was also the issue of precedence. According to the Malayan 
government, the Sultan's ranking among the rulers would be the lowest, based upon the 
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109 The following authors have studied the Malaysian negotiations between the Bruneian and the 
Malayan Governments: Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', pp. 132 - 
161, Saunders (2"d edition), A History of Brunei, pp. 154 - 7. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin III and Britain, pp. 318 - 323, Hamzah, The Oil Sultanate, pp. 175 - 178, Menon, 
`Negara Brunei Darussalam from Protectorate to Statehood', pp. 170 - 174 & R. Singh, Brunei 
1839-1983, pp. 181 -197. 
44 
date of joining the council of rulers and not from the time he ascended the throne. 
Previously, during the preliminary meeting between Brunei and the Malayan 
governments (in July 1962), the Malayan government had assured the Sultan that 
precedence was in accordance with the date of accession to the throne and not 
dependent upon the date of joining the council of rulers. 
Although the terms were further discussed in June 1963, these issues remained 
unsolved, as Tunku Abdul Rahman refused to give in to Brunei's terms and the Sultan 
refused to accept the Malayan terms. The failure to reach any consensus became one of 
the main reasons why the Sultan refused to join Malaysia in 1963. Indeed, the Sultan 
had already stated in his correspondence to Tunku Abdul Rahman between July 1961 
and October 1963 that Brunei should only join the federation if the Malayan 
government could accept all Brunei's terms. ' 10 
However, there was also a suggestion that Brunei refused to join Malaysia as 
the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company influenced the Sultan not to join the federation. 
During the Sultan's meeting with the Malayan government in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Brunei Shell Petroleum Company sent a telegram indicating a large commercial 
discovery of oil at Southwest Ampa Field. The Company warned the Sultan that if 
Brunei joined Malaysia, the control and management of Brunei's oil resources would 
be merged with the federation. According to B. A. Hamzah, the telegram was sent 
purposely to the Sultan in order to influence him to stay out of III Malaysia. ll 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was disappointed with Brunei's decision not to 
enter Malaysia, claimed that discussions broke down after agreement had been reached 
on all matters only when the Sultan raised the question of his precedence (as it was too 
late for Tunku to consult the Council of Rulers). In March 1963, the Council of Rulers 
had already decided that the precedence and the position of the Sultan of Brunei should 
relate to the date of Brunei's accession to Malaysia, so his name would be the last on 
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the election list to be appointed as a Yang Dipertuan Agong of the new Federation of 
Malaysia. 112 
Tunku Abdul Rahman's allegation, however, was strongly denied by the 
Sultan, who stated that the main reason for Brunei not joining Malaysia was that 
Malaya had failed to accept `Brunei terms'. 113 In this regard, the Sultan probably 
thought that his status as a ruler of a self-governing state was better than as a member 
of Malaysia's government with fewer responsibilities. "4 Moreover the Sultan would 
not want to exchange his absolute power for that of a constitutional monarch. This, 
however, was not mentioned during the meeting between the two governments. 11 5 
According to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Sultan might possibly have thought he could keep his power as an absolute monarch if 
Brunei joined the Federation. 116 
In addition, Brunei's wealth had always been a sensitive issue for the 
Sultanate. The fear that it would have to be shared among the other two British Borneo 
territories was one of the reasons why the Sultan was not interested in the British plan 
to associate Brunei with Sarawak and Sabah in the 1950s. When the Malayan 
government insisted that it would control Brunei's oil revenue after ten years and would 
tax any new oil discovered after Brunei joined Malaysia, it looked as if the Federal 
government wanted to control Brunei's oil wealth. Brunei would not surrender its oil 
wealth to the Federal government because that would leave it with nothing, since 
Brunei's economy depended on its oil revenues. 
Finally, the Sultan would not want to give away Brunei's identity as a separate 
kingdom, which the previous Sultans had striven to retain since 1800, by becoming part 
112 Under a rotating system of monarchy, each Sultan (there were nine in all) in the Malaysian 
States (except Malacca, Penang, Sarawak and Sabah) was entitled to be elevated to the position of 
Yang DiPertuan Agong, the supreme ruler of the country, elected to rule every five years. 
Precedence and seniority were determined by the length of their reigns on their respective State 
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of Malaysia. As Ranjit Singh notes: `Bearing in mind the proud historic heritage of 
having preserved the identity of their kingdom for centuries, the Bruneian authorities 
did not feel inclined to reduce the status of their country to a mere state in the 
Federation of Malaysia.... All Brunei would be a loser by joining the Federation of 
Malaysia. '117 According to Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, the Sultan was never interested 
in joining Malaysia. He suggested that `the idea of accepting the idea in principle was 
simply a political maneuver and diplomatic approach on the part of the Sultan to ensure 
for the survival of the Brunei Sultanate in its then form as a Malay Islamic Monarchy 
under the British protection'. ' 18 He further added that the differences over the issues of 
revenue, finance, taxes and precedence were simply explanations for the Sultan to 
reject the idea of joining Malaysia. ' 19 
According to a British report, the Sultan showed no regret at all for not 
entering Malaysia since he had the support of his people, who were mainly anti- 
Malaysia. 120 The Sultan insisted that the question of Brunei's entry into Malaysia was 
closed and that there would be no point in any subsequent meeting between himself and 
Tunku Abdul Rahman or representatives of the two governments. 121 He further stated 
that, should there be any question of reopening the issue of Brunei's entry into 
Malaysia in the future, negotiations would have to begin from scratch, that is, without 
regard to any previous negotiations on the subject, adding that, `no one could tell what 
the position would be in a decade's time'. 122 From this, it was clear that the Sultan's 
mind was more than ever unreceptive to the idea of entering Malaysia. 
The Sultan was actually satisfied with the present arrangement with the 
British government and wanted to maintain British protection if possible indefinitely. 
While the final meetings on Malaysia were taking place in London in July 1963, the 
Sultan had already indicated that he wished to discuss the future relationship of his state 
with Britain and had referred to the possibility of `strengthening Brunei's defence treaty 
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with the United Kingdom'. 123 He also hoped that the British government would 
`continue to honour the existing agreement for the defence of Brunei. 9124 However, the 
British government could not keep on protecting Brunei because its partial 
independence would be increasingly difficult to defend125 by the UK representatives at 
the UN. 
In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly established the Special 
Committee on Decolonization (the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization) to 
monitor the implementation of the Declaration (the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960). 126 The establishment of the 
Special Committee of Twenty-Four on Decolonization put pressure on Britain to 
relinquish its remaining responsibilities towards Brunei. 
Furthermore, both the British and the Malaysian governments did not want to 
see Brunei left to stand on its own, as that would pose political and military problems 
for the British and Malaysian interests over the security of the new federation. Both 
governments were apprehensive that an independent Brunei without British protection 
would be a security risk to Sabah and Sarawak and the Federation of Malaysia as a 
whole. 127 For example, if an uprising recurred in Brunei, it would probably spread to 
Sabah and Sarawak; if that happened, Malaysia would almost certainly have to deal 
with this matter on its own. Moreover, the British government was concerned that 
Brunei might become the target of Indonesian deception and internal insurrection 128 
whereas if it were part of Malaysia, Brunei would not be a target of Indonesia. 
In addition, the wealth of Brunei could be used for the defence and 
development of Sabah and Sarawak and the rest of the Federation. 129 As Arthur 
Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said, `the Malaysians 
would in certain circumstances like to have Brunei in Malaysia, or at least in much 
123 FC0371/169703,11 July 1963, Telegram from Mackintosh to Secretary of State, 18 July 1963. 
124 Borneo Bulletin, 23 June 1963 (cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and 
Britain, p. 323). 
125 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 218. 
126 http: //www. un. org/depts/dpi/decolonization/special_committee main. htm 
127 FCO15/288, Britain's Medium- and Long-Term Policy towards Brunei, 8 November 1967. 
128 Ibid., 8 November 1967. 
129 OD39/89, Talks with the Sultan of Brunei, November 1969 - Brief No. 9. 
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closer association than at present. They could certainly find a good use for Brunei's oil 
revenues'. 130 Also, if Brunei chose to become independent outside of the federation, the 
Malaysian government was concerned that Sabah and Sarawak would probably decide 
to separate from Malaysia and become independent. ' 31 In both cases, they could destroy 
the stability of the federation as a whole; if Sabah and Sarawak opted to become 
independent that would be the end of the federation. 
Thus, in order to ensure the security of the Federation, Brunei should be 
brought into Malaysia. The British, who did not intend to force the Sultan to accept the 
Malaysian proposal, adopted a new policy whereby Britain would try to influence the 
Sultan to join Malaysia at least by 1965.132 The adoption of the policy also aimed to 
avoid any allegation that Britain was trying to maintain a re-colonisation policy in 
Brunei. 133 
Initially, the British government hoped to see continuous co-operation from 
Malaysia in seconding Brunei its officers in various fields of administration even after 
Brunei's rejection of Malaysia in 1963. By giving Brunei this type of co-operation, the 
British government hoped that Brunei would become closer to and eventually enter 
Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, demanded that the Brunei government 
return the Malaysian officers to Malaysia, as he wished to teach Brunei a lesson for not 
joining the Federation of Malaysia in 1963.134 Tunku Abdul Rahman hoped that by 
recalling the officers, their positions would be substituted by British expatriates. When 
this happened, he expected that it would stimulate the people of Brunei to rise against 
the British in Brunei, push the British to grant Brunei independence and drive the 
Bruneians to seek membership of Malaysia. 135 
Tunku Abdul Rahman's action in recalling Malaysia's seconded officers from 
Brunei did indeed impel the Sultan to obtain British assistance in providing Brunei with 
technical and professional services. However, still seeking close co-operation between 
Malaysia and Brunei, the British government encouraged the Sultan to employ officers 
130 DO169/547, A. Bottomley to A. H. Reed, 8 July 1966. 
131 FCO15/288, Brunei -Medium and Long Term Policy, 8 November 1967. 132 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 137. 
133 Ibid., p. 137. 
134 Ibid., pp. 249 - 250. 135 DO169/547, Bottomley to Reed, 25 October 1966. 
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from Malaysia. 136 Although the Sultan claimed that he would review the position of the 
Malaysian officers already in Brunei and intended to retain those who were sufficiently 
experienced, he still chose to recruit officers from Britain rather than from Malaysia. 
137 
Moreover, the Tunku's motive backfired. Although more British officers were needed 
to replace the Malaysian officers, the people of Brunei had actually become more anti- 
Malaysia than anti-British. 138 Britain's efforts to bring Brunei within Malaysia by 1965 
were therefore unsuccessful. 
In 1966, however, the British government had decided to end its 1959 
Agreement with Brunei for the reason that will be explained in the next chapter. This 
presented a problem for the Sultan as he felt that the security of the monarch and the 
monarchy would be in danger without British protection. 
2.4. Conclusion 
From this chapter, it has been shown that the challenges and problems faced 
by the Sultanate (with regard to its security and survival) had existed prior to 1966. The 
British plan to associate Brunei closely with their Northern Borneo territories, namely 
Sarawak and North Borneo, was a challenge to the Sultanate as it could have lead to 
Brunei's status being reduced from a protectorate to a colony and the Sultan's status to 
be decreased from an absolute monarch to a constitutional monarch. Moreover, the 
Sultanate's burgeoning oil would probably have to be shared with Sarawak and North 
Borneo. This chapter has also shown that one of the reasons why the Sultan 
promulgated the Constitution was to safeguard and strengthen the power of the 
monarch and the monarchy, as well as the Bruneian Malays and the Islamic religion. 
Since the Sultan was not interested to closely associate Brunei with the two 
Northern Borneo territories, Britain's plan to see the formation of the federation of the 
three Northern Borneo territories collapsed. Britain, however, hoped that independent 
Malaya would solve the British problem over its Northern Borneo territories. Britain 
did not want to grant these territories individual independence as they were 
136 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 259. 
"' Ibid., p. 257. 
138 Ibid., p. 251. 
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underdeveloped and prone to internal and external threats. When the Malayan prime 
minister proposed the formation of the Federation of Malaysia consisting of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, Britain supported the proposal as this 
would assist it in decolonizing its three Northern Borneo territories. 
The Sultan, although showing a favourable attitude towards Malaya, was 
cautious toward such a plan. He was, initially prepared to study the pros and cons of 
Brunei joining Malaysia before a decision was made in July 1963. However, the PRB 
vigorously opposed the plan from the start and its opposition subsequently led to the 
outbreak of the 1962 Rebellion. The rebellion, viewed by the Sultan as a threat to the 
security of the monarch and the monarchy, was successfully crushed by Britain which 
was responsible for Brunei's internal security. Although the rebellion showed the 
weakness of the Sultanate without British protection, the Sultan did not accept the 
Malaysian Plan straight away. In this regard, the Sultan still wanted to discuss details of 
the terms with Malayan leaders. 
The Sultan however eventually gave up the Malaysian Plan as he did not want 
Brunei to lose its sovereignty to Malaysia. The Sultan was however hoping that Britain 
would continue its protection over Brunei if possible indefinitely. This chapter has 
shown that after Brunei's rejection of Malaysia, the British government continued its 
efforts to bring Brunei within Malaysia at least by 1965. Britain's efforts were however 
unsuccessful as the Sultan refused to employ Malaysian officers, whom the British 
suggested and hoped would bring Brunei closer to Malaysia and eventually persuade 
Brunei to join the latter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Brunei and the British End of 1959 Agreement: 
1966-1970 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine Brunei's political development between 1966 and 
1970 by highlighting the challenges and difficulties faced by Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddien III and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah in relation to Brunei's security and survival. 
This study will show that as a result of Britain's decision to end its 1959 Agreement 
with Brunei, the status of the monarch and the monarchy was under threat. This was 
because, following Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei, it put increased 
pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in the 
Sultanate. The pressure to implement such a system in Brunei did not come only from 
Britain but also from Malaysia and the Parti Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat, the BAKER 
party. This study will argue that the reasons why the Sultan did not want to implement 
the system were mainly a result of his apprehensiveness that the system would decrease 
his power and would bring Brunei into Malaysia. 
This study will also argue that as a result of Britain's decision to end its agreement 
with Brunei, the Sultanate felt that the security of Brunei would be in danger if Britain 
were no longer protecting Brunei. The study will show that the threats to Brunei's 
security came from Malaysia, which continued to endeavour to bring Brunei within the 
federation, and Indonesia, which had not spelled out its policy towards Brunei since the 
end of Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation in 1966 and which between 1963 and 1965 
had been hostile towards the Sultanate. The Sultan did not want the agreement to come 
to an end as Brunei would not be able to defend itself against any internal and external 
threats or attacks. In addition, the Sultan wanted the continuation of the agreement as 
he realized that the people of Brunei could not provide sufficient qualified officers to 
run the administration of the country. 
The study will also show that the Sultan was persistent in rejecting the British 
proposal for a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation that did not include the defence of 
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Brunei. It will also demonstrate that Sir Omar was not interested in associating Brunei 
with the Five-Power nations namely Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Malaysia (for the defence of the region) as Sir Omar distrusted Malaysia. Furthermore, 
the study will indicate that the Sultan and Sir Omar were persistent in retaining the 
British defence of Brunei and were proposing that Britain be jointly responsible over 
Brunei's defence (where Brunei was prepared to accept the financial consequences of 
the proposal). 
3.2. Reason for end of the 1959 Agreement, pressure for democracy and pressure 
for entering Malaysia 
Before this chapter looks into the challenges and difficulties faced by the Sultanate 
as a result of Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei, the reason for the end 
of the 1959 Agreement will be analysed. 
The Labour government's decision to end its 1959 Agreement with Brunei was a 
result of its decision to withdraw all its forces from east of Suez (except Hong Kong 
which was a British colony). This decision came as a consequence of the sterling crisis 
that had occurred in the 1960s. This crisis occurred through maintaining the pound 
sterling at a fixed rate despite relatively high inflation in Britain, which resulted in 
over-priced exports and a recurrent balance of payments crisis. When the Labour Party 
came to power in 1964, it inherited a balance of payments deficit of nearly £800 
million. The main solution to this problem was obviously to devalue sterling. However, 
the Labour government refused to devalue as it wanted to maintain the value of the 
pound. ' In July 1966 when the sterling crisis hit Britain, the Labour government 
announced a plan to bring total defence spending well below the original £2,000 
million target which the British government had decided to achieve by 1969 - 1970.2 
Following that, in August 1966, the Defence Secretary Denis Healey stated that about 
I D. Reynolds (2°d ed. ), Britannia Overrules: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Century, Harlow, Longman, 2000, p. 213. 2 M. Chalmers, Paying for Defence: Military Spending and British Decline, London, Pluto, 1985, 
pp. 84-85. 
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10,000 troops would be withdrawn from Borneo, and that there would be further 
subsequent withdrawals. 
As a result, a decision was made at a meeting at the Commonwealth Office on 4 
November 1966 to end Britain's 1959 Agreement with Brunei. 4 This was because the 
British had decided to withdraw its forces from east of Suez, and it was therefore no 
longer compatible to retain the 1959 Agreement (whereby Britain was responsible for 
Brunei's defence and internal security). At the meeting, it was agreed that the British 
government would secure the end of the 1959 Agreement with Brunei and make an 
orderly withdrawal, leaving behind a stable state, at the latest by the time Britain left its 
bases in Malaysia and Singapore. On 8 November 1966, Harold Wilson, the British 
Prime Minister, declared his policy towards the Sultanate in the House of Commons. In 
his announcement, he stressed that Brunei would progressively assume full 
responsibility in all fields of government `and this will in itself require a review of the 
Brunei Agreement at the appropriate time'. 5 
Following Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei, the Sultan faced 
challenges and difficulties over the security and survival of the Sultanate because the 
Commonwealth Office subsequently put more pressure on the Sultan to introduce a 
democratic system of government in the Sultanate. The British government urged the 
Sultan to implement the system not only because it wanted to see a democratic system 
of government introduced in Brunei, but also because it was a way to end the 
agreement. The 1959 Agreement between the British and the Brunei governments 
3 733 HC Deb., 3 August, 1966, col. 437. Cited in P. Darby, British defence policy east of Suez, 
1947-1968, London, OUP, 1973, p. 314. 
4 FCO15/288, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 25 July 1967 & 
W. L. Dale to H. L. M. Oxley, 26 April 1967. 
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, British House of Commons, Vol. 735,8 November 1966, p. 
1150. 
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contained no provision for termination: it would normally be ended by mutual 
agreement between the subscribing parties. 
Indeed, Britain could use its power to advise the Sultan that the 1959 Agreement 
would be terminated in the foreseeable future. This was impossible, however, because 
since 1959 the Sultan had been refusing to accept the advice of the High Commissioner, 
except when the latter's wishes coincided with his own. Nevertheless, the 
Commonwealth Office could simply tell the Sultan that, since he refused to accept the 
advice of the British, he had actually broken his agreement with Britain and had thus 
caused the treaty to be void. The Commonwealth Office, however, wanted to end the 
agreement as far as possible on the basis of mutual consent rather than by unilateral 
abrogation. This was to ensure that the agreement could be ended smoothly without 
jeopardising the stability of the state and Britain economic interest in Brunei. 
In this situation, the Commonwealth Office was apprehensive that the Sultan might 
retaliate by not giving any new concession to the Shell Petroleum Company in Brunei 
and by withdrawing its sterling reserve from the Bank of England in London. 
According to a record of a meeting at the Commonwealth Office on 27 November 
1967, it was stated that `If Brunei wished to retaliate Brunei's sterling reserves and the 
Shell Company would be the most obvious targets'. 8 Brunei's oil amounted to five 
million tons a year and was a valuable asset that had traditionally been managed by the 
British firm that carried out the original drilling. In 1965, the British government 
received net profits from the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company of about £4,000,000 
(which is approximately £35,000,000 at 2005 prices). Furthermore, in 1966 the Brunei 
government held reserves in London amounting to £133 million (which is 
approximately £800 million at 2005 prices). 9 
Since the Commonwealth Office realised that the Sultan would not want to end the 
agreement mutually, the Law Officers suggested that it should advise and assist the 
6 FCO15/288, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 25 
July 1967 & W. L. Dale to H. L. M. Oxley, 26 April 1967, also in W032/21069. For the full text of 
the agreement see Appendix II. 
7T3122320, Record of Meeting held in the Conference Room of Commonwealth Office, 27 
November 1967. 
81bid., 27 November 1967. 
Ibid., 27 November 1974. 
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Sultan as much as possible in making progress towards the establishment of a 
democratic system of government. 10 That was with a view `to reaching a state of 
advance in the territory at which [point] Britain would be justified in calling for the 
revision of the agreement, or giving a year's notice if such revision was not agreed. " 
The Law Officers' suggestion was based on the provisions of the 1959 Agreement, in 
which it was clearly stated that `it looks forward to a time when the people of Brunei 
will be taking a full share in the government of the State. ' 12 
Moreover, from the circumstances surrounding its signing, the 1959 Agreement was 
not intended to be permanent. The Sultan himself said at the 1959 Conference that `the 
time had come when the first step towards independence should be made. ' 13 
Furthermore, this option was less likely to incur public criticism than an abrupt notice 
would, and possibly be more likely to lead to real advance in Brunei. 14 In addition, this 
last factor was important in light of Britain's obligations under Article 73(e) of the 
United Nations whereby the British had to submit annually to the Secretary-General of 
the UN reports about Brunei's economic, social and constitutional development. 15 
The Commonwealth Office was however not alone in its desire to urge the Sultan to 
implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. The BAKER party which 
was formed in 1966 also urged the Sultan to implement the system in order to `meet the 
needs and aspirations of the people'. 16 The BAKER party which actually originated 
from four political parties: Parti Perjuangan Rakyat, Parti Perikatan Rakyat, Parti 
Kemajuan Rakyat and Parti Barisan Rakyat Brunei aimed to achieve full independence 
and a democratic system of government in Brunei. 
1°FCO15/288, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 25 
July 1967, Dale to Oxley, 26 April 1967 and also in W032/21069. 
" Ibid. 
12 FCO15/288, Dale to Oxley, 26 April 1967. 
13 Ibid., 26 April 1967. 
14 Ibid., 26 April 1967. 
15 Ibid. & FCO15/288, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 25 July 1967. 
16 Borneo Bulletin, 17 September 1966. 
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Apart from the BAKER party, the Malaysian government also wanted to see the 
implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei. '7 This was because 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaysia, believed that a bid to join the 
federation was much more likely to be made by an elected government in Brunei than 
by the Sultan. 18 On this issue, the British government agreed with the Malaysian 
government that only an elected government in Brunei could possibly be persuaded to 
join Malaysia. 19 In this case, it is obvious that Britain still intended to see Brunei within 
the Federation of Malaysia. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, since Brunei's refusal to join Malaysia in July 1963, 
Britain was still attempting to bring Brunei within Malaysia, at least by 196520 
Initially, the British government hoped to see continuous co-operation from Malaysia in 
sending its officers in various fields of administration to Brunei and for Brunei to seek 
officers from Malaysia. 21 However, since co-operation between the governments of 
Brunei and Malaysia was not forthcoming, the British tried to exploit the BAKER party 
to achieve its aims of getting Brunei into Malaysia. 2 In fact, Awang Hapidz Laksmana, 
the president of the party who was a political detainee of the 1962 rebellion, was 
released from prison in order to encourage political activity in the Sultanate. 23 
The British attempt to exploit the BAKER party was well received by the 
Malaysian government. Both the British and Malaysian governments gave indirect 
support to the BAKER party to call for the implementation of a democratic system of 
government in the Sultanate. In the past, the Malaysian government had also supported 
the Brunei National Organization (BNO) and the Brunei United Party (BUP) which in 
January 1963 formed an alliance known as the Brunei Alliance Party. 24 Both parties 
were pro-Malaysian plan. When Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III refused to join 
Malaysia, the leaders of both parties - Awang Marian Mohamad (BNO) and Haji 
17 D0229/8, Brunei and Malaysia, 8 November 1967. 
18 Ibid., 8 November 1967. 
19 Ibid., 8 November 1967. 
20 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 137. 
21 Ibid., pp. 249 - 250. 22 D. O. 169/51 Internal Political Situation 1960-63, A report by Commissioner General in SEA on 
`Brunei' (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 217). 
23 Ibid., p. 217. 
24 R. Singh, Brunei 1839 - 1983, p. 206. 
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Hasbollah bin Daud (BUP) - criticised the Sultan's decision. 
25 In 1965, Haji Hasbollah 
stressed his party's belief that the future of Brunei lay within Malaysia, had not 
changed. 26 
Following Harold Wilson's declaration in the House of Commons of his policy 
towards Brunei in November 1966, the BAKER party prepared a memorandum 
pressing the Sultan to achieve independence for Brunei as soon as possible. 7 It argued 
that Brunei was still colonised by Britain through the appointment of the British High 
Commissioner, as the members of the Executive Council had to accept his advice. 28 it 
called on the Sultan to implement the principal terms of the constitutional proposal 
contained in the White Paper 4/65, which contemplated the introduction of a ministerial 
system of government after the elections for the Legislative Council on 25 March 1965. 
29 
One of the principal terms of the constitutional proposal of the White Paper was 
that a ministerial system of government be introduced immediately after the elections, 
and elected members of the Assembly appointed to the Executive Council would be 
associated with the implementation of the executive and administrative responsibilities 
of the government. 30 Another principal term of the constitutional proposal was that 
Brunei would proceed progressively towards full parliamentary democracy. Thus, in 
order to achieve this aim, Brunei would reconstitute the Legislative Council by 
increasing its elected membership from ten to twenty members, reducing the ex-officio 
membership to the minimum and eliminating nominated membership. 31 From the 
elected members of the Legislative Council, ministers would be appointed in whose 
hands the functions of the state would be placed. These ministers would be answerable 
to the electorate in carrying out policies to secure the future well-being of the State of 
25 Borneo Bulletin, 18 April 1964. 
26 Ibid, 14th August 1965 and R. Singh, Brunei 1839-1983, P. 207. 
2' Daily Star, 3` October 1967. 
28 Ibid., 3rd October 1967. 
29 Borneo Bulletin, 26 November 1966. 
30 For details of the discussion on the White Paper by the People's representatives see 
FC024/1376, United Nations General Assembly Petition from Awang Zainal Abidin Puteh, 
President, and Awang Abdul Latif bin Hamid, Secretary-General, People's Independent Front, 
concerning Brunei, 27 March 1970. 
31 Ibid. 
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Brunei and its people. One other term of the constitutional proposal was that the British 
would hold constitutional talks in Brunei to be attended by representatives of all 
sections of the community, including elected members in order to make 
recommendations to the British government for the speedy independence of Brunei. 32 
The Sultan and Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
agreed that there should be further consultations between them after the March 1965 
elections (in order to consider the next steps towards constitutional advance). After the 
elections, however, none of the principal terms of the constitutional proposal of the 
White Paper was ever carried out. The newly reconvened Legislative Council had only 
twelve elected members out of thirty-three. No elected member was ever appointed to 
be a full minister, and the promise of Ministerial Government was never put into action. 
33 
The BAKER party's memorandum was sent to the Brunei government and also to 
the High Commissioner, who forwarded it on their behalf to the Secretary General for 
Commonwealth Relations for comment. 34 The latter's reply to the BAKER party's 
memorandum came early in February 1967, expressing sympathy for the people of 
Brunei's aspirations for independence. 35 F. D. Webber, British High Commissioner, 
assured the party's leaders that `the British Government was [.... ] as eager as the 
people of Brunei to see that productive constitutional developments take place in the 
country'. 36 
The Sultan, who did not want to implement the constitutional proposals contained 
in the White Paper, chose to remain silent and since no answer was forthcoming, the 
BAKER party organised a delegation to see the Sultan. However, the Sultan rebuffed 
the delegation and it was only during his absence from Brunei in late April 1967 that 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Brunei State Secretary received the memorandum from the BAKER party on 21 November 
1966, and the British High Commissioner received it on 26 November 1966. 
35 Borneo Bulletin, 25 February 1966. 
36 Daily Star, 23 February 1967. 
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the Daily Star reported the Brunei government's stance towards the White Paper 4/6537 
which stated that: 
[The] White Paper represented only a statement of intention and desire on the 
part of the Sultan's Government and [... ] its implementation would be 
realised at a pace, which the Government thought fit for the benefit of the 
people. 38 
The statement was a big blow to the BAKER party and the Commonwealth Office, 
which hoped to see the implementation of a democratic system of government in 
Brunei. 
At talks in London in June 1967, Herbert Bowden, who had succeeded Arthur 
Bottomley as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs39 urged the Sultan to agree 
to a further extension of the ministerial system of government. 0 He too pressed the 
Sultan to hold a constitutional conference in Brunei before the end of 1968.1 The 
Sultan, however, declined to make any specific comments or to enter into any 
commitments. Subsequently, Bowden warned the Sultan that the British Gurkha 
battalion would be withdrawn from Brunei and that Britain would cease its protection 
over the Sultanate once this withdrawal took place 42 
At this stage the Sultan was under pressure as he did not want to implement a 
democratic system of government in Brunei as he was apprehensive that the system 
would reduce his power from absolute to that of constitutional monarch. However, he 
continuously gave excuses that he did not want to implement the system as his subjects 
were not prepared to accept it and were more content under guided monarchy 43 which 
had brought peace and harmony to the Sultanate. 4 Moreover, the Sultan was aware that 
the closer Brunei came to a democratic system of government, the more likely it would 
37 At this time, the Sultan was on a world tour to Australia, the United States and Europe; that was 
before his visit to the UK in June for talks with the Commonwealth Relations Office. 
38 Daily Star, 15 May 1967. 
39 A position which was created on 1 August 1967 by the merger of the old positions of Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
40 Sunday Times, I1 June 1967. 
41 Ibid., 11 June 1967. 
42 PREM13/3181, B. Trend to Prime Minister's Office, 27 July 1967. 
43 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 209. 
44 Ibid., p. 228. 
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be to join Malaysia. In this regard, the Sultan was conscious that some of the members 
of the BAKER party were attracted to the Malaysian political system. The President of 
the BAKER party, Hapidz Laksmana, once openly showed his desire for Brunei to 
merge with Malaysia. 5 When asked about the possibility of Brunei joining Malaysia by 
a reporter of the Malaysian newspaper Utusan Melayu, Hafidz said, `we want 
independence first, after that it will be up to the people. If they want to come into 
Malaysia, we have no objection' 46 
The Sultan knew that (as in the past) some of the local politicians were offered 
important positions if they could bring Brunei into Malaysia. When the Malaysian Plan 
was actively pursued by the Malayan government, the latter attempted to find ways to 
persuade some of the PRB leaders to support the Malaysian Plan. The Malayan 
government offered them important positions in the administration of the Federation of 
Malaysia. Azahari, for example, was offered the position of Second Deputy Prime 
Minister of the Federation of Malaysia, but he did not accept the offer as he felt that 
this would be contrary to the interests of the people of Brunei. 7 
When the PRB successfully presented its motion at the Legislative Council meeting 
in November 1962, the Malayan government offered Azahari and other PRB leaders 
high positions in the Federation of Malaysia. 8 Tunku Abdul Rahman once told R. M. 
Hunt, High Commissioner to Brunei, that if the Gurkha battalion withdrew from 
Brunei, Tunku Abdul Rahman or Tun Abdul Razak would deal with Hapidz Laksmana 
and offer him a better position if he could bring Brunei into Malaysia. 49 Therefore, the 
Sultan concluded that the closer Brunei came to a democratic system of government, 
the greater its possibility of joining Malaysia. so 
At this stage, the Sultan was also under pressure as he did not want Britain to end 
its 1959 Agreement with Brunei. If Britain ended its agreement with Brunei, British 
protection would come to an end and the British Gurkha battalion would be withdrawn 
as Utusan Melayu, 20 October 1967. 
46 Ibid., 20 October 1967. 
47 Zariani, Escape From Berakas, p. 104. 
48 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, Brunei's Political Development, p. 70. 49 See F. C. O 24/212 Internal Security Situation, Letter from R. M., Hunt, High Commissioner, 
Brunei to R. A., Hibbert, Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Far East, 
Singapore, 2nd November 1967. 
so Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 206. 
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from Brunei. The Sultan wanted the Gurkha battalion to remain in Brunei and British 
protection to continue indefinitely to safeguard his country and his position from any 
internal and external threats. In this regard, the Sultan did not view Malaysia alone as a 
threat to Brunei's security and survival, but also Indonesia. 
Since the end of the Malaysia - Indonesia Confrontation in 1966, Indonesia had not 
spelled out its policy towards Brunei. 51 This caused the Sultan to be concerned about 
Indonesia's intention towards the Sultanate. Between 1962 and 1966, Indonesia was not 
only hostile towards Malaysia but also Brunei. Indonesia was hostile towards Malaysia 
following Tunku Abdul Rahman's plan to form the Federation of Malaysia. Azahari, 
who was against the Malaysian plan and who was aiming to form the NKKU, was 
supported by Indonesia. Sukarno maintained publicly that he supported Azahari and his 
struggle to form the NKKU because Malaysia was implementing neo-colonialism over 
the three Borneo territories and was threatening the security of Indonesia. In Sukarno's 
statement he claimed that Indonesia opposed Malaya because `Malaysia is a 
manifestation of new-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia as 
encirclement of the Indonesian Republic'. 52 When the 1962 rebellion broke out in 
Brunei, the event became a pretext for Indonesia to confront Malaysia and destroy the 
federation 53 
When Azahari was in Jakarta, Sukarno allowed the PRB to set up its headquarters 
and to open a Representative Office for the NKKU. The Indonesian government 
sponsored the First Conference of the North Kalimantan People's Revolutionary 
51 Ibid., p. 200. 
52George Modelski, The New Emerging Forces, Canberra, Department of International Relations, 
Research School of Pacific Studies, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National 
University, pp. 74 - 5. Cited in M. Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, London, Published for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs by Allen & Unwin, 1983, p. 79. 
53 Among the plethora of publications on the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia are 
Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963 - 1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1974; Douglas Hyde, Confrontation in the East: A Background Book, London, 
Bodley Head, 1965; Jan M. Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesia Politics, Kuala 
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1965; Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in 
Southeast Asia, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1966; and Gregory John Poulgrain, The 
genesis of konfrontasi : Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 1945-1965 / foreword by Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer Bathurst, N. S. W : Crawford House, 1998. 
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Consultative Committee from 16 to 25 March 1965 held in Bogor. 54 At this conference, 
an organisation called the United National Revolutionary Front of North Kalimantan 
was established. One of the aims of the organisation was to `firmly oppose the 
aggression of British and U. S. imperialists and fight to crush the British project 
"Malaysia" and, with full confidence, defend the national independence of the Unitary 
State of North Kalimantan as proclaimed on December 8,1962, under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Azahari'. 55Another aim of the organisation was to `firmly fight for the 
realisation of complete independence based on genuine democracy in conformity with 
the aspirations of North Kalimantan revolutionary people'. 56 
At the conference, the delegates discussed every aspect of the revolution including 
military organisation and guerrilla activities. During the confrontation the TNKU, the 
militant wing of the NKKU, with the espousal of the Indonesian government made a 
series of cross-border raids into the First, Third and Fifth Divisions of Sarawak. 57 
Between 1963 and 1964, Azahari was in Western Front, Sintang, Putu Sibu where his 
forces were posted. 58 
However, when the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia ended in 1966, 
Indonesia did not spell out its policy towards Brunei. This caused the Sultan to be 
concerned over Indonesia although Indonesia had no intention of expanding its 
territory 59 At this time Indonesia was facing more domestic problems and was trying to 
obtain substantial economic assistance from the Western powers. Moreover, after the 
end of the Confrontation, the Indonesian government under Suharto no longer 
supported Azahari. However, since Indonesia had not clarified its policy towards 
Brunei, the Sultan felt apprehensive towards Indonesia. The Sultan distrusted Indonesia 
54 Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, p. 202. 
ss Minutes of the First Conference of the North Kalimantan People's Revolutionary Consultative 
Committee, 16 to 29 March 1965, Document No. 25/PRB/65. Cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, 
The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 253 - 262. 
56 Ibid., pp. 253 - 262. 57 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 196. 
58 Zariani, Escaped From Berakas!, p. 209. 
59 FCO. 15/289, Assessment of the likely political and security situation in Brunei up till the end 
of 1971, `Outside Influence' (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdulah, `Brunei's Political 
Development', p. 200). 
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because of its aggressive foreign policy though Indonesia never made any territorial 
clam on the Northern Borneo States 60 
According to Major General Lewis Pugh, the Sultan's objective for retaining British 
military protection was undoubtedly the result of security concerns, that is to `secure 
the safety, economic stability and progress of Brunei in the face of a political threat 
should Brunei became independent, in the short term from Malaysia and in the longer 
term from Indonesia'. 61 With the population standing at only 114,145 in 1967 and an 
army of only 69262, Brunei would clearly not be able to defend itself against any 
internal or external attacks. As the Sultan once stated, `even if half of the male 
population of Brunei were to join the armed forces, the little kingdom could not defend 
itself'. 3 Moreover, the regiment had only been in existence for a few years and the 
officers had been fully occupied in undergoing courses and training abroad. That is 
why the Sultan valued British military protection over Brunei and was willing to pay 
for the stationing of the British Gurkha battalion in the Sultanate. 5 To the Sultan, the 
question of cost was not a problem for his government because it would be equally 
costly for Brunei to raise its own forces. 6 Since the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia 
Confrontation in 1966, the Brunei government had paid about half of the cost of 
maintaining the Gurkha Battalion in Brunei, which was approximately £500,000 per 
year. In April 1968, the Sultan declared his willingness to pay the entire sum of about 
£1,000,000 a year for the British battalion until the time of its withdrawal in November 
1970.67 
Moreover, the Sultan wanted the continuity of the British presence in Brunei 
because the people of Brunei could not provide enough capable officers to run the state 
60 Zariani, Escape From Berakas!, p. 182. 
61 FC024/739, Major General Lewis Pugh to H. C. Byatt, 4 September 1970. He had an audience 
with Sir Omar in September 1970. 
62 Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1967. 
63 Borneo Bulletin, 24 May 1969. 
64 FC024/739, Major General Lewis Pugh to H. C. Byatt, 4 September 1970. 
65 W032/21069, Henn's Minutes to the War Office, April 1968. Also see Webber to 
Commonwealth Office, 19 March 1968. 
66 W032/21069, Webber to Commonwealth Office, 19 March 1968. 
67 FCO15/288, Record of Meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary, Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah and Sir Omar, 7 April 1968. 
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administration. As mentioned before, when Brunei rejected the proposal to join 
Malaysia in 1963, the Malaysian government took its seconded officers in Brunei back 
to Malaysia. The Malaysian government withdrew the Malaysian Police Field Force 
unit, Malaysian officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) serving with the 
Royal Brunei Malay Regiment (RBMR) 68 When this happened, Brunei faced serious 
administrative difficulties. 9 Consequently, the Sultan requested the Commonwealth 
Secretary to assist Brunei in filling the key posts and other posts in the administration 
of the state. This was despite Britain's advice to the Sultan that he should first recruit 
officers from Malaysia. 70 To the Sultan, if Britain terminated its 1959 Agreement with 
Brunei, there would be a shortage of competent administrators to run the affairs of the 
state and if this happened, the administration of the state would be in deep trouble. ' 
When the Commonwealth Office broke the news that F. D. Webber, the High 
Commissioner, would be transferred to Australia in October 1967, the Sultan was 
concerned. The Sultan wanted Webber to stay, as he was anxious that any change in 
the-High Commissioner would assume a much tougher line by the Commonwealth 
Office over the issue of constitutional development in Brunei 72 In the Sultan's view, 
the new High Commissioner would not understand his situation, especially regarding 
constitutional development in Brunei. The Sultan moreover felt that, if Webber were 
permanently positioned in Brunei, there would be a chance that he would eventually 
empathize with the Sultan's situation. 73 In a letter to the Commonwealth Office, 
Webber claimed that, `He [the Sultan] is prepared to hear me ranting about our future 
relations and about the need for constitutional development but he would not do 
68 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 210. 
69 The lack of capable officers to run the administration of the country was also a result of the 
1962 Rebellion. Many government servants had been implicated in the rebellion and were either 
in hiding or under detention. Cited in Zariani, Escape From Berakas, p. 278. 
70 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', pp. 215 - 216. 71 Among the positions held by the British were the State Financial Officer, the Attorney General 
(who was British until 1978), the Commander Officer of the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment; the 
Commanding Officers of the Regiments' Air and Naval Wings; the Director of the Security and 
Intelligence Unit and Director of Education. Many senior posts in the Civil Service, the Police, 
Army, Customs, Education, Agricultural and Land & Mine Departments were held by British 
Nationals. Cited in Zariani, Escape From Berakas!, p. 278. 
72 W032/21069, Webber to Commonwealth Office, 7 October 1967. 
73 Ibid., 7 October 1967. 
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business with anyone else'. 4 The Sultan tried to revoke his transfer but was 
unsuccessful. 
In his letter to the Secretary of State, the Sultan urged the Secretary to reconsider 
his proposal to transfer Webber from Brunei, `as I earnestly feel that a change of High 
Commissioner at the present stage of Brunei's development will not be in the best 
interests of the State'. 5 Since the Secretary of State refused to accept the Sultan's 
proposal, the latter rejected Webber's successor, A. R. Adair. 76 Consequently, the Sultan 
was warned by the Commonwealth Office that he would be in clear breach of the 
agreement, which he wished to preserve and the British did not. 7 Although the 1959 
Agreement stipulated that the Sultan should be consulted before any appointment of 
High Commissioner was made, he did not have a veto and in the last resort the 
appointment and withdrawal of the High Commissioner was in Her Majesty's hands. 78 
Subsequently, on 4 October 1967, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III abdicated the throne. 
Here it appeared that the Sultan abdicated because the British government ignored 
his wish to retain Webber. According to a theory of the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
headquartered in London, the Sultan was resigning in `protest against the transfer from 
Brunei of the British High Commissioner, Mr. F. D. Webber'. 79 However, according to 
J. O. Moreton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office `the dispute over the 
appointment of the High Commissioner was probably only a symptom of Sir Omar's 
deeper dissatisfaction with the British policies. Indeed, he had been disturbed by the 
pressure put on him in July in London and by the decision shortly afterwards to 
withdraw British forces from the Far East'. 80 
74 Ibid., 7 October 1967. 
75 FCO24/208, Sultan to Commonwealth Office, 12 August 1967. See also in FCO24/206. 
76 FCO24/206, Secretary of State to Sultan, 2 August 1967. See also F. C. O 24/212 Internal 
Security Situation, Letter from R. M., Hunt, High Commissioner, Brunei to R. A., Hibbert, Office 
of the Political Adviser to the C-in-C, Far East, Singapore, 2nd November 1967. 
" FC024/206, N. Pritchard to Bowden, 31 August 1967. See also FCO24/206, Commonwealth 
Office to Brunei, 18 September 1967. 
78 Ibid., 18 September 1967. 
79 FC024/206, Webber to Commonwealth Office, 12 February 1968. See also in D. Leake, 
Brunei: The Modern Southeast Asian Islamic Sultanate, Kuala Lumpur, Forum, 1990, p. 56. 
80 T312/2320, Record of Meeting held in the Conference Room Commonwealth Office, Brunei: 
Future British Policy, 27 November 1967. In this month, in a further defence review, Healey 
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Following the abdication of Sultan Omar All Saifuddien, his son Hassanal Bolkiah 
Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah succeeded him to the throne. He was proclaimed as the 
twenty-ninth Sultan of Brunei on 5 October 1967. When Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah 
became ruler, the British High Commissioner continued to press him and his father who 
then became known as Sir Omar (the power behind the throne) to implement a 
democratic system of government in Brunei. Tunku Abdul Rahman also persuaded the 
High Commissioner to encourage the new Sultan to work for the implementation of a 
democratic system of government in Brunei and was optimistic that the accession of 
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah would pave the way for closer association between Brunei and 
Malaysia. 81 Tunku Abdul Rahman informed Michael Walker, the British High 
Commissioner to Malaysia, that his country would be ready to enter into discussions 
with Brunei at any time. To the Tunku it seemed clear that only through an association 
with Malaysia could Brunei have any stable long-term future. 82 
Apart from the British and Malaysian governments, the BAKER party too insisted 
that the new Sultan introduce a democratic system of government in Brunei. The 
BAKER party urged the Sultan to hold a general election in 1968, two years earlier 
than originally scheduled. 83 In October 1967, Abdul Latif, the Secretary General of the 
BAKER party, claimed that a general election to form a representative system of 
government might be held in Brunei in early 1968. This was because `the people of 
Brunei want an early election so that a representative government can be elected 
immediately'. 84 
Sir Omar immediately retaliated against the BAKER party's claim regarding the 
general election. In an interview with the reporter of the Utusan Melayu newspaper, he 
announced that the British forces in Singapore and Malaysia would be halved by 1970-71 and 
withdrawn fully between 1975 and 1977. Aden was to be evacuated immediately, although a 
British naval force was to remain in the Persian Gulf. These reductions enabled the British 
government to reduce defence costs by £300 million and to cut service manpower by 75,000 over 
the same period. Cited in A. Sked & C. Cook (4`h ed. ) Post-War Britain: A Political History 1945 
- 1992, London, Penguin, 1993, pp. 233- 234. 81 D0229/8, M. Walker to Webber, 9 October 1967. 
82 Ibid., 9 October 1967. The Commonwealth Office, on the other hand, thought that the accession 
of Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah would not mark any special turning point in the affairs of Brunei as 
the young Sultan would come under the influence of his father (cited in ibid., 7 November 1967). 
83 Utusan Melayu, 20 October 1967. 
84 Ibid., 20 October 1967. 
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stressed that Brunei would not hold a general election within ten years. 85 In addition, he 
warned Malaysia that the British forces would remain in Brunei even though Britain 
had made arrangements to withdraw its forces from Singapore and Malaysia. He further 
stated that the British government (as in the past) would be ready to assist Brunei in the 
event of attack by other countries or if there was an outbreak of incidents such as 
instigation from outside. 86 He also asserted that the Emergency Regulations in the state 
were to continue. 87 
Sir Omar's statement that an election would not be held before Britain ended its 
agreement with Brunei made the Commonwealth Office decide not to continue pressing 
the Sultan and Sir Omar to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. 
Moreover, Britain's plan to end its agreement with Brunei was approaching. The 
Commonwealth Office also felt that it had done enough in encouraging Sir Omar to 
introduce a democratic system of government and had acted in accordance with the 
advice of the Law Officers. Furthermore, the situation in Brunei had been relatively 
stable, and Britain did not expect an internal security problem in the short term-88 As a 
result, the Commonwealth Office decided to leave the constitutional set-up in Brunei as 
it was, since it offered Britain the best chance of withdrawing within the following two 
years, leaving behind a stable state. 89 However, having decided to abandon its policy of 
constitutional pressure on the Sultan, the British government had to reconsider Brunei's 
future position within Malaysia. 
At this time, the Commonwealth Office realised that to press Brunei to join the 
federation would be a risky plan unless such an association represented the wishes of 
the people of Brunei as a whole. So far, however, there was no evidence that the people 
of Brunei wanted to join Malaysia. 90 R. M. Hunt, the High Commissioner, stated in his 
letter to Reed that although perhaps in the absence of Sir Omar, Hapidz Laksmana (the 
85 Ibid, 25 October 1967. 
86 Ibid., 25 October 1967. 
87 Ibid., 25 October 1967. Under the Brunei Constitution of 1959, the Sultan could proclaim a 
state of emergency for not more than two years on an occasion of public danger existing whereby 
the security or economic life of the state of Brunei was threatened. 
88 D0229/8, Commonwealth Office to Webber, 24 October 1967. 
89 DO229/8, Walker to J. O. Moreton, 8 November 1967. 
90 Ibid., 8 November 1967. Also in FC024/236, Commonwealth Office to Webber, 28 April 1967. 
68 
President of the BAKER party), or some other politicians could lead them into 
Malaysia, he was convinced that this would be against the wishes and the interests of 
the majority of the people of Brunei. 91 
Hunt realised that the people of Brunei did not want to join Malaysia because they 
were better off materially than their counterparts in Sabah and Sarawak. 92 Bruneians 
also had a strong sense of national pride, and this feeling was stronger than in the 
Malay states of West Malaysia. That was why Azahari, the leader of the PRB, enjoyed 
overwhelming support from the people of Brunei in his campaign to upstage the 
Malaysian Plan proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1960 93 
Moreover, the Federal Government's stance towards Sabah and Sarawak since their 
entry to Malaysia in 1963 had been autocratic. In early 1967, the federal government 
had thrown the first Chief Minister of Sabah, Donald Stephens, out of office, as it had 
seen him exercising a degree of state autonomy in a manner that bordered on 
separatism. 94 Earlier in 1966, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, 
suffered a similar fate to that of Donald Stephens, and was replaced by Tawi Sili, who 
was more amenable to the directives of the federal government. 95 Stephen Kalong 
Ningkan was removed from office partly because of his objection to the pace and 
methods of implementing the national language policy in Sarawak by the federal 
government96 and because he was reluctant to `borneonize' the Sarawak Civil Service 
as most of the top posts were still in the hands of European expatriates. 7 Stephen 
91 D0229/8, R. M. Hunt to Reed, 14 November 1967. 
92 Ibid., 14 November 1967. Moreover, the people of Brunei received higher salaries for 
comparable jobs, paid less tax, received free pensions and had free education. 
93 Ibid. 14 November 1967. 
94 Andaya & Andaya (2"d), A History of Malaysia, p. 289. Donald Stephens had strong relations 
with Singapore; especially after the latter separated from the federation in 1965. This worried the 
federal government as the latter thought that Sarawak would follow Singapore (Cited in Bruce 
Ross-Larson, The politics of federalism: Syed Kechik in East Malaysia, Singapore: Bruce Ross- 
Larson, 1976, pp. 16 - 17). 9s Andaya & Andaya (2"d), A History of Malaysia, p. 289. 
96 Ibid., pp. 90 - 91. 97Sanib Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak 1946 - 1966; The Search for Unity and Political 
Ascendancy, OUP, Oxford, p. 116. 
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Kalong Ningkan was also sympathetic towards Singapore, especially after its separation 
from Malaysia where the issue of states' rights again came to the surface. 98 
According to I. Ellison of the Commonwealth Office, what happened in Sarawak 
and Sabah had served to convince the people of Brunei even more firmly that Sir Omar 
was right in keeping Brunei out of Malaysia, and they certainly had no wish to be 
treated in a similar fashion by the government in Kuala Lumpur. Moreover, if the 
Sultan and his people were forced to enter the federation, Ellison feared that it would 
create instability, as had occurred in South Arabia and Nigeria. 99Although in those 
countries the political situations were different to Brunei, the Commonwealth Office 
was however cautious on the success of the federation if Brunei were to enter it. So far 
the federations of Nigeria and South Arabia had experienced difficulties. '°° 
The Federation of Malaysia itself experienced the secession of Singapore from 
Malaysia in 1965. Since Singapore's admission into Malaysia, the federal government 
had encountered difficulties with Singapore which was predominantly Chinese. The 
union of Malaya, which was predominantly Malay, with Singapore had been marred by 
increasing conflict over whether the new federation should be a truly multiracial society 
or one dominated by Malays. The disagreements between the Chinese and the Malays 
98 Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism, p. 36 - 7. 99 FC024/222, I. Ellison to Reed, 21 November 1967. 
100 In Nigeria, the situation became out of control because from the beginning, it had problems 
over ethnic, regional and religious differences. Moreover, there were disparities in economic and 
educational development between North and South. The National Elections which were held in 
1965 projected a major realignment of politics and a disputed result that led the country into a 
civil war. The eastern region, which increasingly felt itself to be a troubled state, clamoured for 
secession from the federation. When Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwa, the military commander of the 
eastern region, declared the independence of Biafra on 30 May 1967, the war between the east 
and the rest of the federation occurred (See See Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Nigeria, London, 
Longman 1983 & John Hatch, Nigeria: A History, London, Heinemann Educational, 1971). In 
South Arabia, the Federation of South Arabia was facing a difficult situation after the British 
announced that they would leave Aden not later than 1968. As a result of Britain's decision to 
leave Aden, nationalist bodies began to compete for power and each was hoping that they would 
be the rulers of the country when the British withdrew. The two major rival organizations which 
emerged in the aftermath of the federation, the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for 
the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), caused mayhem in the federation. By late 
1967, the NLF had become the dominant group and forced the collapse of the federal 
government. British forces were withdrawn in November, 1967, and Aden and South Arabia 
became the independent state of South Yemen. South Yemen and (northern) Yemen united as a 
single nation in 1990 (See Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, Cambridge, CUP, 2000 & 
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led to riots where many Chinese and Malays were killed. Although the riots were 
eventually put down, tension between the two communities continued. Since the 
situation between Malaya and Singapore was deteriorating rather than improving, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, soon doubted about the merger. 
To prevent more bloodshed and rioting, he decided that Singapore should leave 
Malaysia. On 9 August 1965, Singapore was separated from Malaysia. 101 
To the Commonwealth Office, as far as Brunei was concerned, the Sultan and his 
people were generally suspicious of Malaysia. The Commonwealth Office felt that if 
the Malaysians were interested in attracting the Sultanate into some sort of association 
with them, they would have to adopt a far more forthcoming and flexible policy 
towards Brunei. Firstly, according to Ellison, if they could be less autocratic in 
governing Sarawak and Sabah and consider the interests of the peoples of those states, 
they would convince the people of Brunei of the advantages of joining the federation. 102 
Secondly, giving Brunei some form of special status in the federation would 
probably persuade the Sultan to join Malaysia. For example, Malaysia could allow 
Brunei to keep its oil revenues and exempt it from most federal taxation. Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, however, would not agree to this, insisting that Brunei must be ready to accept 
`normal obligationsi103 like other states in the federation. According to Tunku, the basic 
principles within the Federation of Malaysia allowed for no special exception; all 
member states had equal duties, rights and responsibilities to the Central Government 
as units of the federation. Tunku could not see how `normal obligations' could be 
achieved successfully without dangerous repercussions for some of the other states in 
Malaysia, which had to shoulder their `normal obligations' as normal members. 104 
Since this flexible policy was not forthcoming, the Commonwealth Office decided 
to grant Brunei full independence and to allow Brunei to make up its own mind as to 
101 See Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, Prentice 
Hall, 1998 & Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First; The Singapore Story, 1965 - 2000; 
Singapore and the Asian economic boom, New York, HarperCollins Publishers, 2000 for the 
event of Singapore's secession from Malaysia. 
102 FC024/222, I. Ellison to Reed, 21 November 1967. 
103 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 151. 
104 D0229/8, Walker to Commonwealth Office, 17 October 1967. 
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whether it wished to enter into some sort of association with Malaysia. 105 The 
Commonwealth Office, however, had no desire to discourage Malaysia's long-term 
interest in the future of Brunei. 106 If the people of Brunei wished there to be some form 
of association with Malaysia, the British would consider it as entirely suitable but 
would not force the pace. 107 In 1967, a British Minister had declared that 
`decolonization cannot consist in the transfer of one population, however small, to the 
rule of another country, without regard to their own opinions and interests'. 108 
The Commonwealth Office also thought that when giving notice of termination it 
was not the elected politicians that the British had to deal with but the ex-Sultan (Sir 
Omar). The Commonwealth Office also thought that it had no authority to insist on 
constitutional advance in the Sultanate before or after the British gave notice 109(as 
Brunei was not a British colony) and that Sir Omar was the right horse to back, not 
Hapidz Laksmana (whom the Malaysians were also backing). ' 10 
However, the Commonwealth Office never revealed to the Malaysian government 
that it had abandoned its efforts in urging the Sultan to implement the system and to 
bring Brunei within Malaysia as such an admission could have upset Malaysia. , This 
was because Tunku Abdul Rahman believed that Britain had the means to exert real 
pressure for constitutional development in Brunei. 112 Moreover, Michael Walker, the 
British High Commissioner, believed that if Tunku found out that Britain had 
abandoned its policy, he would suspect Britain was working against the inclusion of 
Brunei into Malaysia and this would damage the relations between Britain and 
Malaysia. ' 13 In Walker's meeting with the Tunku, he however gave a hint to the Tunku 
that Britain's long-term policy towards Brunei was `to give Brunei its independence 
105 D0229/8, Commonwealth Office to Webber, 24 October 1967. 
106 D0229/8, Commonwealth Office to British High Commissioner to Brunei, 24 October 1967. 
107 D0229/8, British High Commissioner to Malaysia to British High Commissioner to Brunei, 7 
November 1967. 
108 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat From Empire in the Post War-World, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, p. 309. 
109 FCO15/288, Brunei - Medium and Long Term Policy, 8 November 1967. 10 D0229/8, R. M. Hunt to A. H. Reed, 14 November 1967. 
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112 D0229/8, British High Commissioner to Malaysia to J. O. Moreton, 8 November 1967. 
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and if at that time the wish of the people of Brunei was that there should be one form of 
association with Malaysia, we should regard that as entirely suitable', but Britain would 
not force the pace. 114 
On 7 April 1968, George Thomson, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Affairs, clarified to the Sultan and Sir Omar the British stance regarding constitutional 
progress in Brunei. He made it clear to them that, `the British Government did not 
think it right to offer formal advice recommending changes which the Sultan judged to 
be against Brunei's best interest'. 115 Nevertheless, he hoped that the Sultan and Sir 
Omar would feel it right to encourage some changes. 116 
Sir Omar was content with Britain's decision not to press him and his son any 
longer to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei, as it freed them 
from constitutional pressure and thus enabled them to preserve the power of the 
monarch and prevent Brunei from entering Malaysia. Nevertheless, the Sultan and Sir 
Omar continued to face demands from the BAKER party to implement a democratic 
system of government in Brunei. This was despite the fact that the BAKER party (the 
only solid political party in Brunei) failed to win many votes in the 1968 District 
Council elections. In the elections, the BAKER party won only 24 seats out of 55 
seats117 where it had polled only 30 per cent of the votes, with 70 per cent going to 
independent candidates. ' 18 
'" Tunku agreed that it was wise to proceed cautiously and that it would be a mistake to force the 
pace. He was confident that once Britain had withdrawn from Brunei, Sir Omar and the Sultan 
would look increasingly towards Malaysia for defence assistance. Tunku further added that they 
would not be able to maintain their position by relying on mercenaries, since this would show that 
they were unwilling to trust their own people (cited in D0229/8, British High Commissioner to 
Malaysia to British High Commissioner to Brunei, 7 November 1967). 
115 FCO15/288, Record of Meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary, Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah and Sir Omar, 7 April 1968. 
116 According to M. Leigh, the slogan `no independence before majority rule' which was of 
cardinal importance to Britain in former days, seemed to have been overlooked as the UK sought 
to free itself of its colonial remnants (cited in Michael B. Leigh, `Independence For Brunei', 
Current Affairs Bulletin, (60), 1,1983, p. 19). 
117 BA/0561/1983 (SUK Series 3, Box 42), `Election and Organization', Tambahan (Appendix) A 
to C, in Matnor McAfee, Penyelia Pilehan Raya (The Commissioner of Elections) to Pengarah 
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During the Legislative Council Meeting in May 1968, Zainal Abidin Puteh, the 
BAKER party's Secretary-General II, had put forward a proposal demanding the 
implementation of a democratic system of government in and independence for Brunei. 
In the meeting, he demanded that the government carry out a survey to find out the 
people's aspirations for constitutional development and independence. ' 19 In May 1968, 
a representative of the Information Section of the BAKER party Pengiran Mohammad 
Samli bin Pengiran Lahab also demanded that the Brunei government implement a 
democratic system of government in Brunei. 120 The BAKER party's continuous calls 
for the implementation of a democratic system of government worried the Sultan and 
Sir Omar and their concern grew when the British informed them about the end of the 
agreement and the withdrawal of the British Gurkha battalion from Brunei. 
3.3. Brunei's efforts to seek continuous defence safeguards 
On 30 September 1968, in the meeting between George Thomson, the Sultan and 
Sir Omar, Thomson formally notified the Sultan and Sir Omar about the end of the 
agreement and the withdrawal of the British Gurkha battalion from the Sultanate. 121 
Indeed, after Healey's announcement in July 1967 (that the British forces in Singapore 
would be halved by 1970-71 and withdrawn completely between 1975 and 1977), the 
British government continued its review of overseas spending and services manpower 
to see whether further economies could be made. 122 On 18 November 1967, however, 
the British government had to bow to economic pressure resulting from devaluation. 123 
119 Pelita Brunei, 29 May, 1968. 
120 Bintang Harian (Daily Star), 25 May, 1968. 
121PREM13/3181, George Thomson to Prime Minister, 27 September 1968. Thomson also wrote a 
letter to Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah reminding him about the end of Britain's agreement with 
Brunei. In his letter he stated that British responsibilities under the 1959 Anglo-Brunei 
Agreement and the other treaties and agreements referred to in the Article 9(2) of the Agreement 
would be relinquished on 30 November 1970. Cited in PREM13/3181, Thomson to Sultan 
Hassanal Bolkiah, 18 October 1968. For the full text of the letter see Appendix VI. 
122 M. Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 95. 
123 The decision to devalue was seen by many as inevitable: according to C. J. Bartlett, `it is 
difficult to see how devaluation could have been avoided if not in November 1967, then a little 
later' (cited in C. J. Bartlett, A History of Post War Britain, 1945 - 1974, London, Longman, p. 
230). 
74 
In December 1967, another significant decision was taken when Harold Wilson 
made a statement in the House of Commons announcing a review of public expenditure 
in which `no area of expenditure [could] be regarded as sacrosanct. ' 124 This implied 
that defence cuts would be made along with cuts in other areas of government 
spending. In January 1968, Healey stated that the defence capability would be directed 
primarily towards Europe. Moreover, after its withdrawal from the Far East was 
completed, Britain should not be expected to `do more to contribute towards the 
security of independent states outside Europe than any other European power'. 125 This 
was indeed a major shift from the previous plan whereby Britain had intended to 
maintain its defence capability outside Europe even after withdrawing from east of 
Suez in the mid-1970s. 
On 16 January 1968, another major shift from the previous plan was made whereby 
the Wilson government decided to accelerate the final date for withdrawal from 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 instead of by the mid- 
1970s. In the case of Brunei, Britain decided to withdraw from the Sultanate earlier 
than from Singapore, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf, and that was in November 
1970.126 
Sir Omar, however, argued persistently that Brunei was not yet ready for 
independence. He stressed that the British government should continue its protection 
124 Times, 19 December 1967. 
125 Cmnd. 3515, Public Expenditure in 1968-69 and 1969-70, London: H. M. S. O., 1968. Cited in 
McDougall, `The Wilson Government', p. 238. 
126 Prior to this, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had planned to give two years' notice in 
March 1968 of the termination of the 1959 Agreement that is in March 1970, earlier than the 
scheduled withdrawal from east of Suez by 1971. Malcolm MacDonald, the former UK 
Commissioner General in Southeast Asia in the 1950s, however, suggested that two years' notice 
of the termination of the agreement should be postponed at least until towards the end of 1968 
and if possible until about the end of 1969, so that termination came nearer the time when British 
troops withdrew from Southeast Asia at the end of 1971. MacDonald suggested this to avoid 
doubts among the Southeast Asian countries about Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from 
east of Suez by 1971. If Britain withdrew from Brunei in March 1970, other countries in 
Southeast Asia might suspect that the British were withdrawing from Southeast Asia earlier than 
the date of withdrawal by 1971 (cited in FC024/236, MacDonald to Thomson, 14 March 1968). 
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over Brunei, and if that were not possible, he urged Britain to find an alternative 
arrangement for the protection of Brunei. 127 
Indeed the British withdrawal from the Far East was persistently protested against 
not only by Sir Omar but also by leaders of the countries of Singapore, Malaysia, 
Australia and New Zealand who had defence agreements with Britain. Lee Kuan Yew, 
the prime minister of Singapore, argued that Britain's decision to withdraw its forces 
from the Far East would affect not only the security of a small island state but also the 
economy of Singapore as 46,000 local people were directly and indirectly employed by 
the forces. 128Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaysia, further argued that 
the British withdrawal would leave the new federation weakly defended. 129 A 
Malaysian minister had also reportedly commented that Malaysia would never have 
taken Sabah and Sarawak if Malaya had known in 1963 that the British would 
withdraw from the region. ' 30 
The Australian Prime Minister John Grey Gorton too argued that the continued 
presence of British forces in Malaysia and Singapore could provide a greater 
contribution to peace and security than the deployment of forces in the European 
region. He also stressed that if economic considerations led the British government to 
its present proposals, `it might be preferable to make savings in some other areas than 
those of Malaysia and Singapore. ' 131 
Although the British withdrawal from the Far East was persistently argued against 
by the leaders of these countries, the British government planned for a conference in 
June 1969 where Britain would discuss future defence arrangements with Australia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. The conference was planned to find another 
127 PREM13/3181, George Thomson to Prime Minister, 27 September 1968. In October 1968, the 
Sultan replied to the letter of George Thomson dated 18 October 1968 where the Sultan stated his 
disagreement to Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei in November 1970. For the 
full text of the letter see Appendix VII. 
128 Times, 17 April 1967. 
129 Ibid., 8 July 1967. 
130 Ibid., 8 January 1967. 
131 Ibid., 12 January 1968. 
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way of protecting Malaysia and Singapore when Britain pulled out its forces from the 
Far East. ' 32 
Britain also offered to provide help in running the air-defence radar environment 
which was shared by Singapore and Malaysia. Further aid programmes for Singapore 
and Malaysia would be discussed to ease the economic impact of the accelerated 
withdrawal from the area. 133 In the case of Brunei, Thomson offered the Sultan the 
possibility of opening negotiations for a new Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation 
between Brunei and Britain, which set out ways in which Britain would continue to 
assist Brunei in the military field when it became independent. 134 
Under the new treaty, Britain would second its military personnel to the armed 
forces of Brunei and advise them on organisation and methods for increasing their 
effectiveness. The British would help with the selection of civil military personnel to 
serve under contract with the Brunei government. It would also train Brunei officers, 
second them to British units and train police officers. In addition, Britain would 
occasionally send a unit for training in the same way that it did in a number of 
countries, and would help Brunei in the supply of military equipment. 135 
Furthermore, the British government would assist Brunei in its external relations by 
advising Brunei on the establishment and organization of a diplomatic mission in 
London and offering a selection of accommodation. The mission in London would give 
Brunei diplomatic access to almost every other country in the world. In addition, it 
would train Brunei's personnel in the workings of a diplomatic mission, and would act 
as a channel of communication with foreign or Commonwealth governments other than 
Brunei's immediate neighbours. 136 However, since the agreement did not involve any 
continuous defence commitments to Brunei, Sir Omar deferred any decision because 
his main concern was the defence of Brunei after Britain ended its military protection 
over the Sultanate. 137 
132 See Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security 
Sstem 1957-1971, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
131 Times, 17 January 1968. 
134 PREM13/3181, George Thomson to Prime Minister, 27 September 1968. 
131 Ibid., 27 September 1968. 
136 Ibid., 27 September 1968. 
137 Ibid., 27 September 1968. 
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Sir Omar again enquired as to the possibility of continuing defence safeguards 
made available to Brunei; Thomson persistently said that this was impossible. The 
Commonwealth Office, however, tried to associate Brunei with regional military co- 
operation, which would be discussed at a conference in June 1969 with Australia, New 
Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia - which then became known as the Five-Power 
Conference. 138 Britain was trying not to establish a formal defence commitment to 
Brunei but to bring Brunei by the time it became fully independent into some form of 
association with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia (so that the 
defence problems of the area could be viewed as a whole). '39 
It should be borne in mind that, in 1967, the issue of the defence of Brunei within 
the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement created a problem for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. If Brunei joined Malaysia, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office thought that it would not be difficult to extend the Anglo-Malaysian defence 
agreement to Brunei. The British at first thought that the Anglo-Malaysian defence 
agreement should exclude east Malaysia to ensure that the British would not fall into 
the Borneo hook. 140 In 1968, however, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office felt that 
if Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia were considering the 
defence of Malaysia and Singapore, it was necessary to take into account what was 
happening in the North Borneo area if the general picture were to be complete. '4' 
The British initially consulted Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia 
before the conference was held to hear their views on this matter. British consultations 
regarding Brunei's associations with these countries began in December 1968. When 
Britain consulted Australia, the latter was not in favour of including Brunei in the 
forthcoming conference. Australia's decision stemmed from its profound reluctance to 
become involved in any way in the defence of east Malaysia, and it felt strongly that 
Brunei's future lay logically in some form of association with Malaysia. 142 Although 
Britain informed Australia that this was not possible because Brunei did not trust 
138 Ibid., 27 September 1968. 
139 W032/21069, F. Cooper to Moreton, 20 November 1967. 
140 Ibid., 20 November 1967. 
141 FC024/429/1, Moreton to D. P. Aires, 8 January 1968. 
142 FC024/429/1, Adair to Aires, 4 January 1969. 
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Malaysia, Australia stressed that Brunei had to be convinced that its future defence 
rested on co-operation with Malaysia. In other words, Malaysia and Brunei should co- 
operate with regard to the defence of Borneo, and the other countries in the region 
should not get involved. '43 
New Zealand, on the other hand, considered that it would be premature to bring 
Brunei under the Five-Power Defence Arrangements until it had developed politically 
and had achieved independence, and raised the question of constitutional development 
and the type of government in Brunei. 144 Britain maintained that these issues had 
nothing to do with the problem of the defence of the region after it withdrew from 
South-East Asia. Britain felt that New Zealand was trying to evade discussions to bring 
Brunei under the Five-Power Defence Arrangement by raising the question of 
constitutional advance in Brunei. '45 
When Britain consulted Malaysia, the latter did not favour raising the subject in the 
Five Power Forum. According to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Malaysian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, had confirmed that the issue of Brunei would not be mentioned in 
the Five-Power Conference by Malaysia. 146 The Malaysian government did not think 
that that the issue of Brunei should be discussed 147as Brunei was certain to enter 
Malaysia. According to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, there was no need for the five powers 
to take a major initiative because Brunei was almost `bound to fall into their hands. ' 148 
Singapore, which had economic interests in Brunei, asked Britain if it was 
necessary for the latter to withdraw from Brunei completely. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime 
Minister of Singapore, wanted as far as possible for Britain to continue its protection 
over Brunei. '49 Lee Kuan Yew was also not enthusiastic about Brunei being associated 
'a' Ibid., 4 January 1969. 
144 Ibid., 4 January 1969. 
las Ibid., 4 January 1969. 
146 FC024/429/1, Record of Conversation between the High Commissioner and Tan Sri Ghazali 
Shafie, 21 February 1969 at the Wisma Putera. 
147 FC024/429/1, Future of Brunei, London Discussions September/October 1968. 
148 FC024/4291/1, Breton to Ward, 10 April 1969. 
149 In this case, Lee Kuan Yew suggested Britain should continue its agreement with Brunei for 
the next decade, saying that Britain did not have to maintain a permanent military presence there. 
He believed that the Sultan would be content if Britain showed its flag there once in a while, but 
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with Malaysia, as he was apprehensive that Singapore's economic interests in Brunei 
would be affected. '5° 
During this period, Singapore began to form closer relationships with Brunei in 
economic and diplomatic matters, 151 as Brunei increasingly turned towards Singapore 
for friendly co-operation. 152 In October 1968, De La Mare, the British High 
Commissioner to Singapore, mentioned that it seemed as if Lee would welcome the 
Sultan's rejection of any possibility of association with Malaysia. In December, S. 
Rajaratnam, Singapore's Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked De La Mare again whether 
Britain was going to advise the Sultan to establish an association with Malaysia. De La 
Mare replied that Britain did not intend to press him, but rather to make him ponder the 
reality of Britain's departure, which Rajaratnam agreed, was the wisest course. 153 
It was obvious that none of these countries was willing to discuss the future of 
Brunei's defence in the coming conference. 154 J. O. Moreton of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office thought that it could be possible to have a joint declaration by 
Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia that they respected one 
another's territorial integrity, and that of Brunei. However, since the soundings of 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia indicated a clear desire not to bring 
Brunei into the conference, the Commonwealth Office did not pursue the idea any 
further. '55 
Accordingly the Sultan was informed by Thomson after the conference in June 
1969 in Canberra, Australia of the outcome of the meeting of the Five-Power nations 
(where none of them brought up the issue of Brunei in their defence of the region in the 
this should happen for a long time (cited in FC024/429/1, A. De La Mare to Commonwealth 
Office, 1 October 1968). 
150 Cited in FC024/429/1, A. De La Mare to Commonwealth Office, 1 October 1968. 
151 Straits Echo, 13 August 1965 (cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and 
Britain, p. 337). 
152 The first Singapore team to visit Brunei consisted of three technical education experts who 
were invited by the Bruneian Government, in August 1966, to provide consultation in the 
planning and setting up of three technical schools -a building construction school in Brunei 
Town, an engineering technical training school in Kuala Belait and a vocational secondary school 
in Tutong. Malay Mail, 13 August 1966. 
153 FCO24/222, A. De La Mare to Commonwealth Office, 1 October 1968. 
154 FCO24/429/1, Moreton to Walker, 7 February 1969. 
155 Ibid., 7 February 1969. 
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meeting). 156 Sir Omar, however, had never been interested in participating in the 
deliberation. He was not interested in associating Brunei with the Five-Power nations in 
the field of defence, as he distrusted Malaysia. Colin Bickler, a Reuters correspondent, 
who had an audience with Sir Omar on 7 April 1969, told A. R. Adair, the British High 
Commissioner, that Sir Omar had made it clear to him that `Brunei would have nothing 
whatsoever to do with any form of closer association with Malaysia'. He stressed that 
Brunei was `not interested in being associated with the Five Power Talks' and `would 
seek continuous British military protection'. 157 Sir Omar in an interview said that `it 
would be most unwise of the Brunei Government to accept the withdrawal without 
making strenuous representations. ' 158 
Sir Omar, who felt that the British had not satisfied their wishes for reassurances on 
defence, put forward arguments about Britain's decision to end its agreement with 
Brunei to Michael Stewart, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs'59in December 1969. Sir Omar argued for the first time that the notice given by 
Britain to terminate the 1959 Agreement was invalid, as there was no provision for 
termination in the agreement itself. In response, Michael Stewart declared firmly that 
the British view remained unchanged. He stressed that Britain was entitled to relinquish 
its powers and responsibilities in this way. Sir Omar, although obviously disappointed, 
did not contest this point. 160 
For the first time, Sir Omar also reminded Britain that Brunei had remained loyal to 
the sterling, despite the devaluation. 161 This reminder was intended as a hint to the 
British that such loyalty would not be repeated if independence were forced upon 
Brunei in November 1970. It is worth noting here that, during the devaluation of the 
sterling in November 1967, the value in Brunei dollars of the sterling investments and 
156 FC024/429/1, Adair to Aires, 8 April, 1969. 
's' Ibid., 8 April, 1969. 
ýs$ The Guardian, 8 April 1969. 
's9 A position which came into existence with the merger of the positions of Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, and their associated 
departments, into a single Department of State in October 1968. 
160 T312/3128, J. A. Marshall to Barratt, 18 December 1969. 
161 Ibid., 18 December 1969. 
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other sterling balances was reduced by $121,289,327.95.162 Despite this, Brunei did not 
withdraw or end its sterling investments in London. The British delegation, however, 
did not make any response on this matter. 163 
As mentioned before, Britain wanted to end the agreement as far as possible on the 
basis of mutual consent rather than by unilateral abrogation. This was to ensure that the 
agreement could be ended smoothly without jeopardizing the stability of the state and 
British economic interests in Brunei. Britain was concerned that the Sultan and Sir 
Omar might retaliate by withdrawing Brunei's sterling reserve from the Bank of 
England in London. 164 
In the 1960s, many former colonies gradually decreased their London balances as a 
sign of independence and in reaction to local demands. 165 During the colonial period, 
the British territories insisted on keeping their foreign earnings in London and on 
having their local currencies regulated so as to conform to British practice. The habit of 
keeping substantial sterling balances in London facilitated commercial and investment 
links with Britain. 166 However, in the 1960s many former British colonies increasingly 
reduced their London balances. In Brunei's case, the British were apprehensive that the 
Sultanate would withdraw its sterling balances from London. 167 
At a meeting on 22 December 1969 at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 
London, Sir Omar asked Michael Stewart whether Britain could agree to the proposal 
for joint responsibility for Brunei's defence and repeated his plea that Britain should 
continue its protection over Brunei. 168 Stewart, however, made it clear that Britain 
could not agree to the proposal for joint responsibility for defence, as this was not 
compatible with the relinquishment of British responsibilities under the 1959 
162 Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1967 
163 See DO169/553, Cabinet, Defence and Overseas Committee, `Brunei - Future Policy', I 
November 1966. Also see PREM13/3181, Brunei - Future Policy, G. Thomson to Prime 
Minister, 21 September 1967. 
164 Ibid. 
165 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization, p. 305. 
166 Ibid., p. 305. 
167 As stated before, in 1966, the Brunei government held reserves in London, which amounted to 
£133 million (which is approximately £800 million at 2005 prices). 
168 OD39/89, Record of Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and His 
Highness the Sultan of Brunei at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 December 1969. 
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Agreement. Stewart proposed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation under which, if 
Brunei agreed, Britain would be willing to continue its defence protection over Brunei 
until 197 1.169 The British government also offered Lee Kuan Yew the same period of 
extension for the presence of the British military in Singapore. 170 Sir Omar, however, 
rejected Stewart's proposal, as it did not cover the defence of Brunei adequately. 171 
Since the meeting did not produce any acceptable solutions, the Sultan and Sir 
Omar worked out a formula to resolve the problems of Brunei's future defence, which 
the Sultan sent to Stewart in January 1970.172 In the proposal, the Sultan stated that, 
since Britain was not prepared to go beyond the proposed Treaty of Friendship and Co- 
operation by having a new agreement for the defence and protection of Brunei, the 
Sultan suggested that Brunei would be content to `accept a commitment that Her 
Majesty's Government would use its best endeavours to protect Brunei 9 .1 
73 
Additionally, in the context of `shared responsibility' for Brunei's defence, the Sultan 
suggested that the decision on possible British assistance could be a matter for 
consultation between the two governments. 174 Since Britain could not prolong its 
commitment for economic reasons, the Sultan declared that Brunei was prepared to 
accept the financial consequences of his proposal. 175 Stewart, however, could not 
accept the Sultan's proposal. This was because the concept of `shared responsibility' 
for the defence of Brunei was not compatible with the relinquishment of British 
responsibilities over Brunei. 176 
In the meeting on 7 April 1970 between Lord Shepherd Minister of State for the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Sultan and his delegation in Brunei, the 
Sultan's delegation tabled another proposal to Lord Shepherd, where they suggested 
that British protection over Brunei should be extended for a fixed period of years. They 
169 Ibid., 22 December 1969. 
170 Times, 17 January 1968. 
171 OD39/89, Record of Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and His 
Highness the Sultan of Brunei at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 December 1969. 
172 FC024/730, Sultan of Brunei to M. Stewart, 29 January 1970. 
173 Ibid., 29 January 1970. 
174 Ibid., 29 January 1970. 
175 Ibid., 29 January 1970. For the full text of the correspondence see Appendix VIII. 
176 FC024/725, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
19 March 1970. 
83 
recommended that the length of this period was a matter to be discussed when an 
agreement had been reached. During the period of extension, Britain would have 
complete control over Brunei's external affairs, and the defence of Brunei would be a 
responsibility to be shared between Britain and Brunei. In the event or threat of an 
armed attack on Brunei, the two governments would `consult together for the purpose 
of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately to deal with such an 
attack or threat'. 177 Britain would also be entitled to `render immediate assistance in the 
suppression of any organised threat or attempt to overthrow the Government of 
Brunei'. '78 In addition, Brunei would not object to Britain requiring a right, on 
reasonable notice, `to terminate the extended period of protection short of its original 
fixed length. ' 179 However, none of these suggestions was agreeable to Lord Shepherd. 
For example, in the case of `shared responsibility' in the defence of Brunei, the British 
government's views were clear and unequivocal, namely that the responsibility for the 
defence of Brunei must, and should, lie with the Brunei government. '80 
In the same month, the Sultan asked the Nepalese Government whether it could 
provide a Gurkha battalion at the Sultanate's expense, 181 A. R. H. Kellas, the British 
High Commissioner in Kathmandu, however, informed I. J. M. Sutherland at the South 
Asian Department that there was no chance of sending Gurkhas to Brunei. 182In June 
1967, when Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien tried to recruit a Gurkha army from Nepal, the 
Nepalese government turned him down despite being informed by the Commonwealth 
Office that it was in favour of the idea. Among the reasons given by the Nepalese 
government for rejecting the Sultan's request was its embarrassment at providing a 
mercenary force, even though it recognised the special position of Britain in recruiting 
the Gurkhas. Another reason was its shortage of manpower in relation to Nepal's 
"' FC024/730, Record of Meeting between Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, and the Sultan of Brunei at the Istana Darul Hana - Annex I, Brunei 
Proposals, 7 April 1970. 
178 Ibid., 7 April 1970. 
19 Ibid., 7 April 1970. 
180 Ibid., 7 April 1970. 
181 Ibid., 7 April 1970. 
182 FC024/739, A. R. H. Kellas to I. J. M. Sutherland, 19 January 1970. 
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economic development plans, although this reason was considered not altogether valid 
by the British ambassador in Kathmandu. 183 
The reasons for King Mahendra not allowing the Sultan to recruit the Gurkhas from 
Nepal were that he did not want to appear to be committed to supporting the Sultan's 
regime and that he was against the use of the Gurkhas to suppress domestic upheavals. 
The fact that there was a similarity between the Sultan and King Mahendra's system of 
incomplete democracy made him more sensitive on this matter. King Mahendra did not 
want his African and Asian counterparts to accuse him of providing mercenaries to 
support the Sultan's archaic regime. It was for these reasons that King Mahendra 
declined to allow the Sultan to recruit Gurkhas in Nepal, even though he realised the 
financial advantages of his proposal. ' 84 
In May 1970, when the Ministry of Defence drew up a schedule for the withdrawal 
of the battalion from Brunei, Michael Stewart decided to inform the Sultan of the time 
of the withdrawal of the Gurkha battalion from Brunei. This was to convince the Sultan 
and Sir Omar that there was no wavering in Britain's policy to withdraw its Gurkha 
battalion from Brunei and to end its military protection over the Sultanate. 185 The 
battalion was to leave Brunei in stages, on 17 and 27 November, and on 2 and 7 
December 1970. The battalion would not be in operation for about four weeks before 
the final withdrawal, but operational commitments up until 30 November could be met 
from Singapore. 186 Britain would also not open talks with Brunei in advance of the 
UK's general election on 18 June 1970.187 Therefore, up until April 1970, no agreement 
was reached between Brunei and the British government. All Sir Omar and Sultan 
Hassanal Bolkiah's efforts to retain continuous British protection and to seek a new 
183 FC024/435, W. A. Ward to O'Leary, 28 August 1969. 
184New Statesman, 21 May 1971 (Cited in FC037/826). The Gurkhas played an important role in 
the Nepalese economy. The cash flow derived from annual pensions, remittances to families, or 
monies taken home in a lump sump by discharged veterans or by service personnel on leave 
represented a major source of the country's foreign exchange (Cited in www. country- 
data. com/cgi-bin/query/r-9181. html). 
185 FC024/739, Commander in Chief for the Far East (CICFE) to the Ministry of Defence, May 
1970. 
186 Ibid., May 1970. 
187 FC024/739, M. Stewart to Adair, 26 May 1970. 
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defence arrangement with Britain had thus failed, as the Labour government was 
committed to end its agreement with Brunei. 
3.4. Conclusion 
As a result of Britain's decision to end its 1959 Agreement with Brunei, the Sultan 
came under more pressure from the British to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei. The study has argued that the reason for the Sultan's refusal to 
implement a democratic system of government in Brunei was that it would reduce the 
power of the monarch and bring Brunei into Malaysia. Because of Britain's continuous 
pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei and 
Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei, the Sultan abdicated the throne in 
October 1967. 
In 1968, however, the British government abandoned its efforts to urge the Sultan 
and Sir Omar to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei since they 
refused to implement the system and since Britain's withdrawal from Brunei was 
imminent. Following Britain's cessation of its efforts to press the Sultan and Sir Omar 
to implement a democratic system of government, Britain also abandoned its aim to 
bring Brunei within the federation. Nevertheless, Britain upheld its decision to end its 
agreement with Brunei. This study has shown that the Sultan and Sir Omar did not want 
Britain to end its agreement with Brunei as they were apprehensive that Brunei would 
not be able to protect itself from any internal and external threats or attacks (because of 
its small population and small army). In this situation, the Sultan and Sir Omar were 
particularly concerned over Malaysia, which still wanted to bring Brunei within the 
federation, and Indonesia, which had not clarified its policy towards the Sultanate after 
the end of Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in 1966. The Sultan and Sir Omar also did 
not want Britain to end its agreement with Brunei as the people of Brunei could not 
provide enough skilled officers to run the administration of the state. 
Consequently, the Sultan and Sir Omar proposed that Britain extend its military 
protection over the Sultanate. This study has shown that the Sultan and Sir Omar were 
unrelenting in their desire to retain British protection over the Sultanate, proposing that 
Britain be jointly responsible with Brunei over the latter's defence. However, their 
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proposal was rejected as Britain was committed to ending its agreement with Brunei in 
November 1970. When the Sultan proposed to hire a Gurkha battalion from the King of 
Nepal, the King rejected the Sultan's proposal as the King did not want to be accused 
by international communities of supporting an autocratic regime. This study has also 
shown that the Sultan and Sir Omar were persistent in rejecting the British offer of a 
new treaty between Brunei and Britain as it did not include the defence of Brunei. 
When Britain consulted Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore as to the 
possibility of including Brunei in the Five-Power Conference in June 1969, they were 
not interested in doing so. This study has shown that Sir Omar was never interested in 
associating Brunei with the Five-Power nations over the defence of the region because 
of his distrust of Malaysia. 
The Conservative Party which came to power in June 1970, however, reversed the 
Labour government's decision as it was willing to have consultative responsibility over 
Brunei's defence. This, however, caused the BAKER party to appeal to the UN to 
sponsor the independence of Brunei. Their appeal in turn posed further challenges and 
problems for the Sultan and Sir Omar as they were not ready to proclaim independence 
for Brunei. The next chapter will look into the coming of the Conservative Party to 
power, the reversal of policy of the Labour government, the BAKER party's call to the 
UN for Brunei's independence and the Sultan and Sir Omar's response. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Brunei and the British Reversal of Policy: 
1970-1972 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine the challenges and difficulties faced by the Sultanate 
following the reversal of policy east of Suez by the Conservative Party when it came to 
power in Britain in June 1970. This study will first look into the reversal of policy by 
the Conservative government towards Brunei, the signing of the 1971 Agreement 
between Brunei and Britain, and its terms and significance to the Sultanate. By the 
signing of this agreement, Brunei's defence became the consultative responsibility of 
both Britain and Brunei and Brunei's external affairs came under Britain's full control. 
By this agreement, the British government terminated its responsibility for advising the 
Sultan on the internal affairs of the state. Indeed this term reduced the possibility of 
continued pressure for constitutional reform in Brunei which was welcomed by the 
Sultan and Sir Omar. 
The BAKER party, however, upon hearing that Brunei would not gain its 
independence in November 1970, sent a memorandum to the UN calling upon the 
world organization to assist Brunei in achieving independence. The BAKER party also 
continued to urge the British and the Sultan to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei. This was indeed a challenge to the Sultan and Sir Omar as they 
did not want to achieve either matter. As the repeated calls of the BAKER party to the 
UN could have put pressure on the British to relinquish their remaining responsibilities 
towards Brunei, the Sultan and Sir Omar implemented tough measures to put an end to 
the BAKER party's political activities. 
This study will show that the Sultan and Sir Omar ended the BAKER party's 
political activities and the prospect of democracy in Brunei by cancelling the District 
and Legislative Council elections and by continuing the state of emergency in Brunei. 
This study will also show that Britain's inability to persuade the Sultan to implement 
the system, the people's lack of interest in democracy and the lack of credibility of the 
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parties' leaders in organising their parties were further reasons for the failure of the 
implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei. 
4.2. British reversal of policy and the 1971 Agreement 
In November 1970, discussions between Brunei and Britain resumed after 
inconclusive talks with the Labour government in 1968. Since taking office in June 
1969, the Conservative government had given no definite indications of its future 
relations with Brunei. However, it had stated that it would maintain a `modest presence' 
in Southeast Asia. ' 
In September 1970, Air Marshal Sir Brian Burnett, the Commander-in-Chief for the 
Far East, stated that the Tory government planned to leave modest forces where they 
were welcome and where they would be of strategic value. Although Britain could see 
no internal and external threats to the region, it felt that a British presence combined 
with that of other Commonwealth countries would help to ensure that no such threat 
arose. Burnett also stated that the British government would retain the Gurkha 
battalion in Brunei temporarily until a new agreement had been worked out between 
Brunei and Britain. He assured Brunei that while the 1959 Agreement between the two 
countries remained in force, Britain was committed to aiding Brunei in the event of 
external or internal threats. 
The Conservative party that came to power in June 1970 did not envisage a 
complete withdrawal from east of Suez as it claimed that such action would be perilous 
to countries like Singapore and Malaysia. In 1971, the Conservative government 
proposed the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) (between Singapore, 
Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) to succeed the Anglo-Malaysian 
Defence Agreement (AMDA). The FPDA had the proviso that Britain would be a 
participant and not the leader of the new defence force. Since Britain, as part of the 
FPDA, was to continue its presence in Malaysia and Singapore, the Conservative 
Government decided that the 1959 Agreement, under the terms of which Britain had 
responsibility for the defence of Brunei, should continue without substantial 
'Borneo Bulletin, 26 September 1970. 
2 Ibid., 26 September 1970. 
3 Ibid., 26 September 1970. 
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modification. Via the FPDA, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Malaysia agreed to discuss what steps were to be taken in the event of an external threat 
to either Malaysia or Singapore. There was, however, no obligation to act as there had 
been under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement they replaced. The Brunei 
arrangements, though similar to those of the FPDA, were not linked directly with the 
latter. 5 
The talks held between the Sultan and his delegation and the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Anthony Royle, in 
November 1970 produced a draft agreement. Following further discussions in early 
1971, a new Anglo-Brunei Agreement amending the 1959 Agreement was signed in 
Bandar Seri Begawan on 23 November 1971 by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and by 
Anthony Royle on behalf of the British government. 
Under the 1971 Agreement, a Joint Standing Consultative Council for Brunei 
Defence, known as the Brunei Defence Council, was formed to replace the Standing 
Advisory Council, which had been set up under the 1959 Agreement. The new Council 
included the High Commissioner as well as `his adviser, a British officer who will 
normally be the senior officer of Her Majesty's forces as are stationed in the State'. 
The Sultan's representatives would be appointed at his discretion. Both the British and 
the Sultan's representatives would make recommendations as to the defence and 
security of the State to their respective governments. The two governments would 
consult each other to determine what measures should separately or jointly be taken in 
relation to an external attack, or the threat of such an attack, on the State. 7 
Apart from that, there was a provision for Britain to continue to provide staff and 
training facilities for the Royal Brunei-Malay Regiment, which was formed in 1961. 
° Glasgow Herald, 20 April 1971. 
s PREM15/384, UK Responsibility for Brunei: Prime Minister's Meeting with the Sultan, 30 
April 1971. 
6 Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei Amending the Agreement of 29 
September 1959, Bandar Seri Begawan, 23 November 1971, Cmnd. 4932, London, HMSO, 1972. 
Also in FC058/6814, Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei, Amending the 
Agreement of 29 September 1959. 
Ibid. 
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According to Article III (2b) of the Agreement, the British government would continue 
to assist the Sultanate within the capability of the United Kingdom, by the loaning of 
personnel to assist in the staffing, administration and training of the Armed Forces of 
the Sultanate. 8 It would also provide expert advice on the organisation of the Forces and 
assistance in connection with the maintenance of the equipment of the Forces. 
Additionally, it would assist in training the Forces and in recruitment of persons for 
service in police and military posts. It would also provide expert advice and training for 
the Police Force of the State. 9 
Since the defence of Brunei was based on consultation rather than commitment, the 
Conservative government terminated its responsibility over Brunei's internal affairs. 
According to Article III (5a) of the 1971 Agreement: `Situations which are essentially 
of an internal public-order nature are a matter of concern only to the public security 
forces of His Highness'. 1° By this agreement it became the responsibility of the Brunei 
government `to raise, equip and maintain forces sufficient for the preservation of 
internal public order and to be the first line of external defence'. " The Brunei 
government would provide facilities necessary for any British forces stationed in 
Brunei or training or exercising in Brunei with the agreement of the Brunei 
government. 12 
Moreover, the British government also relinquished its responsibility for advising 
on internal affairs of the state. It was indeed Britain's objective to avoid retaining 
formal responsibility for advising on Brunei's internal affairs. The British government's 
move on this matter released Sir Omar and his son from pressure to implement a 
democratic system of government in Brunei. Under the 1959 Agreement, the British 
government was given a measure of indirect responsibility for internal affairs through 
the `advice clause'. However, since Sir Omar rarely accepted or sought Britain's advice, 
the British government decided to relinquish its responsibility for advising the Sultan 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
12 The British Government on the other hand shall continue to assist Brunei to the extent of their 
capability by among other things loan of personnel to assist in the training of the armed forces of 
Brunei and expert advice on organization of the armed forces of Brunei. 
91 
on the internal affairs of the state. 13 Moreover, by giving up its advisory role in the 
internal affairs of Brunei, the British government no longer had to transmit Article 
73(e) of the United Nations Charter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations14 on 
economic, social and educational conditions including constitutional development in 
Brunei. 15 This was because by this agreement, Brunei had achieved full internal self- 
government. Before the agreement was signed, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
had informed the United Kingdom's mission in New York that when the new agreement 
with the Sultan was signed, Britain should cease these transmissions. 16 
The British government was hoping that, by surrendering its advisory role in the 
internal affairs of Brunei, it would reduce internal and external criticisms of the British 
government concerning Brunei's international status and constitutional development as 
Brunei had achieved full internal self-government. If local parties or international 
communities criticised the lack of constitutional development in Brunei or criticised the 
British government for not securing constitutional advance in Brunei (before it had 
relinquished its internal responsibilities), the British government would state that these 
were entirely Brunei's internal affairs - not those of the British. This was because 
Brunei was not a colony, nor had Britain any direct responsibility for the internal affairs 
of the State under the 1959 Agreement. '7 
Under the terms of the 1971 Agreement, the Conservative government, however, 
retained its responsibility for Brunei's external affairs as stipulated in Article II of the 
Agreement: `Her Majesty shall continue to enjoy jurisdiction to make the State Laws 
relating to external affairs'. 18 Additionally, the High Commissioner would no longer be 
`Her Majesty's High Commissioner' but the `British High Commissioner', as he no 
longer held advisory powers or any role in the governance of the State. He ceased to be 
a member of the Council of Ministers and other official government bodies, although 
13FC024/739, Brunei Talks, 2 December 1970. 
14 FC024/1378, Note of a meeting at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 June 1972. Also 
in FC058/6814, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 7 
July 1972. 
's United Nations Chronicles, New York, United Nations, 10 (1), January 1973 and 10(4), April 
1973. 
16 FCO58/625, D. P. Aires to Wilford, 23 March 1971. 
17 FC024/1086, Background Notes/Reference. 
18 Ibid. 
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he could be nominated as an ordinary member of the Privy Council. 19 Brunei no longer 
paid for the maintenance of the British High Commissioner's establishment, which 
became the British government's responsibility. His status was more like that of a 
diplomat-cum-spokesman on behalf of his government, though he made 
recommendations on Brunei's defence and external affairs. 20 
In order to avoid difficulties in terminating the agreement in the future, the 
Conservative Government ensured that the Agreement would be open to review by 
either party by giving one year's notice to terminate the agreement. This was stipulated 
in Article VIII of the Agreement, which states that: `At the request of either High 
Contracting Party, and after the expiry of one year from the making of the request, the 
High Contracting Parties shall review this Agreement'. 21 In November 1974, the return 
of the Labour Party to power led to Britain giving this notice, while almost 
simultaneously announcing that it intended to withdraw the Gurkha battalion from 
Brunei. 
The Conservative government offered to retain its Gurkha battalion in Brunei, but at 
the Sultan's expense. Although the 1971 Agreement did not include the retention of the 
battalion, there was a provision in Article III (a) whereby Brunei should provide 
facilities for any of British forces stationed in the Sultanate for either training or 
exercising with the agreement of the Sultan. 2 Britain's decision to retain the Gurkha 
battalion in Brunei was announced in the White Paper on Defence published on 28 
October 1970. Under the Conservative government, five Gurkha battalions were 
retained - one battalion in the United Kingdom, three in Hong Kong and one in 
19The 1959 Constitution provides for the Sultan as the Head of the State with full executive 
authority. The Sultan was assisted and advised by five councils - the Religious Council, the Privy 
Council, the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet), the Legislative Council and the Council of 
Succession. 
20 Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei Amending the Agreement of 29 
September 1959, Bandar Seri Begawan, 23 November 1971, Cmnd. 4932, London, HMSO, 1972. 
Also in FC058/6814, Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei, Amending the 
Agreement of 29 September 1959. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. For the full text of the agreement see Appendix III. 
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Brunei23 The Gurkha battalion would remain in Brunei as part of British forces in the 
area. They could, however, be withdrawn temporarily at very short notice to deal with 
contingencies elsewhere in the region. 24 Although the Sultan would pay for the 
maintenance of the Gurkhas in Brunei (which amounted to about £1,000,000 a year), 
they would remain under British control and command . 
25 As mentioned before, King 
Mahendra, the King of Nepal, was not prepared to allow them to act on the orders of 
the Sultan, because he did not want to be accused by his African and Asian colleagues 
of supporting the autocratic monarch. 26 The King did not object to the Sultan for paying 
for their maintenance as long as they remained under the command of the British. 
The Conservative government's willingness to be consultatively responsible 
for Brunei's defence with the Sultanate reduced the Sultan and Sir Omar's concerns 
over Brunei's security. Although Britain would not automatically be responsible for 
Brunei's defence, the agreement had an important deterrent value against any internal 
and external threats. Britain's decision to retain the Gurkha battalion in Brunei but not 
under the Sultan's command also had an important deterrent value against any internal 
and external threats. Its decision to cease advising the Sultan in the internal affairs of 
the state furthermore reduced the possibility of continued pressure for constitutional 
reform in Brunei. In its comment on the Agreement, the Straits Times of Singapore's 
editorial on 23 November 1971 stated that: 
The Bruneian Government is fully satisfied.... Full internal self-government 
reduces the possibility of continued pressure (for constitutional reform). 
Whatever the explanation of the somewhat protracted length of the 
negotiations, the new treaty effectively meets changing conditions, a rational 
contribution to the security and the stability of prosperous Brunei and its 
135,000 people. 27 
23 FC024/739, K. C. MacDonald to W. A. Ward, 20 November 1970. 
24 PREMI5/384, UK responsibility for Brunei: Prime Minister's meeting with the Sultan of 
Brunei, 30 April 1971. 
25 Ibid., 30 April 1971. 
26 FC024/435, W. A. Ward to O'Leary, 28 August 1969. 
27 Straits Times, 23 November 1971. 
94 
4.3. Continuous calls for democracy and independence 
However, not everybody was content with the coming of the Conservative Party to 
power in June 1970. The BAKER party, which pressed the Sultan to attain 
independence and establish a democratic system of government in Brunei, was not 
satisfied when it realised that Brunei would not attain its independence in November 
1970. Consequently, Abdul Latif, the Secretary-General of the BAKER party, reacted 
by sending a memorandum to U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, seeking UN 
sponsorship for Brunei's independence and blaming the British government for its 
`interference in the affairs of Brunei and for their vicious attempt to prolong 
colonialism in the state'? $ Abdul Latif also appealed to U Thant for Brunei's case to be 
brought up for discussion. He stated that: `the people of Brunei no longer wish to be 
subjected [to these interferences]. We welcome a UN mission to hold a free referendum 
to decide the future of Brunei'. 29 
The BAKER party based its call to the Secretary-General of the UN for 
independence of Brunei on the policy of the UN General Assembly, which adopted the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 
1960.30 It also based its call on the Resolution of 2621 of 12 October 1970, which 
called upon member states `to promote effective measures for full implementation of 
Resolution 1514 of 1960', in other words expediting the granting of full independence 
to non-self-governing and other territories. 31 In this regard, as mentioned before, the 
Special Committee on Decolonisation, or the Special Committee of Twenty-Four, was 
directed to find ways and means of liquidating colonialism. The Administering Power 
was required to supply information relating to the territories under its jurisdiction in 
compliance with the resolution on decolonisation; 32 and in Brunei's case (to the 
BAKER party) this was the British government's responsibility. 33 
28 Ibid., 17 October 1970. 
29 Ibid., 17 October 1970. 
30 United Nations Chronicles, Vol. 7(10), November 1970; Vol. 10(1), January 1973; Vol. 10(4), 
April 1973; Vol. 10(8), August/September 1973. United Nations Review, Vol. 8(1), 1961. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bintang Harian (Daily Star), 22 October 1970. 
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Sir Omar, who was wary of the BAKER party's call to the UN for Brunei's 
independence, warned the BAKER party that Brunei was not a colony and that Brunei 
only sought British protection in terms of military and external affairs. 34 He rejected 
any demands from the political party to strive for independence. 35 Following this, on 22 
October 1970, the Brunei government stated in the Daily Star newspaper that Brunei 
was not under the Trusteeship of the UN which controlled territories that were not self- 
governing. 36 Since Brunei was not under the Trusteeship of the UN, the petition made 
by the politicians asking the UN to intervene was not acceptable as it was already a 
self-governing state under the 1959 Agreement. 37 
Although Brunei was not under the Trusteeship of the UN and was not a British 
colony, the BAKER party's repeated calls for independence presented a challenge to 
the Sultan and Sir Omar as they could lead Britain to surrender its remaining 
responsibilities towards Brunei and force Brunei to become fully independent. It should 
be borne in mind that, when the BAKER party called upon the UN to assist Brunei in 
achieving independence, the Brunei government had not started to negotiate Brunei's 
future with the Conservative government which came to power in June 1960. In order 
to save Brunei from full independence, the BAKER party's political activities had to be 
halted. 
The fact that the Labour government had in 1968 abandoned its policy of pressing 
the Sultan and Sir Omar to carry out a democratic system of government in Brunei 
(thus leaving the matter entirely to them) had made it easier for the Sultan and Sir Omar 
34 Ibid., 20 October 1970. 
35 Ibid., 20 October 1970. 
36 Trusteeship of the UN is actually a system of UN control for territories that were not self- 
governing. It replaced the mandates of the League of Nations. Provided for under chapters 12 and 
13 of the Charter of the UN, the trusteeship system was intended to promote the welfare of native 
inhabitants and to advance self-government. In the early years of the UN, 11 Territories were 
placed under the Trusteeship System for example, Togoland, Somaliland, Tanganyika and New 
Guinea. In 1994, the Security Council terminated the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for 
the last of the original 11 Territories on its agenda - the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(Palau), administered by the United Nations (cited in 
http: //www. factmonster. com/ce6/history/A0848547. html). 
37 It further stated that the local politicians had given a wrong and contradictory picture about the 
true condition of Brunei from the aspect of international politics. This was because, through the 
1959 Constitution, the Sultan had full authority to rule the country (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 22 
October 1970). 
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to end the activities of the BAKER party. In April 1970, Sir Omar had suspended the 
Legislative Elections and set up a new Legislative Council composed entirely of his 
nominees. 38 Earlier in September 1969, three prominent leaders of the BAKER party, 
Hapidz Laksmana, the President of the party, Pengiran Metusin bin Pengiran Lampoh, 
the Vice-President, and Pengiran Mohammed Yusof bin Pengiran Abu Bakar, the 
Assistant Secretary-General, resigned. All cited personal (business) reasons for their 
resignations39 although it was known that they resigned because they had given up their 
aim to strive for the implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei ao 
Further to this, in December 1970, the Sultan extended the state of emergency for 
another two years. Under the Brunei Constitution of 1959, the Sultan could proclaim a 
state of emergency `for not more than two years of an occasion of public danger 
existing whereby the security or economic life of the state of Brunei was threatened' 4' 
C. A. Munro, of the UK mission to the United Nations, in his letter to Mr Ward of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, thought that neither external aggression nor 
internal disturbance threatened the security and economic life of Brunei and therefore 
there was no justification for the Sultan to continue with a state of emergency. 42 
However, for the Sultan and Sir Omar, the BAKER party was obviously posing a threat 
to Brunei's security. If they did not stop the BAKER party's political activities, the 
British would probably give up their remaining responsibilities towards Brunei and 
force Brunei to accept full independence. 
Moreover, the Sultan and Sir Omar were apprehensive that the closer Brunei came 
to a democratic system of government, the greater the possibility of its joining 
Malaysia. Under Tun Abdul Razak (the new prime minister of Malaysia), he continued 
the policy of Tunku Abdul Rahman to bring Brunei into the federation. In addition, the 
38 The Emergency (Council of Ministers and Legislative Council) Order, Laws of Brunei, s. 58, 
1970 (Cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar All Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 378. See also Borneo 
Bulletin, 26 December 1970). 
39 Borneo Bulletin, 27 June 1969. 
40 Ibid., 27 June 1969. 
41 Ibid., 6 February 1971. 
42 FC024/1078, C. A. Munro to Ward, 16 June 1971. 
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Sultan and Sir Omar realised that the implementation of full democracy in Brunei could 
destroy the position of the Sultan as an absolute monarch 43 
Following the Sultan's extension of the emergency powers, on 30 March 1971, 
Abdul Latif wrote a letter to Michael Stewart, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, concerning Arthur Bottomley's White Paper of 1965, which 
recommended the implementation of a full representative system of government in 
Brunei 44 Further to this, in April 1971 Abdul Latif met H. J. Bowe, the Acting British 
High Commissioner, and pressed the latter about Bottomley's White Paper of 1965 and 
the outcome of the talks between the British and the Brunei governments. In 1969, 
when the BAKER party sought to join the Sultan's delegation for talks in London held 
in the middle of that year, the Brunei government snubbed the party. 45 
When Zainal Abidin Puteh and Pengiran Yusof Abu Bakar of the BAKER party 
sought political representation at the negotiations between the British and the Brunei 
governments, they were rejected by Brunei's palace officials. According to Pengiran 
Dato Haji Mokhtar Puteh and Pehin Dato Dr Haji Mohammad Jamil, the BAKER 
party's political representation was `too absurd for consideration'. 6 They added that 
the Sultan had no intention of including any political leaders in talks with the British 
government whether the leader was a member of the State Legislative Council or a 
member of a District Council or not. 47 This was because the talks were between the 
Sultan and the British government and not between the British and the Brunei party's 
leaders. 8 
When Abdul Latif questioned him as to the outcome of the talks between the British 
and the Brunei governments, Bowe's only reply was that, since they were still in 
progress, he could not comment on the outcome. 49 Regarding the BAKER party's 
question about Bottomley's White Paper of 1965, no official reply was sent to the 
43 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 209. 
as FC024/1075, Abdul Latif to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 30 
March 1971. 
45 Borneo Bulletin, 27 June 1969. 
46 Ibid., 30 August 1969. 
47 Ibid., 12 April 1969. 
48 Ibid., 12 April 1969. Nevertheless, the Sultan always had with him personal advisors appointed 
from government officers at every meeting the Sultan had with the British government. 
49 FC024/1075, H. J. Bowe to W. A. Ward, 25 April, 1971. 
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BAKER party, 50 but the Borneo Bulletin of 10 April 1971 gladly reported that `it was 
probably dumped into a Whitehall wastepaper basket'. The newspaper also warned the 
BAKER party that it was on `dangerous ground in asking Britain to give independence 
the Sultan did not want's' 
In the Sultan and Sir Omar's efforts to halt the progress of democracy in Brunei, in 
May 1971 the Brunei government made a further drastic move by announcing that 
Brunei would not hold any more public elections for some time. 52 It stated that: 
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) of section 83 of the 
Constitution of the state of Brunei 1959, HH the Sultan hereby makes the 
following order: this order may be cited as the Emergency (District Councils) 
Order, 1971, and shall come into force on [the] 24th day of May, 1971. So long 
as the proclamation of Emergency is in force the laws mentioned in the 
Schedule hereto are hereby suspended. 53 
The Brunei government stated that the reason for the termination of the District 
Council elections was that, since the District Councils no longer acted as electoral 
colleges for the election of members to the Legislative Council, they served no useful 
purpose. 54 This was because their advisory functions and the facility they offered for 
liaison between the District Authorities and the people could be equally well provided 
by the Penghulus (village headmen) `who were in constant and close contact with the 
villagers and knew all their needs. '55 
By suspending the election to the District Council, the Brunei government 
completed the dismantling of the elective machinery for the implementation of a 
democratic system of government. Bowe in his letter to Ward on 20 May 1971 
regretted Sir Omar and the Sultan's action in this matter. According to Bowe, although 
the District Authorities could meet the channel of communication between the 
government and the people (where it was done through the medium of the Penghulus), 
50 Ibid., 25 April, 1971. 
sl Borneo Bulletin, 10 April 1970. 
52 Ibid., 29 May 1971. 
53 FC024/1078, The Constitution of the State of Brunei, 1959 (Order under section 83(3)) The 
Emergency (District Councils) Order 1971. 
sa FC024/1078, Bowe to Ward, 20 May 1971. 
55 Ibid., 20 May 1971. 
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they completely failed to take into account the other useful aspect of the council that `it 
provided a safety valve for the airing of political grievances and aspirations' 56 
Although to Bowe the District Council made little practical difference, `its demise was 
a retrograde step as the council constituted the last vestige of any pretence of 
democracy in Brunei. 257 
The suspension of the election of the District Council virtually ended the party's 
desire to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. 58 Subsequently, in 
October 1971, the BAKER party sent a memorandum to the UN asking for the world 
body's help in achieving independence for the state. 59 In the memorandum the BAKER 
party stated that: 
The Peoples' Independent Front of Brunei, a legally registered political 
organisation with branches throughout the State of Brunei sincerely believe that 
the continued presence of the British colonialism in this country will cause more 
harm than good to the State, sovereign and the people of Brunei. To end to this 
state of affairs, the Peoples' Independent Front of Brunei have, in the past, made 
requests and proposals in the most fair and peaceful means to the British 
Government to allow the people and their representatives elected by them to 
share the responsibilities in deciding the constitutional future of the State of 
Brunei. These requests and proposals have been completely ignored by the 
British Government. Under this circumstance, the only alternative left now is 
for the Peoples Independent Front of Brunei to bring this state of affairs to the 
notice of the United Nations in order that justice is done to the people of the 
State of Brunei. This memorandum herewith attached is forwarded for your 
understanding of the state of affairs in this country and we request that 
appropriate steps be taken by the world body in line with the aims and purposes 
of the existence of the United Nations. The peoples Independent Front of Brunei 
56 Ibid., 20 May 1971. 
s' Ibid., 20 May 1971. 
58 Ibid., 20 May 1971. 
39 FC024/1376, Zainal Abidin bin Puteh (President) and Awang Abdul Latif bin Hamid, 
Secretary General, People's Independent Front, to Secretary-General of the United Nations, 12 
October 1971. 
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will render every co-operation possible to facilitate the speedy implementation 
of a referendum to meet the wishes and aspirations of the people of Brunei. 60 
The BAKER party's memorandum was circulated to the members of the Committee 
of Twenty-Four and was to be considered by the sub-committee on petitions in 1972 61 
In a letter dated 12 April 1972, F. D. Popov, Chief of Petitions Section, Department of 
Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories stated that the BAKER party's 
memorandum had been circulated as a petition in document A/AC. 109/PET. 1197.62 
According to Popov, on the recommendation of the sub-committee, the special 
committee had decided that the above-mentioned petition be taken into account by the 
Special Committee and Sub-Committee II in their consideration of the territory. 63 
In a press statement, the BAKER party further stated that `the legitimate aspirations 
of the people and the party have long been ignored here and it is now time something is 
done about it'. 4 The BAKER party stated that it wanted full elections to be restored, 
and the state of emergency to be lifted. The party also wanted the British government to 
keep its promise in implementing the White Paper of 1965.65 
In response to the call made by the BAKER party's leaders, the British Permanent 
Representative of the UN, Sir Colin Crowe, presented a note to the UN Secretary 
General, Kurt Waldheim, in September 1972, conveying the views of both the British 
and the Brunei governments. The note stated that, `as a result of the 1971 Agreement, 
both governments felt it was no longer appropriate for Britain to transmit to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations information relating to the requirements of 
Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter. '66 
60 FC024/1376, Zainal Abidin bin Puteh (President) and Awang Abdul Latif bin Hamid, 
Secretary General, People's Independent Front, to Secretary-General of the United Nations, 12 
October 1971. See also in FC024/1079, Awang Zainal Abidin bin Puteh (president) Awang 
Abdul Latif bin Hamid to Honorable Secretary-General the United Nations, New York. 
61 FCO58/625, Crowe (UK mission to New York) to FCO, 29 November 1971. 
62Lakar Bongsu, `Perjuangan Parti Barisan Kemerdekaan Brunei (Baker) di Negara Brunei 
Darussalam', BA (Hons. ) dissertation, University Brunei Darussalam, 1992/3, p. 66. 
63Ibid., p. 66. 
64 FC024/1075, Thorne to FCO, 27 September 1971 & Straits Times, 24 September 1971. 
65 Ibid. 
66 United Nations Chronicles, Vol. 7(10), November 1970; Vol. 10(1), January 1973; Vol. 10(4), 
April 1973; Vol. 10(8), August/September 1973. Also see in FCO24/6814, Implementation of the 
declaration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples - information from 
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Earlier, on 14 June 1972 (during the meeting between Royle and Sir Omar in 
London), Sir Omar had made it clear to Royle that the Government of Brunei did not 
wish to have relations with any country other than the UK. Moreover, Brunei was not a 
member of the UN, nor did it wish to have any direct relations with the UN. 7 Sir Omar 
made this statement following Royle's assertion to him that Brunei should send reports 
to the UN as Britain had informed the UN Secretariat in September that it would no 
longer supply the reports following Brunei's achievement of full internal self- 
government 68 Further to this, in Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's letter to Michael Stewart, 
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Sultan had stated 
that: 
Brunei is not a member of the United Nations, and consequently neither I nor 
My Government would wish to express any view about the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations. However, it is a fact that by virtue of the 
Agreement signed on 23 November 1971 the Government of Brunei now bears 
full responsibility for the internal affairs of Brunei, and all responsibility of Her 
Majesty's Government for those internal affairs has come to an end. That 
Agreement did not, on the other hand, affect the external affairs of Brunei in 
any way. The conduct of the external affairs of Brunei remains the 
responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. 69 
By this time, however, the BAKER party had lost credibility and existed in little 
more than name. Its only active member was Abdul Latif, the Secretary-General, who 
attempted to keep the party to the fore by airing their independence aims on occasions 
such as the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore, the London 
Talk in April and the United Nations General Assembly session. 70 On 12 March 1972, 
after about seven years in the BAKER party, Abdul Latif resigned from his post 71 
non-self-governing territories transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 27 September 1972. 
67 FC024/1380, Record of Meeting between Mr Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and HH the Sultan of Brunei, at the FCO, 14 June 1972. 
68 Ibid., 14 June 1972. 
69 FC058/6814, Sultan of Brunei to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 7 July 1972. 
70 Borneo Bulletin, 5 January 1972. 
71 Ibid., 5 January 1972. 
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Following his resignation, the party's political leanings declined to practically nil. 72 On 
7 April 1972, Haji Yaakub bin Zainal, the Treasurer, also resigned. According to the 
Straits Times, the entire leadership of the BAKER party had collapsed, leaving only its 
president in Seria the sole leader: Zainal Abidin. 73 The party - the sole political 
organisation in the state - had no leaders in the capital, which left no one to lead it in 
Bandar Seri Begawan. In retrospect the Sultan and Sir Omar were successful in 
bringing to an end the political activities of the BAKER party. Having done so, the 
BAKER party's calls for independence and implementation of a democratic system of 
government in Brunei effectively came to an end. 
4.4. End of plan for democracy 
However, the end of plan for democracy in Brunei in 1972 had been anticipated. 
From the beginning of Sir Omar's rule in 1950, the latter had indeed been committed to 
strengthening the power of the monarch. This commitment was manifested in the 
promulgation of the 1959 Constitution which reinforced the power of the monarch and 
did not pave the way for the introduction of a full democratic system of government in 
Brunei. Under the 1959 Constitution, there was no elective majority on the Legislative 
Council and no direct elections to that Council. This was done in order to safeguard the 
power of the monarch. 
Prior to the coronation of Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, the monarch revived the 
traditional aspect of the monarchy, namely the traditional offices. The monarch had 
bestowed on selected hereditary pengirans (nobles) and commoners the titles wazir, 
chateria and pehin: high offices in the traditional form of government in Brunei. 74 In 
1967, for the first time since 1906, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's brother Pengiran Muda 
Mohamed Bolkiah had been bestowed with the title Pengiran Temenggong Pengiran 
Muda Mohamed Bolkiah. When the 1906 Agreement was signed only two traditional 
72 FC024/1376, J. Thorne to P. J. Streams, 30 March 1970. 
73 Straits Times, 7 April 1972. 
74 Eusoff Agaki Haji Ismail, `Brunei Darussalam: Its Re-emergence as a Sovereign and 
Independent Malay-Muslim Sultanate (1959 - 1983)', MA thesis, University of Hull, 1991, p. 
162. 
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offices were retained, the Pengiran Bendahara and Pengiran Pemancha. 75 Under the 
1959 Constitution both of them were nominated by the Sultan as members in the 
Legislative as well as the Executive Councils. 6 In 1963, when the Constitution was 
amended, they were excluded from the councils by the Sultan possibly as a result of 
Britain's insistence to the Sultan that their positions in both councils were rather 
anachronistic. However, they were allowed to continue in the ceremonial Privy 
Council. 7 
Following the coronation of Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, all the traditional ministerial 
ranks were filled, and in February 1970, Pengiran Temenggong Pengiran Muda 
Mohamed Bolkiah was elevated to Pengiran Perdana Wazir. 78 According to Brunei's 
tradition, there were four wazirs or ministers of state to whom the Sultan delegated his 
executive and administrative powers. 79 Below the wazirs were the chaterias or lesser 
ministers of state, who were ranked on the basis of eight, sixteen and thirty-two 
members per rank. 80 
The revival of traditional aspects of the governmental structure according to Eusoff 
Agaki could be interpreted in some ways as `a determined effort on the part of the 
Sultan to counteract the British government's pressure for further constitutional 
progress. On the other hand, the trend could also be viewed as a process towards 
strengthening national consciousness in terms of Brunei's own political culture. '81 
Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, on the other hand, suggests that by reviving and 
strengthening its monarchical system of government, Brunei confirmed its refusal to 
join the Federation of Malaysia, which had a democratic system of government. 82 There 
was no way that Brunei would join Malaysia because Brunei and Malaysia had 
different systems of government. According to Ghazali Shafie, if Brunei, which was 
ruled by an absolute monarchy, became part of Malaysia, Malaysia would be doomed. 
's D. E. Brown, Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean-Malay Sultanate, BMJ, 
Monograph No. 2,1970, pp. 92 - 3. 76 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar All Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 344. 
77 Ibid., p. 344. 
78 Brown, Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean-Malay Sultanate, pp. 92 - 3. 79 Ibid., pp. 92 - 93. 80 Ibid., pp. 92 - 93. 81 EusoffAgaki Haji Ismail, `Brunei Darussalam: Its Re-emergence as a Sovereign', p. 164. 
82 See Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', pp. 243 - 273. 
104 
He stated that `Malaysia would be doomed if a part of its territory was not subject to 
democratic elections and a government of one of its states was a feudalistic 
autocracy'. 83 Then again, the closer Brunei came to a democratic system of 
government, the greater its possibility of joining Malaysia. As mentioned earlier, the 
Malaysian government perceived that a democratic Brunei might be more susceptible to 
the attractions of the Federation. That is why the Sultan and Sir Omar did not want to 
implement a democratic system of government in Brunei as they feared that Brunei 
would eventually enter Malaysia. 
Furthermore, since the British government had informed Sir Omar in April 1968 
that it would no longer press the Sultan and Sir Omar to work for constitutional 
advance but would leave the matter entirely to them, the Sultan and Sir Omar generally 
had a free hand in this matter whereby they used the emergency powers approved by 
the 1959 Constitution to postpone the Legislative Elections and continue the state of 
emergency in Brunei. As mentioned before, in 1968, the British Labour government 
had to abandon its efforts to persuade the Sultan and Sir Omar to implement a 
democratic system of government after Sir Omar stated that an election would not be 
held in Brunei before the British ended its 1959 Agreement with Brunei (in November 
1970). Moreover, Britain's plan to end its agreement with Brunei was approaching. 
Consequently, Britain had no choice but to abandon its efforts to persuade the Sultan to 
implement the system. 
The coming of the Conservative Party to power in June 1970, which did not insist 
on constitutional progress as a precondition to amend the agreement, and which ceased 
its responsibility for advising on the internal affairs of Brunei, had made Sir Omar even 
more intransigent than before on the ending of calls for democracy in Brunei. 84 
According to A. R. Adair, the British High Commissioner, since Sir Omar had secured 
the 1971 Agreement, the latter had become uncompromising because he felt he was in a 
stronger position than he had been before. In May 1971, the Sultan and Sir Omar 85 
83 Ghazali Shafie's Memoir on the Formation of Malaysia, University Kebangsaan Malaysia 
Bangi, 1998, p. 275 (cited in ibid., p. 163). 
84FC024/1085, A. R. Adair to K. M. Wilford, 22 July 1971. 
85 Ibid., 22 July 1971. 
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virtually closed the door on democracy when elections to the District Councils were 
suspended. 86 
The lack of educated locals in the administration of the state also hindered the 
implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei. Unlike Malaya, 
where the British authorities had introduced English education in the early twentieth 
century, English education in Brunei was only introduced in 1951. The British 
government's policy in Brunei had been to leave the initiative of developing education 
to the people. 87 Although Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam II (r. 1906 - 24) encouraged 
the development of education in Brunei, he could not do a great deal to improve 
matters, since the British Resident controlled Brunei's finances. 88 
There was a similar situation during the rule of his successor, Sultan Ahmad 
Tajuddin. Although the latter called upon the British Resident to set up an English 
school in Brunei, 89 he was ignored. The implementation of the Five-Year National 
Development Plan in 1953 by Sultan Omar All Saifuddien III came nonetheless too 
late: when Brunei entered the 1960s, it lacked educated, qualified and experienced 
people to run the administration of the state. 
Sir Omar on the other hand cleverly used the issue of lack of educated manpower to 
delay the implementation of a democratic system of government for his own benefit, 
which was to retain his power as an absolute monarch. In 1965, when Sultan Omar All 
Saifuddien was pressed by Arthur Bottomley, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, to fulfil the manifestos announced in August 1964 - which aimed to move 
towards a fully representative system of government - the Sultan stated that he wished 
to achieve it step by step 90 Therefore, the British government's attitude towards the 
development of education in Brunei between 1906 and 1950 had to a large extent 
contributed to the lack of educated and qualified people to run the administration of the 
state in the 1960s, which consequently hampered the progress of the implementation of 
86 Borneo Bulletin, 29 May 1971. 
87 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 33. If, after two years, the people 
could prove their need and desire for education, the British Government would step in to pay for 
the overall running of the school and build a permanent schoolhouse. 
88 Ibid., p. 34. 
89CO943/1(59706), Speech by HH Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, I May 1948 (cited in ibid, p. 34). 
90 Sunday Times, 30 May 1965. 
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a representative system of government in Brunei. Sir Omar had thus skilfully used this 
issue to safeguard his power. 
The end of plans for the implementation of full democracy in Brunei came also 
because of the lack of people's interest in the development of democracy in the 
Sultanate. This lack of interest had been growing since the unsuccessful rebellion in 
1962. The 1962 Rebellion had cost lives among the people of Brunei and was 
considered by many as the blackest event in Brunei's history. During the rebellion, 
about 100 rebels were killed and about 2,000 were caught and detained. 91Because of the 
scale of the rebellion and Brunei's small population, almost every family in Brunei was 
affected by the event. Moreover, the swift operation of the British forces in crushing the 
rebellion and the huge presence of a foreign army and war artillery in the country were 
also an unforgettable experience to many people in Brunei. The continued presence of 
the British army in the Sultanate, the Sultan's rule by emergency decree and the 
continuous detention without trial of 59 ex-rebels at the Berakas Detention Camp 
became a constant reminder to the people of Brunei of the dangers of involving 
themselves in the internal politics of the country, and this eventually extinguished their 
spirits towards the implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei. 
The general population of Brunei believed that if they took an active part in politics it 
would lead them to the Berakas Detention Camp under the enforcement of Emergency 
Regulations, 1962.92 As a result of the lack of people's interests towards democracy, 
there was a poor turnout by voters during the 196593 and 1968 District Council 
Elections. In the 1965 District Council Elections for example, of the 19,144 registered 
voters, eighty per cent turned out at the polls, a nine per cent drop from the election of 
1962.94 
In addition to this, the end of plans for the implementation of a democratic system 
of government in Brunei was because of the weaknesses of the political parties that had 
emerged in Brunei after the 1962 Rebellion. These political parties did not have 
91 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar All Saifuddin 111 and Britain, p. 311. 
92 FC024/212 Internal security Situation, Letter from Hunt to R. A. Hibbert, 2 November 1967 
(cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 206). 
93 Borneo Bulletin, 5 August 1967. 
94 Ibid., 27 March 1965. 
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dynamic leadership, as the PRB did, which was significant in order to draw people's 
interest towards Brunei's internal politics. They had vague manifestoes, 95 lacked 
captivating slogans to inspire the people and lacked the organizational skills of the 
PRB. During the second general election in 1965, the leaders of all three contesting 
parties - the Brunei Party Alliance (BPA), the Brunei National Organization (BNO) 
and the Brunei People's Freedom Struggle (BPFSP), which had formed the Brunei 
Alliance Party (BAP) before the elections failed to get elected. 96 Similarly, during the 
1968 District Council elections, the BAKER party (the only solid political party) won 
only 30 per cent of the votes, with 70 per cent going to independent candidates. 7Their 
failure in the elections was indeed a blow to the possibility of running a plausible 
representative system of government in Brunei. 98 
Therefore, it is evident that the end of plans for the implementation of a democratic 
system of government in Brunei was the result of several factors. The Sultan and Sir 
Omar's refusal to implement a democratic system of government (because of their fear 
that the Sultan's absolute power would be reduced), was one of these. Their 
apprehension that the closer Brunei came towards democracy the more likely it would 
be to join Malaysia was another factor for the Sultan and Sir Omar's refusal to 
implement the system. Moreover, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien was committed to 
retaining the power of the monarch and this was apparent in the resumption of the 
monarchical system of government in Brunei in the 1950s and the promulgation of the 
1959 Constitution. 
Britain's inability to persuade the Sultan to implement the system was another 
reason why the system was not implemented and why the British government under the 
Labour party abandoned its efforts to persuade the Sultan to implement the system. The 
fact that Brunei was not a colony and that since 1959 Brunei had been an internally 
9s Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 349. 
96 Ibid., p. 343. These were the parties that had been routed by the PRB during the 1962 District 
Council elections. 
97 BA/056/1983 (SUK Series 3, Box 42), `Election and Organisation', Tambahan (Appendix) A to 
C, in Matnor McAfee, Penyelia Pilehan Raya (The Commissioner of Elections) to Pengarah 
(Director), Penyiaran dan Penerangan (Broadcasting and Information), 3 June 1968, item 27 
(cited in ibid., p. 378). 
98 Out of 13,309 voters only 3,060 voters voted for BAKER party (cited in Pelita Brunei, 29 May 
1968). 
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self-governing state made it difficult for the British to urge the Sultan to implement the 
system. This was also one of the reasons for the Conservative government that came to 
power in June 1970 relinquishing its responsibility in advising the Sultan in the internal 
affairs of the state under the 1971 Agreement. People's lack of interest in the 
implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei and the lack of 
credibility of the parties' leaders in organizing their parties was an additional factor in 
the failure of the implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei. 
Although by 1972 the BAKER party's calls for the implementation of a democratic 
system of government and independence for Brunei ceased, these calls recommenced in 
1974 when the disbanded PRB was revived in Kuala Lumpur by Azahari and the 
escaped 1962 Bruneian ex-rebels. Their calls for Brunei's independence at the UN in 
November 1975 created challenges and difficulties for the Sultan and Sir Omar as they 
were not ready to achieve independence. This however will be covered in Chapter Six. 
The following chapter will examine Brunei's claim over Limbang from Malaysia 
starting in 1970. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the coming of the Conservative Party to power in June 1970 saved 
Brunei from full independence. Under the 1971 Agreement, the Conservative 
government was willing to continue its responsibility over Brunei's external affairs and 
to be consultatively responsible for Brunei's defence. The Conservative government 
also allowed the provisional retention of the Gurkha battalion in the Sultanate. It 
additionally relinquished its responsibilities for advising the Sultan in the internal 
affairs of the state. This was indeed significant as it liberated Sir Omar and his son from 
the pressure to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. 
The Conservative government's resolution, however, disappointed the BAKER 
party, as it did not grant Brunei full independence according to the Labour 
Government's plans. As a result, the BAKER party sought the UN's sponsorship for 
Brunei's independence and called upon the Sultan to introduce a democratic system of 
government in Brunei. The BAKER party based its calls for Brunei's independence on 
the UN General Assembly `Resolution of the Declaration on the Granting of 
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960' and `Resolution of 1970' 
which called upon member states to encourage efficient measures for the full 
functioning of Resolution 1514 of 1960. 
This study has shown that the Sultan and Sir Omar, who refused to bring either a 
democratic system of government or independence into effect, halted the BAKER 
party's political activities by ending the District and Legislative Council elections and 
by continuing the state of emergency in Brunei. By 1972, the BAKER party's calls for 
the introduction of a democratic system of government and Brunei's independence 
effectively came to an end. This study has also shown that the end of plans for the 
implementation of a democratic system of government in Brunei was also a result of 
Britain's inability to persuade the Sultan to implement the system, the people's lack of 
interest towards democracy following the unsuccessful end of the 1962 Rebellion and 
the lack of credibility of the party leaders in organising their parties. The end of plans 
for democracy in Brunei did not only successfully safeguard the power of the monarch, 
but more importantly safeguarded Brunei from entering Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Brunei's claim on Limbang: 
1970-1974 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to study the challenges and problems faced by the Sultanate in 
connection with its claim over Limbang to Malaysia between 1970 and 1973. Limbang 
(an area of 1,535.96 square miles) was taken over by Charles Brooke, the second Rajah 
of Sarawak, on 17 March 1890. From then until 1963, Brunei had never surrendered its 
claim over Limbang from Britain. To the Bruneians, Brunei had rights over Limbang. 
This was because Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam (r. 1885 - 1906) had never given his 
consent to the acquisition of Limbang by Rajah Brooke. Sultan Hashim also never 
accepted the payment of compensation for the acquisition of Limbang by Sarawak right 
up until his death. ' In August 1895, when the Foreign Office declared the matter 
closed, 2 the Sultan refused to accept this decision as final and protested repeatedly to 
the British government until his death in 1906. After his death, however, his 
successors Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam (r. 1906 - 1924) and later Sultan Ahmad 
Tajuddin (r. 1924 - 1950) were not able to make an effective claim over Limbang for 
reasons that will be briefly explained in this chapter. 
When Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III ruled, he brought up the issue of Limbang to 
the British government in the late 1950s and in November 1962, but on both occasions 
the British turned his demands down. When Limbang came under the Malaysian state 
of Sarawak in 1963, Brunei continued its claim over the territory from the British and 
the Federal government of Malaysia. However, neither Britain nor Malaysia accepted 
Brunei's claim on Limbang for several reasons that will be discussed in this section. 
Although Brunei repeatedly wrote letters to the Malaysian government about its claim 
1 D0169/54/42219, Brunei Claim to Limbang District of Sarawak, `Annexation of the Limbang 
District'. 
2 Brooke to FCO 12 January 1893, CO to FO 25 January 1893, Mitchell to FO 22 October 1894 
FO 572/29, Mitchell to FO 23 March 1894 FO 572/30, memo by Anderson 11 February 1895, FO 
to Mithcell 13 July 1895 FO 12/95 (cited in Criswell, `The Origin of the Limbang Claim', p. 
228). 
3 Ibid, p. 228. 
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over Limbang, no reply had been received from Malaysia. In September 1970, Sir 
Omar unexpectedly resurrected Brunei's claim over Limbang publicly when he opened 
an exhibition in Brunei Town. He revived the Limbang issue publicly because he 
considered the Chief Minister of Sarawak's speech to the Bruneians' descendants living 
in Limbang (whom he urged to be loyal to the Malaysian government) as provocative. 
However, Brunei's claim over Limbang proved to be problematic as the Malaysian 
government disregarded its claim no matter what the basis of it, since Limbang had 
been part of Malaysia through the 1963 Agreement it had with Britain. Moreover, 
Britain did not support Brunei's claim over Limbang from Malaysia for several reasons 
that will be discussed in this chapter. This study will show that Brunei's claim on 
Limbang became a pressing matter when the Bruneian ex-rebels escaped to Limbang in 
1973. Here it should be noted that the Bruneian ex-rebels escaped with the connivance 
of the Malaysian government. One of the reasons for Malaysia's involvement in the 
escape of Brunei's ex-rebels was because Malaysia wanted to divert the Sultan and Sir 
Omar's attention away from the Limbang issue and to turn their attention to the issues 
of Brunei's independence and constitutional development. When Sir Omar asserted 
Malaysia to return Limbang to Brunei, the Malaysian government refused to return 
Limbang and closed the Limbang issue to Brunei in December 1973. Sir Omar was 
however adamant that Brunei would not quit its claim over Limbang for reasons of 
security. 
5.2. Brunei's claim on Limbang: 1970 -1973 
Sir Omar unexpectedly made a public resurrection of the Limbang issue in 
September 1970 when opening a book exhibition at the Language and Literature 
Bureau in Bandar Seri Begawan. In his speech Sir Omar said that the map-makers 
should not draw boundaries between Brunei and Limbang as the two were in one and 
the same territory. 4 Following that, he informed A. R. Adair, the British High 
Commissioner, that he had made the claim over Limbang openly because Abdul 
Rahman Yakub, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, had made a public announcement that 
4 For extract of speech from Sir Omar see FC024/734. For the full text of Sir Omar's statement, 
see Pelita Brunei, 30 September 1970, p. 5, Straits Times, 10 October 1970 & Daily Star, I 
October 1970. 
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the descendants of Bruneian citizens in Limbang should give their undivided loyalty to 
Malaysia. 5 To Sir Omar, Abdul Rahman's speech was confrontational as the latter 
should be well aware that Brunei had been claiming the return of Limbang from the 
British since 1890 and the Malaysian government since 1963. 
Indeed, the Sultans of Brunei had been claiming Limbang from Britain since 1890 
when Limbang was annexed by Charles Brooke of Sarawak in that year. However, 
Britain rejected Brunei's claim and instead urged Sultan Hashim to give his consent to 
the annexation of Limbang by Sarawak. It should be borne in mind that the annexation 
of Limbang by Sarawak has been delineated by N. Tarling' Donald E. Brown, 8 G. 
Saunders, 9 D. S. Ranjit Singh 10 and C. N. Crisswell. 11 Recently Muhammad Hadi 
Abdullah in Chapter Five of his thesis `Brunei's Political Development and the 
Formation of Malaysia: 1961-1967' made a preliminary examination of the Limbang 
issue from 1890 until the formation of Malaysia in 1963.12 
After the death of Sultan Hashim, his successor Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam 
was not able to make any claim on Limbang as his rule was under the strict control of 
the British Residents. 13 In 1949, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin tried to reclaim the area from 
the British government, but his untimely death in 1950 virtually closed his claim over 
Limbang. 14 However, when Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III ruled, he resumed Brunei's 
claim on Limbang. In the late 1950s, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III brought up the 
issue of Limbang when the British government proposed the Borneo Federation to him. 
The British officials in Sarawak, however, disagreed that Limbang should be restored 
s FC024/734, Adair to D. P. Aires, 3 October 1970. 
6 FCO24n34, Adair to FCO, 12 October 1970. 
7 N. Tarling, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei, London, OUP, 1971. 
= Donald E. Brown, Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate, Brunei 
Museum Journal Monograph, vol. 2, No. 2 (1970). 
9G. Saunders (2d edition), A History of Brunei, (London, Routledge Curzon, 2002). 
10 D. S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: Problems of Political Survival, (Singapore, 1984). 
11 C. N. Crisswell, `The Origin of the Limbang Claim', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 2, 
no. 2,1971. 
'2Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development'. 
13 See Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Sadien 111 and Britain, pp. 18 - 19, D. S. Ranjit Singh, 
Brunei 1839 - 1983: Problems of Political Survival, Singapore, 1984, p. 112 & Muhammad Hadi 
Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 146. 
14 Ibid., pp. 176-7. 
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to Brunei, and gave the excuse that Brunei should at first implement its constitution. 15 
In December 1960 (after the promulgation of Brunei's constitution in 1959), the Brunei 
Legislative Council passed a resolution requesting the Brunei government to negotiate 
with the Government of Sarawak for the return of Limbang to Brunei. 16 In November 
1962, the Sultan wrote a letter to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, asking for the return of Limbang. '7 
At this time, the return of Limbang to Brunei was considered to be a pressing matter 
for the Sultan as he aimed to forestall the formation of the NKKU planned by the 
PRB. 18 He also wanted Limbang to be restored to Brunei in order to win the hearts and 
minds of the Bruneians who had been awaiting the return of Limbang. He considered 
his claim over Limbang as significant in order to regain his popularity, which he had 
lost following the landslide victory of the PRB in the August 1962 District Council 
Elections. If the Sultan successfully regained Limbang from the Sarawak government, 
support for the formation of the NKKU would weaken, as the strongest supporters for 
the formation of the NKKU were the people of Limbang. 19 The people of Limbang 
supported the formation of the NKKU because it was the only way they could be once 
again reunited with Brunei. If Limbang became part of Brunei, the people of Limbang 
would probably no longer support the PRB and its aim for the establishment of the 
NKKU. However, the governors of Sarawak and North Borneo were reluctant to return 
Limbang to Brunei, 20 as they feared that if the question of Limbang became known to 
the people of Sarawak and North Borneo, especially to the inhabitants of Limbang, it 
could create problems in establishing the Federation of Malaysia. Thus, the British 
151bid., p. 278. 
16 Ibid., p. 278. 
17 CO1030/1296, HH the Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddin to Duncan Sandys, 22 November 1962, 
item 90. Cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar A1i Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 278. See also 
FCO24/734, Brief No. 15, Talks with the Sultan of Brunei, November 1970. 
18Hussainmiya, Sultan OmarAli Saijuddin III and Britain, p. 278. 
19 Ibid., p. 279. 
20 DO169/54, Letter from Sir William Goode to Secretary of State, 28 December 1962 or Letter 
from Sir A. Waddell to Secretary of State for Colonies, 31 December 1962 (cited in Muhammad 
Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development', p. 153). 
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government advised the Brunei government that the Limbang problem should be dealt 
with only after the establishment of Malaysia. 21 
After the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the Brunei government continued its claim 
over Limbang. In this year, the Brunei government wrote a letter to the British 
government about Limbang, which had become part of Malaysia. However, in the 
meeting between Sultan Omar All Saifuddien and Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, on 29 July 1963, Sandys stated that the British 
government was unable to consider Brunei's request, as Limbang had become part of 
the State of Sarawak within Malaysia. Brunei's claim over Limbang therefore should be 
addressed to the Malaysian government and not to the British government u The 
British government's action on this matter was indeed contrary to the 1959 Agreement, 
which stated that anything relating to foreign matters was Britain's responsibility. 
Subsequently, the Brunei government sent a letter to the Malaysian government, but 
neither the Sultan nor the Brunei government received any reply. Nevertheless, the 
Brunei government did not pursue the issue any further, as it realised that the federal 
government was at that time occupied with problems concerning the establishment of 
Malaysia. 
Two years after the establishment of Malaysia, that was on 17 April 1965, Marsal 
Maun, Brunei's Chief Minister, sent a letter to the Minister of External Affairs of the 
Federation of Malaysia reminding the latter about the Sultan's letters on the subject of 
Limbang, which had been passed to the Secretary of State. 3 In this letter, Marsal Maun 
explained that Brunei had put forward its claim over Limbang because it had rights 
over Limbang and had never accepted the annexation of Limbang by Rajah Brooke of 
Sarawak. 24 Furthermore, since both countries professed the religion of Islam and were 
followers of Islamic principles, Brunei felt obligated to put forward a claim to Limbang 
which should properly be within Brunei's own boundaries . 
25 Marsal Maun also 
21 Ibid., p. 153. 
u C. O. 1030/1671 Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State and His Highness the 
Sultan of Brunei, at Commonwealth Relations Office, 29th July 1963 (cited in ibid., p. 172). 
23 These letters were dated 27 July and 13 August 1963. 
24 FC024/734, Marsal bin Maun to the Minister for External Affairs, Federation of Malaysia, 17 
April 1965. 
25 Ibid., 17 April 1965. 
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mentioned that the British government had no objection to the question of Limbang 
being directly raised by the Brunei government to the Malaysian government 26 Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, however, rejected Brunei's letter, explaining that he could not 
negotiate with the Brunei government directly on the issue of Limbang, as Brunei's 
foreign affairs were still dealt with by the British under the 1959 Agreement 27 He 
stressed that the Malaysian government could only discuss the matter with the British 
government. In October 1965, PSN Yusof, the new Chief Minister of Brunei, sent a 
letter through the British government to remind the Malaysian government that it owed 
Brunei a reply to its letter dated 17 April 1965.28 
A year later on 25 April 1966 the Brunei government sent another letter to the 
British government about a reminder to an earlier letter with regard to Brunei's claim 
on Limbang to the Malaysian government 29A reply was received from the British 
government dated 11 May 1966 which stated that the letter was communicated to the 
secretary for Commonwealth Relations in London. A month later, the British 
government informed PSN Yusuf that the claim would be submitted to the Malaysian 
government. Following that, the British government informed PSN Yusuf that the 
Malaysian authorities were actively considering the content of the letter sent by the 
Brunei government concerning its claim over Limbang. However, since then the Brunei 
government had heard nothing from the Malaysian government 30 This was despite the 
Brunei government's further letter to the Malaysian government on 6 February 1969.3 1 
Abdul Rahman Yakub's public pronouncement that the descendants of Bruneian 
citizens should give their undivided loyalty to Malaysia provoked Sir Omar to renew 
his claim over Limbang publicly. 32 Here, however, it is worth noting that Abdul 
Rahman Yaakub made this statement following the migration of the people of 
Limbang, particularly those of Bruneian descent to Brunei. Following the incorporation 
of Limbang into Malaysia, about one thousand inhabitants of a village in Limbang had 
26 Ibid., 17 April 1965. For the full text of the letter see Appendix V. 
27 FC024/1380, Tunku Abdul Rahman to HH Sultan Omar All Saifuddien, 22 April 1965. 
23 FC024/734, PSN Yusof to FCO, 12 October 1970. 
29 Ibid., 12 October 1970. 
30 Ibid., 12 October 1970. 
31 Ibid., 12 October 1970. 
32 FC0241734, Adair to D. P. Aires, 3 October 1970. 
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moved down river to Brunei where the government of Brunei allowed them to set up 
their own community in Kampong Ayer ('Water Village'). 33 The Sultan had given them 
the status of Brunei citizens, and some sections of the community there had expressed 
their wish to have the area returned to Brunei 34 This originated from the difficulties 
faced by the residents who lived in the villages situated on the border, whose 
nationalities could not be easily determined. 5 If Limbang had been part of Brunei, this 
would not have been the case. As a result, Abdul Rahman Yaakub made his speech 
urging the people to be loyal to Malaysia. In retaliation, Sir Omar revived Brunei's 
claim over Limbang openly. 
In his meeting with Adair, Sir Omar also informed the High Commissioner that 
Limbang was one of the issues he intended to raise and that it was a matter on which he 
continued to attach much importance. 36 Adair thought that Sir Omar also raised the 
issue of Limbang publicly because he wanted to remind the Conservative government 
which had come to power in June 1970 that the Limbang issue would be one of the 
matters he intended to bring up in the meeting between Brunei and the British 
government. By raising the issue before the talks between Brunei and the British 
government, Sir Omar had actually made it difficult for the British government to avoid 
the Limbang issue. 7 Indeed, during the meetings between Brunei and the British 
government between November 1970 and November 1971, Limbang was one of the 
main issues dominating the discussions apart from the terms of the amended agreement 
of 1971. 
P. Gautrey on the other hand, who replaced Adair as the British High Commissioner 
to Brunei in 1972, thought that the reason for Sir Omar making a public claim over 
Limbang was that of the oil factor. The possibility that Limbang might be sitting on a 
vast oil reserve had made Sir Omar renew Brunei's claim on Limbang from Malaysia. 
Since the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company had struck its first oil on its 1,470 sq. mile 
33 Borneo Bulletin, 3 October 1970. 
3' Ibid., 3 October 1970. 
35 Ibid., 3 October 1970. 
36 Ibid., 12 October 1970. 
37 FC024l734, Adair to D. P. Aires, 3 October 1970. See also FC024/734, J. E. Thome to W. A. 
Ward, 11 November 1970. 
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concession (that was twenty-two miles off the coast of Brunei in 1970), it had 
stimulated oil explorations in the Temburong District, which was located in the eastern 
part of Brunei separated by Limbang. 38 
The Brunei Shell Petroleum Company, which had been in operation in the state 
since 1918, was the major producer of oil in Brunei 39 In 1963 and 1969, it discovered 
two offshore oilfields, namely the South-West Ampa and the Fairly Field. 0 The South- 
West Ampa Field was situated 13 and 18 km in front of the coast of Kuala Belait (close 
to the sea-border of Sarawak). Parts of the Ampa Field lay in the territorial waters of 
Sarawak and were exploited by the Malaysian national oil company. 41 Both fields had a 
content of natural gas and some of the gas deposits were found separate from the oil 42 
In 1970, an offshore field called Champion was discovered by the Brunei Shell 
Petroleum Company. Another oil company, the Ashland Oil Company, began 
preliminary work in connection with a proposed exploratory programme in the state in 
an area of 1,454 sq. mile concession in Belait, Tutong and the Brunei/Muara Districts 
as well as Temburong in 1969.43 
According to G. E. Wilford in his `Geology and Mineral Resources of Brunei and 
Adjacent Parts of Sarawak' which is the standard geological work for the area, 
produced with the cooperation of Shell and published by Brunei Press in 1961 `the best 
prospects for finding further oil fields appear to be west of the Limbang valley'. °d 
Gautrey in his letter to J. K. Hickman 45 dated 22 March 1973, stated that Brunei had not 
come across any recent indication that there was an active exploration going on in the 
Malaysian part of the Limbang Valley. He added that `sooner or later oil may be found 
in this area. '46 Because of this, it was possible that Sir Omar wanted Limbang to be 
's Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1970. 
39 In 1929, it discovered the first oil well at Seria. 
40 Franz, Johannes C., The Sultanate of Brunei: Oil Wealth and Problems ofDevelopment, p. 77. 
41 Ibid., p. 79. 
42 Ibid., p. 79. 
43 FC024/1692, Gautrey to Hickman, 22 March 1973. Also see Johannes C. Franz, The Sultanate 
of Brunei, pp. 281 - 283 for details of the Bruneian Government concession areas to Brunei Shell 
Petroleum Company, Ashland Oil Company and other companies from 1963 until 1968. 
" FC024/1692, P. Gautrey to J. K. Hickman, 22 March 1973. 
45J. K. Hickman was the British High Commissioner to Malaysia. 
46FCO24/1692, Gautrey to Hickman, 22 March 1973. 
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returned to Brunei before the discovery of oil in those areas. If oil were found before 
Limbang was returned, it would then be impossible for Brunei to reclaim Limbang. 
47 
5.3. The Limbang conflict: 1970 - 1973 
However, Brunei's claim on Limbang from Malaysia (whatever the reasons behind 
it) proved to be difficult for Brunei, as the Malaysian government ignored Brunei's 
claim over Limbang. After the establishment of Malaysia in 1963, the latter ignored 
Brunei's claim on Limbang because the Malaysian government wanted to punish Sir 
Omar for his stubbornness in not joining Malaysia. 48 To the Malaysian government, the 
Limbang territory would only be returned to Brunei on condition that Brunei joined the 
Federation of Malaysia. 49 Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaya, had 
already indicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that, if Brunei did not join 
Malaysia, there was no prospect of Limbang being returned to Brunei before or after 
the creation of Malaysia. Only if Brunei joined Malaysia would there be a possibility of 
the return of Limbang to Brunei 50 Moreover, the Malaysian government considered 
Brunei's claim on Limbang as totally unacceptable. To the Malaysian government, 
since the Brooke dynasty, 51 the British52 and then the Malaysian government had 
exercised continued jurisdiction over the area since 1890, and this was enough to make 
the annexation legal. 53 Moreover, when surveys were conducted to determine the 
47 Ibid., 22 March 1973. According to Gautrey, the Brunei aristocracy felt a certain amount of 
frustration at having lost their lands over the last century and a half when in fact they were sitting 
on the immense wealth of the oil fields. 
'a Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 235. 
" Ibid., p. 235. 
50 Ibid., 153. When Malaya proposed the Malaysian Plan to Brunei, the Malayan government 
suggested to the British that not only Limbang but also Sarawak be returned to Brunei, at least the 
Northern part of Sarawak where the population consisted mostly of Malays and Dayaks 
(C0947/2, Proposed Federation of Malaysia, Commission of Enquiry, Papers for British 
Members, item 6(b) (cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar All Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 279). 
The main reason for the Malaysian government proposing this to the British was that it wanted to 
persuade the Sultan to join the Federation (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's 
Political Development', p. 154). The Colonial Office supported the idea and used Limbang to bait 
Brunei to join the Malaysian Federation (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political 
Development', p. 155). Brunei however did not join Malaysia. 
51 The Brooke dynasty ruled Limbang from 1890 until 1946. 
52 Limbang was under British colonial rule from 1946 until 1963 when Sarawak joined Malaysia. 
53 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development', p. 170. 
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wishes of the people of Sarawak as to whether they would like to join Malaysia or not, 
most of them stated that they would. 
According to the Cobbold Commission Report of January 1963 and the United 
Nations Mission Report of September 1963 (which was set up to determine the views 
of the people of Sarawak and Sabah towards Malaysia), the majority of the people of 
Sarawak including Limbang were in favour of joining Malaysia. These reports showed 
that the people of Limbang had used their right of self-determination and had made 
clear their desire to join Malaysia. This principle of self-determination is contained in 
the United Nations Charter, General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV) Principle IX. 54 In 
other words, the process of establishing the wishes of the people of Sarawak as well as 
those of Limbang met the conditions for the legality of the treaty of cession, in 
accordance with the principle of self-determination within the requirement of the 
General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV) 55 Moreover, the 1963 Malaysia Agreement 
concluded that the cession of Limbang within the Federation of Malaysia was 
tantamount to a treaty of cession in international law. 56 Under this agreement, the 
sovereignty of Limbang was transferred from the British government to the Malaysian 
Federation. 57 
Brunei's claim on Limbang also proved to be difficult as the British government did 
not support Brunei's claim on Limbang. This was because like Malaysia, Britain also 
54See United Nations Malaysia Mission Report, Department of Information, Malaysia, September 
1963 (cited in ibid., p. 170). 
ss However, the findings of the Cobbold Commission regarding the views of the Limbang 
population were debatable. The Cobbold Commission had simplified its findings by concluding 
that one third of the population of Sarawak and North Borneo would like to join Malaysia, one 
third would accept the Federation subject to conditions and a further third had differing attitudes 
towards the Federation of Malaysia (CO1030/1027, Greater Malaysia: - Consideration of the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Summary of Cobbold Report, 'Assessment of Evidence', 
Paragraph 143). According to Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `the findings suggest that the 
substantial majority of the people of Brunei did not favour Malaysia and that the Cobbold Report 
and the UN Commission's findings were not a valid basis for determining the future of Limbang. 
This was because about 40 % or 6,500 of the people of Limbang especially the Malays and the 
Kedayans favoured reunification with Brunei and opposed the unification with Malaysia. This 
number does not include the Chinese, Bisaya, Muruts and Ibans, most of whom also supported 
the return of Limbang to Brunei' (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political 
Development', p. 170). 
56 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 171. 
57 Ibid., 200. 
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considered Limbang as part of the Malaysian State of Sarawak. To the British 
government the 1963 Agreement it had made with Malaysia had effectively transferred 
Limbang to the federal government. 
When Sir Omar requested the British government to suggest to the Malaysian 
government a tripartite discussion on Limbang between the governments of Britain, 
Malaysia and Brunei, Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs warned Sir Omar that Britain did not support Brunei's claim on 
Limbang because it considered Limbang to be part of the Malaysian State of Sarawak. 
58 Sir Omar, however, told Anthony Royle that Brunei had not ceded Limbang to 
Sarawak and it was a fact that Brunei had rights over Limbang. Sir Omar added that 
unlike Sabah and Sarawak, Limbang had never been the subject of concession and that 
there was no document recording an agreement on Limbang by the late Sultan and he 
had certainly seen no proof of such a transaction 59 According to Sir Omar, under 
Islamic principles it would be wrong for Brunei to drop the claim and it was a great 
wrong for a Muslim state to retain the property of another Muslim State. 60 
Anthony Royle also warned the Sultan not to make any more public announcements 
regarding the matter and notified Sir Omar that if he did not heed Britain's advice, the 
British government would announce its stance on the issue publicly, that it did not 
support Brunei's claim on Limbang 61 His reason for warning Sir Omar not to make any 
more public pronouncements regarding Limbang was that Sir Omar's action could 
cause embarrassment to the British government, as the annexation of Limbang occurred 
when Brunei had a protectorate agreement with Britain. 62 
Indeed when Sarawak annexed Limbang Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam, whose rule 
was influenced by the Amanat, sought British protection. It should be borne in mind 
that by the Protectorate Agreement signed between Brunei and Britain in 1888, Brunei 
gained British protection while retaining its internal independence. However, the 
British government, which was committed to the absorption of Brunei either by 
58 FC024/1082, Record of a Meeting between Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
and the Sultan of Brunei at the FCO, 22 April 1971. 
59 Ibid., 22 April 1971. 
60 Ibid., 22 April 1971. 
61Ibid., 22 April 1971. 
62 FC024/734, Adair to Aires, 3 October 1970. 
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Sarawak or North Borneo, did not rescue Brunei. Instead, it urged Sultan Hashim to 
give his consent to the annexation of Limbang by Sarawak. Sultan Hashim, however, 
made it clear that his consent would not be forthcoming. His objections maintained the 
policy of the late Sultan (Sultan Abdul Momin), who did not want any more of Brunei's 
territories to be divided among other powers. 63 In his despatch dated 11 February 1891, 
Sultan Hashim stated that `in accordance with the wishes of the late Sultan we have 
always refused to cede to any other nation the River Limbang and other rivers and 
territory'. 
In order to validate the acquisition of Limbang by Sarawak, a survey was carried 
out by the British government to determine the independence of Limbang. This was 
because the annexation of Limbang by Rajah Brooke was based on his contention that 
the Limbang people had been independent of Brunei for years and the inhabitants of 
Limbang preferred Sarawak's rule to Brunei's. 5 In Rajah Brooke's despatch to Sir C. 
Smith, the High Commissioner for Brunei, Rajah Brooke stated that `I base my 
occupation principally on the will of the inhabitants of Limbang and their right to 
choose a protecting and ruling power, these people having maintained their 
independence against the Bruneian Government since 1884'. 66 
Subsequently, the report on Limbang's independence was revealed by Noel P. 
Trevenen, who was chosen as the British representative to investigate the case. In his 
report, he stated that Brunei had not been practising its sovereignty over Limbang for 
seven years, the people of Brunei had been `hopelessly bad and corrupt' and `the people 
of Limbang had been in periodic revolt'. 7 Consequently, on 12 August 1891 Smith 
informed Sultan Hashim that the British had recognised and confirmed Rajah Brooke's 
possession of Limbang with the condition that he would pay compensation to the 
63 F012/87, Sultan Hashim to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Enclosure 2 in No. 3,11 
February 1891. In 1885, Sultan Abdul Momin called upon his principal officers to a meeting 
whereby from this meeting the Amanat or (Sacred Will) was made. The important point in the 
`Amanat' was that Limbang and other territories should not be leased or ceded to other nations. 
For the full text of the `Amanat' see Appendix IV. 
64 Ibid., 11 February 1891. 
65 F012/87, Lord Salisbury to Sir C. Smith, 29 November 1890. 
66 F012/87, Rajah Charles Brooke to Smith, 30 January 1891. 
67 CO 12/87, P. Trevenen to Salisbury, 30 April 1891. 
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Sultan. 68 Rajah Brooke offered Sultan Hashim $6000 per annum for Limbang; by 
offering compensation, the British hoped that the Limbang issue could be closed 69 
As a result, Sultan Hashim sent petitions to the Queen and to prominent British 
officials for the return of Limbang. 70 In his petitions, he denounced Trevenen's report, 
which supported Rajah Brooke's action, and did not consider the difficulty of Brunei. 
He also condemned Britain for interfering in the internal affairs of Brunei 71 In his 
despatch to Trevenen, he objected that: 
If any of Brunei's subjects rebel against the Bruneian Government, it is not 
right altogether for other nations or governments to interfere, to go between, 
or to consult Brunei subjects who are in rebellion so they may be forced in 
denying the Bruneian Government. 72 
In order to cover up the controversial action of the British, the latter reminded 
Sultan Hashim of Article III of the 1888 Agreement: If any difference should arise 
between the Sultan and the Bruneian government of any other state, the Sultan of 
Brunei agrees to abide by the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and to take all 
necessary measures to give effect thereto. 3 To Sultan Hashim, however, Britain had 
violated the 1888 Agreement it had made with Brunei. This was because Brunei's 
purpose for seeking protection was to preserve the kingdom; this was the spirit behind 
the negotiations. However, by sanctioning Rajah Brooke's annexation of Limbang, 
Britain had actually broken its treaty with Brunei. Moreover, if Brunei were to cede 
Limbang it would violate the 1888 Agreement, especially Article VI of the agreement, 
which says that `no cession nor any other alienation of any part of the territory of the 
State of Brunei shall be made to any foreign state'. 4 
This was why Adair warned Sir Omar not to make any more public announcements 
regarding Limbang as his action could have caused embarrassment to the British. Adair 
in his letter to D. P. Aires of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 3 October 1970 
68 Sarawak Document, Smith to Sultan Hashim, 12 August 1891. 
69 FCO12/88 also in C0144/69, Smith to Salisbury, 11 December 1891, No. 4 (Cited in Tarling, 
Britain, the Brookes and Brunei, p. 413). 
70 F012/95, Sultan Hashim to Governor Sir C. Mitchell, Enclosure I in No. 1,16 February 894. 
71 FO12/87, Sultan Hashim to Trevenen, 29 April 1891. 
72 Ibid., 29 April 1891. 
73See Appendix 1. 
74 Ibid. 
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mentioned that `the embarrassing question of Brunei's claim to Limbang has again, and 
in a quite unexpected context, raised its ugly head'. 5 
Following Sir Omar's public claim on Limbang, the issue of Limbang had been 
publicized from time to time, and had been a bone of contention and source of friction 
between Brunei and Malaysia and this discomfited the British. Following the Sultan's 
claim on Limbang, on 13 October 1970, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia stated in Berita Harlan which was then quoted by the Borneo Bulletin that 
Brunei had no rights to Limbang, as it was not an independent state and that its people 
were `slaves of the British'. 76 Consequently, Sir Omar responded by saying that it was 
actually the states in Malaysia which were the slaves of the Malaysian Central 
Government as `their constitution can be changed by the Central Government as has 
happened in Sarawak'. 77 
Another issue which embarrassed the British was that of the boundary, raised by Sir 
Omar. According to Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Limbang boundary was already fixed 
by the British and the Governor of Sarawak. 78 Brunei's palace official however 
disputed Tunku Abdul Rahman's claim because to Brunei the issue had not been 
discussed let alone approved by Brunei. 79 This embarrassed the British as in 1920, 
1925,1931 and 1933 the British Resident in Brunei had made agreements with the 
Sarawak government relating to the border problem without the Sultan's consent. By 
these agreements, Limbang was effectively recognized as a part of Sarawak's 
territory. 80 
In June 1971, when Sir Omar requested permission to visit Limbang and to talk in 
public about the progress of his Limbang claim, Anthony Royle turned him down and 
reminded him of the advice he had given at the earlier meeting which was not to raise 
the issue in public. Moreover, a visit by Sir Omar to Limbang in any capacity could 
75 FC024/734, Adair to Aires, 3 October 1970. 
76 Borneo Bulletin, 17 October 1970 & FC024/734, Mr Grubb to Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 13 October 1970, Berita Harlan, 13 October 1970. 
" Borneo Bulletin, 17 October 1970, FC024/734, Mr Grubb to Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 13 October 1970, Bintang Harlan (Daily Star), 15 October 1970 & 20 October 1970, 
Bintang Harlan, 20 October 1970, Pelita Brunei, 21 October 1970. 
78 Bintang Harlan (Daily Star), 21 October 1970. 
79 Ibid., 21 October 1970. 
80 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 147. 
124 
only be embarrassing to the British government. As a result, Royle warned Sir Omar 
that if he made the visit, the British government publicly would make clear its view on 
Limbang that it did not support Brunei's claim on the territory. 81 
Anthony Royle also warned Sir Omar that the issue of Limbang, whatever the basis 
of his claim, would involve Brunei's external affairs and was therefore the 
responsibility of the British government. 82 The provisions of Article 3(1) of the 1959 
Agreement, under which the British government had complete control of Brunei's 
external affairs, were unaffected by the amending agreement, which they initialled in 
November 1971. This was indeed a shift in British policy because in 1963 the British 
government had allowed the Brunei government to take the issue of Limbang straight to 
the Malaysian government and not the British government as Limbang had become part 
of the State of Sarawak within Malaysia. The British government's stance on the matter 
showed that it wanted to control Brunei's claim on Limbang. When Sir Omar argued 
that his claim on Limbang was based on Islamic principles and was thus outside the 
British government's jurisdiction, Anthony Royle maintained that it was still inside 
British control as Brunei's external affairs were under the British government's 
influence. 83 
Anthony Royle further warned Sir Omar that, in dealing with the issue, the British 
government would have to take into account the likely views of the Malaysian 
government. On this, Royle reminded Sir Omar that the Malaysian government might 
not consider Brunei's claim on Limbang. Royle, however, believed that there could be 
a possibility of fruitful discussions about border problems if the claim was not 
pursued. 84 From here, one can see that the British government did not support Brunei's 
claim on Limbang, but only supported the possibility of discussions on the border 
problems. Tun Abdul Razak, the new Prime Minister of Malaysia, indicated in 
September 1970 to the British authorities that there would be a likelihood of 
discussions on the border problems if the Limbang claim was not pursued by Sir 
81 FC024/1380, Record of Meeting between Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and 
the Sultan of Brunei, at the FCO, 19 June 1972. 
82 Ibid., 19 June 1972. 
83 FC024/734, Adair to Aires, 3 October 1970. 
84 FC024/1082, Record of a Meeting between Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
and the Sultan of Brunei at the FCO, 22 April 1971. 
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Omar. 85 Sir Omar, however, argued that even border problems were presided over by 
the principles of religion, and in Brunei's view Limbang fell within the borders of 
Brunei. He proposed that the British government discuss with the Malaysian 
government whether the latter could agree to talks on an Islamic basis. 86 Royle at first 
was reluctant to do this, but after many circular arguments, he finally agreed to consider 
without commitment whether the British government could ask Malaysia to agree to Sir 
Omar's proposal. 87 
On 5 May 1971, Royle proposed that Sir Omar prepare a letter expressing the 
Sultan's views on Limbang, which the British government passed on to the Malaysian 
government. 88 In the Sultan's letter, he expressed Brunei's claim on Limbang based on 
the principles of Islamic Law. These principles are: faith and belief in God; belief in the 
teaching of the Prophet; belief in the holy books as handed down; belief in the angels; 
belief in the next world and belief that those who take others' property will not enter 
heaven and must restore the property to their rightful owners. 89 However, the 
Malaysian government refused to receive from the British government a formal request 
on behalf of the Sultan. 90 In response to this, Sir Omar stated to Anthony Royle that, if 
the Malaysian government refused to accept his communication, it would be 
contravening the arrangement whereby the British government handled Brunei's 
foreign affairs. Sir Omar stated that, `if therefore the Malaysian government would not 
accept representations from HMG on behalf of Brunei, what was the position? '91 At 
this stage Sir Omar was obviously disappointed because he knew that the Malaysian 
government was ignoring his claim over Limbang. 92 
Brunei's claim on Limbang became an urgent matter when the 1962 Bruneian ex- 
rebels escaped from the Berakas Detention Camp in Brunei to Limbang in July 1973. 
85 Ibid., 22 April 1971. 
86 Ibid., 26 April 1971. 
87 Ibid., 29 April 1971. 
88 Ibid., 5 May 1971. 
89 FC024/1380, Record of Meeting between Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and 
the Sultan of Brunei, at the FCO, 19 June 1972. 
90 FC024/1689, Talks with the Sultan of Brunei, Brief no. 3- Limbang, 3 September 1973. 
91 FC024/1689, Note of Sir Omar's remarks during Defence Council Meeting, 22 February 1973. 
92 When Sir Omar brought up the issue of Limbang publicly, Tunku Abdul Rahman had already 
stated that Brunei's claim to Limbang was a matter for the Brunei and the British Governments 
(cited in Borneo Bulletin, 10 October 1970). 
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At this point, it should be noted that Sir Omar believed they escaped with the 
connivance of the Malaysian government. Indeed, the Malaysian government was 
involved in the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels. The reasons for the Malaysian 
government's involvement in their escape will be explained in detail in the next chapter. 
It is noteworthy however that one of the reasons for the Malaysian government's 
involvement in the episode was that it wanted to avert Sir Omar and the Sultan's 
attention away from the Limbang issue and to redirect their attention to Brunei's 
independence and constitutional development in the Sultanate. Indeed, following the 
successful escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to Malaysia, the issue of constitutional 
development and that of the continued detention of the ex-rebels without trial in Brunei 
came to the fore and occupied the Sultan and Sir Omar. 
From the end of the 1962 Rebellion until 1973, fifty-seven political detainees had 
been held at Berakas Detention Camp. The UN adopted a consensus on Brunei at the 
943rd meeting on 23 August 1973 by the UN Special Committee with regard to the 
implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (the so-called Committee of Twenty-four). 93 Under this 
consensus, Britain should continue to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the 
Charter with respect to Brunei and ask that the visiting missions of the UN, drawn from 
the Special Committee, should be received in Brunei. 4 As mentioned in Chapter Four, 
before the 1971 Agreement was signed between Britain and Brunei, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office had informed the UK mission in New York that when the new 
agreement was signed, Britain would cease transmission of its reports about Brunei to 
the UN Secretary-General. The UN had, however, asked the UK mission at the UN to 
93FC024/1684, Record of Conversation between the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Sultan at the FCO, 6 November 1973, J. K Hickman 
to Wilford - Speaking Notes for a meeting between A. Royle and the Sultan on 6 November 
1973. 
94 This worried the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as this might have led to a campaign in 
New York and elsewhere, which would have been damaging to Brunei's interests, where some 
countries would express views on Brunei's internal policies. This might in turn stimulate 
organisations such as Amnesty International and possibly even British members to raise the 
matter publicly (cited in FC024/1684, Record of Conversation between the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Sultan at the FCO, 6 
November 1973, J. K Hickman to Wilford - Speaking Notes for a meeting between A. Royle and 
the Sultan on 6 November 1973). 
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continue to transmit these reports. 95 Consequently, Anthony Royle, the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, suggested that Sir 
Omar release the remaining prisoners. Anthony Royle's suggestion posed a problem for 
Sir Omar, as he did not want to release prisoners whom he still considered as dangerous 
to the security of the Sultanate. 96 
The release of the detainees was actually dealt with by a review consisting of a 
chairman and three assessors appointed by the Sultan, and higher authorities further 
considered the committee's recommendations. 97 Usually, releases were conditional 
upon a detainee denouncing Azahari's leadership and political treachery, volunteering 
to reform behaviour and pledging loyalty to the Sultan. From the time the detainees 
were held, none had been brought to trial 98 For some years the review committee had 
not met, as it considered that the remaining detainees were in the `black', i. e., 
dangerous, category. The British High Commissioner commented that too much time 
had passed since the 1962 Rebellion and that it was time for a court-based trial to be 
held 99 The Sultan persistently claimed that when the position of all the detainees was 
revised by the Special Branch and the security committee in 1970, they had suggested 
that these detainees remained hard-core troublemakers. 100 Sir Omar explained that the 
conditions in neighbouring states did not permit the relaxation of security measures in 
Brunei. 1°' When Anthony Royle suggested that Sir Omar implement some kind of 
elected advisory body with limited powers and limited franchise, 102 Sir Omar rejected 
his suggestion as he did not want to reduce his power to a constitutional monarch. 
Although the issues of constitutional development and the continued detention of 
the ex-rebels without trial in Brunei came to the fore and occupied the attention of the 
95 FC058/625, D. P. Aires to Wilford, 23 March 1973. 
96 FC024/1684, Record of Conversation between the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Sultan at the FCO, 6 November 1973, J. K Hickman 
to Wilford - Speaking Notes for a meeting between A. Royle and the Sultan on 6 November 
1973. 
97 FC024/1698, Briefs on Brunei/Malaysia Relations: Escape of Detainees, September 1973. 
98 Ibid., September 1973. 
99FCO24/1698, Briefs on Brunei/Malaysia Relations: Escape of Detainees, September 1973. 
loo Ibid., September 1973. 
101 FC024/1679, Record of Conversation between His Highness the Sultan of Brunei and 
Anthony Royle at the FCO, 6 July 1972. 
102 FC024/1684, Record of Conversation between Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Sultan at the FCO, 6 November 1973. 
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Sultan and Sir Omar, they did not abandon the issue of Limbang. To Sir Omar and the 
Sultan the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to Limbang could have posed a threat to 
Brunei's security. Thus in the interests of Brunei's national security, Limbang had to be 
reclaimed and Brunei's defence had to be tightened. 
In a meeting between Sir Omar and Royle on 19 September 1973 in London, Sir 
Omar questioned Royle on the results of his communication with the Malaysian 
government regarding Brunei's claim on Limbang. 103 Royle confirmed that he would 
write to Tun Abdul Razak informing him of the discussions. Similarly in the meeting 
on 12 November 1973 between the Sultan and Royle, Sir Omar once again pressed 
Royle about his contact with Tun Abduk Razak. Since there had been no reply from 
Malaysia, Sir Omar suggested Royle send a reminder to Tun Abdul Razak requesting a 
reply by the end of the year. The Sultan also suggested to Royle that he himself would 
write a letter to Tun Abdul Razak if Royle did not get an answer from Tun Abdul 
Razak. '°4 Royle, however, stated that Sir Omar's suggestions would only make it more 
difficult to reach a satisfactory outcome for Brunei's claim on Limbang. As a result, Sir 
Omar warned Royle that he would withdraw from his position as adviser to the Sultan 
if he did not receive any reply from Tun Abdul Razak. He insisted on having a reply by 
31 December and if he did not get it, he would resign. '°5 
5.4. The closure of the Limbang issue 
On 14 December 1973, Tun Abdul Razak finally replied to Brunei's letter which 
had been forwarded via Royle in 1971; in the reply, he closed the Limbang issue 
completely. In the letter, Tun Abdul Razak stated that the Malaysian government was 
not prepared to entertain any discussions on the Limbang claim by Brunei, because to 
him such discussions would not serve any useful purpose. 106 In answering the three 
questions posed by Brunei, the Malaysian government stated that its Constitution did 
103 FC024/1684, Record of a Conversation between HH the Sultan of Brunei and Mr Royle at the 
FCO, 19 September 1973. 
104 Ibid., 12 November 1973. 
105 Ibid., 12 November 1973. Sir Omar was appointed as the Sultan's adviser following the 
latter's accession to the throne in October 1967 (cited from Utusan Melayu, 25 October 1967). 
106 FC024/1679, Tun Abdul Razak to Anthony Royle, 14 December 1973. See also Pelita Brunei, 
6 February 1974. 
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not prove that Islam was the official religion, while at the same time guaranteeing 
complete freedom for the practice of other religions. However, he stated that Muslims 
in Malaysia followed the Shafeite School of Islam and recognised the authority of the 
Quran and other holy books of Islam on religious matters. These facts, according to 
Tun Abdul Razak, were well known, but they did not help Malaysia in any way with 
regard to the Limbang claim, which was not a religious matter. 107 
In response to Tun Abdul Razak's letter, Sir Omar, in a statement which was 
delivered by the Acting State Secretary Dato Paduka Awang Haji Abdul Aziz on Radio 
Brunei on 30 January 1974, maintained that Brunei would never give up its claim over 
Limbang from Malaysia. Brunei would not allow Limbang, which belonged to Brunei, 
to be part of Malaysia. He further stated that Brunei would continue to claim Limbang 
from the Malaysian government and that it would discuss with the British government 
Brunei's intention to continue its pursuit to reclaim Limbang from Malaysia. '°8 
Following the Sultan's statement, Brunei received persistent warnings from Abdul 
Rahman Yakub, the Chief Minister of Sarawak. On 21 March 1974, the Chief Minister 
of Sarawak warned Brunei not to approach Sarawak and that `[we] will never give 
away an inch of Malaysian soil in Limbang to Brunei'. He further warned Brunei not to 
`wake the sleeping tiger. There are a million people here'. 109 The figure of one million 
was particularly threatening, for it reminded Sir Omar that Brunei had a population of 
only about 150,000, living in restricted areas hemmed in by Sarawak territory, and 
furthermore split in two by the disputed Limbang claim. He also provoked Sir Omar by 
reminding him that the latter needed the Gurkha soldiers in his state, not because 
Brunei was facing security problems, but because he was afraid of an uprising from his 
people who were desperate for independence. ' 10 
In his further provocation towards Brunei, Abdul Rahman Yaakub stated in the 
State Council that Malaysians in Sarawak were prepared `to sacrifice to the last drop of 
107 FC024/1679, Tun Abdul Razak to Anthony Royle, 14 December 1973. 
108 Pelita Brunei, 6 February 1974. 
109 Sarawak Tribune, 22 March 1974, New Nation, March 22,1974 & Straits Times, 23 March 
1974. 
110 Ibid. 
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their blood to resist the Brunei claim'. " He called upon Brunei to give up what he 
termed `the groundless claim', ' 12 and rejected Brunei's claim on Limbang. ' 13 In 
response to this, Sir Omar stated that `Brunei's claim to Limbang was directed to the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia and not directed to the Chief Minister of Sarawak. "4 
However, in April 1974, Tun Abdul Razak told the House of Commons that he 
officially supported the Sarawak Chief Minister's rejection of the Limbang claim. He 
stated that `because Limbang is part of Sarawak, it is only right that in facing the 
continuous accusations from Brunei, the Sarawak Chief Minister is forced to take 
prompt measures to show the feelings of the Sarawak Government and also of its 
people. ' l"5 
The Brunei Government was also accused of indicating a further claim to the Baram 
River in Sarawak, which was reluctantly ceded by Sultan Abdul Momin to Rajah 
Brooke in 1882.116 On this, Sarawak warned Brunei that past territorial connections 
could not be used as a basis for territorial claims. It added that: 
If one country claims over another, then one can imagine the number of 
territorial claims that would crop up all over the world. Brunei will have 
claims over the whole of Sarawak. Indonesia in turn will have claims over the 
whole of Borneo. 117 
Brunei was also accused of referring to Sarawak as a kind of neo-colony with a 
Malaysian-appointed governor. The Sarawak Chief Minister stressed that the people of 
Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah should work together to solve common problems, though 
the sounding was actually directed to the people of Brunei and not the Brunei 
government. 118 In an act extremely provocative to Brunei, in 1974, the Sarawak 
government renamed the Kampong Pendaruan (where `Malaysians' had been killed in 
"'New Nation, March 29,1974, Nanyang Siang-Pao, 30 March 1974, Sunday Tribune, 31 March 
1974 & Sarawak Tribune, 1 April 1974. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Sin Chew fit Poh (Singapore), 2 April 1974, Sarawak Tribune, 3 April 1974, Daily News 
(Kuching), 3 April 1974 & Daily Express, 8 April 1974. 
114 Pelita Brunei, 10 April 1974. 
lls Radio Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, News Bulletin, 17 April, Straits Times, 18 April 1974 & Sin 
Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), 19 April 1974. 
116 Sabah Times, 7 June 1974. 
1" Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1974. 
118 Lim, Joo-Jock, `Brunei: Prospects for a Protectorate' in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1976, p. 157. 
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the 1962 Rebellion) as the Kampong Perjuangan ('Heroes Village'), which was three 
miles from Brunei's border. 119 In the same year, Brunei also witnessed the flight of 
some of its people to Limbang. In May, nine families from Kampong Lumapas ran 
away to Limbang, 120 as the ex-rebels in Limbang provoked them by saying the Brunei 
Government would arrest them following their intention to reorganise the PRB in 
Brunei. 121 A month later a group of twenty-two students from Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin College (SOASC) fled to Limbang. The refugees stayed in Limbang, where 
the Malaysian government then gave them asylum. The issue of the escape of the 
Bruneian ex-rebels and nine families from Kampong Lumapas and the students from 
SOASC to Limbang will be explained further in the next chapter. 
In order to discredit Brunei's claim on Limbang, on 23 April 1974 Tun Abdul 
Razak told the House of Commons that the British government had already informed 
the Malaysian government that it would not support Brunei's claim to Limbang. Tun 
Abdul Razak could not accept Brunei's claim because Limbang was part of Sarawak 
and the people of Limbang had decided to join Malaysia in 1963.122 In June, Tun 
Abdul Razak made a further statement about Malaysia's stance on Limbang when he 
was asked by Goh Hock Guan, M. P. (Gerakan) about the possibility of having an 
intermediary to solve the problem quietly between the Malaysian and the Brunei 
governments regarding Limbang. Tun Abdul Razak stated that: 
As I have stated many times before, Malaysia does not recognise the so-called 
claim by Brunei because there is no basis for such a claim. The people of 
Sarawak have freely chosen to be in Malaysia and their wishes must be 
respected by Brunei. Therefore the question of a settlement or the use of an 
intermediary does not arise. Limbang is an integral part of Sarawak, which 
enjoys independence in Malaysia. As far as I can see the only way the matter 
can be `settled quietly' is for Brunei to leave Limbang alone so that its 
119 Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), 2 April 1974. 
120 Ibid., 21 May 1974. 
121 The Head of the refugee group was Osman Bakar, the Deputy Head was Salleh Mahal and 
family. The followers were Haji Ahad bin Taha, Tamin bin Taha, Syed bin Taha, Mudin bin 
Nordin, Jeludin, Ghani Miasan, Ahmad Midin and Pak Mohamad Tahir with all their families 
(cited in Zariani, Escape From Berakas!, p. 260). 
12 Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), 23 April 1974, Daily Express, 23 April 1974, News Bulletin 
Radio Malaysia Kuching and Limbang, 25 April 1974. 
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inhabitants can continue to prosper and live in peace, free from any political 
controversy. ' 23 
Although Sir Omar contended that he would continue to make his claim over 
Limbang, he could not pursue his contention as his attention was shifted towards the 
activities of Brunei's ex-rebels in Malaysia and international arena. The activities of the 
escaped Bruneian ex-rebels in Malaysia posed challenges and problems not only to Sir 
Omar and the Sultan but also to Britain, which wanted to end its military protection 
over the Sultanate. The activities of Brunei's ex-rebels in Malaysia and the problems 
they posed for the Sultan, Sir Omar and the British will be looked into in the next 
chapter. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The difficulties faced by the Brunei government regarding its claim over Limbang 
were the result of the failure of the British government to return Limbang to Brunei 
before it became the Malaysian part of Sarawak in 1963. The British government 
should have returned Limbang to Brunei when the Brooke family ceded Sarawak to the 
British government in 1946. However, because of lack of commitment from the British 
government, the issue of Limbang persisted until the 1960s. In early 1960 when Sultan 
Omar Ali Saifuddien claimed Limbang from the British government, the latter refused 
to consider his claim, as it did not want it to endanger the formation of Malaysia. When 
Brunei claimed its right over Limbang to the federal government after the formation of 
Malaysia in 1963, the latter did not wish to discuss the matter with the Brunei 
government because Brunei's foreign affairs came under the jurisdiction of the British 
government. 
However, from the outset, the Malaysian government was not interested in 
discussing the matter, as Limbang was already part of the Malaysian State of Sarawak. 
Moreover, the people of Sarawak including Limbang had chosen to become part of 
Malaysia prior to its entry into Malaysia. Furthermore, the signing of the 1963 
Malaysian Agreement validated the transfer of Sarawak including Limbang from 
123 Foreign Affairs (Malaysia), Vol. 1.7. No 2, June 1974. 
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Britain to Malaysia; the Malaysian government therefore considered Brunei's claim on 
Limbang, whatever its basis, as invalid. In addition, the Malaysian government wanted 
to punish Sir Omar for his obstinacy in not joining Malaysia. The Malaysian 
government used the Limbang issue as a kind of retribution against the Sultan. To the 
Malaysian government, the Limbang territory would only be given back to Brunei on 
provision that Brunei joined the Federation of Malaysia. 124 Tunku Abdul Rahman, the 
Prime Minister of Malaya, had already recommended to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies that, if Brunei did not join Malaysia, there was no prospect of Limbang being 
returned to Brunei before or after the establishment of Malaysia. Only if Brunei joined 
Malaysia would there be a possibility of the return of Limbang to Brunei. 125Moreover, 
the British government did not support Brunei's claim on Limbang as Limbang was 
already part of Malaysia via the 1963 Agreement it had with Malaysia. As a result, the 
claim was ignored and further reiterations of it resulted in outright rejection. 
This study has shown that Brunei's claim on Limbang became an urgent matter 
when Brunei's 1962 ex-rebels escaped to Limbang in July 1973. For Brunei, Limbang 
had to be reclaimed from Malaysia in order to safeguard Brunei's national security. 
Nevertheless, the Malaysian government refused to return Limbang to Brunei and 
closed the Limbang issue to Brunei in December 1973. Although the Brunei 
government stated it would continue to claim Limbang from Malaysia, this proved not 
to be possible as it was occupied with the activities of the escaped Bruneian ex-rebels 
(who had the support of both Sarawak and the federal government of Malaysia), which 
to the Brunei government could undermine Brunei's internal and external security. 
124 Ibid., p. 235. 
125 Ibid., 153. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Escape of the 1962 Bruneian Ex-rebels and 
their Political Activities: 1973 -1975 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to study the challenges and difficulties faced by the Sultanate in 
connection with its security and survival following the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to 
Limbang in July 1973. From the outset, Sir Omar suspected that Malaysia was involved 
in the event. This study will show that the reasons behind his suspicion were the 
disappearance of Malaysian nationals who manned the camp and the speed of the 
escapees' movements from Limbang to Kuching in addition to the granting of political 
asylum to all the escapees by the Malaysian government. This study will also show that 
the reason why the Malaysian government was involved in the escape was that it 
wanted the ex-rebels to put pressure on the British government to grant Brunei full 
independence. Furthermore, it wished to divert the Sultan and Sir Omar's attention 
away from the Limbang issue and direct their attention to the independence of Brunei 
and to constitutional development in the Sultanate. ' 
This study will demonstrate that Malaysia's intention to use Azahari to achieve its 
aim had given Azahari a chance to continue the struggle that had been repressed by the 
Indonesian government following the coming to power of Suharto in 1966. The study 
will describe briefly Azahari's political activities in Indonesia between 1963 and 1966, 
after which the Indonesian government no longer supported him. In Kuala Lumpur, 
Azahari and the ex-detainees revived the PRB with the aim of achieving independence 
for Brunei and implementing a democratic system of government in Brunei. This study 
will demonstrate that since the Malaysian government did not control the activities of 
the ex-detainees in west Malaysia, the Brunei government had to recall its students 
studying in west Malaysia to Brunei as it feared that the ex-rebels would influence the 
students to work against the Brunei government. 
The escaped ex-rebels were aware that the Malaysian government was using them to deflect the 
Sultan and Sir Omar's attention away from pursuing their claim over Limbang and to switch their 
attention to the independence of Brunei as being pursued by the escaped detainees when they 
reactivated the Parti Rakyat Brunei (PRB) in Kuala Lumpur in 1974. 
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Subsequently, the study will discuss the PRB's political activities in Limbang 
where it will show that the Chief Minister of Sarawak was actively involved in the 
PRB's political activities in order to push Britain to grant Brunei independence and to 
subvert Brunei's security. In addition this study will discuss Britain's efforts to resolve 
the conflict between Brunei, Sarawak and the Federal Government of Malaysia, 
especially following Britain's announcement on 27 November 1974 that it planned to 
review its 1959 Agreement with Brunei. Although there was a lull in the PRB's 
political activities in Kuala Lumpur and Limbang toward the end of 1974 (following 
Britain's warning over Malaysia), this was only temporary as the PRB's political 
activities shifted into the international arena. This study will show that the PRB was 
supported not only by Malaysia but also by the international communities, and it was 
their support which led to the presentation of the PRB's case at the UN in November 
1975. It will also discuss the response made by Britain's ambassador to the UN and the 
Sultan following the PRB's representation at the UN. 
Lastly, it will look at the precautionary measures undertaken by the Sultan and Sir 
Omar to ensure the security of the Sultanate following the escape of Brunei's 1962 ex- 
rebels to Limbang. The chapter will show that as a result of the escape of Brunei's ex- 
rebels, the Sultan accelerated the phase of forming the second battalion, continued the 
emergency orders in Brunei and established the Department of Security and 
Intelligence (DSI) in order to ensure the security of the Sultanate. 
6.2. The escape of Brunei's ex-rebels 
The eight ex-rebels who escaped from Berakas Detention Camp to Limbang were 
Zaini Haji Ahmad, the former Vice-President of the PRB, who, during the rebellion 
was with Azahari in Manila on a mission to represent their case at the UN. Next, 
Mohammad Yassin bin Abdul Rahman (alias Yasin Affandy), the former Secretary- 
General of the PRB, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the NKKU, and Commander-in- 
Chief of the TNKU, the militant wing of the PRB who was shot and caught during the 
rebellion by the British Gurkha army. Then there were Samul Jamaluddin, Yusof 
2 After the unsuccessful rebellion, Zaini renounced Azahari and sought asylum in Hong Kong, but 
the British turned him over to Brunei. See D. Leake, Brunei: The Modern Southeast Asian Islamic 
Sultanate, Kuala Lumpur, Forum, 1990, p. 57. 
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Ibrahim, Ghani Metusin, Sheikh Salleh Sheikh Mahmud, Othman Latiff and Omar 
Tamin 3 They had been in prison since the end of the rebellion in 1963. Two other 
Bruneians who assisted their escape from the camp, Mahmud Murshidi Othman and 
Awangku Hamzah Pengiran Salleh, also followed the eight political detainees. 
The disappearance of Raja Azlan, the principal officer of Berakas Detention Camp, 
and Ahmad Desa, the warder of the camp, both of whom were Malaysians4 convinced 
Sir Omar that the escape was carried out with the support of the Malaysian government. 
According to the Borneo Bulletin's report dated 28 July 1973, Raja Azlan left the state 
without warning. 5Moreover, the Malaysian government had never mentioned the 
disappearance of its nationals Raja Azlan and Ahmad Desa from Brunei. The speed 
with which the escaped party was moved from Limbang to Kuching and granted 
political asylum made Sir Omar believe even more firmly that the Malaysian 
government was involved in the incident. 7 
The Malaysian government was indeed involved in the episode. 8 According to 
Mahmud Murshidi, the man who helped the detainees to escape from the Berakas 
Detention Camp, the reason for this involvement was Malaysia's adoption of ZOPFAN, 
the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 1971, which aimed to neutralize 
Southeast Asia. 9 The Malaysian proposal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia was 
adopted at a special Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971. 
Tun Abdul Razak viewed Brunei as a hindrance to the achievement of ZOPFAN, as 
Brunei was still under British protection. In order to achieve ZOPFAN in Southeast 
Asia, Tun Abdul Razak decided to work with Azahari (who had been in Indonesia since 
3 Borneo Bulletin, 28 July 1973. 
4 Malaysians and some Singaporeans manned the Berakas Detention Camp. 
S Borneo Bulletin, 28 July 1973. 
6 Malaysians working as warders at the Berakas Detention Camp were later replaced by Brunei 
citizens (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 4 August 1973). 
FC024/1675, Johnston to FCO, 14 December 1973. Also see FC024/1684, Record of Meeting 
between the Sultan of Brunei and A. Royle at the FCO, 19 September 1973, FC024/1675, 
Douglas-Home to Moffat, 14 December 1973 & See FC024/1684, Wilford to Youde, 23 
November 1973. 
8 Author's interview with Mahmud Morshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
9 Ibid., 7 March 2006. 
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1963), so that Azahari could put pressure on the British government to grant Brunei full 
independence. 
Another reason, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was that the Malaysian 
government wanted to divert the Sultan and Sir Omar's attention from pursuing their 
claim over Limbang to the independence of Brunei and to constitutional development 
in the Sultanate. As well as using the detainees to divert the attention of the Sultan and 
Sir Omar away from pursuing their claim over Limbang, the Malaysian government (as 
suggested by one of the strongest supporters of the PRB) was using the detainees to 
achieve its ultimate aim of bringing Brunei within Malaysia. By supporting the political 
detainees in the achievement of their aims, the Malaysian government was hoping that 
one day they could be persuaded to enter Malaysia. Nevertheless, according to a 
statement made by another supporter of the PRB to the author, the PRB would not 
bring Brunei into Malaysia as that would be against their struggle to gain independence 
for Brunei outside Malaysia. 
Malaysia's intention to use Azahari to achieve its aim had given Azahari the 
opportunity to continue his struggle which had been repressed by the Indonesian 
government after the coming of Suharto to power in 1966. When Sukarno was in 
power, Azahari received material and moral support from the Indonesian government. 
As noted before, Sukarno supported and recognized the establishment of the NKKU, 
which was proclaimed by Azahari on 8 December 1962. Sukarno's support was the 
main reason for Azahari moving from Manila to Jakarta. In Jakarta, Sukarno allowed 
the PRB to set up its headquarters and to open a Representative Office for the NKKU. 
As stated previously, in 1965, Azahari formed an organisation called the United 
National Revolutionary Front of North Kalimantan, whose aims included opposition to 
British imperialism and the protection of the NKKU which was under his leadership. 1° 
A year later, however, the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia came to 
an end. This was following the coming to power of Suharto as a result of a coup d'etat 
on 1 October 1965. When a group of dissident pro-Communist army and air force troops 
10 Minutes of the First Conference of the North Kalimantan People's Revolutionary Consultative 
Committee, 16 to 29 March 1965, Document No. 25/PRB/65 (cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, 
The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 253 - 262). 11 Ibid., p. 41. 
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attempted to seize control of the government in Jakarta in October 1965 Suharto, who 
was particularly anti-Communist, successfully suppressed them. The army alleged that 
the PKI was responsible for the abortive coup. Subsequently, in March 1966, Suharto 
persuaded President Sukarno to authorize him to restore security and order, which 
effectively transferred executive authority to Suharto. The issuance of `Supersemar' 
(Surat Perintah 11 Maret, or the March 11 Order) by Sukarno on 11 March 1966 gave 
Suharto sweeping powers to take action as he saw fit to restore order and stability in 
Indonesia and reverse many of Sukarno's policies. 12 
This development worried Azahari as the Indonesian government could change its 
policy regarding its support for his cause until Brunei was granted independence. 
Although during Azahari's meeting with Suharto the latter assured him that there was 
no change in Indonesia's policy regarding its support for his cause until Brunei was 
granted independence, Suharto's support did not materialise. Azahari was deprived one 
by one of the facilities offered by Sukarno. For example, Azahari's monthly allowance 
of 500,000 Rupiah was stopped. 13 After the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was over 
the TNKU collapsed and by June 1966 it was completely destroyed. As Indonesia 
recommenced its diplomatic relations with Malaysia, the TNKU could no longer find 
support from any section in Indonesia. 14 
Azahari's position in Indonesia was further threatened when it was implied by 
General Sudisman (Indonesia's former ambassador to Egypt) that Azahari had had a 
meeting with Chen Yi of the People's Republic of China and Prince Sihanouk of 
Cambodia. At the meeting General Sudisman claimed that Azahari, Chin Yi and Prince 
Sihanouk planned to turn Southeast Asia into a Communist region. 15 Earlier in 1966, 
Azahari's position in Indonesia was threatened when Mohammad Manggol (who was 
once appointed as a First Legation16 by Azahari in 1963) 17 in a press statement 
12 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN. - Foreign Policy and Regionalism, New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 39 - 40. 13 According to Zariani, `Azahari's facilities were withdrawn for some sinister regional reasons 
understood only by a few' (cited in Zariani, Escape from Berakasl, p. 219). 
14 Ibid., pp. 222-3. 
15 Ibid., p. 219. 
16 The position of a First Legation emerged after the Indonesian government which supported 
Azahari requested him to appoint a representative from the NKKU in order to represent the 
latter outside Indonesia. 
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implicated Azahari as a Communist. 18 Subsequently, in May 1967, Panglima Komando 
(Commander of commandoes) Mandala Siaga issued an order for the return of NKKU's 
Representative Office in Jakarta, and in July Azahari moved from Jakarta to Bogor. 19 
Therefore it can be said that the coming of Suharto to power in 1966 had in many ways 
affected Azahari's struggle for the formation of the NKKU as Suharto did not support 
him. 
As mentioned before, Malaysia's intention to use Azahari to push the British to 
grant Brunei full independence had given Azahari an opportunity to continue the 
struggle that was suppressed when Indonesia was ruled by Suharto. Azahari agreed to 
work with the Malaysian government to achieve ZOPFAN with conditions that: the 
political detainees in Berakas were released; Kuala Lumpur would become a host for 
the PRB and the Malaysian government must treat the PRB as an `equal partner' to 
Malaysia rather than as an inferior group. ° 
Following the meeting Raja Ahmad, also from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was 
commanded by the Ministry to pass a message to Raja Azlan, the principal camp officer 
of the Berakas Detention Camp (who became the middleman to the Malaysian 
conspiracy), to inform one of the detainees (apparently Sheikh Salleh Sheikh Mahmud) 
that the Malaysian government would grant the detainees political asylum if they 
managed to escape from the camp to Malaysia. 21 They were, however, to devize their 
own plan of escape. 2 Having been assured by Raja Azlan that they would be granted 
asylum in Malaysia, Sheikh Salleh and other detainees agreed to escape. 23 
'7 Zariani, Escape From Berakas, p. 199. 
18 It is noteworthy that in September 1964, Azahari replaced Muhammad Manggol by Jais Abbas 
as the First Legation as the former had become more ambitious and wanted to take over from 
Azahari as the Prime Minister of NKKU (cited in ibid., p. 200). 
19 Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, p. 224. 
20 Author's interview with Mahmud Murshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
21The plan was given to Raja Azlan with the promise that, if he achieved this mission, he would 
be given the post of Director at Pudu Prison at Kuala Lumpur (Raja Azlan Raja Ngah, Kearah 
Kemerdekaan Brunei, pp. 52, cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political 
Development', p. 236). 
22This was to ensure that the Malaysian government would not be implicated by the Brunei 
government for the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels. 
23 Zaini was however the last person to be informed by Sheikh Salleh about the escape that is the 
eleventh hour before they escaped from the Berakas Detention Camp to Limbang (cited in 
Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, pp. 15 -16). 
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They agreed to escape as they themselves were unsure of when they were likely to 
be released. Some time between 1967 and 1968 their plan to escape did not materialize 
as they were not sure where to go. If they escaped to Malaysia, they feared that they 
would not be granted asylum as they were the very people who were against the 
Malaysian Plan. They also feared escape to Indonesia as previous escapees had been 
badly treated by the Indonesian authorities. 24 
Moreover, their appeal for release from the Brunei government was also rejected. In 
1964, Zaini Haji Ahmad, Yassin Affandy, Mesir Keruddin, Osman Latif, Awang 
Momin Ahmad, Sheikh Salleh Sheikh Mahmud and several other detainees25had 
written a letter to the Brunei Chief Minister, Marsal Maun, requesting their release. 26 
Subsequently, the positions of the three leaders of the PRB, Awang Momin Ahmad, 
Mesir Keruddin and Zaini Haji Ahmad were considered by the Review Committee. The 
committee recommended their release and asked Internal Security for a second opinion. 
Internal Security endorsed the Review Committee's recommendation and approved 
their release. However, according to Zaini Haji Ahmad, `for reasons best known to the 
government, the recommendation of the Review Committee was ignored'. 7 Since the 
detainees' chance for freedom was remote and since the Malaysian government assured 
that they would be granted asylum if they successfully escaped to Malaysia, they 
agreed to do so. 
However, the detainees made certain conditions to the Malaysian Foreign Affairs 
that upon their successful escape they wanted the Malaysian government to allow them 
to continue their political activities in Kuala Lumpur. The detainees also wanted the 
Malaysian government to bring Azahari to Malaysia from Indonesia and demanded that 
the Malaysian government must not use them as a political `pawn' over the Limbang 
24 Ibid., pp. 20 - 21. 2 Awang Abdullah Jahfar, Haji Garip Dato Haji Mangol, Abdul Hamid Muhammad, Jais Haji 
Karim and Awang Lalim Haji Serudin. 
26 Haji Zaini Haj i Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 54. 
27 Ibid., pp. 55 - 56. As a result, Zaini repeatedly appealed to the Brunei government to free him, 
but was unsuccessful. When all efforts failed, Zaini made his desperate bid for freedom by 
declaring that he was prepared to renounce his Bruneian citizenship if he were allowed to leave 
Brunei in exile. `A neighbouring country', apparently Malaysia, according to press reports 
`indicated its willingness to grant him political asylum' (cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The 
People's Party of Brunei, p. 54). 
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issue. 8 Undoubtedly, as explained before, one of the reasons for the Malaysian 
government plotting the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels was that it wanted to use them to 
divert the attention of the Sultan and Sir Omar away from pursuing their claim over 
Limbang and to redirect their attention to the independence of Brunei and to 
constitutional development in the Sultanate. 
To make the escape possible, Sheikh Salleh sought Mahmud Murshidi Othman's 
(Sheikh Salleh's nephew) help to assist the detainees. Mahmud Murshidi, who had been 
given a pass by the detention camp officer to enter the camp regularly with his small 
lorry to collect spring chickens from Sheikh Salleh (who reared chickens in the camp), 
was to transport the detainees from the detention camp to Pangkalan (Wharf) Sibabau, 
off the Berakas-Muara road . 
29 According to their plan, from Pangkalan Sibabau, they 
were to flee to Limbang by using a boat which was prepared by Awangku Hamzah, 
Mahmud Murshidi's cousin. Both Mahmud Murshidi and Awangku Hamzah also 
joined the escapees to Limbang. 
The episode of the escape of the Bruneian ex-rebels from Berakas Detention Camp 
to Limbang has been delineated in detail by Zariani in her book Escape from Berakas! 
1962 Brunei Revolt. Her delineation is based on the interview she made with the 
escaped ex-rebels. In her description she stated that Sheikh Salleh had recruited Ahmad 
Desa, one of the camp's warders, to help the detainees to escape from the camp30 by 
manning tower number two whereupon the escapees cut the wire fence below the tower 
in order to escape from the camp. 31 Having successfully escaped, they leapt into 
Mahmud Murshidi's pick-up that was waiting outside the camp and were driven to 
Pangkalan Sibabau, from where they fled to Limbang. 
Once they arrived in Limbang, they surrendered themselves at the local Police 
Station, where they informed the police officer of their escape and stated their request 
for political asylum in Malaysia. The police officer in turn advised them to write a letter 
28Author's interview with Mahmud Murshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
29 Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, p. 236. By 1967, the detainees were allowed into the vegetable 
and chicken farms in order to occupy their time. 
30 Ibid., p. 13. 
31 Ibid., p. 16. 
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to the Chief Minister of Sarawak, Abdul Rahman Yakub. 32 Consequently, all eleven 
were flown to Kuching, the capital of Sarawak, in a Caribou Transport of the Royal 
Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). 33 In Kuching, Abdul Rahman Yakub asked them to 
write individually to Tun Abdul Razak, requesting political asylum. After about seven 
days in Kuching, they were then flown to Kuala Lumpur34 and when they arrived there, 
the escapees were immediately granted political asylum by the Malaysian government 
on 20 July 1973. A statement issued by the Malaysian Foreign Affairs stated: 
The Government of Malaysia announces that a group of ten citizens of the 
State of Brunei, having made their escape to Malaysia, have requested asylum 
in this country, and after due consideration, the Government of Malaysia has 
decided in accordance with international law and practice to grant them their 
request. 35 
As mentioned before, the speed with which the escaped party were moved from 
Limbang to Kuching and granted political asylum made Sir Omar even more convinced 
that the Malaysian government was involved in the incident 36 Following Malaysia's 
decision to grant asylum to the escaped ex-rebels, an announcement was made over 
Radio Brunei on 25 July in which it was stated that `it is clear that the escape was 
planned from a neighbouring country'. 37 Emphasis was also placed on the role of 
Malaysian nationals whom Brunei considered as violating the peace of the state of 
Brunei. It also slammed the Malaysian government for being treacherous to Brunei. 38 
6.3. PRB political activities in Kuala Lumpur and Limbang 
Nearly a year after the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to Limbang, on 7 May 1974, the 
defunct PRB was officially reactivated in Kuala Lumpur. 39 When the PRB was 
reactivated, the following leaders were elected as its Executive Committee Members in 
32 Ibid., p. 20. 
33 Ibid., p. 20. 
34 Ibid., pp. 18 - 20. 35 Straits Times, 27 July 1973; Foreign Affairs Malaysia, vol. 6 (4) 1973. 
36 FC024/1675, Johnston to FCO, 14 December 1973. 
37 FC024/1698, R. P. Flower talks with the Sultan, 12 September 1973. 
38 Ibid., 12 September 1973. 
39 PRB headquarters was at 141 Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya. 
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exile: A. M. Azahari, the President of the PRB and Head of the Bureau of Politics, Zaini 
Haji Ahmad, Acting Vice-President and Head of the Economic Bureau, Yasin Affandy, 
the Secretary-General, Sheikh Salleh Sheikh Mahmud, Acting Treasurer, Omar Tamin, 
Head of the Social Bureau, Osman Latif, Head of the Department of Information, 
Samad Jamaluddin, Head of the Department of Organisation, Yusuf Ibrahim, Head of 
the Agriculture and Fishery Bureau, Mahmud Murshidi Othman, Head of the Youth 
Section and Rogayah Abdul Rahman, Head of the Women's Section 4° 
The main objectives of the PRB in exile were to establish an independent kingdom 
of Brunei with the Sultan as constitutional head, and with political sovereignty vested 
in an elected parliament. 1 Although the formation of the NKKU was no longer stated 
as one of their objectives, the PRB's ambition to form the NKKU never ceased; this 
was mentioned by one of the members of the PRB to the author. However, the mission 
was impossible as they were at that time in Malaysia supported by the Malaysian 
government. Moreover, Sabah and Sarawak were already part of Malaysia, and the 
PRB recognised the independence of Sarawak and Sabah inside Malaysia. 42 
The reactivation of the PRB in Kuala Lumpur by Azahari and the escaped Bruneian 
ex-rebels caused apprehension to the Sultan and Sir Omar as they might provoke 
students to oppose the Brunei government and push the British to grant Brunei full 
independence. This was because the Malaysian authorities did not prevent Azahari and 
the escaped ex-rebels engaging in political activities throughout west Malaysia. 43 These 
political activities were actually contrary to the assurances given by the Malaysian 
government when the latter granted them political asylum. 
40 Zaini, Partai Rakyat Brunei, p. 57. 
41 Partai Rakyat Brunei Manifesto Politik 1975 inside ibid., pp. 285-301. 
42 Author's interview with Mahmud Morshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
43 FC024/1679, Hickman to Wilford, 1 November 1973. According to the Brunei Special Branch 
Report, Mahmud Murshidi, the man who had assisted the eight detainees in their escape from 
Berakas, was actively engaged in trying to subvert Bruneian students. He was enrolled as a 
student at the MARA Institute of Technology. The Malaysian Government did not only allow 
him to have classes with Bruneian students at MARA, but also allowed him to stay in the same 
hostel as Bruneian students. Mahmud Murshidi advised the students that Malaysia would offer 
them better scholarships than those offered by the Brunei Government. The students were also 
advised to abscond to Limbang where they would be given political asylum should they 
encounter any difficulties with the Brunei Government upon their return to Brunei (cited in 
FC024/1675 G. E. Coster to Acting Brunei High Commissioner, 27 December 1973). 
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When the Malaysian government granted political asylum to the escapees, they 
were subjected to the conditions that they should not undertake any political activities 
in Malaysia and that they should reside in Peninsular Malaysia. 4 In September 1973, 
Tun Abdul Razak, in his meeting with Anthony Royle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, made further confirmation that the former 
detainees would not be allowed to leave Peninsular Malaysia, where they would be 
closely watched and their movements restricted 45 
When J. K. Hickman, the British High Commissioner to Malaysia, met Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia's Minister of Home Affairs, in London on 11 September 
1973, Tan Sri Ghazalie Shafie assured him that the Malaysian government was keeping 
a close watch on the former detainees and was not permitting them to take part in 
political activities. 6 However, the Malaysian government did not keep its word47 (as it 
did not stop the escaped Brunei ex-rebels from carrying out their political activities in 
west Malaysia). Furthermore, the Malaysian government did not prevent the escapees 
from leaving west Malaysia. 
In December 1973, the Brunei Special Branch had reported that Awangku Hamzah 
had been seen in Bangkok in the first week of December. Earlier, he and Mahmud 
Murshidi had been visiting Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. According to the Brunei Special 
Branch, they had left Kuala Lumpur on 17 October. In another Special Branch Report, 
it was reported that Zaini Haji Ahmad and his wife went to Mecca where 600 Bruneian 
pilgrims were making the haj. 48 
Since the Malaysian government did not stop the political activities of Brunei's ex- 
rebels or the movement of the escapees from west Malaysia to east Malaysia and to 
other countries, in November 1973, the Brunei government ordered more than one 
hundred Bruneian students who were studying in west Malaysia to return to Brunei for 
fear the ex-rebels would incite them to work against the Brunei government and to push 
44 FC024/1698, Talks with the Sultan of Brunei - Brief No. 2, Brunei/Malaysia Relations: Escape 
of Detainees, September 1973. 
as FC024/1684, Record Meeting between the Sultan and A. Royle at the FCO, 19 September 
1973. 
46 FC024/1679, Hickman to Wilford, 1 November 1973. 
47 Ibid., 1 November 1973. 
48 FC024/1686 Moffat to FCO, 6 December 1973. Also in FC024/1675. 
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the British to grant Brunei full independence. 49 These were the students who were 
studying at educational institutions such as MARA Institute of Technology, the 
University of Malaya, the University of Kebangsaan Malaysia and the Agricultural 
University in Serdang. 50 
Consequently, Ungku Aziz, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya, appealed 
to the Brunei government to allow two of the Brunei's students due to take their final 
degree examination in January to return for the period of the examination, but he was 
unsuccessful. 51 When he approached the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia as to 
whether he could help him to settle the matter, the former stated that the Malaysian 
government could not intervene. 2 It was therefore obvious that the Malaysian 
government was not concerned over Brunei's situation. 
Apart from the PRB's political activities in west Malaysia, the Brunei Special 
Branch reported that there were some `liberal' activities in the students' union in 
London. The Brunei Special Branch attributed their activities to Zaini and other ex- 
detainees in their efforts to subvert Brunei's students wherever they were outside the 
Sultanate. 53 According to G. E. Coster, Head of Brunei Special Branch, Zaini's 
objectives were: 
i. to enlist the support of Amnesty International to embarrass the government; 
ii. to enlist the support of the committee of Twenty-Four of the United Nations 
iii. and, if his objectives could not be attained by these and other peaceful 
means, to foment opposition in the state 54According to one of the ex- 
detainees/rebels statement to the author, their aim was not only to foment 
opposition in the state but also to launch another revolution in Brunei. 
49 FC024/1686, Johnston to FCO, 28 December 1973. 
50 Several of these students were actually within days of taking their final examinations for 
degrees and diplomas, and some were even in the middle of their examinations. Malaysian 
newspapers said that some of the students were frustrated at the recall and some had begged to be 
allowed to stay for the examinations (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 1 December 1973). 
51 Unjzku Aziz also assured the Deputy Prime Minister that he would give them a university flat 
and would personally guarantee that they were kept out of contact with any other persons outside 
the exam room and would return them to Brunei immediately the exam was concluded. Ibid, 28 
December 1973. 
52 Ibid., 28 December 1973. 
53 Ibid. & FC024/1675, Moffat to Hickman, 22 November 1973. 
sa FC024/1675, Moffat to FCO, 20 November 1973 & FC024/1675, Moffat to Hickman, 22 
November 1973. 
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When the High Commissioner suggested to Sir Omar that the British government 
could ask the Malaysian authorities to deport Zaini to the United Kingdom, Sir Omar 
was against his idea as he was concerned that Zaini would subvert Brunei's students 
there. In 1972, when Royle suggested that Sir Omar release Zaini from the detention 
camp and that the British would make arrangements for him to come to Britain, or to 
one of Britain's colonies, Sir Omar also disagreed for the same reason stated 
previously. 55 Sir Omar also declared that in the interests of Anglo-Brunei friendship it 
would be better if Zaini were not released. 56 
Besides operating in Kuala Lumpur, the PRB also operated in Limbang. Since 
Kuala Lumpur was far from Brunei, the PRB set up a base in Brunei's former territory 
so that their objectives to push the British to grant Brunei full independence could be 
more effective. Yasin Affandy was the head of the PRB headquarters in Limbang 57 In 
Limbang, Abdul Rahman Yakub, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, was directly 
supporting the PRB political activities in Limbang. This was mentioned by the Head of 
Brunei Special Branch during the Brunei Defence Council Meeting on 8 July 1974.58 
According to the Brunei Special Branch report, in May 1974, Yasin Affandy and 
Othman Latif (the second most important figure in the PRB in Limbang) visited Miri in 
Sarawak where they had a meeting chaired by Abdul Rahman Yakub. 59 The report of 
the meeting between Abdul Rahman Yakub, Yassin Affandy and Othman Latif in Miri 
suggested that the Chief Minister of Sarawak was supporting the PRB's political 
activities in Limbang 60 
During the meeting, Abdul Rahman Yakub and Yasin Affandy stressed that it was 
essential to re-organise the PRB with a view to wresting independence from the British. 
In the meeting, Abdul Rahman Yakub advised those present on how to plan the 
campaign of subversion, which was necessary to achieve independence. 61 Although he 
emphasised that there was to be no violence, he agreed to use sabotage as a weapon and 
ss FC024/1380, Record of Conversation between HH the Sultan of Brunei and Mr Royle at the 
FCO, 6 July 1972. 
56 Ibid., 6 July 1972. 
37 Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, p. 259. 
58 FC024/1962, R. P. Flower to Hickman, 15 July 1974. 
59 FC024/1962, Callaghan to British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, 4 July 1974. 
60 FC024/1951, Eric Norris to K. M. Wilford, 18 June 1974. 
61 FC024/1951, Gautrey to British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1974. 
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promised military training in this context. He also advised that anyone who feared he 
was in danger of arrest should flee to Limbang. 62 According to one of the sons of the 
remaining detainees who was arrested and detained by the Brunei authorities in 1975, 
he had attended an explosive and small -arms course given by Malaysian army 
instructors near Kuching, Sarawak to prepare him and others for acts of sabotage within 
Brunei 63 
With the support of the federal government and the Chief Minister of Sarawak, the 
PRB's propagandists and recruits infiltrated Brunei to distribute anti-British leaflets, 
flags, membership application forms, Hari Raya (Eid) cards and even recorded 
speeches of the party leader, Azahari. The leaflets called on the people of Brunei to 
support the long defunct PRB and to end the presence of foreign troops in Brunei. In 
February 1974, for example, the leaflets which were scattered throughout Brunei called 
upon the people of Brunei to revive and support Azahari. In March 1974, other leaflets 
from the ex-rebels were circulated throughout Brunei which `call upon all the people of 
Brunei, wherever they may be, to strengthen and close their ranks for our national 
struggle for an independent and sovereign state of Brunei, both internally and 
externally'. 4 In June 1974 (that was after the reactivation of the PRB) more leaflets 
were again distributed. 
In the same year, nine families from Kampong Lumapas ran away to Limbang, 65 as 
the PRB members in Limbang incited them by saying that the Brunei government 
would detain them following their plan to reorganise the PRB in Brunei 66 Some of 
them had been in contact with the PRB's branch in Limbang. The refugees stayed in 
Limbang, where the Malaysian government granted them political asylum. 67 A month 
62 Ibid., 9 July 1974. 
63 FC024/2102, UK policy towards Brunei, Briefs for talks with Sultan of Brunei 1976. 64 FC024/1951, A Copy of translation of a leaflet being circulated in Brunei which formed an 
annex to the draft, Gautrey to Hickman, 8 May 1974. 
65 Borneo Bulletin, 21 May 1974. 
66 The Head of the refugee group was Osman Bakar, the Deputy Head was Salleh Mahal and 
family. The followers were Haji Ahad bin Taha, Tamin bin Taha, Syed bin Taha, Mudin bin 
Nordin, Jeludin, Ghani Miasan, Ahmad Midin and Pak Mohamad Tahir with all their families 
(cited in Zariani, Escape From Berakas' p. 260). 
67Some of them had been formerly detained for their part in the unsuccessful 1962 Rebellion. 
According to Awang Osman, `because we have decided to work for Brunei's independence we 
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later a group of twenty-two students from Sultan Omar All Saifuddin College (SOASC) 
also fled to Limbang, provoked by the PRB who suggested that they would be captured 
by the Brunei government. 8 According to the Brunei Special Branch report, from 
Limbang the students were sent to Miri and then to Kuching in military planes and 
flown from Kuching to Kuala Lumpur in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) 
aircraft. 69 Some of these escapees were later despatched to Libya (with the connivance 
of the Malaysian government). According to one of the ex-political detainee's statement 
to the author, about thirty Brunei Malays, including some of the students from the 
SOASC, were sent to Libya via Italy to be trained as commandos. However, Mahmud 
Murshidi, the man who helped the ex-rebels to escape from the detention camp, denied 
this. According to Mahmud Murshidi, the Libyan government was only offering 
`tarbiyah' (education) scholarships to Brunei students where para-military training 
might be one of the courses offered in their studies. 70 
The dispatches of Brunei students to Libya caused the Sultan to be apprehensive 
over the security of the Sultanate. Libya at this time was linked with terrorism by the 
west where Colonel Gaddafi was implicated as actively supporting international acts of 
terrorism. In this regard, potential terrorists were being trained by terrorists from the 
Japanese `Red Army'. ' In 1976, Asiaweek reported that a meeting was held in Kuala 
Lumpur which was attended by Azahari, Libyans and Moro National Liberation Front 
representatives. During the meeting, Libya offered to train and finance a Bruneian 
are sure that they will arrest us. We hope that the Sarawak Government will let us stay in 
Sarawak; we don't want to return to Brunei. ' (cited in Sabah Times, 21 May 1974). 
68 Given Brunei's very small student population, 22 are considered significant. 
69 This was not unusual, as RMAF aircraft had brought out most of the families of the escapees 
from Limbang. For example the wives of Yasin Affandy and Zaini Haji Ahmad were reported to 
have been transported from Limbang to Miri by RMAF aircraft (cited in FC024/1686 Moffat to 
FCO, 6 December 1973. Also in FC024/1675 & FC024/1686 Moffat to FCO, 8 December 
1973). Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie stated to Royle that this flying-out of families of escapees proved 
nothing more than a sympathetic attitude to the escapees themselves. When the issue of Zaini's 
pilgrimage to Mecca was brought to him by Johnston, the British High Commissioner to 
Malaysia, he stated that the Malaysian Government was unable to refuse as it was a religious duty 
(cited in FC024/1686, Johnston to FCO. Also in FC024/1675). He further added that, if one of 
the ex-detainees was offered an opportunity to study in America and Britain, Tan Sri Ghazali 
would not regard it as hostile to Brunei to allow him to take advantage of the opportunity (cited in 
(FC024/1675, Johnston to Hickman). 
70 Author's interview with Mahmud Morshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
71 Lord Alun Chalfont, By God's Will: A Portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, London, 1989, p. 114. 
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`liberation' army where in return the PRB had to agree that once Brunei had been 
`liberated', the country would be used as a launching platform for the escalation of the 
Mindanao conflict. 72 It should be borne in mind that Mindanao (where the population 
was predominantly Muslim) since the Philippines' independence in 1945, was fighting 
for its own independence from the central government. The Muslims in Mindanao had 
supported Azahari and his struggle for the formation of the NKKU in the 1960S. 73 
Some of them proposed to lead volunteer forces to fight together with the rebels; others 
proposed non-military support, as well as supporting the PRB's mission to the UN. 74 
Mahmud Murshidi Othman on the other hand claimed that there was no such scheme 
between the PRB and Libya regarding the use of Brunei as a base for the acceleration 
of the Mindanao conflict. 75 
Nevertheless, the Libyan government was a strong supporter of the PRB. In 1975, 
Azahari and his delegation were guests of the Libyan government for two weeks when 
they were lobbying for their cause in Africa and the Middle-East. 6 In Libya they 
discussed important issues such as the PRB's struggle, problems of the Muslim 
Community and how the PRB and the Libyan government could cooperate to eliminate 
colonialism and imperialism. '? It was Ali Tureiki (the Director-General of Asian 
Affairs), who later served as Libya's Public Relations at UN and also its Foreign 
Minister, who initiated the move that the Muslim League should support the PRB and 
all Libyan embassies abroad should support and render any assistance required by the 
PRB delegation. 8 The Libyan government was also claimed by one of the escaped 
Bruneian ex-rebels to be a sponsor of the PRB. According to an officer of the DSI who 
visited Labuan in August 1975, the party as mentioned by Sheikh Salleh (whom he met 
face to face) was being financed by the Libyans. 9 
72 Asiaweek, 6 January 1984. 
73 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, `Brunei's Political Development', p. 183. 
74 Ibid., p. 184. 
"Author's interview with Mahmud Morshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
76 Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 60 -61. " Ibid., pp. 60 - 61. 78 Zariani, Escape From Berakas, pp. 252-253. 
79 FC024/2098, Report on the Security Situation in Brunei from the period 10 August 1975 until 
4 September 1975. 
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Apart from the Bruneians receiving training in Libya, some of the PRB members 
were receiving training at Dusun Tua in Peninsular Malaysia. 80 Dustin Tua (the name 
means Old Orchard) was a government youth training centre in Ulu Langat Selangor 
about 12 miles from Kuala Lumpur. It was established in 1966 where the students were 
mainly rural Malays who had failed their school examinations. It offered technical 
subjects and could take about 1,000 students. The courses, which lasted between six 
and three years, had a so-called paramilitary division which appeared to be analogous 
to a British School OTC (Officers Training Corps). Although it was not used for 
clandestine military activity, to Eric Norris of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office it 
would be a suitable cover. 81 According to Norris, the objective of the course for the 
Bruneians was probably to fit them for specific operations in Brunei. 82 
It was the activities of the PRB in Malaysia, and the support it gained from the 
Federal government of Malaysia and Sarawak, which posed doubts to the Sultan and 
Sir Omar as to achieving independence for Brunei. The Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, which felt that the PRB, Sarawak and the federal government's activities 
towards Brunei could create instability in the Sultanate and could cause continuous 
rejection of independence by the Sultan and Sir Omar, made efforts to settle the 
problems between Brunei, Sarawak and the federal government of Malaysia. In June 
1974, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office brought up the activities of the PRB in 
Kuala Lumpur and Limbang with the Malaysian Foreign Affairs which claimed that it 
was unaware of the alleged activities of the PRB setting up its temporary office in 
Kuala Lumpur. 83 
According to the Malaysian Foreign Affairs (as reported by Utusan Malaysia on 19 
June 1974), the PRB was not registered in Malaysia and because of that it was not able 
to set up an office in Kuala Lumpur, temporary or otherwise. 84 The Malaysian 
government emphasised that the position of the former members of PRB who had been 
granted political asylum in Malaysia remained unchanged under normal conditions of 
80 FC024/2090, Norris to FCO, 9 December 1975. 
81 Ibid., 9 December 1975. 
82 Ibid., 9 December 1975. 
83 FC024/1951, Norris to FCO, 20 June 1974. 
84 Ibid., 20 June 1974. 
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political asylum. They were not permitted to engage in any political activities during 
their stay in Malaysia. 85 However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office knew well 
that in reality this was not the case. The Malaysian government had been making the 
claim that it was not permitting the ex-rebels to taking part in political activities since 
September 1973. However, the Malaysian government never kept its word. 
On the other hand, Malcolm MacDonald, the former UK Commissioner General in 
Southeast Asia in the 1950s, suggested that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
might consider the feasibility of a long-term policy designated to settle the problem by 
a package deal. In the package deal, the three Northern Borneo territories would come 
together in a federation under the Sultan of Brunei as a titular head of state. There 
would be no changes in frontiers and the Limbang claim would be relinquished. In the 
future, the federation could in turn either come together with Peninsular Malaysia in the 
form of a confederation or form ties with Singapore. 86 
However, his suggestion was not welcomed by J. K. Hickman of the British High 
Commissioner to Malaysia. Hickman, in his letter to Mr Galsworthy of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office dated 18 July 1974, stated that he did not think the package deal 
was realistic and that the Malaysian government would consider it to be totally 
unacceptable and interference in their affairs. 87 D. Gordon of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in his telegram to Hickman argued that `if it were to come to the 
Malaysians' ears that MacDonald was talking about the possible attractions of a North 
Borneo federation, particularly with a possible link with Singapore, we should be in 
trouble'. 88 Moreover, Sir Omar had stated unequivocally in the Brunei Defence Council 
meeting on 8 March 1974 that he objected to Brunei entering a grouping of the three 
Northern Borneo states. 89 
Indeed it was not the first time that Malcolm MacDonald had suggested the 
incorporation of Brunei with Sarawak and Sabah and with Malaysia and Singapore. In 
1968, Malcolm MacDonald had also suggested to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
85 Ibid., 20 June 1974. 
86 FC024/1962, Record of Meeting between Lord Goronwy-Roberts and Malcolm MacDonald in 
the House of Lords, 16 July 1974. 
87 FC024/1962, Hickman to Galsworthy, 18 July 1974. 
88 FC024/1962, Gordon to Hickman, 9 August 1974. 
89 FC024/1962, Wilford to Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 27 July 1974. 
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Office that both Brunei and Singapore should be incorporated into a wider Malaysia 90 
In MacDonald's discussions with Malaysia and Singapore's leaders, and his own 
consideration of the problem regarding Brunei's future, he considered it desirable for 
Britain to try to influence affairs in those countries towards the creation of a wider 
Malaysia, which would be a looser federation than the present Malaysia. 91 However, 
nothing came out of his discussion as it had been confirmed by the Labour government 
that it would grant Brunei independence and would allow the latter to make its own 
decision as to whether it wanted to enter into some sort of association with Malaysia. 92 
In Britain's subsequent attempt to solve the problems between Brunei, Sarawak and 
the federal government on 29 July 1974, the British High Commissioner in Kuala 
Lumpur gave Tan Sri Zaiton, permanent secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an 
account of the PRB's meeting at Miri and other PRB political activities in Sarawak. 93 
Following Britain's announcement on 27 November 1974 that the Labour government 
planned to review the 1959 Agreement, which was amended in November 1971, the 
British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur met the Prime Minister of Malaysia on 28 
November. The former gave formal representations of the meeting between the PRB's 
members and the Chief Minister of Sarawak in May 1974 94 
Following the meeting, Tun Abdul Razak undertook to restrain the activities of the 
PRB and their Malaysian supporters and assured the High Commissioner that Malaysia 
had no wish to absorb Brunei forcibly. Nevertheless, Tun Abdul Razak warned the 
High Commissioner that the British government should use its influence to bring about 
constitutional development in Brunei without which he foresaw continuous 
trouble. 95Although these representations had a positive effect (whereby the para- 
military training of the PRB members appeared to cease and as there was a lull in other 
PRB political activities in both Kuala Lumpur and Limbang), this turned out to be no 
90As being mentioned in Chapter Two, Malcolm MacDonald in the 1950s was delegated to carry 
out the task to closely associate the Northern Borneo territories before they were merged with 
Malaya. 
91 FC024/236, MacDonald to Thomson, 14 March 1968, FC024/236, A. R. Adair to J. Johnston, 
11 March 1968 & FC024/222, Adair to Robin, 29 February 1968. 
92 Ibid. 
93 FC024/2102, UK policy towards Brunei, Briefs for talks with Sultan of Brunei 1976. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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more than a pause to prepare for an all-out political campaign on the international plane 
which the PRB launched in March 1975 with the espousal of the Malaysian 
government. 96 
6.4. PRB political activities in the international arena 
In the international arena, the PRB political activities were supported by many 
countries and international organizations. Its political campaign outside Malaysia began 
in December 1973 when the ex-detainees in west Malaysia appointed Dr Mahmud 
Saedon Othman, a Bruneian student graduate at Al Azhar University, Cairo, as their 
representative in Egypt and in the Middle East. 97 His duty was to make political 
contacts with the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) whose 
political support Azahari enjoyed between 1963 and 1966 and with Arab Embassies for 
the purpose of soliciting their moral and material support. 8 
Azahari, in his effort to bring about the formation of the NKKU between 1963 and 
1966, gained support not only from Indonesia, but also from some countries in Africa 
and Asia; the NKKU especially enjoyed support from AAPSO. 99 In February 1963, 
AAPSO, which held its conference in Moshi, Tanganyika in Africa, supported the 
Brunei Revolution. '00 Representatives of Malaysia and Singapore were excluded from 
this conference. The Indonesian delegation appealed for support for the `revolutionary 
government' headed by Azahari and called for opposition to the incorporation of the 
Borneo territories into Malaysia. 10'At the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference held in 
Jakarta, Indonesia between 2 and 30 April 1963 and the Afro-Asian Writers' 
96 Ibid. 
97 People's Party of Brunei Mandate No. 4/M/PPKB/75 issued to Dr Saedon Othman, Cairo, 
Egypt (cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 57). 
98 Ibid., p. 57. 
9 AAPSO was a non-governmental organization which from its inception in the late 1950s 
struggled against colonialism, apartheid, wars and endeavoured for peace. The Organization and 
its national affiliate committees and member liberation movements extended all forms of support 
to peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Cited in 
http: //www. aapso. fg2o. com/Aboutus/Aboutus_home. htm). 
loo Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 48. 
101 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 84. 
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Preparatory Committee held in Bali, Indonesia between 16 and 21 July 1963, the 
participants also supported Azahari and the establishment of the NKKU. 102 
As well as Dr Mahmud Saedon Othman, Jais Abbas, the former ambassador of the 
NKKU during the revolution, was appointed by the PRB committee as a representative 
to Jakarta in order to lobby the Indonesian government for recognition and at the same 
time to revive contact with former supporters and sympathisers of the PRB. 103 
In its effort to solicit moral and material support, in March 1975 the PRB sent its 
first petitions addressed to the Commonwealth of Nations Secretariat in London. In its 
appeal, the PRB outlined the history of the party, its struggle and achievements in the 
years prior to the 1962 Brunei Rebellion. 104 It then asked the leaders of the 
Commonwealth assembled in Kingston, Jamaica, West Indies, to counsel the British 
government to convene a Tripartite Conference between the Sultan of Brunei, the PRB 
and the British government. This was done with a view to paving the way for early self- 
government and independence for Brunei. 105 
In addition to soliciting support from the Commonwealth, in April 1975, the party 
appealed for support from the Organization of Islamic Conferences' members in the 
Middle East. The party received support from Rabetat Al Islamy, a Saudi government- 
funded body organised to help Muslim organisations to achieve fraternal brotherhood 
among the Islamic community all over the world. 106 In May 1975, in recognition of the 
PRB's struggle, the Secretary-General of the AAPSO, Youseff El-Sebai, wrote an open 
letter of appeal to all Muslim leaders to extend their fraternal support to the leader of 
the party in his quest for freedom and independence. 107 A joint communique between 
the Secretary-General of the AAPSO and Azahari was also made whereby they 
considered it constitutionally desirable for a Tripartite Conference to be convened 
102 Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad , The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 49 - 50. The support, 
however, 
eventually minimised as some of the members of AAPSO refused to perceive Malaysia as a 
manifestation of neo-colonialism (cited in Liefer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 104). 
'03 Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 57. 
104 See Chapter III. Document No. 27/PRB/75. Dated 17 March 1975 (cited in Ibid., p. 58). 
105 Ibid., p. 58. 
'06Ibid., p. 59. 
107 Kemuncak Perjuangan Kita, Jabatan Penerangan, PRB Kuala Lumpur & See Chapter III. 
Document No. 32/PRB/75. Dated April 1975 (cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad (ed. ), The People's 
Party of Brunei, p. 59). 
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between the British government, the Sultan of Brunei and representatives of the PRB to 
work out a plan for the immediate transfer of political power to the people of Brunei in 
accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960.108 
In the same month, through a document dated 20 March 1975, the PRB requested 
political rights for the PRB, the development of a new constitution for Brunei, 
discussions for independence and an amnesty for all PRB detainees and escapees to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 109 The PRB also sent a copy of its political 
manifesto to the Sultan whereby it declared its desire to establish an independent 
kingdom of Brunei with the Sultan as constitutional head, with political sovereignty 
vested in an elected parliament. It underlined the country's ideology which was Islamic, 
Nationalist and Democratic and its development plan which would continuously strive 
for political stability and the development of Brunei's economy, society and culture of 
the Sultanate! 10 
In terms of politics, the party encouraged the development of political awareness 
among the population of Brunei by establishing party politics where elections based on 
adult suffrage would be held every five years. In relation to the economy, the 
exploitation of natural resources was to be `evaluated on the basis of equal and just 
partnerships with local control', with a substantial amount of public revenues devoted 
to the funding of indigenous projects. " In terms of social improvements, the PRB 
pledged to give allowances to widows and orphans of the 1962 rebels (who died during 
the rebellion), handicapped people, as well as those who were fifty and over, especially 
if they were incapable of working. There would be a national housing programme 
whereby every family would have a decent house and government loans would be made 
available to enable people to buy houses with easy payments. 112 In terms of culture, 
emphasis was put on the development of education, the sending of more students to 
108 Joint-Communique between Secretary-General, AAPSO and President, People's Party of 
Brunei, Document No. 31/PRB/75. Dated 4 May 1975 (cited in ibid, pp. 303 - 304). 
109 FC024/2098, Davidson to FCO, 16 April 1975. 
"°The Political Manifesto, The People's Party of Brunei, Document No. 29/PRB/75,1 April 1975 
(cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 285 - 301). 
111 Ibid., pp. 285 - 301. 112 Ibid., 285 -301. 
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universities abroad (not necessarily to the UK, Canada, Australia or New Zealand) and 
the establishment of a university `Universitas Hassanal Bolkiah'. 113 
In response to this letter, Sir Omar reported to J. A. Davidson of the British High 
Commissioner that the PRB was banned in Brunei, and that if the detainees who had 
escaped wanted to return to Brunei, they would have to be detained `so as not to be able 
to subvert and incite the people of Brunei or spread the influence of the central 
government of Malaysia among the people of Brunei'. ' 14 Finally, the Sultan reported 
that Britain should protest to Malaysia. ' 15 The Sultan strongly pressed the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office for representations to the Malaysian government on the grounds 
that the political activities of the PRB were a flagrant breach of their earlier 
undertakings. 116 
In May 1975, in a further effort to solicit moral and material support, the PRB 
delegation went to Cairo, Egypt. The trip was sponsored by AAPSO to gain support for 
its cause at the United Nations when the Special Committee of Twenty-Four discusses 
the question of Brunei's independence during the current session'. ' 17 On 6 May 1975, 
Youseff El-Sebai despatched a telegram to the Decolonisation Committee of the UN 
where it stated that `AAPSO supports the Brunei People's Party struggling for 
liberation in Brunei. i118 In Algeria, Libya and Iraq, the PRB delegations received 
assurances from these countries that they would sponsor the party's mission in front of 
the UN. 119 
Eventually, on 11 July 1975, the meeting with Australia's Duncan Campbell, Co- 
Chairman of Sub-Committee II, produced a draft proposal on Brunei; it was this draft 
113 The Political Manifesto, The People's Party of Brunei, Document No. 29/PRB/75,1 April 1975 
(cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 285 - 301). 
114 FC024/2098, Davidson to FCO, 17 April 1975. 
115 Ibid., 17 April 1975. 
116 FC024/2098, L. Bevan to Male, 27 June 1975. 
1" Text of Speech of A. M. Azahari during the extended meeting of AAPSO, Cairo, 4 May 1975 
(cited in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 60). 
118 Telegram sent to United Nations Decolonisation Committee by Youseff EI-Sebai, Secretary- 
General of AAPSO. Dated 6 May 1975 (cited in ibid., p. 60). 
119 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
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proposal that finally brought about consensus on Brunei and was endorsed by the 
Committee of Twenty-Four. 120 The Brunei Consensus read: 
The Special Committee, having examined a petition concerning the situation in 
Brunei, and having heard the important statement made by A. M. 
Azahari... which in the 1962 election received 98 per cent of the votes cast, 
endorses the call by the PRB for immediate tripartite talks between the 
administering power, the Sultan of Brunei and the PRB with the object of fixing 
a date for the independence of Brunei and the holding of free and democratic 
elections under the supervision of the United Nations. 121 
On 15 July 1975, when the PRB delegation presented its case before the Special 
Committee II (the first time the PRB raised their voice at the UN) Azahari among other 
things called upon the UN to give its strong support to the PRB's quest for the 
independence of Brunei, to call the committee to reaffirm the inalienable rights of the 
people of Brunei to self-determination and independence, in conformity with General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and to call upon the 
administering power to take immediate measures to transfer all powers to the people of 
Brunei, without any conditions or reservations, by holding a general election in Brunei 
under the supervision of the UN. 122 He also urged the committee to call upon the 
administering power to hold a tripartite conference between the administering power, 
the Sultan of Brunei, and the legitimate representative of the People's Party of Brunei 
with a view to working out the measures that had been mentioned. 123 He further urged 
the committee to reaffirm and endorse the proclamation of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence of Brunei by the People's Party of Brunei on 8 December 1962 and to 
render moral and material support to the People's Party of Brunei in its fight against 
British Colonialism. 124 
120 Personal Note of Zaini Haji Ahmad. Dated 11 July 1975 (cited in ibid., p. 63). 
121 Ibid., p. 64. 
122 Cited in statement delivered by Mr A. M. Azahari, President of the People's Party of Brunei 
before Sub-Committee II of the Committee of 24, United Nations, New York, Document No. 
32/PRB/75,15 July 1975. Cited in Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, pp. 303 - 
314. 
'23 Ibid., pp. 303 - 314. '24Ibid., pp. 303 - 314. 
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Next, the PRB made efforts to gain the support of the Fourth Committee during its 
thirteenth session in November. The Malaysian government sponsored the Brunei 
Resolution, 125 and it was co-sponsored by Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Liberia, 
Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey and Tanzania. 126 In the final count of votes for 
the Brunei Resolution, ninety states voted in favour, none against, and there were 
fourteen abstentions. '27 
Following the PRB representation at the UN, in September 1975, Azahari made a 
secret visit to Limbang. 128 A gathering of some thirty people, a number of whom had 
travelled from Brunei, listened to an address during which Azahari denied 
responsibility for the 1962 Rebellion and claimed to have been persuaded to lead the 
people of Brunei once more in their struggle for independence by a Malaysian authority 
(who visited him in Jakarta in 1973). 129 At the meeting, he promised to achieve 
independence for Brunei in the near future and to resort to violence if the PRB failed in 
its non-violent struggle for Brunei's independence. 130 
Two months after his visit to Limbang, on 13 November 1975, the Bruneian 
Resolution was finally adopted by the Fourth Committee of the UN. The Bruneian 
Resolution: 
Calls upon the Administering Power, consistent with its responsibility as the 
Administering Power, to take all steps within its competence to facilitate 
expeditiously the holding of free and democratic elections by the appropriate 
125 Ibid., p. 66. 
126 Ibid., pp. 66-7. Singapore, wishing to keep the bridge to Brunei open, did not co-sponsor the 
Malaysian Resolution. According to Zariani, the reason why Singapore did not agree to co- 
sponsor the Malaysian Resolution was because it did not wish to offend Brunei and wanted to 
appease Brunei, especially in matters of business and defence (cited in Zariani, Escape from 
Berakasl, p. 256). 
127 Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 65. Those who abstained were Canada, 
Germany (F. R. ), Ireland, Netherlands, Israel, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
France, the United States of America and two others. 
128 He arrived in Limbang on 1 September 1975 and spent the night in the house of Yasin Affandy 
which was guarded at the time by the Malaysian soldiers (cited in FC024/2089, Report on the 
Security Situation in Brunei from the Period 10 August 1975 to 4 September 1975). 
129 FC024/2089, Report on the Security Situation in Brunei from the Period 10 August 1975 to 4 
September 1975. 
130 Ibid. Azahari, however, did not stay long in Limbang as he was apprehensive that he might be 
kidnapped by British Intelligence. Consequently, he was flown by government helicopter to 
Kuching, Sarawak (cited in Zariani, Escape From Berakas, pp. 258 - 259). 
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government authorities in Brunei in consultation with and under the supervision 
of the United Nations in accordance with the inalienable rights of the people of 
Brunei to self-determination and independence, and further calls, prior to the 
elections, for the lifting of the ban on all political parties and the return of all 
political exiles to Brunei so they can participate freely and fully in the 
elections. 131 
In Azahari's petition to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations, he reviewed 
the political development of Brunei between 1956 and 1975.132 In his speech, he 
criticised the British government for prolonging its protection over Brunei because of 
the oil factor and added that Brunei's surplus was invested in London to sustain an 
ailing British economy. Azahari also condemned the British view that Brunei was never 
a British colony and argued that if it had not been, the British government would not 
have sent 10,000 troops during the height of the 1962 Brunei rebellion. 133 
Azahari's speech was supported by Malaysian Ambassador Khir Johari who spoke 
on behalf of the co-sponsors of the Brunei Resolution declaring his disagreement with 
the British claim that Brunei was already a self-governing state and thus Britain had no 
responsibility over the internal affairs of the state. 134 To Malaysia, the self-governing 
state should have political parties, legislative councils or assemblies and some form of a 
ministerial system of government by the elected representatives of the people. 135 He 
suggested that the Brunei government which was supported by the British should lift 
the ban on political parties and at the same time allow the `return of all political exiles 
to Brunei so that they can participate freely and fully in the elections'. '36 
131 United Nations Document No. 4/L. 1103. Dated 12 November 1975 (cited in Haji Zaini Haji 
Ahmad (ed. ), The People's Party of Brunei , p. 69). 132 See Chapter III. Document No. PRB/33/75. Dated 13 November 1975 (cited in Haji Zaini Haji 
Ahmad (ed. ), The People's Party of Brunei, p. 66). 
133 Ibid. p. 67. 
134 Ibid., p. 67. 
135 Ibid., p. 68. 
136 Ibid., p. 68. In October 1975, a spokesman for the PRB said that party leaders living in exile 
were ready to return home if the Sultan agreed to elections and not to detain them again. 
However, the Bruneian Government's stance was that it would not negotiate with any illegal 
organisation (cited in the Borneo Bulletin, 25 October 1975). The PRB leaders living in exile who 
wanted to come back must seek an audience with the Sultan to ask for a pardon (cited in the 
Borneo Bulletin, 1 November 1975). 
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The Brunei Resolution was conveyed to Brunei through the British High 
Commission in Kuala Lumpur. 137 Subsequently, Ivor Richard, British representative to 
the UN, responded by informing the UN decolonization that Brunei was a sovereign 
state, which was not and never had been a British colony. Ivor Richard further stated 
that political development in Brunei was an entirely internal matter in which Britain 
had no responsibilities and no power. His comments came shortly after a similar 
declaration in Britain's House of Lords, which was told that Britain's responsibilities in 
Brunei were limited to defence and external affairs. 138 
Richard also added that Brunei had freely chosen to maintain a treaty relationship 
with Britain for more than a hundred years. He emphasised that agreements with 
Britain during this time had been `voluntarily entered into' by Brunei and throughout 
that time Britain was responsible for the internal affairs of Brunei. 139 He further 
explained that since the 1971 Agreement, however, Britain had not taken any part in 
Brunei's internal affairs and stated that `My Government responsibilities are confined 
to the conduct of Brunei's external relations and to a commitment to consult with the 
Government of Brunei in the event of external attack. ' 140 Referring to the 
decolonization committee's resolution that Britain should press for elections in Brunei, 
Richard stated that this was impossible, as it was related to Brunei's internal affairs. '4' 
Speaking at the opening of the Legislative Council session at the Dewan Majlis on 
29 December 1975, the Sultan stated in defence that Brunei was not and never had been 
a colony. He further added that his government would continue `to defend the position 
of Brunei as a fully internal self-governing state with full authority' 142 and at the same 
137 Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, p. 256. 
138 Borneo Bulletin, 13 December 1975. 
139 Ibid., 13 December 1975. 
140 Ibid, 13 December 1975. 
141 Ibid., 13 December 1975. Following the PRB's success in presenting its case at the UN, Lord 
Goronwy-Roberts, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs who visited Brunei 
from 5-9 January 1976 in his interview with the Borneo Bulletin stated that: `We are of course 
perhaps one of the cradles of democracy, and very much in favour of every country - and this 
means every country - moving in the direction of free institutions. The pace of this varies from 
country to country according to circumstances. But our basic view is that for that to happen, and 
from time to time of course we intimate, especially to our friends, our views, our hopes and our 
encouragement. And this applies to Brunei' (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 17 January 1976). 
'42Borneo Bulletin., 3 January 1976. 
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time Brunei would continue to strengthen the treaty of friendship with Britain 
concerning defence. '43 
6.5. Brunei's precautionary measures 
Following the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to Malaysia in 1975, the Sultanate took 
several precautionary measures to ensure the security of the state. One of the measures 
implemented by the Sultanate was to accelerate the phase of forming the second 
battalion where, since the decision had been made on 23 May 1973, the recruitment had 
not yet begun. In the 15t September edition of the Borneo Bulletin, the Brunei 
government advertised the recruitment for the formation of the battalion. 144 The Sultan 
maintained that the planned expansion of the battalion was to enable the Brunei 
government to meet its obligations under the 1971 Agreement, according to which it 
was responsible for its own internal security. This was because if the government did 
not have enough troops it could not fulfil its role of defending Brunei. 145 Eventually, 
the second battalion was formed on 2 January 1975. 
Another precautionary measure implemented by the Sultanate was to continue the 
Emergency Orders in Brunei whereby during the defence council meetings on 26 - 27 
November 1973, he announced that the Emergency Orders would remain in force as 
long as Brunei's neighbours behaved in an `unfriendly manner'. Sir Omar also 
expressed his concern that Malaysia was not keeping its word over undertakings 
concerning detainees and was continuing to interfere in Brunei's affairs. '46 
Sir Omar, who was continuously suspicious of Malaysia's intentions to subvert 
Brunei's security, also took precautionary measures by ceasing the transit of the 
Malaysian forces to Brunei from Miri to Limbang or vice-versa. 147 The transit had 
actually been carried out on the basis of friendly arrangements going back to the British 
143 Ibid., 3 January 1976. 
144 FC024/1698, R. P. Flower's talks with the Sultan, 12 September 1973. 
145 FC024/1684, Record of Meeting between the Sultan and Royle at the FCO, 19 September 
1973. 
146 FC024/1675, Record of Brunei Defence Council 26-27 November 1973 & FC024/1686, 
Moffat to D. Tonkin, 27 November 1973. 
147 Ibid. 
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days in the three territories. 148 In December 1973, Sir Omar instructed the Attorney 
General to look into legislation which would give effect to his decisions to prohibit the 
transmitting of Malaysia's security forces, whether police or military, and to forbid the 
entry of Malaysian vessels into Brunei waters. If Malaysia's troops landed in Brunei on 
any kind of aircraft, then the aircraft should be inspected; if it was necessary for an 
aircraft to land for technical reasons, then service or police personnel should not be 
allowed to leave the air field. '49 
Sir Omar also attempted to discontinue the connection between the Brunei Special 
Branch and the Sarawak Special Branch and suggested that any loss of information 
caused by the break with the east Malaysian Special Branches be made up by 
intelligence from the British. 150 Coster backed by the Commissioner of Police, 
however, rejected Sir Omar's suggestion, as Brunei would suffer intelligence service 
that was available through those contacts. '5' This was because British Intelligence 
tended to be concerned only with overall communist penetration in the region and not 
specifically with the more detailed intelligence that the Brunei Special Branch could 
pick up from local sources across the border. Sir Omar eventually accepted this. 152 
In 1975, following the activities of the PRB in Limbang, the Department of Security 
and Intelligence (DSI) was established in order to strengthen Brunei's security. The 
task of the new department was to identify members and sympathisers of the banned 
148 FC024/1675 Moffat on Commentary on the Record of the Meeting of the Brunei Defence 
Council, 26-27 November 1973. 
'49FC024/1675, Johnston to FCO, 14 December 1973. 
150 The relationship between the Bruneian Special Branch and the Special Branches of the 
neighbouring territories of east Malaysia derived from close association during the Emergency 
and Confrontation, and also from the backbone of European ex-Malaya Special Branch officers 
who, in effect, under Coster ran Brunei, all of whom had literally decades of service in the region 
(cited in FC025/1675, Moffat on Commentary on the Record of the Meeting of the Brunei 
Defence Council, 26-27 November 1973). 
151 Ibid., 26-27 November 1973. 
152 Ibid., 26-27 November 1973. Although this was the Bruneian Special Branch stance regarding 
the east Malaysian Special Branches, the Bruneian Special Branch was also actually suspicious 
about the sincerity of the Sarawak Special Branch and the presence of Malaysians in Brunei. 
Some of them were working in the Brunei Government services, some were people from Sarawak 
or Sabah who merely crossed the border to get into Brunei and some were from Peninsular 
Malaysia. Some of them held important positions in the Bruneian Government. Because of 
Coster's suspicion of the sincerity of the east Malaysian Special Branch and the Malaysians in 
Brunei, Coster preferred to provide Jack Johnston, the British High Commissioner in Kuala 
Lumpur, with information to be passed by word of mouth than to be attributed to a report. 
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PRB and other dissidents, as well as to monitor their activities against the state. 
153 In 
the Borneo Bulletin dated 6 December 1975, a government spokesman warned that 
154 further arrests would be made unless `this drift towards the PRB ceases'. He further 
added that anyone attempting to revive the banned party was committing an offence 
and was likely to be arrested and detained. '55 
The Brunei government was also taking a deliberately anti-Malaysian (and on 
occasion pro-Singapore) line. One example was the decision to sever the currency link 
with Malaysia while retaining one with Singapore. When the Malaysian government 
wanted to terminate the Board of Commissioners of Currency, which issued currency 
for Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories, including Brunei, and to replace the 
Straits dollar with the new currency issued by the Bank of Malaysia, Brunei followed 
Singapore in issuing its own currency, which subsequently became interchangeable 
between the two countries. In another example, when Malaysia-Singapore Airlines split 
up into Singapore International Airline (SIA) and Malaysia Airlines System (MAS), 
Brunei chose to allow landing rights only to SIA. '56 
6.6. Conclusion 
From this chapter it has been shown that the Malaysian government was involved in 
the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels with the aim of putting pressure on the British to grant 
Brunei independence and diverting the Sultan and Sir Omar's attention away from the 
Limbang issue and redirecting it to the independence of Brunei and constitutional 
development. The study has also shown that the objective of the Malaysian government 
in using Azahari to achieve its aim gave Azahari an opportunity to resume his struggle 
which was contained by the Indonesian government when Suharto came to power in 
153 Borneo Bulletin, 12 April 1975. 
154 Ibid., 6 December 1975. In October 1975, the Sultan stressed that his country would destroy 
attempts made by a `neighbouring state' to destabilise the country, whether from outside or inside 
the country (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 18 October 1975). 
155 Ibid., 6 December 1975. 
156 Asia Research Bulletin, 1- 31 July 1973. In August 1973 (i. e. following the escape of 
Bruneian ex-rebels to Limbang), the Brunei government stated that it would not renew the work 
permits of unskilled migrant workers from Malaysia. These unskilled jobs include shop assistants, 
clerks, and telephone operators (cited in FCO24/1679, Douglas-Home to British High 
Commissioner to Brunei, 31 August, 1973). 
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1965. In Kuala Lumpur, Azahari and the escaped detainees revived the PRB which 
aimed to achieve independence for Brunei and to implement a democratic system of 
government in the Sultanate. 
The PRB's political activities in west Malaysia caused apprehension to the Sultan 
and Sir Omar as the Malaysian government did not control these activities (although it 
had stated that the escaped detainees were not allowed to get involved in any political 
activities). This chapter has also shown that since the Malaysian government did not 
control the activities of the PRB, the Brunei government had to recall Bruneian students 
who were studying in west Malaysia to Brunei for fear that the escaped detainees would 
influence the students to work against the Brunei government. The chapter has also 
demonstrated that the PRB's political activities in Limbang which threatened Brunei's 
security were supported by Abdul Rahman Yakub, who aimed to push Britain to grant 
Brunei independence and to destabilise Brunei's security. From Limbang, the PRB 
spread its propaganda and its recruits infiltrated Brunei. 
Although in June and July 1974 the British warned Malaysia about the activities of 
the PRB in Limbang, the Malaysian government did not put an end to these activities. 
This study has demonstrated that the PRB's political activities were supported not only 
by Malaysia but also by other countries and international organizations which led the 
PRB to present its case at the UN in November 1975. At the UN the PRB persistently 
called upon Britain to grant Brunei full independence and to implement a democratic 
system of government in Brunei. The PRB's call at the UN coincided with the Labour 
government's decision in October 1974 to revive its 1966 policy to end its agreement 
with Brunei. This put more pressure on the Sultan and Sir Omar as neither of them 
wanted Britain to end its agreement with Brunei. The next chapter will look into the 
revival of the 1966 Labour government's policy to end its agreement with Brunei and 
the challenges and problems this posed for the Sultanate. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Revival of the British Policy of 1966: 
1974-1979 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to study Brunei's political development as a result of Britain's 
decision to end its agreement with the Sultanate. When the Labour Party returned to 
power in 1974, Sir Omar and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah faced similar problems to those 
they had faced in the 1960s. In November, in accordance with Article VIII of the 
Amended Agreement of 1971, the Labour government gave one-year's notice to Brunei 
to review the agreement's term. This notice took effect in November 1975 and 
negotiations began in January 1976. Sir Omar was reluctant to accept Britain's decision 
as he and the Sultan lacked confidence over Brunei's internal and external security. The 
Sultan and Sir Omar's apprehensiveness regarding Brunei's security was shared by 
General Sir Walter Walker who once commanded British forces in Borneo. This 
chapter will show that after several arguments between the Sultan and Sir Omar and the 
British, the Sultan and Sir Omar won temporary retention of the British Gurkha 
battalion in Brunei. However, the date of the British final withdrawal from Brunei 
remained unsettled. 
This chapter will also show that Malaysia's hostile attitude towards Brunei and its 
continuous support of the PRB was the main reason why the Sultan and Sir Omar were 
not confident regarding independence. Although Tun Abdul Razak assured the British 
High Commissioner that Malaysia would prohibit the activities of the escaped ex-rebels 
and that the incorporation of Brunei into Malaysia was less important, the Malaysian 
government repeatedly displayed unfavourable attitudes towards the Sultanate. This 
study will demonstrate that Malaysia's support of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor 
in December 1975 and its comparison of Brunei's situation with the annexed territory, 
together with the Malaysian government's accusation that Brunei was financing the 
Sarawak National Party (SNAP) in its election campaign in Sarawak were examples of 
Malaysia's hostile attitudes towards Brunei. 
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However, the Indonesian and Malaysian changes of policy towards Brunei in 1976 
reduced the Sultanate's tension over its security. This chapter will show that when 
Hussein Onn came to power following the death of Tun Abdul Razak in January 1976, 
he changed his predecessor's policy from an adventurist to a friendly one. Indonesia, 
which did not want any radical regime to appear in Brunei that would influence the 
stability of the region, spelled out its goodwill policy towards the Sultanate. Following 
the Malaysian government's change of policy towards Brunei, the PRB no longer 
gained support from Malaysia and this led to the demise of the PRB. This chapter will 
show that the change of attitudes of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments 
towards Brunei and the demise of the PRB created a favourable atmosphere for the 
signing of an agreement between Brunei and Britain in 1979. Under this agreement 
Brunei would achieve full independence at the end of 1983. 
7.2. Revival of policy 
The Labour government's objectives when it came to power in October 1974 were 
to end Britain's anachronistic relationship with Brunei, to review the agreement with 
the Sultan with a view to terminating Britain's responsibility towards Brunei, and to 
leave behind a peaceful and stable situation in which British economic interests would 
be safeguarded. In order to achieve these objectives, Malaysia's co-operation or at least 
acquiescence was essential to Britain. ' 
As mentioned before, it was on 27 November 1974 that the Labour government 
informed the Brunei government of its plan to review the 1959 Agreement, which had 
been amended in November 1971. In his message, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, informed Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of the British 
government's decision to withdraw its Gurkha battalion in 1976. At the same time, he 
gave formal notice (in accordance with Article VIII of the Agreement of 23 November 
1971), of the British government's desire to review its agreement of 29 September 1959 
as amended by the Agreement of 23 November 1971 2 As a result of Britain's decision 
to end its agreement with Brunei and withdraw its forces from the Sultanate, Sir Omar 
1 FC024/2096, L. Beavan to D. McD Gordon, 1975 & Moffat to R. P. Flower, 3 February 1975. 
2 FCO2102, UK policy towards Brunei, Briefs for the talks with the Sultan of Brunei 1976. 
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and the Sultan felt that they were thrown into a situation similar to the one they had 
been in before the Conservative government came to power in June 1970. They did not 
want Britain to end its agreement with the Sultanate - not at a time when they still felt 
insecure over Brunei's internal and external security. 
Sir Omar and the Sultan's apprehensiveness over Britain's decision to withdraw its 
forces from Brunei was also shared by General Sir Walter-Walker, who commanded 
British forces in Borneo and the Brunei rebellion in 1962. He joined the battle on behalf 
of Sir Omar and the Sultan to retain the British Gurkha battalion in the Sultanate. Sir 
Walter Walker argued that the retention of nine hundred and seventy-seven Gurkha 
soldiers in Brunei would not cost the British taxpayer a single penny and the British 
government's defence cuts east of Suez, made on financial grounds, did not apply to 
Brunei. 3 He also argued that Brunei needed the Gurkha army to back up its own army 
which was still young. If the Gurkha battalion was taken away from Brunei, he was 
concerned that this would leave a gap in the state's defence line which would likely be 
filled by the enemy. 4 Sir Walter-Walker also warned Britain over the security of the 
Brunei Shell Petroleum Company which he thought deserved to be fully protected. 5 
In 1975 Brunei was at the height of its oil production. Oil prices had begun to rise 
sharply in the international market following the OPEC cutbacks of the early 1970s. 
The value of exports for crude oil had increased sharply from B$295,221,358 in 1971 
to B$1,939,913,413 in 1975. Moreover, Brunei was at the height of its natural gas 
production. Gas production in the Sultanate had become increasingly important when 
the world's biggest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant owned by a joint venture 
between the Brunei Government, Shell and Japanese interests, the Mitsubishi 
Corporation, was officially opened by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah in 1973. Since then, the 
3 Sunday Times (London), 23 February 1975. 
4 Borneo Bulletin, 25 January 1975. 
$ According to Walter: The Shell people are making 20% of their income from the Brunei 
oilfields, and natural gas from Brunei is earning £8 a second. It is madness to deprive the Sultan 
of the presence of the Gurkha Battalion at the very time that his neighbours are casting avaricious 
eyes on his wealth (cited in Sunday Times (London), 23 February 1975). 
6 Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1971 & 1975. 
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value of exports for gas had significantly increased from B$534,363 in 1971 to 
B$424,969,365 in 1975.7 
The British government, however, made it clear that it could not treat Brunei as an 
exceptional case in its defence cutbacks and future commitments because it did not 
think that Brunei's situation would permit the retention of the Gurkha battalion in the 
Sultanate. Although Brunei paid for the maintenance of the Gurkha battalion, it would 
not affect Britain's decision to withdraw the battalion from Brunei. 8 John Grovers, 
public relations chief at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, said that the reason 
behind the proposed withdrawal `goes wider than a search simply for financial 
savings'. 9 The British government wanted to concentrate on the defence of Britain and 
on its involvement on NATO; Britain's non-NATO commitments were considered case 
by case against strategic priorities. It would for example consider a case where the 
`political effects of the withdrawal at the present time militate against such a step'. 1° In 
other words, the country concerned might find itself in a difficult situation. The British 
government, however, felt that Brunei did not fall under that category and because of 
that its forces would be withdrawn from Brunei. " 
When the meeting to discuss the timing of the withdrawal of the Gurkha battalion 
was held from 25 February until 11 March 1975 between Brunei and Britain, the Sultan 
argued that the British government should not precipitate the date of the withdrawal of 
the Gurkha battalion and should take full account of the time scale needed for the 
building up of Brunei's own forces. 12 The Sultan's delegation also argued that the 
Gurkha battalion in Brunei did not cost the British government a penny, as Brunei met 
all the payment and maintenance costs. 13 To get round the reduction in the RAF's 
transport fleet announced in December 1974, the Sultan offered to use Brunei's civil 
aircraft to ferry the Gurkhas to and from their base at Hong Kong. 14 As a result, the 
Sultan won temporary retention of the Gurkhas, but the date of the final withdrawal 
Ibid., 1971 & 1975. 
8 Borneo Bulletin, 15 February 1975. 
9 Ibid., 15 February 1975. 
10 Ibid, 15 February 1975. 
11 Ibid., 15 February 1975. 
12 Times, 21 May 1975. 
13Ibid., 21 May 1975. 
14 Ibid, 21 May 1971. 
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remained inconclusive. 15 The security of Brunei was definitely the reason why the 
mission was unable to reach a conclusion. At the meeting of the Brunei Defence 
Council on 7 May 1974, the Head of Special Branch presented a draft report which 
indicated a deterioration of the security position in Brunei and implicated `that forces in 
Sarawak are directing, rather than merely exploiting the struggle for independence'. 16 
This development caused the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be 
apprehensive about Brunei's situation. Nevertheless, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office did not want to appear, either to Malaysia or in public, too closely committed to 
the maintenance of Sir Omar's regime at all costs or too closely identified with Sir 
Omar's belief that discontent was the result of Malaysia's interference rather than his 
own illiberalism and autocracy. '7 To the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in order 
for the British withdrawal from Brunei to be smooth, Malaysia's co-operation or at 
least its acquiescence was indeed significant. 
At the meeting between Tun Abdul Razak and Lord Goronwy-Roberts in London 
on 14 April 1975, the latter mentioned the British wish to review the latter's 1959 
Agreement with Brunei and stressed that while the negotiations between Brunei and 
Britain were in progress, it was essential that the activities of the PRB should be kept 
low key (so that Brunei would have no reason to be unduly alarmed about external 
threats to its stability). 18 Although Tun Abdul Razak assured Lord Goronnwy-Roberts 
that he would do all he could to restrain the activities of the PRB in Malaysia, there 
were limits to this. Here Tun Abdul Razak emphasised that the implementation of a 
democratic system of government in Brunei was essential and if the Sultan of Brunei 
failed to achieve this, the people would rebel. Tun Abdul Razak also pointed out his 
preference to work with an elected government in Brunei rather than with the Sultan 
and stressed that Brunei's integration into Malaysia was secondary. 19 
13 Borneo Bulletin, 12 July 1975 and also FC024/2096, Draft Briefs, The Prime Minister's Talks 
with the Malaysian Prime Minister, 14 April 1975. 
16 FC024/1951, Gautrey to British High Commissioner to Kuala Lumpur, 18 May 1974. 
17 FC024/1686, Johnston to FCO, 11 December 1973. 
18 FC024/2096, Record of Meeting between the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Prime Minister of Malaysia, 14 April 1975. 
19 Ibid., 14 April 1975. 
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Tun Abdul Razak's contentions showed that Malaysia was continuously hostile to 
Brunei. In 1974, in an act of hostility towards Brunei, Malaysia accused Brunei of 
financing the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) leaders in their election campaign in 
Sarawak. Malaysia also accused Brunei of transmitting to Datuk James Wong of the 
SNAP party a large sum of money totalling $4,000,000 in exchange for arranging the 
return of Limbang in the event of his SNAP party winning the 1974 elections in 
Sarawak 2° Although Brunei made no response to such an allegation, the Malaysian 
attitude towards Brunei was hostile. According to Jim Davidson, the British High 
Commissioner to Brunei, when he was in London, he was informed by the Chartered 
Company that it had granted Wong an overdraft to the amount of millions of dollars not 
long before he was alleged by Tun Abdul Razak to receive that money from Sir 
Omar. 21 
In October 1974, Datuk James Wong was detained under the ISA (Internal Security 
Act). 2 Peter Searle thought that Wong's arrest appeared to be motivated by `personal 
revenge that culminated a long and bitter political rivalry between the two men'. 23 it 
should be noted that James Wong was Deputy Chief Minister of Sarawak where 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan was then Chief Minister. Historically, SNAP had antipathy 
towards Abdul Rahman Yakub (the Chief Minister of Sarawak) and the federal 
government for their high-handedness over the Stephen Kalong Ningkan affair. 24 if 
Wong were removed from the party, the federal government hoped that the party would 
disintegrate as it would not receive any financial or psychological support from 
Wong. 25 
In another example, on 31 August 1975, the Sarawak Government Information 
service played a film which covered the appearance before the UN Decolonization 
26 Committee of Azahari, Zaini and Yasin on the Limbang padang (field). As mentioned 
20 FC024/2096, C. A. Munro to S. L. Hutchinson, 24 November 1975. 
21 FC024/2098, G. Kidd to C. A. Munro, 1 December 1975. 
22 FC024/2096, C. A. Munro to S. L. Hutchinson, 24 November 1975. 
23 FC024/1962, S. M. Bolt, British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur to R. P. Flower, 1975. 
24Ibid., 1975. 
25Peter Searle, Politics in Sarawak 1970 - 1976, The Than Perspective, Oxford, OUP, 1983, p. 
184. 
26 FC024/2098, Report on the Security Situation in Brunei from the period 10 August 1975 until 
4 September 1975. 
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in the previous chapter, this was the PRB's first appearance before the Committee 
where Azahari among others called upon the UN to give its strong support to the PRB's 
quest for independence. The main reason why the Sarawak government Information 
Service played the film was to incite the people of Brunei to work against the British 
government and to gain more support from the people of Brunei. 
Then in September 1975, in his speech in London, Datuk Mohammed Rahmat, 
Malaysian Deputy Minister, told the Inter-Parliamentary Union in London that `the 
Malaysian contention that Brunei is still a British dependent territory is fully shared by 
the United Nations Committee of 24' and that `the remnants of colonialism must not be 
allowed to remain in existence'. 27 According to Craig of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Rahmat's speech seemed to suggest that Brunei should be 
incorporated in the larger neighbour as `there was genuine concern over their (small 
territory) because of economic and geographical factors'. 28 The editorial of the New 
Straits Times, the Malaysian newspaper which commonly reflects Malaysian 
government opinion, rubbed it in, drawing a parallel with current events in East Timor, 
saying that `an untenable enclave in our midst, open to those who may wish to fish in 
troubled waters, is a threat to Malaysian stab ility., 29 
Another display of the Malaysian government's hostile attitude towards Brunei was 
when Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie spelled out his anti-colonial explanation for his 
government's hostility towards Brunei during a seminar30 in Jakarta in October 1974. 
He drew attention to `the security issue that revolves around the continuing exercise of 
vestigial colonial territories in our region'. 31 He warned that `their existence, besides 
being historically anomalous, also makes them the foci of local discontent and foreign 
intrigue. The security issues that they may pose may be peripheral of the ambit of our 
concern here, but they are nevertheless potential areas of instability. '32 
27FC024/2098, Craig to FCO, 26 September 1975. 
28Ibid., 26 September 1975. 
29 New Straits Times, 11 September 1975 (cited in FC024/2096). 
30Lord Alun Chalfont, By God's Will: A Portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, London, 1986, p. 115. 
31 Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazalie bin Shafie, 'ASEAN's Response to Security Issues in Southeast 
Asia', in Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Jakarta: 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975, p. 23. Cited in Liefer, `Decolonization and 
International Status: The Experience of Brunei', p. 247). 
32 Ibid., p. 247. 
172 
Further to that, in the meeting on 14 October 1975 between the Malaysian Prime 
Minister and Mr Whitlam, the Prime Minister of Australia, the former mentioned that 
Malaysia felt that Brunei should become a state in its federation. The source indicated 
that Australia was not opposed to Malaysia's proposal provided the people of Brunei 
were not against joining Malaysia. It is understood, however, that members of the PRB 
were not in favour of such a move. 33 According to the Canberra Times newspaper 
dated 14 October 1975, `the banned PRB whose leaders are now in Malaysia, is 
strongly opposed to this course. '34 
In the meeting between Suharto and Tun Abdul Razak in Parapat, Indonesia in 
November 1975,35 Tun Abdul Razak regarded Brunei as a `constitutional problem'. 
Although Abdul Razak claimed that there was no parallel between the situation in 
Brunei and that in Portuguese Timor, the Malaysian government supported Indonesia 
and its policy over East Timor. Abdul Razak stated to Indonesia that `Malaysia was 
willing to be convinced that the policy of limited action that Indonesia was adopting 
was the right policy and that it would succeed. '36 
In November 1975, the Indonesian military intervened in the former Portuguese 
colony of East Timor and claimed it as Indonesia's twenty-seventh province. Timor, 
which had been a Portuguese colony since the mid-seventeenth century, was declared 
as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia in July 1976. When it was abandoned by 
Portugal in 1975, East Timor unilaterally declared itself independent on 28 November 
1975. Nine days later, however, it was invaded by Indonesia before it could be 
internationally recognized. Indonesia alleged that the popular East Timorese Fretilin 
Party, which received some vocal support from the People's Republic of China, was 
Communist. With the American cause in South Vietnam lost and as America feared a 
Communist domino effect in Southeast Asia, the US along with its ally Australia did 
not object to the pro-Western Indonesia government. 37 
33 FC024/2096, J. A. Davidson to P. de Coucry Ireland, 22 September 1975. 
34 Canberra Times, 14 October 1975 (cited in FCO24/2096). 
35 President Suharto met Tun Abdul Razak for two days from 15 to 17 November 1975. 
36 FC024/2998, G. A. Duggan to Muir, 26 November 1975. 
37See James Dunn (3`ded. ), East Timor: a Rough Passage to Independence, Double Bay, N. S. W., 
Australia, Longueville Books, 2003 & Paul Hainsworth & Stephen McCloskey (ed. ), The East 
Timor Question: the Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, London, I. B. Tauris, 2000. 
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Malaysia's encouragement towards Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor within 
the former worried Brunei as Malaysia might in its own interest want to take over 
Brunei. Malaysia's success in testing its military offensive capability in 1975 worried 
Brunei even more. In that year, Malaysia had successfully tested its offensive capability 
in a combined operation, which involved a seaborne landing of a full infantry brigade 
of about 3,000 men with supporting arms. Naval and close supports were part of the 
exercise, which took place in beaches near Mersing on the East Coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia. 38 It should be noted that the coastline of Brunei extends for some 160 km, of 
which 112km front the South China Sea. By the proclamation of 1954, Brunei annexed 
the continental shelf up to a water depth of 183 meters, thereby doubling the total area 
of the State of 14,516 sq kilometres. 39 Brunei's lack of sufficient infantry and coastal 
defence vessels might have put its territory in danger. Moreover, it totally lacked an 
effective air force. 
In January 1976, Lord Goronwy-Roberts again continued to discuss with the Sultan 
the issue of Britain's withdrawal and the need for further change in the British-Brunei 
relationship. However, the mission ended somewhat inconclusively. 0 Lord Goronwy- 
Roberts, however, claimed at a press conference that `our view is that there is no 
inherent or real threat to Brunei... (even though) it is not for me to deny that the Sultan 
is apprehensive about the security of his state' . 
41 To emphasise his point, Lord 
Goronwy-Roberts made a statement in Kuala Lumpur. In his talks with Hussien Onn, 
the new prime minister of Malaysia and the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku 
Ahmed Ritaudeen in Kuala Lumpur in January 1976, Lord Goronwy-Roberts told them 
that the Sultan was apprehensive about the security of Brunei and `it was up to every 
one concerned to remove (Brunei's) apprehension through friendly discussions' 42 
38 Joo-Jock Lim, Lim, Joo-Jock, `Brunei: Prospects for a Protectorate', Southeast Asian Affairs 
1976, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. p. 163. 
39A. J. Crosbie, 'Brunei: The Constraints of a Small State', in Southeast Asian Affairs 1978, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978, p. 77. 
40 Straits Times, 15 January 1976. 
41 New Straits Times, 15 January 1976. 
42 Borneo Bulletin, 17 January 1976 & 24 January 1976, Guardian, 17 July 1976. 
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7.3. Malaysia and Indonesia: change of attitudes 
In 1976, the Malaysian government unexpectedly showed a change of policy 
towards Brunei when Hussien Onn became Prime Minister of Malaysia in January 1976 
(following the sudden death of Tun Abdul Razak). Tun Abdul Razak passed away on 
14 January 1976 while seeking medical treatment in London due in part to leukemia. 
Hussien Onn, whose early career was as a military man, was a Secretary-General of 
UMNO Youth until his father, Datuk Onn bin Ja'afar, the party-founding President, 
resigned in 1951 to form the Independence of Malaya Party. Hussien Onn was elected 
as a Member of Parliament in 1969 and appointed Federal Minister of Education in 
1970. In 1973, he was appointed as Minister of Trade and Industry and Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
When Hussien Onn became Prime Minister he changed his predecessor's 
adventurist policy towards Brunei to a friendly one. One of the reasons for doing this 
was his realisation that Malaysia's political adventurism towards Brunei would not 
make it easier for the British to leave Brunei. 43 He therefore wanted to establish a 
viable relationship with Brunei based on mutual interest and political equality. 44 
Hussien Onn's change of policy towards Brunei was also the result of British 
persuasion and pressure. The British government, which had already urged the late Tun 
Abdul Razak to be on good terms with Brunei, also told Hussien Orin of Britain's 
concern over the PRB's political activities which repeatedly sought international 
support from extreme Arab governments such as Libya in its desire to achieve its aims. 
Callaghan pointed out that it could not be in Malaysian interests (or in that of others in 
the region) that outside powers should be given an opportunity to meddle in Brunei's 
affairs as this could easily lead to Communist exploitation 45 
Moreover, the Malaysian government's change of policy also stemmed from its 
wish to uphold the ASEAN treaty and declaration - the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in South-East Asia and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord. Both 
documents, which were signed by the ASEAN countries at the first summit meeting in 
43 Liefer, `Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei', p. 249. 
as Borneo Bulletin, 10 December 1979. The new prime minister was said to be free of any 
p5revious prejudicial experience or bias. Searle, Politics in Sarawak, p. 192. 
FC024/2098, Callaghan to British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, 30 June 1975. 
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Bali, Indonesia in February 1976, signified ASEAN's aim towards establishing peace 
and stability in the region. 46 Although Brunei was not a member of ASEAN, its 
geographical position made it necessary for ASEAN members especially Malaysia, 
which shares its border with Brunei, to have good relations with the Sultanate. 7 
Furthermore, Brunei no longer represented a source of wealth to Malaysia, whose 
oil and natural resources had been confirmed and were being exploited 48 In 1971, Shell 
had struck natural gas off Sarawak which was at least comparable to Brunei's project. 
In the same year, oil was found at Erb West and in 1973 at Samarang, both in Sabah. In 
1975, Sabah became Malaysia's second oil-producing state. 49 By 1973, although there 
was no existing production of oil and gas in West Malaysia, a number of encouraging 
strikes had been reported. Esso's exploration had discovered natural gas off Trengganu 
while the Consortium of Continental Oil, El Paso and Broken Hill Proprietors had 
struck oil off Kuantan. 50 
Furthermore, the federal government no longer experienced conflict with leaders in 
Sarawak and Sabah who since 1963 had been inclined towards autonomy and 
separatism. In the 1960s, the independence of Brunei worried Malaysia as it would lead 
Sabah and Sarawak to follow Brunei's step. By 1976, however, the two west Malaysian 
states had been brought under the federal government's umbrella and the federal 
leaders believed that nothing would encourage leaders in Sarawak and Sabah to revert 
to the autonomous rein. 51 In 1976 Tun Mustapha, the Chief Minister of Sabah, had 
been removed from office because of his continuous pursuit of greater autonomy from 
the federal government since the mid 1970s. With the removal of Tun Mustapha from 
power, the major threat to federalism was neutralised, and contending forces emerged 
46 ASEAN: An Overview, Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, 1995, p. 1. 
47 Donald E. Weatherbee, `Brunei: The ASEAN Connection', Asian Survey, 23(6), 1983, p. 730. 
48 A. J. Crosbie, 'Brunei: The Constraints of a Small State', p. 79. 
49 http: //allmalaysia. info/ 
so FC024/1692 E-Jones Parry to Hickman, 12 December 1973). See K. Young, W. L. C. Bussink, 
P. Hassan, Malaysia: Growth and Equity in a Multiracial Society, Baltimore, Published for the 
World Bank by Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp. 283 - 287 for description on oil and 
gas in Malaysia between 1970 and 1980. 
51 Bruce Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism, Bruce Ross-Larson, Singapore, 1976, p. 213. 
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to balance each other in a manner that made them dependent on Kuala Lumpur for their 
future. 52 
Malaysia's change of policy towards the Sultanate was revealed in 1977 when 
Hussien Orin met Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah at Queen Elizabeth's jubilee celebration in 
London. 53 Following the meeting, in March 1977, Tun Mustapha Harun, the former 
chief minister of Sabah, made a private visit to Brunei, spending four days in the 
Sultanate and succeeding in having an audience with the Sultan. 54 He made a statement 
to the press that Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei `should work closely together because no 
one country in the world can afford to be alone'. 55 Similarly, in March 1977, Abdul 
Rahman Yakub, the chief minister of Sarawak, directed by Hussien Orin to convey 
Sarawak's wishes to improve relations with Brunei and in December 1978, visited 
Brunei where he briefly met the Sultan. 56 His meeting with the Sultan was historically 
significant as it led to the process of improving relations between Brunei and Sarawak. 
The Borneo Bulletin of 5 December 1981 stated that the visit `marked the end of an era 
of official hostility between Brunei and Sarawak that began in 1970'. 57 The Malaysian 
government also clarified its stance over Limbang, stating that the issue of the latter 
would only be discussed when Brunei achieved its full independence. According to Tun 
Hussien Onn, Malaysia could not discuss the issue of Limbang with Brunei as Brunei 
was not yet an independent country. 58 
Despite these positive developments, the Malaysian government under Hussien Orin 
pressed for the British decolonization of Brunei. In November 1977, the Malaysian 
government co-sponsored the PRB's resolution, which was adopted by the Fourth 
Committee. The Brunei Resolution appealed to the world body that it `reaffirms the 
inalienable right of the people of Brunei to self-determination and independence in 
52 Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism, p. 213. 
53 It was also reported by the press that the British Government's determination to end its 
responsibilities over Brunei was made clear by the Queen in her letter to the Sultan (cited in 
`Royal Persuasion', Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 1978). 
sa Borneo Bulletin, 5 March 1977. 
ss Ibid., 5 March 1977. See also `Looking for a New Friend', Asiaweek, 3 March 1978. 
56 Borneo Bulletin, 9 December 1978. 
57Ibid., 5 December 1981. 
58 Author's interview with Jasin Affandy, 6 December 2004. 
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accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)'. 59 The reason for Hussien 
Orin pressing for the British decolonization of Brunei was that to him the existence of a 
colony in the ASEAN region would affect the confidence of other countries towards the 
creation of ASEAN as a neutral region of peace. Moreover, he believed that the 
granting of full independence to Brunei was consistent with the ASEAN resolution for 
peace and stability in this region and would represent a step forward in the realisation 
of the concept of a zone of peace and neutrality. 0 Tengku Ahmed Ritaudeen, the 
minister of foreign affairs of Malaysia, in his speech to the House of Representatives 
stated that `As a peace loving country which upholds the policy of anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism consonant with the principles and charter of the UN, Malaysia would 
like to see an end to British colonialism in Brunei' . 
61 The Utusan Melayu newspaper 
argued that `the delay by Britain in granting [Brunei's] independence and holding free 
elections will only give the opportunity to the Communists to look for a new base in the 
midst of the ASEAN nations'. 62 
Similarly, in a dramatic turn of events, Indonesia spelled out its policy towards 
Brunei. Indonesia's reason for doing so was its apprehensiveness over the prospect of 
any kind of radical regime emerging in Brunei, which in turn would affect the stability 
of the region. 3 When Aswismarno, Minister/Counsellor at the Indonesian Embassy in 
Singapore, met W. J. Watts, British High Commissioner in Singapore, he stated that his 
government was against Malaysia's support of the PRB. Indonesia felt that if Malaysia 
continued to support the PRB, this would be undesirable for Brunei and the region and 
could even lead to the break up of ASEAN. Indonesia wanted stability in the region and 
had no desire to see it endangered by Malaysia's support of the PRB. 64 
The `new order' thinking of Indonesia at that time was that Indonesia needed 
foreign aid and investment; domestic stability was therefore necessary, which to some 
S9Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad (ed. ), The People's Party of Brunei, p. 354. 
60 Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 1978. 
61 Ibid., June 1978. 
62 Utusan Malaysia, 28 June 1978. 
63 D. E. Weatherbee, Indonesia's Security Perceptions and Policies: Implications for US Policy 
(South Carolina: Institute of International Studies, University of North Carolina 1979). Cited in 
Menon, `Negara Brunei Darussalam from Protectorate to Statehood: the Ceaseless Quest for 
Security', p. 383. 
64 FC024/2098, W. J. Watts to L. Bevan, 2 June 1975. 
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extent depended on regional stability. 65 The `new order' was established by Suharto as 
a contrast with the `old order' of Sukarno. Under the `new order' the Suharto 
government promised national economic development and improvements to levels of 
education and welfare. To achieve these promises, the Suharto government needed 
massive foreign loans from western countries; in order to obtain such loans he had to 
ensure the stability of Indonesia, which to some degree depended on the stability of the 
region as a whole. 66 Moreover, after the invasion of East Timor, Indonesia wanted as 
much as possible to regain trust from countries in the region and also throughout the 
world. Indonesia therefore had to prove to the world that it was not an expansionist 
country. 7 Many countries had condemned Indonesia for its invasion of East Timor in 
1975 and its confrontational policy towards Malaysia in 1963. The 1969 Act of Free 
Choice of West Irian had also caused suspicion in the region and in the world as a 
whole. 68 
In 1962, when an agreement was concluded between the Netherlands and Indonesia 
allowing Indonesia to control West New Guinea which was then renamed West Irian, 
Indonesia was required to conduct an election on self-determination with UN assistance 
no later than 1969. Once in control, however, Indonesia quickly suppressed any 
political groups that demanded outright independence for the territory. When the so- 
called `Act of Free Choice' was conducted by UN officials in August 1969, Indonesia 
selected 1022 West Papuans to vote publicly and unanimously in favour of integration 
with Indonesia. In this regard, Indonesia had evidently failed to meet its international 
obligations although in November 1969 the UN "took note" of the "Act of Free Choice" 
and its results. Therefore, in order to regain trust from countries in the region and the 
world as a whole, Indonesia had to prove that it was not an expansionist country. As 
Djisman Simandjuntak said: 
65 V. G. Kulkarni, `Asean's Sixth Member', FEER, 26 November 1984, p. 33. 
66 M. C. Ricklefs (3`d ed. ), A History of Modern Indonesia since c1200, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
2001, pp. 342 - 358. Under the First Five-Year Development Plan 1969 - 1974, three quarters of 
Indonesia's expenditure was financed by foreign loans. 
67Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, New York, 1995, 
pp. 196-7. 
a Ibid., p. 196 - 7. 
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We also want to show that Indonesia was not an expansionist country... if 
Indonesia behaved as if it were going to be expansionist all the time, it 
would be very difficult to create a peaceful environment necessary for 
economic development - especially as Indonesia is so dependent on outside 
source'. 9 
Like Malaysia, Indonesia also pressed for Britain's decolonization of Brunei 
but did not want any kind of Malaysia federation solution to this decolonization. 0 In 
this regard, Indonesia would strongly reject any attempt by the Malaysian government 
to incorporate Brunei by force into Malaysia. 711n 1975, Indonesia co-sponsored with 
nineteen other countries a resolution by Malaysia and the PRB before the Fourth 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the decolonization of 
Brunei. 72 In 1977, Indonesia again voted for a resolution co-sponsored by Malaysia 
calling on Britain to take steps to facilitate the holding of free elections in Brunei. 
Indonesia's support for the resolution on Brunei in the UN was reflected in a statement 
made by Vice-president Adam Malik in 1978: 
As a general principle, we'd like to see the removal of all remnants of the old 
colonial powers in the region... in forcing Brunei to become independent, there 
shouldn't be a situation that would inject instability into the area. This is why 
Indonesia and Malaysia have offered to help the Sultan with either military or 
civilian assistance - to enable him to stand on his own feet. We'd like to see the 
growth of some form of democratic government in the state, and therefore we 
would like to see the presence of one or two political parties. But they must be 
loyal to the Sultan. 73 
In the meeting between Suharto and Hussien Onn in May 1978, Suharto 
emphasized that Brunei was to be discussed first in the context of regional security and 
stability. 74 Both the Indonesian and Malaysian leaders reiterated that neither Malaysia 
69Dewi Fortuna Anwar's interview with Dr Djisman Simandjuntak, CSIS, Jakarta, 29 January 
1986, p. 198. 
70 Weatherbee, `Brunei: The ASEAN Connection', pp. 729 - 730. 
71 FC024/2098, W. J. Watts to L. Bevan, 2 June 1975. 
72 Haj i Zaini Haj i Ahmad , The People's Party of Brunei, p. 65. 73 A Talk with Adam Malik', Asiaweek, 17 July 1978. 
74 Weatherbee, `Brunei: The ASEAN Connection', p. 730. 
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nor Indonesia had designs on Brunei. 5 Indonesia also preferred Brunei to be included 
in ASEAN. In June 1978, when Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, met 
Suharto in Jakarta, Lee revealed that he was asked to convey to Brunei the message that 
it would be welcome to join ASEAN. 76 
7.4. The demise of the PRB 
Apart from witnessing the changing attitudes of the Malaysian and Indonesian 
governments towards Brunei, between 1976 and 1979 Brunei also witnessed the 
diminishing strength of the PRB which had gained support from the Malaysian 
government between 1973 and 1975. This happened after Hussien Onn became Prime 
Minister of Malaysia in January 1976. Since Hussien Onn had abandoned the 
aggressive policy of the late Tun Abdul Razak towards Brunei, the support extended to 
the PRB operating from Malaysia was circumscribed. 77 According to Mahmud 
Murshidi Othman, Hussien Onn suppressed the political activities of PRB as he had to 
bow to pressure imposed on him by the British. The British pressurised Hussien Onn to 
stop the PRB's activities as Britain had promised to grant Brunei independence. 78 
Consequently, the Malaysian government withdrew the facilities extended to the 
escaped ex-rebels under Tun Abdul Razak: for example, the Malaysian authorities 
confiscated their passports and their office was closed. 
Towards the end of 1976, when the Libyan connection was brought to his attention, 
Hussien Onn exercised his authority to sever it. 9 According to one of the escaped 1962 
ex-rebels' statement to the author, when Hussien Onn found out that Bruneians were 
sent to Libya, he was annoyed and ordered those who had sent them to return them to 
Malaysia. Hussien Onn also banned Azahari from Malaysia, and at the same time 
obtained Indonesia's concurrence in keeping the PRB leaders, `... bottled up in 
's Timothy Ong, 'Modem Brunei: Some Important Issues', Southeast Asian Affairs 1983, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983, p. 82. 
76 See Tempo (Jakarta), 5 July 1980,14 - 17 & Straits Times, 4 July 1980 for the text of an 
interview with PM Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. 
77 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saffuddin III and Britain, p. 381. 
78 Author's Interview with Mahmud Morshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
79 Leifer, `Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei', pp. 248 - 49. 
181 
Bogor'. 80 In Indonesia, Suharto banned Azahari from carrying out any anti-Brunei 
activities. 
To make matters worse, in early 1976 there was a fundamental split in the PRB's 
leadership. The Vice President and Head of the Economic Division of the PRB, Zaini 
Haji Ahmad, suspended his support of the party's president, Azahari, as Zaini claimed 
there were `several defects in his leadership'. 81 Indeed by the end of December 1974, 
there were signs of disagreement on the use of violence between Azahari and Zaini. 
According to an unnamed source [which G. E. Coster, Head of Brunei Special Branch 
passed to Davidson who contacted Azahari following his returned to Kuala Lumpur on 
23 November (that was after his appearance in New York)], Azahari mentioned that 
since there was no prospect of negotiation with Britain, he decided to use violence to 
achieve his aim. 82 
According to the Department of Security and Intelligence (DSI) report of 6 
December, Azahari decided to organise an `act of violence' originating externally to 
make the Brunei government `sit up' and listen to the PRB. 83 The same source said that 
ten of the fugitive students who were known to be at the Malaysian government youth 
training centre at Dusun Tua were receiving training designed to prepare them for 
`specific operations' in Brunei. Subsequently, on 18 December 1974, Zaini visited the 
British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur and claimed that Azahari favoured 
following the PRB's aims by violent means and this had led to disagreement between 
them. 84 However, as mentioned by Mahmud Murshidi, Azahari never resorted to the use 
of violence to achieve the PRB's aims but preferred peaceful means to achieve them. 85 
According to one of the members of the PRB, the conflict between Azahari and 
Zaini was more personal than Zaini's claim that Azahari preferred peace to violence in 
achieving the PRB's aim as Azahari never resorted to using violence to achieve the 
party's aim. Although sometimes Azahari talked of violence in order to achieve his 
aim, he never meant it. If Azahari had resorted to violence, he would have carried it out 
80 Asiaweek, 6 January 1984, p. 32. 
81 Borneo Bulletin, 3 January 1976. 
82 FC024/2098, Davidson to FCO, 6 December 1975. 
83 FC024/2102, UK Policy towards Brunei: Briefs for talks with Sultan of Brunei, January 1976. 
84 Ibid., January 1976. 
8' Author's interview with Mahmud Murshidi Othman, 7 March 2006. 
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when Indonesia and Malaysia were supporting him between 1963 and 1966 and 
between 1973 and 1976 respectively (as both countries were willing to render military 
support to him). However, Azahari did not accept their support for security reasons. In 
this regard, Azahari was apprehensive that if he accepted either Indonesia or Malaysia's 
offer of the use of force in Brunei, the latter's sovereignty would be lost to either 
Indonesia or Malaysia. Moreover, Azahari was apprehensive that the military assault 
over Brunei would only cost lives amongst the Bruneians. 
Zaini's self-suspension from the party and his public pronouncement of his distrust 
of Azahari had strong repercussions for the PRB's members and followers both in 
Brunei and in exile. His suspension caused the party members to split up. The PRB's 
members and followers were also said to be increasingly critical of the inept leaderships 
of Zaini and Azahari. 86 According to one of the former students of SOASC, he and his 
associates were thoroughly disgusted with Zaini and the other PRB leaders as there was 
a lack of positive action in connection with the 'struggle'. 87 Many of the students from 
the SOASC who fled to Limbang in June 1974 returned to Brunei. 88 According to a 
Brunei Special Branch Report, they returned to Brunei as they were frustrated with the 
slow rate of progress towards the achievement of Brunei's independence. 89When they 
were in Brunei, these students together with other members of the PRB made a 
statement to the press that they no longer had confidence in Azahari's leadership and 
urged Azahari to step down from the presidency. 90 
In addition to Zaini and the students, many members and supporters of the PRB in 
Brunei and Limbang no longer supported Azahari and other leaders of the PRB, as they 
realised that their leaders were no longer in a position to gain control in Brunei. 91 
According to one of the supporters of the PRB `I was first advised that the PRB would 
be in control in Brunei in 1976. Then it was 1977, and then 1978.1 now know they 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 FC024/2102, UK Policy towards Brunei: Briefs for talks with Sultan of Brunei, 3 January 
1976. 
89 FC024/2098, Report of the Security Situation in Brunei State for the period 16 February 1975 
to 19 March 1975. 
90 Eusoff Agaki Haji Ismail, `Brunei Darussalam: its Re-emergence as a Sovereign and 
Independent Malay-Muslim Sultanate (1959-1983) M. A. thesis, University of Hull, p. 194. 
91 Ibid., p. 194. 
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were talking rubbish'. 92 With the increased hardship, frustration and lack of 
achievement, many members of the PRB became disillusioned and gave up their 
support of the party leaders. One of the supporters of the PRB who had once been a 
political detainee said that the PRB members had no money and little food in 
Limbang. 93 This was largely due to the action of the Department of Security and 
Intelligence (DSI). When the DSI was established, its officers intensified their 
monitoring and surveillance of its suspected members and sympathisers of the PRB, 
preventing them from giving any aid to the PRB members and refugees in Limbang. 
In 1976, the lives of the refugees in Limbang deteriorated when they were 
implicated by the Brunei Special Branch (which reported to the Malaysian Special 
Branch) that they wanted to overthrow the Sultan of Brunei. This happened when a 
function was held in one of the refugees' residence where a Brunei Intelligence officer 
reported to the Brunei Special Branch that the gathering aimed to campaign for new 
PRB recruits with the purpose of overthrowing the Sultan of Brunei. As a result, the 
Malaysian government (which had changed its policy towards Brunei) did not give 
them any more allowances or assistance. After that episode Yasin Affandy, the head of 
the PRB in Limbang, left the latter for Kuala Lumpur as he feared arrest. 4 As the 
Bruneian refugees in Limbang could not endure the suffering and hardship, most of the 
eighteen families who had escaped to Limbang in 1974 returned to Brunei. 95 
The release of the political detainees by the Brunei government, which partly aimed 
to counter the activities of the PRB leaders in exile, played a significant role in 
undermining the PRB. In November 1974, despite Sir Omar's unwillingness to release 
the political prisoners, a group of three detainees was freed: they were the first to be 
freed since 1967. A month later, the Brunei government freed another group of four 
detainees - one of them was Mesir Keruddin, a former TNKU commander and 
Legislative Councillor detained since May 1963 96 Jais bin Haji Karim, the most 
influential Kedayan tribe member and also the military commander of the TNKU forces 
92 Borneo Bulletin, 25 February 1978. 
93 Ibid., 25 February 1978. 
94 Zaraini, Escape From Berakas!, p. 259. 
9' Ibid., p. 260. 
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and the former Head of Economic Section of the PRB in Brunei at the time of the 
revolution were released by the Brunei government. In his public statement he 
denounced Azahari and Yasin Affandy's past activities. 7 
In June 1975, seven more PRB members were released. 98 This was followed by a 
further four releases in September 1975.99 However, Brunei's aim of countering the 
activities of the PRB backfired when, in January 1975, Mesir bin Keruddin, who was 
released in December 1974 for the purpose of countering the PRB's influence, crossed 
to Limbang and joined the campaign for independence. 100 He claimed that he crossed to 
Limbang because he did not want to be exploited by the Brunei government to counter 
the influence of the PRB leaders living abroad as he felt that he was betraying the 
PRB's struggle to attain independence. '01 
In a dramatic turn of events, in January 1975, some of the families who had earlier 
fled to Limbang returned to Brunei after the Brunei government assured them that they 
would not be arrested. 102 The defunct BAKER party also took a pledge of support for 
the Sultan's government and pleaded to the public to do the same, vowing to fight any 
`elements inside or outside the state' who might try to cause disloyalty and disunity. 103 
Some said that the BAKER party reacted in such a way towards the PRB to counter the 
ex-rebels' attempts to revive the banned PRB. Zainal bin Puteh, the President of the 
Party, claimed that the PRB's revival attempts were `useless', purely because the 
people inside Brunei would not support them. 104 
97 He stated that, because of the promises made to them by the revolt's leader Azahari, the 
Kedayan people in Brunei had suffered `very false greatly, both physically and financially' in the 
1962 rebellion (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 15 March 1975). 
98 Pelita Brunei, 18 June 1975. 
99 Ibid., 3 September 1975. 
100 Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, The People's Party of Brunei, p. 59. 
101 According to Mesir, the ex-detainees were asked to deliver speeches and talks regarding the 
PRB (cited in Zariani, Escape from Berakas!, p. 258). However, according to the report on the 
internal security in Brunei from the period 10 August 1975 until 4 September 1975, the reason for 
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Limbang. However, the men of the families were imprisoned once again for 3 years in Jerudong 
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thousand strong membership. 
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In April 1975 Awangku Hamzah Pengiran Salleh, who fled together with the 
escaped detainees from the Berakas Detention Camp in July 1973, urged the people of 
Brunei not to listen to men he had helped to free. Awangku Hamzah was speaking at a 
press conference on his release after spending three months helping the police with 
their inquiry into the incident. Awangku Hamzah surrendered himself to the Brunei 
authorities in January 1975.105 
In October 1975, a committee of former detainees with the encouragement of the 
Brunei government stepped up their campaign against the banned PRB to condemn the 
PRB leaders, particularly Azahari. 106 Public rallies denouncing PRB activities were 
held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Seria and also in Temburong. According to Awang 
Momin bin Ahmad, treasurer and information adviser to the committee, `our aim is to 
show that the people condemn the PRB leaders, including Azahari, and that they are 
loyal to the Sultan. ' 107 He and the committee also spent every Friday and Saturday 
visiting villages to answer PRB propaganda and to tell the people why they should 
support the Sultan's government. The Brunei government's Chief Information Officer, 
Pehin H. M. Salleh, also took part, urging the people to unite and to co-operate to 
defend Brunei's peace and prosperity. '08 
In March 1976, four political detainees who were released after about ten years in 
prison had openly condemned Azahari for not keeping his `promises'. 109 In February 
1978, a further release of four former rebels who had spent fifteen years in prison 
warned everyone in the state to steer clear of any PRB supporters who should not and 
could not be trusted. 1 ° Support for the PRB had also gradually dwindled as the 
standard of living in Brunei improved and as former supporters of the party had been 
rehabilitated, most being given posts in government service. " In his 1976 New Year's 
los FC024/2089, Internal Security in Brunei, 1975. 
106 Borneo Bulletin, 25 October 1975. 
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message, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah issued a warning that no mercy would be shown to 
traitors whether working from inside or outside the State. 112 
Therefore, the change of attitudes of both Malaysia and Indonesia towards Brunei 
and the declining popularity of the PRB following the loss of support from the 
Malaysian government and the people of Brunei were indeed a significant 
development, especially at a time when Britain wanted to relinquish its remaining 
responsibilities towards Brunei. The change of attitude of both Malaysia and Indonesia 
and the demise of the PRB had reduced the Sultan and Sir Omar's tension over 
Brunei's security and created an encouraging atmosphere for Britain and Brunei to 
finalise an agreement in 1979. According to a news analyst, a key `reason behind what 
appeared to be a sudden change of policy by Brunei lay in the new and full appreciation 
of a changed atmosphere in the region towards Brunei'. ' 13 
7.5. Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, 1979 
On 7 January 1979, a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Britain and 
Brunei was signed in Bandar Seri Begawan to effectuate Brunei's full independence. "4 
Under the treaty, Brunei was to assume full responsibility as a sovereign and 
independent state after the end of 1983, five years after the signing of the agreement. 
However, in May 1983 it was officially announced in Brunei that the actual date of 
independence would be 1 January 1984.115 Since Brunei would resume control of its 
external affairs and defence from Britain after 1983, the Brunei government sought 
British assistance during the five-year period in those fields. Article 2 of the Agreement 
was central to these matters and read as follows: 
1 12 New Straits Times, 3 January 1976. 
113 Ibid., 11 September 1978. 
'14 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan and Yang 
Di Pertuan of Brunei with Exchange of Notes. CMND 7496. London: HMSO, 1979 (hereafter 
cited as Treaty of Friendship and Commerce). 
115 Pelita Brunei, Tahun 28, Bil. 22,1 June 1983 & Borneo Bulletin, 28 May 1983. Pehin Aziz 
made the announcement at the end of his speech opening at the national Quran-reading 
competition held at the SMJA Secondary School Padang in Bandar Seri Begawan. He said 
January 1 Brunei would resume full international responsibility as a sovereign and independent 
state - and that meant this date will be Independent Date for Brunei. 
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Her Majesty's Government shall, until the Government of the State of Brunei can 
make alternative arrangements, and in such manner as shall in no way affect the sole 
responsibility of the Government of the State of Brunei for the external relations of the 
State, give sympathetic consideration to any specific request by the Government of the 
State of Brunei for diplomatic or consular assistance in the conduct of those relations 
and in particular Her Majesty's Government shall, in appropriate cases, if the 
Government of the State of Brunei so request: 
i. act as a channel of communication between the Government of the 
State of Brunei and the governments of states with which the State of 
Brunei is not in direct diplomatic communication, or between the 
Government of the State of Brunei and international organizations; 
ii. employ their good offices, as appropriate to promote the admission of 
the State of Brunei to any international organisation which it may wish 
to join: 
iii. afford protection to a citizen of the State of Brunei through their 
diplomatic and consular representatives in a foreign country where 
there is no Brunei representative; 
iv. assist with the establishment and training of the Brunei Diplomatic 
Service; offer advice on the printing and supply of Brunei new 
passports! 16 
In the field of defence HMG will at the request of the Government of the State of 
Brunei continue to assist the Armed Forces of the State of Brunei within the capability 
of the UK, in accordance with detailed arrangements to be decided, by: 
i. the loan of personnel to assist in the staffing, administration and 
training of those Forces; 
ii. providing advice and assistance in connection with the provision 
and maintenance of the equipment of those Forces; 
iii. providing assistance for training those Forces; 
116Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan and Yang 
Di Pertuan of Brunei with Exchange of Notes. CMND 7496. London: HMSO, 1979 (hereafter 
cited as Treaty of Friendship and Commerce). 
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iv. providing assistance in recruitment of persons for service in police 
and military posts in the state; 
v. providing expert advice and training for the Police Force of the 
State. 117 
The treaty, which was accompanied by Five Exchanges of Notes, terminated the 
special relationship between Britain and Brunei as well as all other agreements and 
arrangements inconsistent with the assumption of full international responsibility. The 
exchanges of notes covered the following issues: the termination of the special treaty 
relationship, assistance to the Brunei Armed Forces and training facilities for British 
Forces, questions of nationality, assistance in judicial matters and assistance on the 
establishment of diplomatic services. 
Britain also continued to station a battalion of Gurkhas in Brunei for five years from 
the date of signature of their letter of 31 December 1978. In this regard, the British 
government delayed the withdrawal of the British Gurkha battalion in Brunei from 
1976 (as suggested earlier by Lord Goronwy-Roberts when he informed the Sultan on 
27 November 1974) to 1983. The battalion would remain in Brunei on the same basis 
as formerly, that is the Gurkhas would be directly answerable to the British government 
and the Sultan would continue to pay for its upkeep. Britain would retain the right to 
withdraw the battalion to deal with contingencies elsewhere if this proved necessary. ' 18 
The decision to continue stationing the Gurkha battalion in Brunei was believed to 
stem from the British concern that Sir Omar might withdraw Brunei's sterling reserve 
from London. If the Sultan suddenly decided to pull out nearly £400 million from 
London 119, the ailing British economy would suffer even more. 120 Moreover, Brunei 
had remained faithful to British economic management of its resources, despite 
successive devaluation of the British pound that entailed a depreciation of Brunei's 
reserve. 121 In 1976, when the sterling depreciated, Brunei did not end or transfer or 
1" Ibid. 
118 F093/214/lA, Sultan of Brunei to Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 28 September 1978. 
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withdraw or diversify its reserves. 122 However, Brunei and British sources continued to 
maintain that Brunei's investments in Britain `were not being used as a lever to retain 
the Gurkhas in the state'. 123 
Furthermore, the retention of the British Gurkha battalion in the Sultanate would 
help the British government to keep the Gurkhas without incurring costs. From the 
Ministry of Defence's point of view, given that the Sultan paid for the battalion, there 
would be neither resource cost in keeping it, nor resource gain (in terms of relieving 
over-stretch) in removing it. 124 The battalion would also be available for use in the 
rapid reinforcement of Hong Kong. 125 In June 1979, about 200 Brunei-based Gurkha 
troops were sent to Hong Kong to help strengthen British forces there (to stem the wave 
of illegal immigrants pouring in across the Chinese border). '26 In January 1980, the 
Brunei-based Gurkha troops were again assisting Hong Kong in its efforts to control the 
influx of illegal Chinese and Vietnamese refugees. This was in accordance with the 
provisions of Brunei's treaty with the British government, where Brunei agreed to the 
loan of two companies from the 10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles to serve in 
Hong Kong for three months from January. 127 
7.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the coming of the Labour Party to power in October 1974 caused 
anxiety to Sir Omar and the Sultan as the Labour government had decided to end its 
agreement with Brunei and withdraw its Gurkha battalion from the Sultanate. The 
Sultan and Sir Omar did not agree to Britain's decision as they were still not confident 
over Brunei's security. This study has shown that Malaysia's continuous hostile attitude 
towards Brunei was the main reason why the Sultan and Sir Omar were not confident 
over establishing independence. In this chapter it has been shown that Indonesia's 
annexation of East Timor and Malaysia's support of Indonesia's act of aggression and 
122 Borneo Bulletin, 3 January 1976. 
123 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 380. 
124 FC024/1688, H. J. Blanks to Hickman, 28 December 1973. 
125 Ibid, 28 December 1973. 
126 Borneo Bulletin, 23 June 1979. 
127Ibid., 12 January 1980. 
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its comparison of Brunei's status with East Timor made Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and 
Sir Omar apprehensive about the future of Brunei. 
However, the Indonesian and Malaysian changes of policy towards Brunei in 1976 
reduced the Sultanate's tension over its security. In that year, the Indonesian 
government spelled out its friendly policy toward Brunei in order to downplay world 
condemnation of its annexation of East Timor in 1975, its controversial 1969 Act of 
Free Choice of West Irian and its confrontational policy toward Malaysia between 1963 
and 1966. Furthermore, the Indonesian government changed its policy towards Brunei 
as it did not want a radical regime to replace the rule of the present monarch which in 
turn would affect the stability of the region. 
The untimely death of Tun Abdul Razak in January 1976 and the coming of 
Hussien Orin as Prime Minister of Malaysia--who preferred a friendly policy towards 
Brunei than the aggressive policy of the former premier--minimised the tension 
between the Brunei and Malaysian governments. British pressure and persuasion also 
contributed to the change of policy of Hussien Orin towards Brunei. Moreover, the 
Malaysian government wanted to uphold ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in South-East Asia and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord which contemplated 
peace and security in the region. Furthermore, the PRB lost its credibility after the 
Malaysian government ceased its support of the party and after a split occurred in its 
leadership. 
This chapter also showed that the sudden change of policy of the Malaysian and 
Indonesian governments and the fall of the PRB lessened the Sultan and Sir Omar's 
tension toward the security of Brunei and created a favourable atmosphere for the 
successful conclusion of the 1979 Agreement between the British and Brunei 
governments. By the 1979 Agreement, Brunei would become independent at the end of 
1983. The five-year transition period provided under the agreement was indeed 
significant not only in preparing the Sultanate in its external affairs but also in 
strengthening its internal and external security in the wake of Brunei's independence. 
The next chapter will look into this period in depth. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Preparations Towards Independence: 
1979 -1983 
8.1. Introduction 
Between 1906 and 1971, Brunei's internal and external security had been fully 
safeguarded by the British. However, between 1971 and 1983 Britain was only 
consultatively responsible over Brunei's external security and after 1983 Brunei had to 
handle its external security on its own. Between 1963 and 1975, the source of Brunei's 
insecurity came largely from Malaysia, Indonesia and the PRB. From 1976 onwards the 
tensions between Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia began to ease as Indonesia and 
Malaysia changed their policy towards Brunei from an aggressive to a friendly one. 
This chapter will show that after the signing of the 1979 Agreement, Brunei took 
significant steps by making more contacts with Malaysia and Indonesia in order to re- 
establish and strengthen its relations with them. Although the personal antagonism 
between Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, and Sir Omar 
arose in the process of Brunei re-establishing its relations with Malaysia, this did not 
stop Brunei from strengthening its relations with Malaysia. 
This chapter will also show that apart from re-establishing relations with Malaysia 
and Indonesia, Brunei also made efforts to secure itself externally by joining regional 
and world organisations, namely ASEAN and the UN. This chapter will also show that 
as well as securing itself within regional and world organizations, Brunei incessantly 
re-equipped, expanded and strengthened its military in order to safeguard itself against 
any internal and external threats. This chapter will look into how the Sultanate 
expanded and strengthened its Royal Brunei Armed Forces and how it ameliorated the 
shortage of military personnel. One of the solutions was by retaining the Gurkha 
battalion in Brunei. Finally, this chapter will show that the Sultan also strengthened 
Brunei's security by imposing the Internal Security Enactment, by continuing 
Emergency Laws and by improving the social welfare of the people of Brunei. 
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8.2. Re-establishing relations with Malaysia and Indonesia 
Since its rejection of Malaysia in 1963, Brunei had never had a steady relationship 
with the Malaysian government. Following Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's coronation in 
1968, no official visits had been made between the two countries. In 1981, Sultan 
Hassanal Bolkiah put an end to this by making his visit to Sabah - his first official visit 
to any Malaysian states. ' Earlier in February 1979, the Malaysian Foreign Minister 
Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen had visited Brunei: the first official visit since Tunku 
Abdul Rahman had attended Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's coronation in 1968. He 
personally conveyed Malaysia's congratulations to the Sultan and the government of 
Brunei on the signing of the independence agreement with Britain in January 1979. He 
also stressed the need for `common understanding' between the two countries which 
could be achieved by exchange visits. 
Indeed, the exchange visits made by the leaders or the representatives of the two 
countries helped to enhance the relationship between Brunei and Malaysia. In July 
1979 Malaysia's Prime Minister, Datuk Hussien Onn, attended Brunei's royal wedding 
and in March 1980, the Yang Di Pertuan Agong (the supreme ruler) of Malaysia visited 
Brunei. 3 In July the same year, the Sultan paid a five-day visit to Malaysia and attended 
the installation of the Yang Di Pertuan Agong where the Sultan was the only foreign 
monarch present at the ceremony. The Malaysian Yang Di Pertuan Agong had already 
established `polo diplomacy' with Brunei when earlier that year the Malaysian team 
under the newly appointed Yang Di Pertuan Agong had played the Sultan's team in 
Brunei .4 Another visit was made a year 
later in connection with the wedding of the 
5 Yang Di Pertuan Agong's daughters 
1 Borneo Bulletin, 12 September 1981. 
2 Ibid., 10 February 1979. 
3 Ibid., 23 February 1980. 
° Puspha Thambipillai, `Brunei in ASEAN: the Viable Choice', in South East Asian Affairs 1982, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982, p. 109. 
5 Timothy Ong, 'Modern Brunei: Some Important Issues', p. 82. 
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In 1981, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, Abdul Rahman Yakub, accompanied by his 
designated successor Datuk Amar Taib Mahmud, paid a visit to Brunei6' and the new 
Chief Minister of Sabah, Datuk Haris Salleh, attended the Sultan's 35th birthday 
celebration. Both the official and unofficial visits made by Brunei and Malaysia 
created a friendly atmosphere, which was hardly achieved after Brunei's rejection of 
Malaysia in 1963. The coming of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, whose foreign policy was 
based on diplomatic adventurism, to the office of Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981, 
further ameliorated Brunei's relations with Malaysia. 8 
As a result of improved relations between Brunei and Malaysia, in January 1982 
Brunei opened up a government agency office in Kuala Lumpur - the same day that the 
Malaysian government established a representative office in Bandar Seri Begawan. 9 In 
September 1982, Brunei announced that it had offered diplomatic privileges and 
immunities to the Malaysian Government Agency representative, a move which was 
well received among diplomatic circles. In October 1982, the Sultan announced that the 
government had agreed to upgrade the Malaysian Government Agency to the status of 
Commissioners. '0 
To assist in Brunei's efforts to train more of its people in various skills and 
expertise, the Malaysian government offered the Brunei government training on 
numerous courses, especially in education. A one-week visit to Malaysia by Brunei's 
Acting Chief Minister, Pehin Aziz Umar, in January 1982 was followed by a significant 
three-day visit to Brunei in March by Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa 
Hitam. The latter's visit concluded with a number of accords which centred on 
6 Eusoff Agaki Haji Ismail, `Brunei Darussalam: its Re-emergence as a Sovereign and 
Independent Malay-Muslim Sultanate (1959-1983), p. 206. 
Borneo Bulletin, 12 September 1981. 
8 Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Politics of Indonesia - Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations, 
London, 2005, p. 134. Tun Hussien Onn announced his stepping down as premier at the local 
party congress in his hometown Johore Bahru, Malaysia. He retired as the prime minister of 
Malaysia due to ill-health. 
9 Brunei, Published for and on behalf of the Information Secretary, Department of State 
Secretariat, Brunei by Media Publishing (m) sdn. bhd. Printed by Grenier Insular sdn. bhd, No 5 
Jln 5 1/201, Off Jln Tandang, Petaling Jaya, 1981. 
10 Ibid. 1981. 
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education and training where Malaysia offered its expertise. " A year earlier, a team of 
officials led by the Director of Education, Dato Haji Ahmad bin Haji Jumat, led an 
exploratory visit to Malaysia on matters regarding education. 12 
Following the withdrawal of Brunei's students from various institutions in West 
Malaysia in 1973, the majority of Brunei's students were sent to England and 
Singapore for higher education. Although much controversy had been aroused in 
England by the increase in fees for overseas students, education officials in Brunei 
stressed that this was not the reason for sending students to Malaysia. Brunei officials 
claimed that sending students to Malaysia would help overcome language difficulties 
because students going to England for higher education invariably had to undergo an 
intensive course in the English language to prepare them. Another factor was that life 
and culture in Malaysia were similar to those of Brunei and this would help the students 
to settle in more easily. 13 
Despite the growing ties between the Brunei and the Malaysian governments, 
personal antagonism between Sir Omar and Tunku Abdul Rahman, which had occurred 
since Brunei's rejection of Malaysia in 1963, continued. In October 1981, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman appeared in his weekly column Watan, in which he claimed that one of the 
reasons for Brunei not joining Malaysia was that Sir Omar's desire to become Yang Di 
Pertuan Agong (supreme ruler) of Malaysia had not been fulfilled. 14 Sir Omar, 
however, rebuked the statement by saying that he would not allow prosperous Brunei to 
become a dependency of Malaysia's and stressed that Brunei's decision not to join 
Malaysia was final. 16 In 1983, once again Tunku Abdul Rahman gave the same reason 
for Sir Omar's rejection to join Malaysia in the Malaysian newspaper Mingguan 
11 The Malaysian Government also offered training to Brunei police officers in basic detective 
work (cited in Borneo Bulletin, 22 October 1983). 
12Ibid., 6 June 1981. 
13Ibid., 6 June 1981. 
14 Borneo Bulletin, 7 November 1981 & Watan, 23 October 1981. 
"Borneo Bulletin, 7 November 1981. The Bruneian Government also said that the conditions 
attached to a `voluntary donation' involved in the Malaysian arrangements would have made it 
tantamount to tribute and because of that Brunei would have become `a dependency and a 
conquered territory and servitude'. 
16 Borneo Bulletin, 7 November 1981. See also Pelita Brunei, 11 November 1981. 
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Malaysia. 17 Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia's Foreign Minister, on the other hand claimed 
that the reason Brunei did not join Malaysia was because of `poor communication' 
between the Tunku and the Sultan. 18 Although Brunei's efforts in re-establishing and 
strengthening its relations with Malaysia were hampered by these episodes, they did not 
stop the Brunei government from pursuing its wish to have close relations with the 
Malaysian government. 
As well as Malaysia, Brunei was also re-establishing its relations with Indonesia. In 
April 1981, the Sultan made his first official visit to the republic. In their speeches, both 
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and Suharto spoke of strengthening socio-cultural ties and 
acknowledged that bilateral relations could be built on their shared cultural and 
linguistic traditions. 19 A year later, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar 
Kusumatmadja, made a reciprocal visit to Brunei. 20 The visit was significant not only 
for Brunei in its efforts to re-establish and strengthen its relations with Indonesia, but 
also for the latter. This was because Indonesia was keen to re-establish ties with Brunei 
which had been suspended in 1963 (following the abortive rebellion). The Indonesian 
officials viewed the Sultan's visit as `very significant in shaping a regional order based 
on peace, stability and harmonious relations'. 2' Dr Mochtar Kusumatmadja assured 
Brunei that there would be no return to past policies, which had given rise to hostilities 
between Brunei and Indonesia. 22 He also assured Brunei that the changes of 
1' Borneo Bulletin, 1 October 1983. Also see Mingguan Malaysia, 18 September 1983. 
18 Ibid. In 1968, a Malaysian newspaper, Sabah Times, reported the reason for the Sultan's refusal 
to join Malaysia was because of his aim to become Yang Di Pertuan Agong of Malaysia had not 
been met. Consequently, Sir Omar, in his broadcast over Radio Brunei as well as in the local 
newspaper, the Daily Star, stated that Brunei would never join Malaysia (cted in FC024/222, 
Adair to Walker, 3 September 1968; Daily Star, 23 August 1968; Straits Times, 24 August 1968). 
In September 1968, Sir Omar published private letters exchanged between himself and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, with the aim of contradicting Malaysia's claim that the former Sultan of Brunei 
had refused to join the federation because he was not offered the position of Yang Di-Pertuan 
Agong of Malaysia (cited in FC024/222, Adair to Walker, 3 September 1968). Subsequently, in 
February 1969 Tunku Abdul Rahman hinted at `the possibility' of another revolt in Brunei when 
he compared Brunei with the African State of Zanzibar, where a Communist-inspired revolution 
in 1964 had overthrown the government just one month after the country had gained 
independence, forcing its sultan to flee to England; the sultan, Tunku said, was now working in a 
London restaurant (cited in OD39/89&FC024/429/1, D. P. Aires to Ward, 11 April 1969). 
19 Straits Times, 26 October 1984. 
20 Borneo Bulletin, 18 April 1981; New Straits Times (Malaysia), 14 August 1982. 
21 Borneo Bulletin, 18 April 1981. 
22 Ibid., 18 April 1981; New Straits Times, 14 August 1982. 
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government (in Indonesia) and of president and the reversal of past policies `everything 
has followed from that'. 23 He further added that his government would welcome Brunei 
joining ASEAN. 24 
Following the Sultan's first visit to Indonesia, Brunei lifted the restrictions that 
prevented Brunei citizens travelling to Indonesia. 25 From the early 1960s until Brunei's 
independence and membership of ASEAN in 1984, Bruneian passports were not valid 
for visits to communist countries or to Indonesia. 26 According to Prince Mohamed 
Bolkiah, the foreign minister of independent Brunei, the friendship consistently offered 
to Brunei by President Suharto transformed relations between Brunei and Indonesia and 
enabled Brunei to have confidence in its independence which `we rarely felt in the 
fifties and early sixties. '27 
8.3. Strengthening security through ASEAN and the UN 
In addition to re-establishing and strengthening relations with Indonesia and 
Malaysia, Brunei also ventured into the possibilities of entering ASEAN and the UN in 
order to ensure its external security when Britain ended its military protection over 
Brunei. 
ASEAN, which was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, until 
Brunei's entry into ASEAN in 1984 consisted of five countries, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It was formed with the aim of 
promoting economic co-operation and welfare of the people in the region. Even though 
initially political co-operation was not included in the declaration, ASEAN members 
were actually more involved in political co-operation than in economic and social co- 
operation . 
28 On 24 February 1976, political co-operation was included at the First 
ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, where ASEAN heads of government signed the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which became the framework for ASEAN political 
23 Borneo Bulletin, 14 August 1982. 
24 Ibid., 14 August 1982. 
25 Borneo Bulletin, 1 August 1981. 
26 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 230. 
27 Pengiran Perdana Wazir Pengiran Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, Time and the River: Brunei 
Darussalam 1947- 2000: A Memoir, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Press, 2000, p. 169. 
28 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 165. 
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co-operation. The summit also endorsed ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality) for South-East Asia, introduced in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971, as 
the objective of ASEAN political co-operation. Under the ZOPFAN, ASEAN members 
would co-operate to safeguard South-East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality, free from interference of outside powers. 29 The First ASEAN Summit also 
produced the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia whereby rules of 
conduct for countries in South-East Asia in their relations with each other were set out. 
Under this treaty, they agreed to renounce threats or the use of force to settle disputes, 
and to resolve conflicts only through peaceful means. 30 
From its inception in 1967, Brunei had watched with interest the development of 
ASEAN . 
31 The possibility of Brunei joining ASEAN had existed as early as 1978, 
several years before its independence and even prior to the signing of the Treaty of 
Friendship with Britain in 1979.32 Geographically, ASEAN is part of the Malaysian- 
Indonesian core area in South-East Asia. The countries in ASEAN were historically and 
culturally inter-related and the histories of the member states overlap considerably. 
Most of the ASEAN nations had at one time or another been under the domination of 
foreign powers. However, the most important reason for Brunei's interest in joining 
ASEAN was that of security. In his speech in Bangkok, Thailand in January 1984, 
Prince Mohamad Bolkiah stressed that Brunei's admission into ASEAN was `guided by 
our political and security interests, upon which our security hinges'. 33 
By joining ASEAN, Brunei could expect that it would not be threatened by its 
neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia. Instead both countries would be expected to take 
the same seat as Brunei. 34 By participating in ASEAN, Brunei could expect that it 
would be accepted and tolerated by its neighbours as an equal state. If Brunei perceived 
29http: //www. aseansec. org/92. htm 
301bid. 
31 Pengiran Perdana Wazir Pengiran Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, Time and the River: Brunei 
Darussalam 1947 - 2000: A Memoir, p. 164. 32 Ibid., p. 164. 
33 Straits Times, 17 January 1984. 
34 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 227. A prominent political scientist from the 
National University of Singapore, Professor Chan Heng Chee, clearly stated that: `The success of 
ASEAN is predicated upon the fact that Indonesia as the largest member is prepared to take the 
same seat as Singapore and Brunei. This has been the wonder of ASEAN. ' (cited in Dewi Fortuna 
Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 226). 
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a threat from outside the sub-region, it could expect support and perhaps physical aid 
from ASEAN, and would enjoy strength from such collective support. 35 When the 
Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in 1978, the ASEAN members showed their 
commitment in opposing Vietnamese action at the UN. On 14 November 1979, the 
ASEAN states sponsored a UN resolution on Cambodia calling for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from that country. ASEAN also led the annual lobby at the UN 
condemning the continuing Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and denying the 
legitimacy of the Heng Samrin regime. 36 
Brunei could also expect by joining ASEAN that disputes between member 
countries could be settled amicably: under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN members agreed to renounce the use of force to settle disputes, 
and to solve conflicts only through peaceful means. 37 Moreover, by joining ASEAN 
Brunei could expect no interference in its internal affairs by the members of ASEAN. 
Chapter I Article 2(c) of the treaty clearly upholds the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of member states. This was what the Sultanate wished for. Prince 
Mohamed Bolkiah, in his speech at the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Singapore in 
June 1982, stated that Brunei, being a small country, `gives great importance to the 
principle of non-interference'. 38In the ASEAN context, any attempt by a member state 
to interfere in the internal affairs of another would only damage the Association's 
cohesion and viability. 39 
By participating in ASEAN, Brunei could benefit from the `ASEAN way' of 
diplomacy, which is based upon the Malay cultural practices of `musjawarah' and 
`mufukat', which Sukarno and the Indonesians introduced. Musjawarah and mufukat 
represented an approach to decision making that emphasizes consensus and 
consultation. The negotiations that take place in the spirit of musjawarah are `not as 
35 Puspha Thambipillai, `Brunei in ASEAN: the Viable Choice', pp. 110-111. 
36 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, pp. 184 - 5. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia and 
toppled Pol Pot in December 1978, Heng Samrin was appointed by Hanoi to run a puppet 
government. 
37 For details of the treaty see http: //www. aseansec. org/1217. htm 
38 Straits Times, 7 January 1984. 
39 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 140. 
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between opponents but as between friends and brothers. '40 It is a consultative process 
that is primarily motivated by the desire to create a stable intramural environment. 41 
According to Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, ASEAN always `led to decisions by consensus 
and that was exactly the way we like to work. It matched our own traditional method. 
We certainly felt at home and were comfortable in our new regional surroundings. ' 42 
Brunei's entry into ASEAN was strongly supported by senior diplomatic circles in 
London. 43 A senior British diplomat, Kevin Burns (Head of the Foreign Office's South- 
East Asian Department), reportedly discussed ASEAN with the Sultan during his visit 
to Brunei. He was quoted as saying `I can go as far as we in London hope Brunei will 
decide to join ASEAN. But this is entirely up to His Highness and his advisers. We are 
confident ASEAN would welcome Brunei as a member. '44 Lord Belstead, Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs who visited Brunei in 1982, said that 
Britain would be `very happy' if Brunei joined ASEAN as `it would give Brunei 
membership of one of the strongest trading groups in the world and membership of a 
politically important trading group which stands at a bastion against communism from 
Vietnam through Cambodia'. 5 
Among the ASEAN members, Brunei's entry into ASEAN was strongly supported 
not only by Malaysia and Indonesia but also by Singapore. Singapore was in fact the 
only member of ASEAN with whom Brunei had established a favourable relationship. 
Although strikingly different in terms of cultural and racial identity, the two states 
nonetheless identified with one another in terms of relative size, sense of vulnerability 
and sources of external threat. Brunei had political, economic and military relations 
with the small island-state, i. e., the relations were outside of the terms of the Anglo- 
Brunei Agreement of November 1971 46 Unlike other ASEAN states which supported 
the PRB's struggle for Brunei's independence to the UN, Singapore did not support the 
PRB. 
40 Jorgenson-Dahl, Regional Organisation and Order, p. 166. 
41 Shaun Nairne, Explaining ASEAN, Boulder, CO.; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 
31. 
42 Pengiran Perdana Wazir Pengiran Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, Time and the River, p. 167. 43 Borneo Bulletin, 28 February 1981. 
as New Sunday Times, 1 March 1981. 
as Borneo Bulletin, 18 December 1982. 
46 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, p. 249. 
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In terms of economy, Brunei has huge investments in Singapore. 7 The Brunei 
dollar is also on par with the Singapore dollar as the result of a parity agreement and the 
two currencies are acceptable in both states. Because of Singapore's friendly 
relationship with Brunei (while Malaysia and Indonesia had problems with the 
Sultanate), President Suharto asked Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, to 
convey to Brunei the fact that it would be welcome to join ASEAN. In September 1981, 
a one-day seminar on the five-nation group was held in Singapore. The conference was 
specifically organised by the Singapore Foreign Ministry to familiarise Brunei's 
emerging diplomats with the broad aspects of ASEAN. 48 
Thailand and the Philippines also strongly supported Brunei's entry into ASEAN. 
In March 1981, Thai Deputy Foreign Minister, Arun Bhanupong, visited the Sultanate 
as he was encouraged by the fact that Brunei would be welcome to join the grouping. 
The Philippines, which organised the 1981 Annual Foreign Ministers' Meeting, hosted 
the Brunei delegation in Manila and supported its membership. 49 From the ASEAN 
point of view, Brunei was geographically part of the region and therefore the most 
logical choice of member if and when ASEAN increased its membership. Moreover, 
Brunei faced similar political and security issues, which were therefore compatible with 
the rest of ASEAN goals. so 
In order for Brunei to achieve its aim of joining ASEAN, an ASEAN section was 
established when the Sultanate formed the Diplomatic Service Department in 1980 that 
functioned as a national secretariat to facilitate Brunei's participation in the regional 
organisation 51 In May 1981, it was officially announced from the palace that the Sultan 
would be sending an observer to the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Manila in 
June 1981.52 ASEAN leaders collectively decided to invite Brunei as an observer to this 
annual meeting until it became independent in 1984, at which time it could become a 
47 Crosbie, 'Brunei: The Constraints of a Small State', p. 81. 
48 Borneo Bulletin, 12 September 1981. 
49 Puspha Thambipillai, `Brunei in ASEAN: the Viable Choice', p. 110. 
50 Ibid., p. 111. 
51 Pengiran Perdana Wazir Pengiran Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, Time and the River: Brunei 
Darussalam 1947 - 2000: A Memoir, p. 164. 52 Borneo Bulletin, 16 May 1981. 
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full member if it chose 53 The significance of the occasion was underlined in a speech 
to the conference by Prince Mohamed Bolkiah who referred to it as `our maiden 
appearance at a regional or international conference. '54 He also noted that the Sultanate 
was aware that it was part of South-East Asia and could not separate itself from 
developments in the region and therefore Brunei was willing to be part of the 
grouping 55 Brunei became an official observer in 1982 56 
However, it was only in June 1983 that Prince Mohamed Bolkiah was able to reveal 
officially that Brunei intended to join ASEAN. According to Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, 
`We were, however, still cautiously feeling our way'. 57 In November 1983, six weeks 
before its independence, the Brunei government confirmed that Brunei would become 
the sixth member of ASEAN on 7 January 1984.8 Prince Mohamed Bolkiah found 
ASEAN's straightforward record of solidarity and co-operation remarkable. In fact, 
immediate membership of ASEAN was Brunei's best insurance policy. 59 It served the 
security interests of the Sultanate because `the five founding states would be obliged to 
be restrained in political intent towards their new regional partner'. 60 
Apart from ASEAN, Brunei ventured into the possibilities of joining the UN. Like 
its entry into ASEAN, the Sultanate was interested in joining the UN mainly for 
security reasons. The Charter of the United Nations, which was signed on 26 June 1945 
in San Francisco after the end of the Second World War, spells out the principles of 
maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination 
principle 61 
s' Puspha Thambipillai, `Brunei in ASEAN: the Viable Choice', p. 109. 
54 Borneo Bulletin, 6 June 1981. 
ss Pelita Brunei, 24 June 1981. 
56 Pengiran Perdana Wazir Pengiran Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, Time and the River: Brunei 
Darussalam 1947 - 2000: A Memoir, p. 164. 57 Ibid., pp. 164 -165. 58 Borneo Bulletin, 19 November 1983. 
59 Pengiran Perdana Wazir Pengiran Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, Time and the River: Brunei 
Darussalam 1947 - 2000: A Memoir, p. 165. 60 See Bilveer Singh, `Vulnerable Allies: Singapore-Brunei Defence Bilateralism', Asian Defence 
Journal, No. 5,1992, p. 12. 
61 http: //www. mfa. gov. bn/foreignpolicy/unitednation. htm 
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For a small state like Brunei, the world body is the vital asset in ensuring its 
continuous security and survival. It is `a global assurance policy' for Brunei 
62 In his 
first address to the UN, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah noted that: 
Small countries like ours want peace but we see a world where others want to 
settle issues by force of arms. Our only hope is to look to the moral and 
persuasive authority of the United Nations and its machinery for the 
maintenance of peace and security. We shall, of course, endeavour to build up 
our defences to the extent that men and resources permit, but we believe that in 
the world of today the collective strength of the United Nations is the ultimate 
hope for us small countries. '63 
When a Brunei delegation attended the UN ASEAN Conference on Palestine held 
in Kuala Lumpur, it gave its support for the Palestinian cause and let it be known that it 
expected to be able to rely on the international community for its own future security. 64 
In this event, the Brunei delegation stressed the impotence of the United Nations in the 
face of Israeli aggression, particularly since Brunei placed its trust and hope of its own 
security and existence in the ideals declared in the Charter of United Nations 65 
In September 1982, Prince Mohamed Bolkiah and Brunei's Attorney General 
attended the 37th Assembly of United Nations at the invitation of the Malaysian Foreign 
Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie. 66 The aim was to take a close look at the workings of 
the United Nations General Assembly in New York in preparation for its forthcoming 
independence 67 In 1983, Prince Mohamed Bolkiah attended the 38th United Nations 
General Assembly in New York. He joined the ASEAN delegation at the invitation of 
Singapore's Foreign Minister, Mr S. Dhanabalan. Earlier in 1981 Singapore UN had a 
Bruneian attached to it. Brunei finally joined the UN at the 39th General Assembly of 
62 Puspha Thambipillai, `Diplomacy and the Small State: Brunei Darussalam and the International 
System', in Abu Bakar bin Haji Apong, Haji (ed. ), Sumbangsih UBD: Essays on Brunei 
Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Akademi Pengajian Brunei, 1992, p. 283. 
63 At the speech to the United Nations, on Brunei's admission in September, 1984. Source: 
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Bangsa Bersatu', p. 22 & http: //www. mfa. gov. bn/foreignpolicy/unitednation. htm 
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the United Nations on 21 September 1984 with the aim of securing its position within 
the world body. 
Besides ASEAN and the UN, Brunei became a member of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) in January 1984, which aimed to strengthen its international 
Islamic identity. On the day of its independence on 1 January 1984, Brunei also 
immediately became a member of the Commonwealth, which aims to promote 
international peace and order, which the Brunei government sought after. 68 
8.4. Strengthening Brunei's defence organisation 
In addition to joining ASEAN and the UN as a way of increasing its external 
security, Brunei also expanded its defence organization as a way of strengthening its 
internal and external security. Brunei's internal and external security is the 
responsibility of four distinct defence organizations: the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment 
(RBMR), the Royal Brunei Police, the Gurkha Reserve Unit, and the British Army 
Gurkha Battalion. In order to bolster Brunei's security in the wake of Brunei's 
independence, the Sultanate re-equipped and expanded its armed forces - the RBMR. 
The Regiment, which was formed in early June 1961, was initially stationed in the 
Federation of Malaya where recruits underwent training common to that of army 
personnel. Initially, the main component was designated as the Task Force, but to allow 
expansion and future roles this was reorganised as the First Battalion, RBMR, in March 
1972 69 The tasks of the Regiment were limited to providing guards at the Sultan's 
palace, as well as carrying out the responsibility for the internal security of the state and 
of the coastal waters of Brunei 70 The tasks carried out by the Regiment changed 
slightly after the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation in 1966 and at the run- 
down of the British troops in the state. They were responsible for public order, 
patrolling the interior of the state and its coastal waters, and for the provision and 
control of helicopters for the use of the regiment and government officers. 7' To carry 
68 Cited in httpJ/www. mfa. gov. bn/foreignpolicy/commonwealth. htm 
69 Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1972. 
70 Ibid., 1965. Other tasks were assisting with the manning of military landing crafts and 
controlling of the government helicopters. 
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out these commitments, one company remained stationed in Temburong, and the 
remainder of the Regiment was in Berakas Camp. In 1969, in addition to the tasks 
mentioned before, the force also operated in jungle terrain and functioned as a deterrent 
against external aggression. 2 
In 1970, the RBMR continued to expand in order to carry out more efficiently its 
primary roles of deterring outside aggression and supporting the police in preserving 
order. In 1971, the RBMR held a greater responsibility, as under the amended 
agreement of 1971 Britain relinquished its responsibility over Brunei's internal 
security. Under the 1971 Agreement, it became the responsibility of the Brunei 
government `to raise, equip and maintain forces sufficient for the preservation of 
internal public order and to be the first line of external defence'. 73 Since internal 
security had been passed to the Brunei government, the latter maintained its efforts to 
increase and equip its forces in order to safeguard its internal security. Under the 1971 
Agreement Britain would not be automatically responsible for Brunei's defence and 
this led the Sultanate to expand the role of the RBMR to include both external and 
internal defence, instead of concentrating solely on the internal role. 
Brunei's spending on defence also increased considerably from year to year. In 
1962, Brunei's defence budget was only about $2,000,000 but in 1963 (at the outset of 
the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation) the defence budget was $8,000,000.74 At the 
run-down of Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from the region, Brunei's defence 
spending increased from $8,000,000 in 1963 to $19,000,000 in 1966.75 From 1966 
onwards, because of uncertainty over the maintenance of the British military presence 
in the Sultanate, the latter's spending on defence had increased. 76 In 1967, the defence 
72 Ibid., 1969. 
73 Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei Amending the Agreement of 29 
September 1959, Bandar Seri Begawan, 23 November 1971, Cmnd. 4932, London, HMSO, 1972. 
Also in FC058/6814, Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei, Amending the 
Agreement of 29 September 1959. 
74 Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1963. 
'S Ibid., 1966. 
76 Tim Huxley, Brunei Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, Canberra, Australia National 
University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 166,1988, pp. 13 - 14; 
Tim Huxley, `Brunei: Defending a Mini-State', Chin Kin Wah (ed. ), Defence Spending in 
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budget had risen from $17,967,61377 to $30,117,209 in 1971 78 After the Labour 
government announced its decision to revise its agreement with Brunei and to withdraw 
its Gurkha battalion from the Sultanate in 1976, the Brunei government spent nearly 
$100 million79 whilst for the year 1979 the RBMR received $374 million and in 1980 it 
received $288 million. According to Tim Huxley `in terms of military expenditure per 
capita, the Sultanate was outspending its future ASEAN associates even in the mid- 
1960s'. 8° 
A considerable proportion of the defence budget was actually used to acquire 
sophisticated weapons and artilleries. The Regiment, which was established in 1961, 
acquired a flotilla based at Muara and an air wing of helicopters. The Pahlawan, 
flagship of the flotilla in the early 1970s, was in her time the fastest warship afloat. The 
flotilla also boasted a troop-carrying hovercraft. In 1978, Brunei ordered a battery of 
Rapier-Blindfrre surface-to-air missiles. New patrol boats ordered in 1979 were fitted 
with French Exocet missiles. In the same year, six Bo 105C-armed helicopters were 
ordered. 81 In early 1981, the government ordered three Rotork 12.6m patrol boats, 
SF260 armed training aircraft and three Bell 212 helicopters. 82 A squadron of British- 
made Scorpion tanks provided extra punch on land. The armed forces also deployed a 
highly sophisticated and advanced tactical communications system. 83 
By 1983, Brunei's forces were well-equipped and able to deal with emergencies on 
the oilfield and to respond to a threat of sabotage or piratical attack at sea. On land they 
could respond to a cross-border incursion or domestic insurrection. 84 According to the 
Deputy Commander of the RBMR, Colonel Pehin Mohamad Daud, when Britain gave 
up its responsibility for Brunei's defence Brunei would be `as well equipped as any 
Southeast Asia, Pasir Panjang, Singapore, Regional Strategic Studies Programme, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1987, p. 244. 
"Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1967. 
78 Ibid., 1971. 
79 Ibid., 1975. 
80 Tim Huxley, Brunei Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, p. 1; Tim Huxley, `Brunei: 
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81 See Table 4 in Tim Huxley, Brunei Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, p. 32; Tim 
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army in this neighbouring region. The only danger is if we equip ourselves too much, 
we could land ourselves with problems'. 85 Therefore it could be concluded that money 
is not a problem in wealthy Brunei, `with its per capita income the highest of any 
country east of the Arabian Gulf, 86 however lacking manpower is. 
As mentioned earlier, Brunei's small population was the stumbling block for it to 
compete with other countries in terms of military personnel. It was also a reason for 
Brunei acquiring sophisticated weapons. As Brunei did not have a sufficiently large 
population to set up sizeable armed forces, it had to turn to technology to compensate 
for the lack of manpower. From 1961 to 1962, the strength of the army was only about 
400. At the run-down of the British forces from the Far East in 1966, the total strength 
of the army was about 500.87 In 1970, for the first time, the strength of the army 
reached 1,000 and because of the shortage of personnel, in 1965 the Brunei government 
requested the British government to provide seconded officers and NCOs (Non- 
Commissioned Officers). The Brunei government also requested that the British 
government provide seconded officers and NCOs; the Malaysian government ceased to 
provide officers and NCOs training to the regiment, partly because of the increased 
demands made on their personnel as a result of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation 
in 196388 and partly because the Malaysian government wanted to teach Brunei a lesson 
for not entering Malaysia. In fact, the armed forces relied heavily on British officers on 
secondment from the British army or hired on contract. In 1981, their numbers were 
close to 200, but a policy of Bruneization brought this down to about 150 by 
independence and to around eighty in 1989.89 
In order to ameliorate the shortage of military personnel, on 1 January 1979, the 
Brunei government formed a Young Soldiers Company with an intake of thirty-one 
recruits for the three-year course. 90 In 1981, the Brunei government formed the RBMR 
Women's Company. However, the intake was small and the Women's Company only 
85 Borneo Bulletin, 12 June 1981. 
86 Shuhud Said, `The Royal Brunei Armed Forces - Money Cannot Buy Men', Asian Defence 
Journal, January 1988, p. 12. 
87 Brunei Government/State of Brunei, Annual Report, 1966. 
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carries out non-combat duties. The uses of arms in the training are purely for self- 
defence purpose. 91 Furthermore, the Sultan independently recruited a Gurkha Reserve 
Unit which guarded the palace and government installations. This unit was in fact one 
of the distinct organizations that were responsible for Brunei's internal security. The 
Gurkha Reserve Unit is directly under the command of the Sultan. Its 900 or so men 
had been discreetly recruited, mainly from among retiring British army Gurkhas and 
officers. The unit functioned primarily as a praetorian guard that protected the Sultan 
against any internal or external threat that might arise. 92 
A further solution to ameliorate the shortage of military personnel was to retain the 
Gurkha battalion in Brunei. The Gurkha battalion was another distinct defence 
organization that was responsible for Brunei's internal and external security. In April 
1968, when Britain decided to withdraw its forces from the Far East, the Sultan agreed 
to pay the full cost of maintaining the Gurkha Army in Brunei of about £1,000,000 a 
year. 93Since its stationing in the Sultanate in 1963, the Brunei government had been 
voluntarily paying half of the cost of maintaining the battalion. 94 The Sultan paid 
£600,000 directly to the British government. Moreover, the Brunei government 
provided barracks at Seria, petrol, oil and lubricants, fuel, light and water, together with 
various other services to the British government free of charge, making a total saving of 
about £180,000 per annum. 95 
The Gurkha battalion acted as a deterrent against any external attacks. It also acted 
as reinforcement to local security forces in maintaining general security within the state 
with special emphasis on the protection of oil and gas installations in Belait and Seria. 
The Gurkhas were in addition guarding the hangar that housed the RBMR's 748 aircraft 
at the airport and Berakas Camp. 96 A paper presented in 1982 by the Deputy 
Commander of the RBMR, Col. Mohamed, at a seminar in Honolulu spelled out that `a 
threat could develop along one of three main lines, or a combination of them': 
a. external attack, presumably aimed at taking control of the country's oil wells; 
91 Borneo Bulletin, 10 June 1981. 
92 http: //www. country-data. com/cgi-bin/query/r-9181. html 
93 FC024/236, A. T. Lindsay to I. K. C. Ellison, 9 May 1968. 
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b. guerilla activity aimed at overthrowing the government and backed by an 
external power; and finally 
c. terrorist activity involving the seizure of aircraft or vital installations like oil 
rigs or other `soft' objectives as a political gesture. 97 
However, the British government initially refused to retain the Gurkha battalion in 
Brunei as it was concerned that the battalion might find itself called upon to assist the 
Sultan in another popular uprising in Brunei. 98 Eventually, however, Britain agreed to 
let the Ghurkas remain in the Sultanate as the British were reportedly concerned that 
Brunei might end the agreement under which the Royal Dutch Shell Group jointly 
exploited the Sultanate's resources. 99 
Since 1975, the Brunei government has had a 50-50 shareholding with the Royal 
Dutch Shell Group. The Brunei government in the Borneo Bulletin dated 7 May 1982, 
however, strongly denied the report which was made by the international news agency 
Reuters and stated that the agreement had no relation whatsoever directly or indirectly 
to defence talks between Brunei and Britain. '00 Nevertheless, in May 1982, a deal was 
signed between the Brunei government and Jasra Jackson Private Limited, which was 
25 per cent a Bruneian Company and 75 per cent owned by a United States firm called 
Jackson Exploration Incorporated where some 700,000 acres had been granted. '°' 
Britain was also reportedly concerned that the Sultan might decide to pull out nearly 
£400 million of Brunei's investment managed by the Crown Agents from London. As 
mentioned previously, if the Sultan did decide to withdraw these investments, Britain's 
economy was bound to suffer even more. 102 Moreover, Brunei had been faithful to the 
Crown Agents in spite of successive devaluations of the sterling pound that entailed 
depreciation of Bruneian reserves. In 1976, when the sterling depreciated, Brunei did 
97 Irvine Cohen, `Defending the Abode of Peace', Defence Minister and Chief of Staff, No. 1 
(1986), p. 21. 
98 See Dinah Lee, FEER, 2 June 1978, p. 10-12; A. J. Crosbie, `Brunei: the Constraints on a small 
state', Southeast Asian Affairs 1978, Singapore: ISEAS, 1978, p. 78 and M. Leifer, 
`Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei', pp. 246-247 and Menon, 
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not end or transfer or withdraw or diversify its reserves, although Brunei lost money 
through this depreciation. 103 
The Shell Company, which had provided the garrison accommodation in Seria, had 
made it plain that they wished the Gurkha battalion to remain there as they believed the 
presence of the battalion underwrote the security of their personnel and installations 
since the oil refinery was under British control in Southeast Asia. 104 Moreover, the 
British Ministry of Defence was aware that the Gurkha presence provided good 
experience for nearly 200 British officers and NCOs, as Brunei had an excellent jungle 
training school. 105 Furthermore, the fact that the Sultanate continued to pay for the 
upkeep of the battalion in Brunei was another important factor in Britain's decision to 
allow the Sultan to retain the Gurkha battalion, as that would reduce the cost of 
deploying the Gurkhas to Hong Kong in times of emergency there. 
Nevertheless, the Sultan insisted that the Gurkha battalion should pass under his 
command on the coming of independence. The British government, however, rejected 
his request, as it did not want its forces to be used to suppress an insurgency in Brunei 
or to confront a cross-border incursion without British consent. 106 As a result of 
Britain's refusal to allow the battalion to come under the Sultan's command, British 
relations with Brunei became strained. The Sultan, who was disappointed with Britain's 
decision, forced the departure of the British High Commissioner, Arthur Watson, in 
April 1983.107 When the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) world radio service 
speculated that Arthur Watson had clashed with the Sultan, Radio Television Brunei 
ceased relaying the BBC. 108 Further to this, in July Brunei suddenly withdrew the 
management of its huge investment portfolio from Crown Agents. 109 
103 Borneo Bulletin, 3 January 1976. 
104 FC024/1688, H. J. Blanks to Hickman, 28 December 1973. 
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Although Brunei had begun diversifying the management of its finances in 1978, 
the sudden withdrawal showed that there was tension between Brunei and the British 
government. 110 The departure of British financial officer Pehin Dato John Lee, a strong 
supporter of the Crown Agents, also indicated the strained relationship between Brunei 
and Britain. However, according to V. G. Kulkarni, `the action appears to have been 
prompted by nationalistic aspirations as well as desire to further internationalise the 
handling of its huge foreign reserves'. " Pehin Dato Haji Abdul Aziz, Minister of 
Education and Health of independent Brunei explained that the move was made simply 
because Brunei wanted to diversify the handling of its investments and to get banks that 
would work with young Bruneians. 112 
The Brunei government transferred its entire investment portfolio to the newly 
created Brunei Investment Agency. Two US banks (Morgan Guaranty Trust and 
Citibank), two Japanese security firms (Nomura and Daiwa), and two British firms had 
been appointed as advisers to the Brunei Investment Agency. 113 Morgan Guaranty Trust 
was established in 1846 as New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company 114 whereas 
Citibank was founded in 1812 also in New York. 115 The Nomura Securities Company 
on the other hand was established as a spin-off from Securities Dept. of Osaka Nomura 
Bank Co., Ltd. on 25 December 1925116 whereas Daiwa began operations as Fujimoto 
Bill Broker in 1902.117 
Eventually, however, the Sultan agreed that the battalion would come under British 
command and not his own. Subsequently, in September 1983, Britain entered into a 
defence agreement with Brunei. Under the new agreement the Gurkha battalion would 
be answerable directly to the British government, not the Sultan. The Sultan would 
continue to pay for its upkeep in Brunei, ' 18 but it would be withdrawn from Brunei if 
10 Saunders (2"d ed. ), A History of Brunei, p. 173 & Leake, Brunei: The Modern Southeast Asian 
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hostilities broke out with neighbouring states. The battalion would additionally be 
called for use in Hong Kong if an emergency broke out there. 119 The agreement also 
covered the continued presence of seconded British officers and NCOs in technical and 
advisory roles within the RBAF. 120 It was an open-ended agreement, but the situation 
could be reviewed after five years if either party so desired. 
Apart from strengthening its defence organizations by re-equipping and expanding 
its forces, Brunei also established military relations with Singapore in order to bolster 
Brunei's security. When the Malaysian government denied Singapore's use of 
Malaysia's military in particular, 121 Singapore looked to Brunei. Following visits by 
Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, to Brunei in the 1960s and 1970s, an 
agreement in principle was reportedly reached between Brunei and Singapore. Brunei 
opened its jungle-training facility in Temburong to Singapore in 1977122 where the 
Singaporean troops trained on a regular basis. In the same year, a company of about 
110 men carried out basic jungle warfare training in the Temburong District as the first 
phase. As mentioned before, Temburong is an area crucial to Brunei's security as it is 
separated by the main part of the Sultanate - Limbang -a territory disputed between 
Brunei and Malaysia since 1963. In 1983, a new SAF training camp was officially 
opened at Lakiun, also in Temburong. 123 
Singapore in return accepted Bruneian officers and soldiers for training in various 
military establishments. 124 In September 1983, the SAF began joint signal exercises 
with the RBMR for the first time125 and in November 1983 SAF infantry companies 
took part in the RBMR battalion exercises. 126 Singapore additionally supplied Brunei 
with some of their military ordinance, for example the spares and bombs for the heavy 
1 19 Saunders (2"d ed. ), A History of Brunei, p. 173. 
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mortars used by the RBMR in place of the British 81-mm Mortar. 127 Singapore also 
built fast patrol craft for the Sultanate. 128 In the 1970s, Singapore's Vosper Yard 
supplied the RBMR with fast attack and coastal patrol craft. 129 
As a result of Singapore's close relationship with Brunei, Malaysia became 
suspicious of Singapore. Indeed a number of Malaysian organizations, for example 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), had been publicly critical of 
Singapore's arrangement with Brunei to allow the SAF to carry out its training in 
Temburong. 130 Welcoming Brunei as the sixth member of ASEAN, the Neiv Straits 
Times, which regularly reflects Malaysian government opinion, warned in its editorial 
on 9 January 1984: 
Nonetheless a word of caution is in order. It would not do for any of the pre- 
existing ASEAN members to try to persuade the new member that its interests 
are specifically closer to one particular state. All ASEAN states are in it 
together. Centrifugal tendencies at this stage of its (ASEAN's) life will be 
detrimental. 131 
Here it was all too clear that the warning was aimed primarily at Singapore because 
of its close ties with the Sultanate. Indeed, Singapore's trading success with Brunei and 
Singapore's Prime Minister's friendly terms with the Sultan and Sir Omar had caused 
Malaysia to envy Singapore which also attempted to get `a slice of the cake'. 132 
Singapore's close relationship with Brunei did not cause suspicion only to 
Malaysia, but also among the Bruneians. Awang Haji Badaruddin bin Pengarah Haji 
Othman, the Director of Information, said the reason given for the existence of the 
Singapore Armed Forces warfare training camp in Brunei was that the troops did not 
have the necessary facilities in their own country. 133 According to Tim Huxley, 
although there was no publicised formal defence agreement between Brunei and 
Singapore, the close military co-operation between the two countries `may be intended 
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at least partially as notice to Malaysia that Brunei can expect military support from 
Singapore if its security is seriously threatened. If conflict erupted between Singapore 
and Malaysia, Brunei's military links with Singapore could raise fears in Kuala Lumpur 
over the potential for a second front in East Malaysia. ' 134 
With the government already committed to spending heavily on adding steel to its 
defence, the Legislative Council passed an enactment to crush any internal peace threat. 
The government brought into force a tough Internal Security Enactment (ISE) whereby 
it granted much wider and clearer cover for dealing with threats to the peace of the 
state. It provided a wide-range measure for dealing with internal security and public 
order threats, including preventing detention for renewable two-year periods and 
subversion methods, curfews and restrictions on the movement of people and 
vehicles. 135 
The police was also given more power of search and arrest136 and they could order 
the destruction of unoccupied buildings to prevent them being used by enemies. They 
could additionally close roads and waterways and arrest suspects without warrants. The 
Chief Minister, with the approval of the Sultan, could declare any zone within this 
security district as a `danger area' or a `controlled area'. 137 The police and any other 
security forces would be authorised to kill if necessary to prevent anybody from 
entering a danger zone. Those caught trying to deliver any form of supplies to the 
enemy would be jailed for life. 138 
The Chief Minister, with the Sultan's approval, could detain anybody regarded as a 
security threat for up to two years in order to restrict his movements. This preventive 
detention was renewable for further periods of up to two years at a time. Advisory 
boards appointed by the Sultan would enquire into the grounds for detention and make 
recommendations to him. The final decision, however, as to whether a person should be 
"'Huxley, Defending the Lion City, p. 62. According to J. N. Mak Brunei's `close economic and 
military ties with Singapore may be regarded as a similar attempt to counter Malaysian 
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released or detained was his alone and could not be subject to appeal in any court. The 
authorities would not be obliged to disclose facts or produce documents relating to 
preventive detention which were considered to be against the national interests. 139 
The ISE, however, had not replaced the emergency laws passed at the time of the 
1962 Rebellion. 140 Nevertheless, the Department of Security and Intelligence (DSI) 
established in 1975 was disbanded and instead there was a Special Branch Section of 
the Royal Brunei Police Force, a section that existed before the DSI was formed. 14' In 
1975, it was reorganised into the security and intelligence service. This was as part of 
the defence mechanism against external interference in Brunei affairs. In November 
1979, however, the Service was disbanded as relations between Brunei, Malaysia and 
Indonesia improved and as both Malaysia and Indonesia had given their assurances that 
they would not support the PRB. 142 
8.5. Social programmes and security 
Furthermore, the Sultan bolstered Brunei's internal security by improving the social 
welfare of the people of Brunei. The Sultan's efforts in this domain, however, had 
started during the reign of his father Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III. The 
implementation of the National Development Plans between 1953 and 1984 was a clear 
reflection of the Sultan's efforts to improve the socio-economic welfare of the people of 
Brunei. 
In the First Five-Year Development Plan (1953 - 8), the Brunei government spent 
$100 million, targeted specifically on the development of education, health and 
infrastructure. This was indeed a departure from the spending policy of the British 
Residents, who were too cautious to spend from the oil revenue. Before 1950, most of 
the revenue from oil was put in the oil reserve fund, which in 1938 stood at 
139 Ibid., 18 June 1983. 
140Ibid., 18 June 1983 & 16 January 1982. Also in Asia Yearbook 1983, Hong Kong: Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1983, p. 120. 
14' Borneo Bulletin, 27 October 1979. 
142 Crosbie, `Brunei: The Constraints of Small State', pp. 89 - 90. 
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$704,428.143 For ordinary expenditure, the government did not use revenues from oil 
royalty but from other sources. '44 
For the British officials, the reserve fund was essential to back up Brunei's 
economy in times of emergency. 145 R. E. Turnbull, for example, who was the British 
Resident from 1934 to 1937, hardly approved any expenditure other than for the 
running of the country's basic administration. He was hesitant to spend for public 
services such as medical and health services as well as education and infrastructure 
which were necessary to attract commercial investment in Brunei. 146 The slow progress 
in education, for example, had a major impact on political development in Brunei, 
especially when the latter resumed its internal self-government in 1959 where there was 
a lack of local skilled workers to run the country's administration. Consequently, the 
Brunei government had to recruit considerable numbers of skilled workers from Malaya 
and Britain. This in turn had caused resentment among the locals who did mostly 
unskilled jobs. 
The lack of social and economic development in Brunei according to Muhammad 
Hadi Abdullah was also one of the factors `which encouraged the people to take up 
their arms against the authority whether it be the Sultan, the British or the monarchist- 
aristocratic group' in the 1962 Rebellion. 147 This was because of the people's 
dissatisfaction with the government's policy which could not provide social services 
and economic opportunities to improve their standard of living, especially in the 
countryside. 148 Consequently, in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1962 - 6), 
the government specifically targeted education, housing and infrastructure and planned 
143 C0717/110(51535), Memorandum by R. E. Turnbull, 22 January 1935, para. 8. Cited in 
A. V. M. Horton, 'The Development of Brunei during the British Residential Era, 1906 - 1959: A 
Sultanate Regenerated', Ph. D. thesis, University of Hull, 1985, p. 275. 
144 Horton, The British Residency in Brunei, 1906 - 1959', Hull, University of Hull, Centre for 
South-East Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6,1984, p. 29. 
las C0717/117(5153), Minute by Edward Gent, 16 March 1936 (cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan 
Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain, p. 36). 
146 Between 1932 and 1952, only about 10 per cent of the Sultanate's income was spent on health, 
education and agriculture (cited in ibid., p. 61). 
147 C. O. 1030/1457, Brunei Future Policy'The Brunei Administration' (cited in Muhammad Iladi 
Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development', p, 104). 
148 Ibid., p. 104. 
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to achieve greater equity in income distribution as well as a national health service. 
149 
During his address to the budget session of the Legislative Council on 16 December 
1963, the Sultan spoke at length on the need to improve the economic well-being of the 
state: 
My Government has always placed in the forefront the economic development 
of the State and its resources, and this is a subject to which constant and 
unremitting attention will be given. It is the aim of my government to examine 
with great care every project that will conduce to the welfare of my people, and 
Honourable members can rest assured that no effort will be spared to translate 
these plans into action. Not surprisingly, this is not an easy task, as there are 
many problems concerning technical and professional staff, equipment and so 
forth, and consequently results cannot be expected overnight. There is, however, 
every reason to hope that continued progress will be made in implementing the 
development plans. 'so 
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, the Sultan narrowed the gap between the rich 
and the urban population and the remote villagers, as well as between the government 
and the people. From 1965 onwards, the people were well off and were generally 
satisfied with their steadily improving conditions; because of that Sir Omar felt that 
there should be no need for drastic reform in the political aspects of the country. 
's' 
According to A. R. Adair, the British High Commissioner to Brunei: 
Yet it would be wrong to suggest this autocracy represents any defiance of the 
popular will.. . people by and 
large are happy with conditions. The regime is 
working for the good of the people as a whole. Certainly it is paternalistic but it 
is so in the best sense of the word. 152 
149 M. Cleary & Shuang Yann Wong, Oil, Economic Development, and Diversification in Brunel 
Darussalam, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 81 - 82. 
150 BA/13853/1978 (SUK Series 1), Sultan's Draft Speech for 16 December 1963, approved at the 
Executive Council Meeting, 12 December 1963 (cited in Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin 
111 and Britain, p. 347). 
151 FCO15/289, Assessment of the likely political and security situation in Brunei up until the end 
of 1971, 'Economic Prospect' (cited in Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's political 
Development', p. 243). 
152 Straits Times, 8 August 1968. 
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Adair was convinced that the continuance of the present autocratic regime was 
more likely to be conducive to stability than handing over power to somewhat 
irresponsible politicians who might be expected to replace the present regime. '53 
Royle in his correspondence to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that 
`despite the lack of democratic institutions, the regime has spent a lot of money on 
development and welfare and is actively working on a further five-year development 
plan designed to provide further opportunities for employment'. 154 With the Third 
National Development Plan (1975 - 9) and the Fourth National Development Plan 
(1980 - 4), the Brunei government expanded the employment base and planned to 
maintain a high level of employment. It attempted to reduce income disparities, 
expanded education at high levels and constructed a number of rural clinics. '55 
8.6. Conclusion 
This study has shown that after the signing of the 1979 Agreement, Brunei made 
significant efforts in re-establishing and strengthening its relations with its 
neighbouring countries, Malaysia and Indonesia. This was done in order to boost its 
confidence before and after its independence in 1984. Its efforts in re-establishing and 
strengthening its relations with both countries were made easier as Malaysia and 
Indonesia had changed their aggressive policy towards Brunei to a friendly one. The re- 
establishment and strengthening of relationships via both official and unofficial visits 
between Brunei and the two countries were significant as they brought Brunei closer to 
them. Despite the personal squabbles between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sir Omar 
about the latter's refusal to enter Malaysia in 1963, Brunei's efforts to re-establish its 
relations with Malaysia continued. 
This study has also shown that Brunei made efforts to secure itself externally by 
entering ASEAN and the UN. Both ASEAN and the UN, which uphold peace and 
stability in the region and in the international arena, were the main driving force for 
Brunei's entry into the organisations. This study has also demonstrated that to further 
153 FC024/429/1, Adair to Aires, 4 January 1969. 
154 FC024/1684, Royle to FCO, 2 October 1973. 
155 Ibid., pp. 85 - 6. 
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enhance its security Brunei strengthened and expanded its RBMR, established a Gurkha 
Reserve Unit and retained the Gurkha battalion, although not under the Sultan's 
command after its independence. It has also demonstrated that to bolster Brunei's 
security, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah continued to enforce the Emergency Laws and 
formed a tough Internal Security Enactment (ISE) to ensure the internal security of the 
Sultanate and the monarch. The enactment reinforced the government's powers to 
detain without trial, to restrict movement and to impose curfew, which had all 
previously been provided for in the 1962 emergency decrees following the rebellion. 
Additionally, the Sultan improved the socio-economic status of the people of Brunei in 
order to ensure continuous peace and stability in the Sultanate by introducing the 
National Development Plans whereby various aspects of social and economic 
development were outlined and implemented for the benefits of the people of Brunei. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion 
This study has shown that the challenges and difficulties faced by the Sultanate over 
its security and survival between 1950 and 1966 were as a result of Britain's long-term 
policy to decolonise Brunei. In the 1950s, when the British decided to merge Brunei 
with its Northern Borneo territories Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah), Sultan Omar 
Ali Saifuddien III showed no interest in the plan as he was apprehensive that Brunei's 
wealth would be invested for the development of Sarawak and North Borneo and that 
Brunei's status would be reduced from a protectorate to a colony. He was also 
apprehensive that the British plan would have an affect on his status, the Malay race 
and the Islamic religion. Subsequently, the Sultan promulgated a constitution which in 
many ways safeguarded the monarch, the monarchy, the Malay race and the Islamic 
religion. Since the Sultan was not interested in the British plan, it met with failure. 
In 1960 however, the Malayan Prime Minister proposed the formation of the 
Federation of Malaysia, which would consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah 
and Brunei. The Sultan, who was cautious towards the plan, preferred to study its pros 
and cons first before a final decision was made in July 1963. Azahari, the leader of the 
PRB, however, was against the Malaysian proposal from the beginning as it was 
contrary to his party's desire to form the NKKU, which would consist of Brunei and its 
former territories Sarawak and Sabah with the Sultan of Brunei, Sultan Omar All 
Saifuddien III, as constitutional monarch. As pressure for the formation of Malaysia 
was escalating, in December 1962 a rebellion led by the PRB broke out. 
The rebellion was considered by the Sultan as a challenge to the security of the 
monarch and the monarchy. It came to an end when the British government, which was 
responsible for Brunei's defence and internal security, sent its Gurkha battalion to 
Brunei to defeat the rebels. The Sultan however, who failed to reach a consensus with 
the Malayan government over the Malaysian terms eventually decided not to join 
Malaysia. The Sultan refused to join Malaysia because he could not accept Malaysia's 
terms regarding the issues of the status of the Sultan, Brunei's revenue and the Sultan's 
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contribution to the federal government. There is also a suggestion that Brunei did not 
wish to join Malaysia as the Sultan was reluctant to relinquish Brunei's identity as a 
separate kingdom which the previous Sultans had striven to maintain since 1800. 
Another suggestion is that the Sultan might never really have wanted to join Malaysia 
even if the Malayan government had accepted the Sultan's terms. 
Following the 1962 Rebellion and Brunei's rejection of Malaysia, the Sultan sought 
continued British protection to ensure the security and survival of the monarchy. This 
study however has shown that after Brunei's rejection of Malaysia, Britain continued its 
efforts to bring Brunei within the federation at least by 1965. These efforts, however, 
were unsuccessful as the Sultan refused to employ the Malaysian officers whom the 
British proposed and hoped would bring Brunei closer to Malaysia and eventually 
influence Brunei to enter Malaysia. 
Britain's decision in 1966 to end its 1959 Agreement with Brunei posed further 
problems and difficulties for Brunei over its security and survival, as the British put 
increased pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of government in 
Brunei. The Sultan did not want to implement the system as it would have reduced the 
power of the monarch from an absolute to a constitutional one. From the beginning of 
his rule, Sultan Omar All Saifuddien III had been too protective over his position as an 
absolute monarch. When the British government proposed the merger of Brunei with its 
former territories, Sarawak and Sabah in the 1950s, the Sultan rejected it, as he feared 
that if the population of Sarawak and Sabah inundated the Bruneians, his power might 
be taken over by the rule of the majority. 
Moreover, the Sultan was well aware that the implementation of a democratic 
system of government would only bring Brunei into Malaysia. The Malaysian 
government wanted to see the implementation of a democratic system of government in 
Brunei as it believed that a bid to join the federation was much more likely to succeed if 
Brunei was ruled by an elected government than by the Sultan. Because of Britain's 
persistent call on the Sultan to implement the system and Britain's decision to end its 
agreement with Brunei, the Sultan abdicated the throne in October 1967. Nevertheless, 
the British contention that Brunei should implement a democratic system of 
government continued after Sultan Omar All Saifuddien's abdication. 
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However, since the new Sultan and Sir Omar constantly rejected the 
implementation of the system, in 1968 Britain abandoned its attempt to urge them to do 
so. At the same time, the British also gave up its plan to see Brunei within the 
federation, as not only the Sultan was against the admission of Brunei into the 
federation but also the people of Brunei. Although the Sultan and Sir Omar were 
pleased with Britain's decision to cease urging them to implement a democratic system 
of government, they were not gratified by Britain's decision to end its agreement with 
Brunei in November 1970. 
This study has shown that the Sultan could not accept Britain's decision to end its 
agreement with Brunei, as the end of the 1959 Agreement with the Sultanate would 
have left the latter inadequately defended against any internal and external threats. At 
this time the Sultan was concerned not only over Malaysia's hostile attitude towards 
Brunei, but also that of Indonesia. This was because since the end of the Indonesia- 
Malaysia confrontation in 1966, Indonesia had not indicated its policy towards Brunei. 
Moreover Azahari, the leader of the 1962 rebellion, was still in Indonesia where in the 
past he had been supported by the Indonesian government in his struggle to establish 
the NKKU. In addition, the Sultan was aware that Britain's decision to end its 
agreement with Brunei would cause suffering in terms of its administration, as the 
people of Brunei could not provide sufficient qualified officials to run the 
administration of the state. 
This study has also shown that since Britain wanted to end its agreement with 
Brunei, the Sultan persistently tried to persuade the British government to agree to the 
proposals to be jointly responsible over Brunei's defence and to accept Brunei's 
agreement to finance the consequences of the proposals. However, none of the 
proposals was agreeable to the British government, as the latter was committed to 
ending its agreement with Brunei in 1970. The study has also shown that the Sultan was 
relentless in rejecting the British offer for the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
with Brunei as it did not involve any permanent defence commitments over the 
Sultanate. When Britain planned to bring Brunei within the Five-Power conference (so 
that the defence of Brunei could be discussed within the context of the Five-Power 
nations' defence of the region), Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore were 
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not interested in bringing Brunei into the discussion. The study has nevertheless shown 
that Sir Omar was actually never interested in associating with the Five-Power nations 
over the defence of the region, as he distrusted Malaysia. 
When the Conservative Party came to power in June 1970, the Sultan and Sir Omar 
were content as it overturned the Labour government's decision to end its agreement 
with Brunei. The Conservative government was willing to continue its responsibility 
for Brunei's external affairs and to be consultatively responsible over the defence of the 
Sultanate. The Conservative government permitted the preservation of the Gurkha 
battalion in the Sultanate and did not insist on the implementation of a democratic 
system of government. Moreover, it ceased its responsibilities in advising the Sultan on 
the internal affairs of the state. 
The BAKER party, however, was not pleased with the Conservative government's 
decision to overturn the Labour government's decision to end its agreement with 
Brunei. Subsequently, the BAKER party sought the UN's sponsorship of Brunei's 
independence and continued to call upon the Sultan to implement a democratic system 
of government in Brunei. This study has shown that the Sultan and Sir Omar, who 
refused to bring about independence and to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei, ended the BAKER party political activities by suspending 
elections to the District Councils and by continuing the state of emergency in Brunei. 
In so doing, the Sultan and Sir Omar did not only stop the political activities of the 
BAKER party but also ended the plan for democracy in Brunei. This study has also 
demonstrated that the end of plans for democracy in Brunei were the result of Britain's 
inability to influence the Sultan to implement the system, the people's lack of interest in 
relation to democracy following the fruitless end of the 1962 Rebellion in Brunei and 
the lack of integrity of the party leaders in arranging their parties. 
Although the Sultan and Sir Omar successfully ended the BAKER party's political 
activities and ceased plans for democracy in Brunei, the Sultan and Sir Omar continued 
to face challenges and problems over its security from Malaysia. Malaysia's 
involvement in the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels to Limbang caused the relationship 
between Brunei and Malaysia to deteriorate. In 1973, the Malaysian authorities used 
Azahari and the escaped Bruneian ex-rebels to divert the Sultan's attention away from 
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the Limbang issue and to redirect it to Brunei's independence and constitutional 
development in Brunei. In this study it has also been shown that the Malaysian 
authorities used Azahari and the escaped Bruneian ex-rebels to put pressure on the 
British to grant Brunei independence and implement a democratic system of 
government in the Sultanate. Azahari on the other hand used this opportunity to 
continue his struggle, which had been restrained by the Indonesian government when 
Suharto came to power in 1966. 
The PRB's political activities in west Malaysia caused the Sultan and Sir Omar to 
be apprehensive as the Malaysian government did not control their activities in west 
Malaysia (although it had stated that it would not allow them to be involved in any 
political activities). This study has indicated that since the Malaysian government did 
not control the activities of the PRB, the Brunei government recalled its students 
studying in west Malaysia to Brunei for fear that the ex-rebels would influence them to 
oppose the Brunei government. 
This study has also shown that the PRB's political activities in Limbang had the 
strong support of the Chief Minister of Sarawak who was aiming to push the British to 
grant Brunei independence and to destabilise Brunei. Although in June and July 1974 
the British warned Malaysia about the activities of the PRB in Limbang, the Malaysian 
government did not put an end to these activities. Moreover, the PRB's political 
activities were supported not only by Malaysia, but also by other countries and 
international organizations and it was their support which eventually led the PRB to 
present its case at the UN in November 1975. At the UN, the PRB called upon the 
British to grant Brunei full independence and to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei. 
The PRB's call at the UN coincided with the Labour government's decision in 
October 1974 to revive its 1966 policy to end its agreement with Brunei. In November 
1974, following the Labour party's return to power in Britain in October 1974, it gave 
one year's notice for Britain's withdrawal from Brunei, which would come into effect in 
November 1975. The Sultan and Sir Omar could not agree to Britain's decision as they 
were still not confident over Brunei's security without British protection. This study has 
shown that Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in December 1975, Malaysia's 
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support of this annexation and its comparison of Brunei's situation with East Timor 
made the Sultan and Sir Omar apprehensive concerning the security of Brunei without 
British military protection. 
However, the change of policy of the Malaysian government from an antagonistic 
to a friendly one in 1976 and the spelling out of a friendly policy by the Indonesian 
government towards Brunei as well as the fall of the PRB reduced the Sultan and Sir 
Omar's tension over the country's security and created a conducive atmosphere for the 
conclusion of the 1979 Agreement between the Brunei and British governments. 
This study has shown that Malaysia changed its policy towards Brunei because the 
new prime minister of Malaysia thought that its adventurist policy towards Brunei 
would not make it simpler for the British to leave Brunei. The change of policy was 
also a consequence of British pressure and persuasion. Moreover, Malaysia wanted to 
defend the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the 
Declaration of the ASEAN Concord which were signed by the ASEAN countries in 
January 1976. Furthermore, Brunei no longer denoted a source of wealth to Malaysia, 
whose oil and natural resources had been verified and were being exploited. Besides, 
the federal government no longer faced conflict with leaders in Sarawak and Sabah who 
since 1963 had been leaning towards autonomy and separatism. 
Indonesia on the other hand spelled out its friendly policy towards Brunei as it was 
apprehensive over the prospect of any kind of radical regime emerging in Brunei which 
sequentially would affect the stability of the region. Moreover, after the incursion of 
East Timor in 1975, Indonesia wanted to regain confidence from the world's 
communities that it was not an expansionist country. 
As a result of Malaysia's change of policy towards Brunei, the PRB lost the support 
of the Malaysian government. After having championed the interests of democracy in 
Brunei and having given protection and encouragement to the PRB leaders, the 
Malaysian government then chose to drop the issue and seek cordial relationships with 
the Sultan. The Indonesian government also chose to end its support of Azahari as it 
had stated that there would be no recurrence of past policies. The loss of support of the 
Malaysian government was one of the factors which led to the demise of the PRB. The 
split in the PRB leadership, that is between Azahari and Zaini, was another factor 
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which led to the downfall of the PRB. The division in the leadership of the PRB caused 
its members to break up. Many also no longer supported the leaders as they thought that 
there was a lack of positive action in connection with their struggle. Once the 
Malaysian government was no longer supporting them, many returned to Brunei. The 
release of political detainees by the Brunei government also played an important role in 
undermining the PRB. Their condemnation of the PRB leaders' activities in west 
Malaysia and in the past also undermined the PRB. 
The change of policy of Malaysia and Indonesia towards Brunei and the demise of 
the PRB lessened the Sultan and Sir Omar's anxiety over the security of Brunei and 
created a favourable atmosphere for the signing of the 1979 Agreement between Britain 
and Brunei. Under this agreement, Brunei would attain full independence at the end of 
1983. The five-year shifting period set in the agreement allowed Brunei to step up its 
security both internally and externally. Brunei restored and toughened its relations with 
Malaysia and Indonesia and secured itself externally by joining ASEAN and the UN 
after it became independent in 1984. It also fortified its internal and external security by 
expanding and re-equipping the RBMR and by retaining the Gurkha battalion in the 
Sultanate. Apart from that, Brunei also improved the social-welfare of the people 
through the implementation of several national development plans. 
Therefore in this study, Brunei's political development between 1966 and 1984 is 
delineated; the study highlights the challenges and problems faced by the Sultans with 
regard to the Sultanate's security and survival as a result of Britain's decision to end its 
agreement with Brunei. As stated in the literature review, the previous authors of 
Brunei's history have either not mentioned this issue or only mentioned it in passing. 
There is therefore a significant gap in the study and analysis of Brunei's history. This 
study however has discussed in detail the problems and challenges that the Sultans were 
facing with regard to the Sultanate's security and survival between those periods of 
time. 
The study has shown that as a result of Britain's decision to end its agreement with 
Brunei, the Sultan's status was in jeopardy. This was because as a result of the decision, 
Britain put more pressure on the Sultan to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei. The Commonwealth Office's assertion to Sultan Omar Ali 
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Saifuddien and later to Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah to implement a democratic system of 
government in Brunei posed a problem for both of them as the system could have 
reduced the power of the monarch. Moreover, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien considered 
that the faster Brunei moved towards a democratic system of government, the more 
likely it was to become part of Malaysia. As mentioned previously, it was not only the 
British who insisted that the Sultan should implement the system but also the PRB, the 
Malaysian government and the BAKER party. As stated earlier, the previous authors 
only mentioned the formation of the BAKER party without explaining its political 
activities, but this study has explained in detail its activities as well as the challenges 
and difficulties it posed to Brunei's security. As the BAKER party's political activities 
could have led Britain to end its remaining responsibilities towards Brunei, the Sultan 
and Sir Omar put an end to the BAKER party's political activities. This study has 
shown that the Sultan and Sir Omar's actions in suspending the Legislative and District 
Council elections in 1970 and 1971 respectively did not only stop the BAKER party's 
political activities, but also ended the plan for a democratic system of government in 
Brunei and delayed Brunei's independence. 
This study has also shown that as a result of Britain's decision to end its agreement 
with Brunei, the Sultans faced threats over the security of the monarchy (if Britain were 
no longer protecting Brunei). In this regard, the Sultan and Sir Omar were concerned 
over Malaysia's continuous attempts to bring Brunei within the federation. As 
demonstrated before, the previous authors have not studied this issue and because of 
that there is a significant gap in the study and analysis of Brunei's history. This study 
however has discussed in detail Malaysia's plan to bring Brunei within the federation. 
It has shown that Malaysia supported the local Bruneian politicians so that they would 
insist on the Sultan implementing the system. This was because the Malaysian 
government believed that a proposal to join Malaysia was more likely to be made by an 
elected government in Brunei than by the Sultan. This study has also explained why the 
Malaysian government was conniving for the escape of Brunei's ex-rebels from the 
Berakas Detention Camp and the threats these ex-rebels posed to the security of the 
Sultanate which the previous authors have not mentioned in their studies. In addition, 
this study has examined in detail Brunei's claim over Limbang between 1970 and 1974 
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which the previous authors have only studied briefly. The study has also looked into 
why Brunei's claim over Limbang became an urgent matter for the Sultanate in 1973; 
the main reason for this was its concern over Brunei's national security. 
Furthermore, the study has continued from where Muhammad Hadi and B. A. 
Hussainmiya left off. Both authors have studied Brunei's political development 
between 1950 and 1966; this study has analysed Brunei's political development 
between 1966 and 1984, which specifically covered the problems and challenges faced 
by the Sultanate over its security and survival. This study has shown that the difficulties 
and challenges faced by the Sultanate between those periods of time were as a result of 
Britain's decision to end its agreement with Brunei whereby the Sultan's position as an 
absolute monarch came under threat, as did Brunei's security. In this regard, the Sultan 
and Sir Omar were concerned not only over Malaysia, which still wanted to bring 
Brunei within the federation, but also over Indonesia, which had not indicated its policy 
towards Brunei after the end of the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation in 1966. 
In addition, this study has also touched on the reign of the new Sultan - that is 
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah - whose rule began in October 1967. As pointed out in the 
literature review, no detailed studies about him (between 1967 and 1984) have been 
written before. However, this thesis has studied his rule in detail by highlighting the 
difficulties and challenges faced by Brunei between 1967 and 1984 over its security and 
survival. This study has made full use of the documents relevant to Brunei-British 
relations from the Public Record Office in London between 1966 and 1975 (which the 
previous authors of Brunei's history have not used). The use of these documents has 
raised issues which have not been stated or explained in detail by the previously 
mentioned authors, namely those concerning Brunei's political development between 
1966 and 1984 as well as the challenges and difficulties over its security and survival. 
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APPENDIX I 
TIIE PROTECTION TREATY OF 1888 
BRUNEI, 1888 
AGREEMENT WITH THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI: SIGNED AT BRUNEI. 
SEPTEMBER 17Th 1888. 
Whereas, Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam Akamadin, Sultan and lawful Ruler of the State of 
Brunei, in the Island of Borneo, has represented to Her Britannica Majesty's Government 
the desire of the State to be placed under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen, under 
the conditions hereinafter mentioned; it hereby agreed and declared as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The State of Brunei shall continue to be governed and administered by the said Sultan 
Hashim Jalilul Alam Akamadin and his successors as an independent State, under the 
protection of Great Britain; but such protection shall confer no right on Her Majesty's 
Government to interfere with the internal administration of the State further than is herein 
provided. 
ARTICLE II 
In case any question should hereafter arise respecting the right of succession to the 
present or any future Ruler of Brunei, such questions shall be referred to Her Majesty's 
Government for decision. 
ARTICLE III 
The relations between the State of Brunei and all foreign States, including the States of 
Sarawak and North Borneo shall be conducted by Her Majesty's Government, and all 
communications shall be carried on exclusively through Her Majesty's Government, or in 
accordance with its directions; and if any indifference should arise between the Sultan of 
Brunei and the Government of any other State, the Sultan of Brunei agrees to abide by 
the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and to take all necessary measures to give 
effect thereto. 
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ARTICLE IV 
Her Majesty's Government shall have the right to establish British Consular Officers in 
any part of the State of Brunei, who shall receive exequaturus in the name of the Sultan 
of Brunei. They shall enjoy what ever privileges are usually granted to Consular Officers, 
and they shall be entitled to hoist the British flag over their residences and public offices. 
ARTICLE V 
British subjects, commerce, and shipping shall, in addition to the rights, privileges, and 
advantages now secured to them by Treaty, be entitled to participate in any other rights, 
privileges and advantages, which may be enjoyed by the Subjects, commerce, and 
shipping of the State of Brunei. 
ARTICLE VI 
No cession or other alienation of any part of the territory of the State of Brunei shall be 
made by the Sultan to any foreign State, or the subjects or citizens thereof, without the 
consent of Her Majesty's Government, but this restriction shall not apply to ordinary 
grants or leases of land or houses to private individuals for purposes of residence, 
agriculture, commerce or other business. 
ARTICLE VII 
It is agreed that full exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over British subjects and 
their property in the State of Brunei, is reserved to Her Britannic Majesty, to be exercised 
by such Consular or other officers as Her Majesty shall appoint for that purpose. 
The same jurisdiction is likewise reserved to Her Majesty in the State of Brunei over 
foreign subjects enjoying British protection; and the said jurisdiction may likewise be 
exercised in cases between British or British protected subjects and the subjects of a third 
power, with the consent of their respective Governments. 
In mixed civil cases arising between British and British protected subjects and the 
subjects of the Sultan, the trial shall take place in the Court of the defendant's nationality; 
but an officer appointed by the Government of the plaintiff's nationality shall be entitled 
to be present at, and to take part in, the proceedings, but shall have no voice in the 
decision. 
230 
ARTICLE VIII 
All the provisions of existing Treaties, Conventions, and Declarations between Her 
Majesty the Queen and the Sultan of Brunei are hereby confirmed and maintained except 
in so far as any of them may conflict with the present Agreement. 
In witness whereof, His Highness the said Sultan of Brunei bath hereunto attached his 
seal at the Palace, in the city of Brunei, on the 17th day of September, in the year of Our 
Lord 1888, being the 110' day of the month of Moharram, in the year 1306 of the 
Mohammedan era; and Sir Hugh Low, K. C. M. G., British Resident at Perak, in charge of 
a special Mission to His Highness the Sultan, hath, on the part of Her Majesty's 
Government, signed this Agreement in the presence of witnesses. 
(Seal of His Highness the Sultan of Brunei. ) 
HUGH LOW. 
Witness to the seal of His Highness the Sultan of Brunei, 
(Signed in Chinese by the Datoh Temenggong Kim Swee. ) 
Witness to the signature of Sir Hugh Low, K. C. M. G., 
L. H. Wise, 
September 17th, 1888. 
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APPENDIX II 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
BRUNEI ON DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 29 DECEMBER 1959 
Whereas Agreements subsist between Her Majesty and His Highness: 
And whereas His Highness has with the advice and consent of His traditional advisers 
and the State Council provided by Proclamation for the constitutional development of the 
State of Brunei, the succession to the Sultanate and for various matters connected 
herewith: 
And whereas the aforesaid Proclamation providing for the constitution development of 
the State of Brunei will commence to operate on a day to be appointed by His Highness, 
hereinafter referred to as `the first appointed day': 
And whereas Her Majesty has heretofore had jurisdiction to make for the State of Brunei 
laws relating to defence and external affairs: 
And whereas Her Majesty, in token of the friendship which She bears towards His 
highness, the subjects of His Highness and the inhabitants of the State of Brunei, has at 
the request of His Highness agreed that as from the first appointed day fresh 
arrangements shall have effect for the protection and defence of the State of Brunei: 
Now, therefore, it is agreed and declared as follows: 
1. This Agreement may be cited as the Brunei Agreement, 1959, and shall come into 
operation on the first appointed day. 
2. In this Agreement- `High Commissioner' means Her Majesty's High Commissioner in 
the State of Brunei, and references to the High Commissioner include any person for the 
time being discharging the functions of High Commissioner; 
`His Highness' includes His Highness's Successors; 
`Secretary of State' means one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State; 
and 
`the State' means the State of Brunei, Darul-Salam. 
3. (1) Her Majesty shall have complete control of the external affairs of the State; and 
His Highness agrees that without the knowledge and consent of Her Majesty's 
Government of the United Kingdom he will not make any Treaty, enter into any 
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engagement, deal in or correspond on political matters with, or send envoys to, any 
other State. His Highness further agrees that he will ensure that such legislative and 
executive action as in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government shall be necessary 
for the purpose of Her Majesty's exercise of Her control of the external affairs of the 
State shall be taken within the State. 
(2)Her Majesty shall have complete control of the defence of the State, and agrees at 
all times to protect the State and the Government thereof and to the utmost of her 
power to take whatever measures may be necessary for the defence of the State; and 
His Highness agrees that for these purposes he will ensure that such legislative and 
executive action as in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government shall be necessary 
for the purposes of the defence of the State and the Government thereof (which 
expression in this Article includes defence against any grave menace to the peace or 
tranquility of the State) shall be taken within the State; and His Highness further 
agrees that for the aforesaid Her Majesty's Forces and persons authorized on behalf 
of Her Majesty shall at all times allowed to have free access to the State. 
(3)Subject as aforesaid, His Highness agrees that Her Majesty shall continue to enjoy 
jurisdiction to make for the State laws relating to defence and external affairs. 
(4)Her Majesty agrees that She will keep His Highness informed of any action taken 
or proposed to be taken by Her in pursuance of this Article. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Article relating to 
defence against any grave internal menace to the peace or tranquility of the State, Her 
Majesty and His Highness agree to constitute a Standing Advisory Council, 
consisting of representatives of Her Majesty and of the Government of the State, 
which shall consult as necessary on matters regarding such defence. Her Majesty 
agrees that no measures in exercise of the right of access to the State given by 
paragraph (2) of this Article shall be taken for the purposes of such defence without 
prior consultation with the Standing Advisory Council except when there exists a 
state of emergency of such a nature as to make such prior consultation clearly 
impracticable, in which case, the Standing Advisory Council shall be consulted as 
soon as possible after the measures have been taken. 
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(b) For the purpose of this paragraph, the expression `state of emergency' means 
situation in which there is compelling evidence of a grave internal menace to the 
peace or tranquility of the State. 
4. (1)His Highness agrees to receive, and provide a suitable residence for, a High 
Commissioner to advise on all matters connected with the government of the State 
other than matters relating to the Muslim religion and the Custom of the Malays as 
practised in the State, and agrees to accept the advice of the High Commissioner. 
(2) Nothing in this Article shall in any way prejudice the right of His Highness to 
address Her Majesty through a Secretary of State if His Highness so desires. 
(3) The High Commissioner shall have such other functions (if any) as may be 
conferred on him by any law in force in the State. 
5. The cost of the High Commissioner and his establishment as from time to time agreed 
between His Highness and the Secretary of State shall be borne by the State and shall 
be a charge on the revenues of the State. 
6. His Highness shall be consulted before any person whom it is proposed to send as 
High Commissioner is appointed. 
7. All persons of whatever race in the same grade in the service of the State shall, 
subject to the terms and conditions of their employment, be treated impartially. 
8. His Highness desires and Her Majesty agrees that it shall be a particular charge upon 
the Governor of the State to provide for and to encourage the education and training 
of the local inhabitants of the State so as to fit them to take a full share in the 
economic progress, social welfare and government of the State. 
9. (1) The Agreement signed in Brunei on the 3`d day of December, 1905, and the 2 "a 
day of January, 1906, between His Majesty's Government within the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Highness Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam 
Akamuddin ibni Almarhum Sultan Omar All Saifuddin, the Sultan of the State of 
Brunei for Himself, His Heirs and Successors, is hereby revoked. 
(2)A11 other Treaties and Agreements subsisting immediately before the commencement 
of this Agreement shall continue in force save in so far as they are inconsistent with this 
Agreement or in so far as they contain provisions relating to the succession to the 
Sultanate of Brunei. 
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10. This Agreement is made and expressed in both the English and the Malay languages; 
but, for the purposes of interpretation, regard shall be had only to the English version. 
In witness whereof His Excellency Sir Robert Heatlie Scott, Knight Grand Cross of the 
Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Commander of the Most 
Excellent Order of the British Empire, Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in 
South East Asia, has hereunder set his hand and seal for and on behalf of Her Majesty 
and His Highness Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin Sa'adul Khairi Waddin, Sovereign and Head of 
the Most Esteemed Family Order, the Most Honourable Order of the Crown of Brunei, 
Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, 
ibni Almarhum Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam, Sultan of the State of Brunei, has 
hereunto set His hand and seal. 
[Here follow the signatures and seals] 
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APPENDIX III 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND HIS 
HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI AMENDING THE AGREEMENT 
OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1959 
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, (hereinafter referred to 
as "Her Majesty"), represented by Mr, Anthony Henry Fanshawe Royle, M. P., 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and His 
Highness Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaullah, Sovereign and Chief of the 
Most Esteemed Family Order, Sovereign and Chief of the Most Illustrious Order of Laila 
Jasa Keberanian Laila Terbilang , Sovereign and 
Chief of the Most Gallant Order of 
Pahlawan Negara Brunei Sovereign and Chief of the Most Blessed Order of Paduka Setia 
Negara Brunei, Sovereign and Chief of the Most Distinguished Order of Paduka Setia 
Negara Brunei, Sovereign and Chief of the Most Distinguished Order of Paduka Seri 
Laila Jasa, Sovereign and Chief of the Most Honourable Order of the Crown of Brunei, 
Sovereign and Chief of the Most Faithful Order of Perwira Negara Brunei, Honorary 
Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, the 
Most Esteemed Family Order (Kelantan), The Most Esteemed Family Order (Johore), 
Ibni Sir Muda Omar All Saifuddin Sa'adul Khairi Waddin, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan 
of the State and Territory of Brunei Darul Salam, and All Its Dependencies, (hereinafter 
referred to as "His Highness"); 
Having regard to the Agreements which subsist between Her Majesty and His Highness 
and in particular the Agreement signed at Bandar Seri Begawan on 29th of September, 
1959 (hereafter referred to as "the 1959 Agreement"); 
Considering it appropriate that the existing close and special relationship between the 
United Kingdom and the State of Brunei, Darul-Salam (hereinafter referred to as "the 
State") should be amended so as to reflect developments that have taken place since 
1959; 
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Having decided to this end that Her Majesty should continue to be responsible for the 
external affairs of the State, and that, subject to consultation, provision for the defence 
and security of the State should be a task to be shared between Her Majesty and His 
Highness, and that the State should enjoy full internal self-government, and that the 
necessary amendments to the 1959 Agreement should be made; 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
Article 2 of the 1959 Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following: 
Article 2 
In this Agreement- 
'British High Commissioner' means the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in 
the State of Brunei and references to the British High Commissioner include any person 
for the time being discharging the functions of British High Commissioner; 
`His Highness' includes His Highness's Successors. ' 
ARTICLE II 
At the end of the second sentence of paragraph (1) of Article 3 of the 1959 Agreement 
the full-stop shall be deleted and the following words added: 
"and that Her Majesty shall continue to enjoy jurisdiction to make for the State laws 
relating to external affairs. Her Majesty agrees that She will keep His Highness informed 
of any action taken or proposed to be taken by Her in pursuance of this Article. " 
ARTICLE III 
Paragraph (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 3 of the 1959 shall be deleted and replaced by 
the following paragraphs: 
"(2) To meet the essential requirements of the defence of the State: 
(a) His Highness shall 
(i) raise, equip and maintain forces sufficient for the preservation of internal public order 
and to be the first line of external defence; 
(ii) provide facilities necessary for any of Her Majesty's forces stationed in the State or 
training or exercising in the State with the agreement of His Highness; 
(iii) enter into arrangements with Her Majesty's Government in relation to the status and 
jurisdiction of Her Majesty's forces present in the State. 
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(b) Her Majesty shall continue to assist His Highness within the capability of the United 
kingdom, by: 
(i) the loan of personnel to assist in the staffing, administration and training of the Armed 
Forces of His Highness; 
(ii) providing expert expert advice on the organization of those Forces; 
(iii) providing advice and assistance in connection with maintenance of the equipment of 
those Forces; 
(iv) providing assistance for training those Forces; 
(v) providing assistance in recruitment of persons for service in police and military posts 
in the State; 
(vi) providing expert advice and training for the Police Force of the State 
(3) For the purpose of the defence of the State, Her Majesty's Forces and persons 
authorized on behalf of Her Majesty shall at all times be allowed to have free access to 
the State; 
(4) There shall be established a joint standing consultative body, to be called the Brunei 
Defence Council, which shall meet quarterly, or more frequently if occasion demands. 
This Council shall consist of representatives of both Her Majesty and His Highness. Her 
Majesty's representatives will be the British High Commissioner and, as his adviser, a 
British officer who will normally be the senior officer of such of Her Majesty's Forces as 
are stationed in the State. His Highness's representatives will be appointed at His 
Highness's discretion. The representatives of Her Majesty and of His Highness shall 
make recommendations as to the defence and security of the State to their respective 
governments. Twelve months from the entry into force of this Agreement the 
Governments of Her Majesty and of His Highness shall examine the working of the 
Brunei Defence Council in order to determine what changes, if any, are required to 
improve its effectiveness. 
(5) (a) Situations which are essentially of an internal public order nature are a matter of 
concern only to the public security forces of His Highness. 
(b)Her Majesty's Government and His Highness's Government shall consult together to 
determine what measures should, separately or jointly, be taken in relation to an external 
attack, or threat of such attack, on the State. 
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(c) In a situation which does not clearly fall under sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) of this 
paragraph there shall be consultation between the two Governments to determine to what 
extent the threat is externally organized or supported. 
(6) Her Majesty and His Highness shall take legislative and executive action necessary 
for carrying out their tasks under the provisions of paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this 
Article. " 
ARTICLE IV 
Articles 4,5 and 6 of the 1959 Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following: 
"Article 4 
(1) Her Majesty shall appoint and His Highness shall receive a representative of Her 
Majesty designated as British High Commissioner. Her Majesty's Government 
will propose to His Highness the name of the British High Commissioner whose 
appointed shall be subject to His Highness's agreement. 
(2) His Highness shall have the right to address Her Majesty through Her Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if His 
Highness so desires. " 
ARTICLE V 
Articles 7 and 8 of the 1959 Agreement shall be deleted. 
ARTICLE Vl 
Subject to amendments made by the present Agreement, the 1959 Agreement shall 
continue in force and as amended by this Agreement, the two shall be read together as 
one document. 
ARTICLE VII 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the signature. 
ARTICLE VIII 
At the request of either High Contracting Party, and after the expiry of one year from the 
making of the request, this Agreement shall be reviewed by the High Contracting Parties. 
ARTICLE IX 
This Agreement is made and expressed in both the English and Malay languages, but, for 
the purposes of interpretation, regard shall be had only to the English text. 
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APPENDIX IV 
SULTAN ABDUL MOMIN'S `WILL' 
Translation 
This is a Decree of His Highness the Sultan. After having consulted with the Pangeran 
Tumonggong and Pangeran Bendahara and Pangeran di Gadong, together with his 
Ministers and Officers, and with the whole of the population of Brunei, who agree to 
sanction the Arrangement arrived at herein, and thereby peace may come on the whole of 
the country. 
Now concerning Limbang and other countries which still remain under the government of 
Brunei, they cannot be leased or given away to any other nation, but must remain under 
our rule and that our ancestors who may be elected Rajahs of Brunei, cannot on any 
account take rivers, or slaves, or private property, and in the same manner the slaves 
appertaining to the Sovereign cannot be made private slaves. After us to whomsoever 
property may belong it will remain him, rivers, followers, `tulip' and hereditary property. 
And the customs of our ancestors shall be followed by those who come after us. They can 
on no account be changed while there is a sun and moon, in order that there shall be no 
complication in the country. 
Written on the 6t' Jamal-ah-Ahwal, 1302, in the city of Brunei. 
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APPENDIX V 
LETTER OF CHIEF MINISTER OF BRUNEI TO THE MINISTER 
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA 
REGARDING LIMBANG 
Your Excellency, 
LIMBANG 
From correspondence which has passed between His Highness the Sultan and Her 
Majesty's former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, it is understood that 
His Highness's letters to the Secretary of State on the above subject dated 27th July and 
18th August 1963 were passed on to your Government. Her Majesty's Government taking 
the view that the question of Limbang had become a matter with which Her Majesty's 
Government had no further concern. Neither His Highness nor His Highness's 
Government have received any communication from your Government relating to these 
letters, but it is quite understood that your Government has been occupied with many 
weighty problems connected with the establishment of Malaysia and its consequence, and 
further that the historical investigation of the title to Limbang is of itself a protracted 
matter which your officials have no doubt been undertaking. 
It is, of course, Brunei's constant desire to strengthen the friendly relations between 
Brunei and the Government of Malaysia as it is only proper in view of the close historical 
association between the two territories and their common profession of the Religion of 
Islam and the following of Islamic principles. It is with this in mind that Brunei feels 
impelled to put forward a claim to an area which should properly be within its own 
boundaries. 
His Highness's Government has ascertained that Her Majesty's Government have no 
objection to the question of Limbang being directly raised by His Highness's 
Government with your Government. It is therefore felt that it would not be inappropriate 
at this stage to suggest that Limbang should form a subject for confidential discussion 
between our two governments. 
As I think you are aware, the Limbang district was seized by force by then Rajah of 
Sarawak's officers from Brunei in the year 1890 and despite protests by Her Majesty's 
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Government from time to time, the Rajahs of Sarawak refused to return the territory. 
Brunei has, however, at no time acquiesced in this seizure and from time to time 
endeavoured to respond the matter with Her Majesty's Government without success. His 
Highness's Government is, however, certain that your Government's attitude to this 
question will not be governed by the name considerations as affected Her Majesty's 
Government in declining to discuss the problem. 
Quite apart from the question of Legal title, there are, of course, obvious geographical 
and administrative factors which strangely support Brunei's claim that Limbang should 
be returned to its parent state. 
I hasten, however, to ensure your Government that His Highness's Government has no 
thought of pressing for a return to the territory contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants, 
but we are equally confident that your Government would not desire to retain a territory, 
the title to which is so questionable, against the wishes of its inhabitants. 
I think you will agree that the existence of this unsolved question is not only a factor 
which obstructs and will continue to obstruct the furtherance and extension of good 
relations between our respective countries, but is also one which unfriendly States can 
use to our mutual disturbance and disadvantage. 
I am sure that you will agree that nothing but benefit can come of full and frank 
discussion between the representatives of our respective Governments on the Limbang 
question, and I am confident that your government will see its way to entering into 
discussions. It is obvious to me that agreement to hold such discussion should be a matter 
of strict confidence between our two Governments and you may be assured that every 
possible precaution will be taken to avoid publicity being given to the fact that such 
discussions have been sought for, and I trust arranged. 
Brunei would be particularly concerned in ensuring that no opportunity would be given to 
those who are ill-disposed towards Malaysia to use this subject as propaganda and it is 
considered helpful, the Brunei Government would be happy to discuss this matter at any 
place outside Malaysia or Brunei which your Government might consider suitable. 
I have the honour to be, Your Excellency's obedient servant, 
(Marsal bin Maun) 
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Mentri Besar 
His Excellency, 
The Minister for External Affairs, 
Federation of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 
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APPENDIX VI 
LETTER OF GEORGE THOMSON TO SULTAN HASSANAL BOLKIAH 
ABOUT THE RELINQUISHMENT OF 1959 AGREEMENT 
18 October 1968 
My Dear Friend, 
I was very sorry to hear through Mr. Lawson this morning that Your Highness does not 
feel able to agree to a document summarising the discussions we have had over the past 
weeks. For my part I feel I must set down for the record certain essential features of these 
discussions. 
I explained that against the background of the major changes in British defence policy 
including the withdrawal of British forces from Southeast Asia by the end of 1971 it was 
necessary to review the relationship between Britain and Brunei. 
I gave Your Highness notice, which I now take the opportunity of repeating, that Her 
Majesty's powers and responsibilities under the Brunei Agreement 1959 and the other 
Treaties and Agreements referred to in Article 9(2) of that Agreement will be 
relinquished on 30 November 1970. 
In view of the impending relinquishment of Her Majesty's powers and responsibilities we 
discussed the possibility of opening negotiations from a new Treaty of Friendship and 
Co-operation between Brunei and the United Kingdom which would set out the ways in 
which Britain would be glad to continue to assist Brunei thereafter. A draft which could 
form the basis of such a Treaty, as tabled by me during our discussions, is annexed to this 
letter. Your Highness indicated that for your part you wished to defer any decision about 
a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation for the time being. 
Your Highness expressed concern about the implications for the State of Brunei of the 
withdrawal of British protection and enquired about the possibility of continuing defence 
safeguards being available to Brunei. 
I explained that it was not possible for Her Majesty's Government at the present time to 
forecast what arrangements for defence co-operation might come to be agreed for the 
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area. I said however that if we were able to reach agreement on how to proceed Her 
Majesty's Government would be willing to report the concerned expressed by Your 
Highness to the Commonwealth Governments in the area and to discuss with them the 
possibility of associating Brunei with any arrangements for defence co-operation which 
may emerge from current consultations on this subject. 
During the discussions I informed your Highness that it would be necessary to settle the 
period of which a battalion of the Brigade of Gurkhas could remain in Brunei. I am glad 
to inform Your Highness that the Defence Secretary has agreed that a battalion may 
remain in Brunei until 30 November 1970. This date is related to the military rundown 
plans, both of Brigade of Gurkhas and on our other forces in South East Asia, and could 
not be postponed. I hope that Your Highness will accept the fact that a Gurkha battalion 
will be present in Brunei for a much longer period than was originally envisaged as an 
earnest for the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the close friendship and 
understanding between our two countries should continue. 
I should be grateful if Your Highness would acknowledge receipt of this letter. 
(George Thomson) 
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APPENDIX VII 
LETTER OF SULTAN HASSANAL BOLKIAH TO GEORGE THOMSON 
ABOUT THE RELINQUISHMENT OF 1959 AGREEMENT 
21 October 1968 
My Dear Friend, 
I thank you for your letter of 18 October to which I have given careful consideration. 
For reasons which have been mentioned in our discussions, and which I am sure that you 
understand, I am unable to agree to the relinquishment on 30 November 1970 of Her 
Majesty's powers and responsibilities under the Brunei agreement of 1959 and the earlier 
treaties and agreements referred to in the 1959 Agreement. 
As I hope it has been made plain, I have not been and am not unwilling to discuss 
revision of the 1959 agreement. Yet it seems now to me that it would be appropriate to 
postpone discussion of such revision until it becomes clear what continuing defence 
safeguards can be made available to Brunei. In such a situation I believe we should be 
able to reach agreement whereas at the present time and in the present circumstances 
discussion of the detailed terms of revision would lack reality. 
I have to thank you for obtaining the Defence Secretary's agreement that a Gurkha 
battalion shall remain in Brunei until 30 November 1970. I note, of course, what is said 
upon this matter. I hope, however, that, as that date approaches, the position of the 
battalion will be considered in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. 
In conclusion I would like to say that, although, greatly to my sorrow, we have been 
unable to reach agreement I am not unappreciative of the friendship which you have 
never failed to demonstrate towards myself and my advisers and of the concern which I 
know you entertain for the future of Brunei and its people. 
Hassanal Bolkiah 
246 
APPENDIX VIII 
LETTER OF SULTAN HASSANAL BOLKIAH TO MICHAEL STEWART 
Translation 
29 January 1970 
Whilst I should like to record my sincere thanks to you for the friendly reception which 
you have accorded to myself and my advisers and for the frankness with which Lord 
Shepherd had conducted our discussions, I cannot refrain from expressing my bitter 
disappointment that our recent talks in London have produced no acceptable solutions so 
that the future of my country and its people remain uncertain. 
I am as concerned as you are, to find a position from which we can hopefully consider 
again the pattern of the future relationships between our two countries. So as to reinforce 
the mutual friendship and co-operation which has lasted for over a century. There is a 
possible legal approach to this matter, for Her Majesty's Government contends that the 
1959 agreement can be brought to an end by a unilateral act, whereas Brunei contends 
otherwise. There is clearly a legal issue between us. My adviser, Dato Lawson, made a 
suggestion as to how that issue might be resolved without delay so that upon its 
resolution we could negotiate about future relationships from a common legal basis. I do 
not complain that Her Majesty's Government have been unable to accept this suggestion, 
and if you were to say that important political decisions ought not to be made by lawyers, 
however, distinguished, I do not think that I would quarrel with that, although I still feel 
that an agreed basis for discussions would have been better than a disputed one. 
Subject to your views then, it does not seem at the moment profitable to treat the question 
as a legal one. I would therefore suggest that a practical approach is not out of the 
question. Let me assume that the 1959 agreement in fact comes to an end on the date 
proposed by Her Majesty's Government (as you know, I do not accept this. ) As from that 
date I understand that Her Majesty's Government will have remaining commitments in 
Eastern Asia, that there will be substantial British interests subsisting in Brunei, and that 
Her Majesty's Government is prepared to make a new arrangement with Brunei 
containing responsibilities in relation to our armed and police forces and other matters. 
This new arrangement will clearly involve a special relationship between our two 
countries of a closer and more intimate kind than subsists between Her Majesty's 
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Government and the Governments of other Commonwealth countries. If Her Majesty's 
Government is not prepared to go further than so far suggested by entering into a new 
agreement for the defence and protection of Brunei - and I know that you will accept that 
I should be falling short of my responsibilities if I did not hold the view that such a new 
agreement was necessary - this could be for two reasons: - 
Firstly, it has been said that Her Majesty's Government's policy does not permit the 
undertaking of absolute commitments in the area with which we are concerned 
Secondly, it has been said that the economic burden of such a commitment would be 
unduly heavy. 
As to the first of these points, at our last meeting I understood you to say that the military 
withdrawal in 1971 would not preclude British troops from being sent back to the area 
but that Her Majesty's Government alone would decide whether or not such assistance 
was appropriate. It seems to me this provides a basis upon which we could reach an 
agreement on the lines I contemplate because I can assure you that Brunei would be 
content to accept a commitment that Her Majesty's Government would use its best 
endeavours to protect Brunei - Brunei does not desire to seek an absolute commitment in 
that respect - and further, I would suggest that in the context of shared responsibility for 
defence any decision as to whether or not a situation had arisen in which any and what 
form of assistance was required could be a matter for consultation between our respective 
governments. 
As to the second point, finance, I can assure you that Brunei is prepared to accept the 
financial consequences of the above proposal. 
I ask you, again, to consider the future relationship of our two countries in the realisation 
that Brunei does not contemplate or intend to enter into any arrangements, political or 
military, with other states. Her Majesty's Government need, then, have no anxiety that a 
qualified commitment for the defence and protection of Brunei would become entangled 
with problems arising from Brunei's undertaking obligations in other directions. There 
will be no other commitments on Brunei's part. 
I do not believe that you would wish me to cite evidence of the loyalty of Brunei towards 
Her Majesty or the support which Brunei has given to Her Majesty's Government on 
many occasions in many directions. This loyalty and support is not only prompted by 
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gratitude, but also by the conviction that the continued friendship and co-operation 
between our two countries is important not only for the welfare and progress of Brunei, 
but also for the maintenance of peace in the world. It was a consideration of this last 
factor in particular which led to the Brunei proposal not only for an acceptance of joint 
responsibility with Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of defence and protection 
but also to offer that Brunei's facilities would be made available without cost to enable 
Her Majesty's Government to fulfill their other commitments in the region. 
I beseech you to give your most earnest consideration to my suggestion. Dato Neil 
Lawson enjoys my confidence, and should you wish to discuss any matter with him 
before replying to me he is of course, at your disposal. 
Of course I shall in the meantime consider the points which you made in the course of 
our last meeting, with the greatest care. 
Your sincerely, 
Signed: 
Hassanal Bolkiah 
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APPENDIX IX 
LIST OF BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONERS, 1966 -1983 
1. F. D. Webber 
(Webber was transferred to Canberra, Australia, 
In October 1967 but returned to Brunei to resume 
His duties in February 1968) 
2. A. R. Adair 
3. P. Gautrey 
4. J. A. Davidson 
5. A. C. Watson 
6. Tom Malcolmson 
7. Francis Cornish 
July 1965 - May 1968 
May 1968 - January 1972 
January 1972 - January 1975 
January 1975 - November 1978 
November 1978 -April 1983 
April 1983 -August 1983 
August 1983 
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APPENDIX X 
DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL 
COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES ADOPTED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) OF 14 DECEMBER 1960 
The General Assembly, 
Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the 
United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small 
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and 
peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self- 
determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion, 
Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the 
decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence, 
Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way 
of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace, 
Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for 
independence in Trust and Non- Self- Governing Territories, 
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its 
manifestations, 
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of 
international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic 
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development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of 
universal peace, 
Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co- 
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law, 
Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to 
avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation 
and discrimination associated therewith, 
Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into 
freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards 
freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence, 
Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of 
their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, 
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end 
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations; 
And to this end Declares that: 
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes 
a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 
and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. 
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never 
serve as a pretext for delaying independence. 
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4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent 
peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to 
complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. 
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all 
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the 
peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with 
their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, 
in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. 
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration 
on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect 
for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity. 
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